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ABSTRACT 
IMAGES OF THE ARAB-ISLAMIC WORLD IN THE MEDIA: A 
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE STUDY OF THE WESTERN 
PRESS (1978-1993) 
The thesis examines the historical emergence of modes of perception, 
interpretation and evaluation within Western European nations of what has 
been termed Arab Islamic culture. It is argued that the West perceives Arab 
Islamic East as "Other" or 'Them", but that the content of this "Otherness" 
shifts over time according to a range of historical, political, cultural and 
economic factors. 
The two central themes that emerge within these modes of interpretation are 
termed "Romanticism" and "Negativihj/Hostility". The manifestation of these 
two themes is traced from antiquity to the modern age. The thesis 
demonstrates the continuities, shifts and transformations of these two themes 
throughout the history of European engagements with the Arab Islamic East. 
In addition to a comprehensive survey of Western literary and cultural 
interpretations of the Arab Islamic East, the study provides a content analysis 
of the presentation of Arab Islamic acts and events on the world stage in six 
modern Western newspapers. The content analysis and its evaluation are 
both quantitative and qualitative. The findings of the content analysis 
confirm much of the theoretical work of the earlier chapters. 
The central finding of this thesis is the gradual erosion of an earlier 
"Romanticist" interpretation and its increasing replacement by forms of 
interpretations summarised by the term "Negativity/Hostility". This process is 
not considered to be irreversible and the thesis hopes to contribute to more 
adequate, comprehensive and empathetic evaluations and relations between 
East and West. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Clearly the mass media have an immense influence on the way we 
live and perceive ourselves and others. This can make a large and 
diverse world appear small and compressed. Where the mass media 
encounter difference or 'Otherness'- forms of life or culture that resist 
homogeneity, they tend to emphasise, crudely or stereotypically, what 
it perceives that difference to be. Information, ideas and images are 
constantly and rapidly made available about everything, including 
other cultures, nations, and beliefs. The question of how a certain 
nation or culture is presented by the mass media becomes of 
paramount interest to any person, from that nation, living in an 
increasingly globalised world. The specific concern of this project is to 
deal with the portrayal of Arab Islamic culture in the Western media. 
The Arab Islamic world that will be studied in this thesis, covers the 
geographical area from Egypt in the West to Iraq in the East, and from 
Syria in the North, to the Arabian Peninsula in the South. We will also 
include Arab North Africa in this definition. 
This study will concentrate on the emergence of a mode of perception 
and interpretation described, by Edward Said and others as 
"Orientalism", a notion which came to dominate the political and 
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intellectual arena of Western perceptions of the East. The work of 
Edward Said focuses on how the "constitution of Otherness" permeates 
any process of identity formation. This study will develop and sub-
divide the notion of Orientalism into two clear component concepts: 
These are, firstly, Romanticism; that is the interpretation of the East by 
the West in romantic and idealised terms. The second component 
could be termed Negativity or demonisation, this refers to the complex 
and widespread tendency of the West to perceive or interpret the Arab 
Islamic world in negative, crude or hostile terms. These concepts 
should not be viewed as opposed or competing interpretations, more 
accurately they could be described as two sides of the same coin or as 
the two faces of Western perceptions of the Arab world. It is the 
contention of this thesis that in the modern period, specifically since 
the creation of the State of Israel, the resurgence of Islam, and the 
recent Gulf conflict, Western media perceptions of the Arab Islamic 
world are increaSingly skewed towards the negative, while the 
romantic view, though still present is steadily eroded. 
The thesis will approach Western media perceptions of Arab Islamic 
culture through the following key terms taken from Schlesinger and 
Elliott (1991): firstly the concept of difference, or perceptions in terms of 
"Self" and "Other" or "Us" and "Them". The second crucial theme is 
that of threat, this refers specifically to the tendency of the Western 
media to equate fundamentalism with terrorism. The third important 
theme is irrationality. This refers to the ways in which the Western 
media attempt to criticise or discredit those beliefs it defines as 
discrepant or alien, as irrational. The fourth feature defined by 
Schlesinger and Elliott is termed similarity, this is the selective 
interpretation of distinctions between "Self" and "Other" such that the 
beliefs of the "Other" can be presented as inferior though related forms 
of thought. These four essential components have characterised the 
thought of the West and its mass media in interpreting communism 
and the Soviet Union. However, with the collapse of communism and 
2 
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the opening of the former Soviet Union to market capitalism, these 
schemes of interpretations are now being more frequently applied to 
the East. This study will attempt to locate their operation in six 
Western newspapers. 
1.1. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
The European Christian Crusades, whose purpose to "save" the holy 
lands from the Arabs, marked the beginning of a period of direct and 
indirect contact between Arabs and Europeans. This was followed by a 
period of intense trading, travelling and exploring by Westerners into 
the region. Chapter two will explore the meanings and interpretations 
of Arab Islamic culture through the centuries focusing specifically on 
important works such as The Arabian Nights. 
The influential work of Edward Said has discussed the portrayal of the 
Arabs in the West as a result of the influences brought about by the 
social sciences, electronic media, interest groups and others. He 
suggests that the Arabs came to occupy "a negative value" in the 
United States after w.w.n. Said argues that the Arabs and Islam 
"presented Europe with an unresolved challenge on the political, 
intellectual, and for a time, economic levels (p.73-74). Further, and of 
crucial interest for the present thesis, Said suggested that the electronic 
inventions had helped to reinforce "the stereotypes by which the 
Orient is viewed:" 
"Television, the film, and all the media's resources have 
forced information into more and more standardised models. 
So far as the Orient is concerned, standardisation and 
cultural stereotyping have intensified the hold of the 19th 
century academic and imaginative demonology of the 
'mysterious Orient'. This is no where more true than in the 
ways by which the Near East is grasped. Three things 
have contributed to making even the simplest perception of 
the Arabs and Islam into a highly politicised ... matter: one, 
the history of popular anti-Arab and anti-Islam prejudice 
3 
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in the Wes!. ... ; two, the struggle between the Arabs and 
Israeli Zionism, and its effect upon American Jews as well 
as upon the liberal culture and the population at large; 
three the almost total absence of any cultural position 
making it possible either to identify with or 
dispassionately to discuss the Arabs or Islam" (Said, 1978, 
p.26). 
Said's thesis concerning the negative portrayal of Arabs in the Western 
media is supported by a variety of research on the media portrayal of 
Arab Islamic culture. Chapter four will deal with these studies in detail. 
1.2. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of the study is to perform a content analysis of six 
Western newspapers over a period of sixteen years to determine 
whether there have been any significant shifts in the media 
presentation of the Arab Islamic world and which directions, if any, 
these representations actually took. In other words, the study seeks to 
show how the Western media represents Arabs and their religion 
Islam, that is what images of them are presented in the material and 
why do these images come to dominate. 
The goal of international understanding and better inter-cultural 
relations necessitates a greater knowledge of, and a deeper look at, 
others' cultures and civilisations. The Arabs are people of different 
values, cultures and characteristics in general. To understand them, the 
foreign mass media must gain a better appreciation of this difference 
and evaluate them according to different standards concerning their 
cultures and beliefs. 
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1.3. THESIS DESIGN 
This thesis will consist of nine chapters including the introduction and 
the conclusion. The first four chapters deal with the historical, literary 
and political contexts of the Western presentation of images of the East. 
And the latter three chapters with the content analysis and evaluation 
of the results. 
Chapter two presents an overview of a number of related and shifting 
forms of interpretation of the East by the West. The work begins with 
images of the Arabs in ancient times and notes the important shifts 
caused by such major historical events as the crusades, the expansion of 
trade and imperialism, and the modern period of conflict, hostility and 
suspicion. 
Chapter three is concerned with theoretical views and develops the 
concepts of "Self" and "Other", taking Said's work as a starting point. It 
evaluates and criticises Said's approach on a number of points. The 
chapter then considers a range of academic sources culminating with 
Lerner's modernisation theory, by examining the concepts of "Self and 
"Other" in their work. 
Chapter four will deal with Western views of the Arab-Islamic world, 
introducing the notions of 'Image' and 'Stereotype'. It will then focus 
specifically on the images of Arab-Islamic culture constructed and 
disseminated within the Western media. Of particular importance here 
are the images of the Arab-Islamic world in the Western Cinema, 
Cartoons, and in the press especially during the Gulf War. 
Chapter five focuses on factors structuring the media. It will consider 
the political and economic role of the media through a summary of the 
main theories and models of media. It will focus on the ownership of 
the media and the form of the linkages with news values, 
5 
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representations and images; in particular emphasising the role of 
stereotypes and negativity in news reporting. 
The purpose of chapter six is to provide details of the methodological 
approach. The chosen methodology is content analysis, which will be 
deployed in a critical manner. The chapter provides information on 
the selection of the newspapers, contextualizing their historical 
background and applying development themes/ events. Finally it 
presents the full coding schedule distinguishing between actors, 
authors and their location, and crucial terms or terminology. 
Chapter seven presents the data analysis and results. It includes data on 
the main countries and main actors concerned and on the differences 
in their reporting by the selected Western newspapers. The data is 
presented through a number of graphs and tables according to a range 
of salient themes and events. These are provided in the appendix. 
Chapter eight provides a detailed analysis and evaluation of the 
reporting of three events in the six Western newspapers. These events 
are the assassination of President Sadat of Egypt, the hijacking of a 
Kuwait Airways flight, and the Oklahoma bombing. The analysis will 
reveal a number of important themes that are central to Western 
interpretations of events which either occur in the East or are thought 
to involve Arabic actors. These themes are related to the earlier work 
on the history and development of the notion of Orientalism and the 
shifting of Western views of the East. 
1.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is hoped that the present research may contribute to a better 
understanding of the Western media. It may provide answers to 
questions, such as: what are the themes that attract the attention of the 
6 
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media more than others? What are the sources of news? How does the 
press treat foreign nations where there is a Western interest which 
increases over time? and what is the role of the press in matters that 
pertain to stereotyping and image-making of foreign nations? 
The thesis hopes to establish the linkage of a number of themes, the 
central ones being Western Romanticism and its gradual erosion and 
replacement by modern discourses of hostility, throughout the study. 
These themes are emphasised in the historical background, the 
theoretical approaches, and the content analysis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ARAB AND MOSLEM IMAGES IN HISTORY 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the course of "the historical development of the relationship 
'between the East and the West', the image of the Orient from the 
point of view of the West was subject to a number of changes in 
substance and emphasis, and this is still the case today. Since the 
Mediterranean Orient has been decisively shaped by religion both 
culturally and politically since the eighth century, Islam is the unifying 
and determining element underlying the European evaluation of the 
region as a 'unified whole' (Kappert, 1995, p.33). 
Between the tenth and fourteenth centuries, the Islamic world had a 
lasting influence on Western Europe. With the help of Middle Eastern 
Christian and Jewish translators and scholars the knowledge of the 
ancients was handed down and developed. Europe participated in this 
process and eventually, by building on it, laid the foundations of the 
modern natural sciences and humanities. The knowledge of the 
ancients that had been safeguarded in the Arabic world made its way to 
Europe between the tenth and thirteenth centuries through translators 
and commentators. 
Since the fifteenth century, the importance of the Islamic world for 
Europe has been characterised less by direct cultural influence than by 
8 
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the awareness of a political and military threat. With the decline of the 
Byzantine empire and the establishment of Ottoman rule on its ruins 
in former Constantinople in 1453, followed by the Ottoman expansion 
in the Balkans up to the gates of Vienna, the Orient presented Europe 
with a principally 'Turkish face'. This bore the features of the 
apocalyptic Antichrist and spread terror, barbarity and a new religion 
'with fire and sword' (ibid., p.33). 
This chapter, therefore, will discuss the influence of the Orient on the 
West, the major concern here is how the Europeans constructed an 
imaginary Orient, as fantasised 'counter-world', which poets and 
Orientalists, principally in the nineteenth century, dreamed up and set 
against their own Western reality. In this chapter, we will discuss a 
multiplicity of Western images of Arab Islamic culture over the 
centuries. The term "Western" here will refer to, primarily British and 
American accounts of the Arab world. The contention is that such 
images and stereotypes became generalised through the wider Western 
world and while it is important to be aware of considerable regional 
differences, there exists a broadly based consensus of opinion in the 
West concerning East. It is these general themes and currents of 
interpretation that form the crux of this chapter. 
The Orient we will be dealing with here is the geographical area which 
consists of the Arabian Peninsula, the Mediterranean countries such as 
Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine, Arab North African countries such as 
Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia. In the nineteenth century 
this is what was referred to in the West as the Ottoman Empire and its 
Eastern Moslem dominions, including North Africa. The term 
"Orientals" refers to the people who lived in this geographical area. In 
the West they were variously called Turks, Muhammadans, Arabs, and 
Muslims. The most important part of this Orient for the West in the 
nineteenth century was the Holy Land and its immediate 
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surroundings, and it is this Orient which was the main object of an 
Orientalist thinking and behaviour throughout. 
A large advancement in the institutions and content of Orientalist texts 
had occurred, providing ample incentive and opportunity for those 
Westerners who, as Benjamin Disraeli stated, wanted to make "the East 
a career' (Tancred, 37). And if one was not able to travel to the East, 
there were plenty of texts about it which would supplant first-hand 
experience. 
Thus, Orientalism, a European/Western field of study and creative 
writing about the East and its people, is characterised by its impressive 
breadth, among other aspects. European writers and scholars like 
Burton, Doughty, Bunt, and Lane, did produce all encompassing texts 
portraying people from the Near, Middle and Far East in such 
categorically restrictive manners that the impact of their works 
consequently invited legions of European/Western writers and 
scholars to explore their favourite aspect of the "boundless East". It is in 
these Oriental texts which Said argues, ethnic stereotypes frequently 
occur, and tend to classify those Oriental people and things being 
studied or written about, European/Western stereotypes of Easterners 
and their culture are a concern of contemporary critics. Stereotypes of 
Asians, Muslims and Arabs became institutionalised by the textual 
mass productions about them and its resulting authoritativeness, until 
future Orientalists no longer studied anew (i.e., without the existing 
stereotypes in mind) these Easterners as individuals. In addition to 
imposing certain limits on European/Western attitudes regarding 
"Orientals" and their customs, Orientalism's proclivity to categorise its 
material and convey an authoritative stance on a particular subject also 
tended to limit the human interaction between different cultures and 
people, thereby widening the gap of understanding between East and 
West. 
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This cultural gap, Said says, is increased by the West's purposeful 
construction of the Orient (stretching from China to the 
Mediterranean) as its "cultural contestant," as a land populated by 
people who could not represent themselves as literally and 
academically as Westerners could. Because Europeans believed 
Easterners to be a "backward people", many felt not only a justification 
to colonise their lands, but a near-mandate by all of Europe as well. 
Consider this remark by Lord Arthur Balfour in an address to fellow 
English colonial administrators, "We are in Egypt not merely for the 
sake of the Egyptian ... we are also there for the sake of Europe at large" 
(Said, 1978, p.33). Colonialist leaders like Lord Balfour and Evelyn 
Cromer typically described the "Oriental" as "irrational, depraved 
(fallen), childlike, 'different'" (ibid., p. 40). Moreover, many colonialist 
administrators held the opinion that the behaviour and intellect of 
Easterners were totally antithetical to those of the "cultured" 
Englishman, and Said quotes Lord Cromer to illustrate such thinking, 
" ... I content myself with noting the fact that somehow or other the 
Oriental generally acts, speaks, and thinks in a manner exactly opposite 
to the European" (ibid., p. 39). 
This superior attitude translated itself to Western writers and scholars, 
who attempted to "invent" the East in ways which ultimately benefited 
the West and perpetuated stereotypes of Eastern inferiority and 
exoticism. In constructing the Orient, Orientalists participated in 
"making statements about it, authorising views of it, describing it, by 
teaching it, settling it... dominating, restructuring, and having 
authority over the Orient" (ibid., p.3). 
Cox (1977) employs different terminology to Said, he claims that there 
are actually two "Orients". One is made of real people and real earth, 
while the other is a myth that resides in the head of Westerners. One is 
an actual cultural area, stretching from India to Japan and from 
Mongolia to Singapore. The other is a convenient screen on which the 
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West projects reverse images of its own deficiencies. This mythical 
Orient, Cox describes, once consisted almost entirely of "sages and 
fakirs, magical talismans and esoteric lore, (secret belief), serpents 
weaving to nasal flutes, infinite holiness, wisdom and inner peace" 
(Cox, 1977, p.149). Recently this Western dream of an Eastern Xanadu 
has soured somewhat. It now includes some nightmare qualities: 
"elusive guerrilla bands, teeming pools of population, swarming 
yellow hordes waving little red books and hypnotic cult leaders bent on 
brainwashing idealistic youngsters" (ibid.) . The West's inner Orient 
accommodates both our fondest fantasies and our most gruesome fears. 
The Orient symbolises both threat and promise in the imagination of 
the West, and the two elements feed on each other, like paradise and 
perdition. 
2.2. EARLY HISTORY 
A search for the origins of the contemporary Western image of the 
Arabs leads one inevitably to two very early sources: first, the works of 
the ancient classical authors and secondly the Bible. 
In the sixth century, the ancient Greeks had heard about the Arabs and 
Arabia at the time of Alexander the Great, who, according to legend 
"intend ... even to make it (Arabia) his royal abode ... " (Strabo, in Nasir. 
1979, p. 2). Alexander had despatched his Admiral Nearchus to explore 
a sea route to the Euphrates. Nearchus reported seeing during the 
course of his journey shoals, reefs, frankincense-trees, "sea hedge-hogs" 
and pearls. 
The Romans, who penetrated into the area generally known now as 
the Middle East, also reported that Arabian goods included spices, 
perfumes, gums and precious stones. Arabia was known to the 
Romans as the "happy" country (ibid., p. 3). The notions and 
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impressions the Romans entertained about the inhabitants of the 
Arabian Peninsula, whom they called the Sabaeans, were that they 
formed a race of prosperous and powerful merchants. The source of 
their wealth was said to be derived from the export to Europe, of such 
commodities as aromatics, gold, pearls and precious stones. 
In his work Geography, written shortly before the birth of Christianity, 
Strabo, a Greek historian, referred to Arabia as "Arabia the blest". 
Nasir's (1979) important commentary on the ancient history of the 
relationship between the East and the West provides an interesting 
reading of Strabo's historical work. He saw the Arabs as people who 
"till the land either little or none, but they kept herds of all kinds, 
particularly of camels" (See Nasir, p.3). He described the natives of 
Gerrhal , as people who inhabit a district where "the soil contains salt 
and the people live in houses made of salt; and since flakes of salt 
continually scales off, owing to the scorching heat of the rays of the 
sun, and fall away, the people frequently sprinkle the houses with 
water and thus keep the walls firm" (ibid.). Strabo's accounts further 
portrayed Arabia and its peoples (the Sabaean country) as a fertile land, 
rich with spices and strange creatures and inhabited by an easy going 
even lazy people. 
As a contrast to the coastal town of Gerrha, Strabo described the desert 
of Arabia as a "sandy waste, with only few palms and pits of water". 
The Bedouin, living in tents, were said to exist as robbers and camel 
drivers subsisting primarily on animal milk and flesh (ibid.). 
Taken as a whole, the ancient Greek and Roman writers pictured 
Arabia as a mysterious and strange land, containing various riches and 
valuable products. The Arab inhabitants were depicted partly as 
la coastal town on the Gulf 
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nomads who lived in deserts, their main vocation being plunder; and 
partly as city dwellers, described as prosperous and sensual merchants. 
Perhaps the most significant event for the West, which brought the 
Arabs onto the world's stage was the emergence of Islam in Arabia at 
the beginning of the seventh century. Islam as a religion began with 
the prophet Mohammed, who was born in the year 571. He was 
destined to transform Arabian society and influence the life and 
thought of Europe. 
Prophet Mohammed, an Arab, brought into being Islam as a new 
religion. Although Islam emanated from the main springs of both 
Judaism and Christianity, it became a major cause of concern to the 
latter. In the first place, it was considered by Christians as a rival to the 
power and influence of their own religion. Secondly, the subsequent 
Arab conquests were seen as a menace to the security of European 
lands. 
Until the arrival of Islam, "Christianity had no rival to compete with 
in the world", after Judaism, "its status as a revealed religion was 
institutionalised through an established church and priesthood" (ibid., 
pA). When Islam emerged on the scene in the Middle East, "both 
Judaism and Christianity felt threatened and did not want to accord it 
the status they enjoyed". But the dynamic message of the new religion 
soon spread from Arabia to China and various Moslem empires have 
left their imprint on the history of the world. 
Why did Christianity and Judaism feel threatened by Islam? The 
reason seems to be that it was because Islam had come to complete the 
message brought by many prophets. Islam claimed that the revelations 
of Jesus Christ had not been retained but compromised in the Bible. 
Judaism and Christianity, however, did not accept this contention. 
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They attacked Islam; and no strategy, including the Crusades, was left 
untried to destroy the credibility of Islam as revealed religion. 
Initial reactions against Prophet Mohammed and Islam came from a 
number of Christians who were living in Muslim lands. These 
criticisms were later passed on to Europe and ultimately absorbed, 
adapted and adopted by the Latinate Christian West. It is believed that 
St. John of Damascus, who was Mohammed's contemporary, was the 
first to spread the unfavourable portrayal of Prophet Mohammed and 
Islam. Claims were made to discredit the new religion and its founder 
on the grounds that Prophet Mohammed, acting on the advice of an 
Arian Monk called Bahira, manufactured the Qur'an, primarily from 
the Old and New Testament, to satisfy his own personal interests. 
Norman Daniel, in his book Islam and the West, notes that in 
attacking Prophet Mohammed, st. John introduced such elements as 
power, infidelity and sexual indulgence into the image of Islam. Of this 
aspect he writes: "St. John also introduced other elements that would 
long survive: he descended to ridicule, for example, of what he 
mistakenly took to be Quranic belief, the Camel of God, in a petty 
bringing in God-simulating revelation in order to justify his own 
sexual indulgence" (Daniel, 1966, p. 4). 
According to Daniel, Prophet Mohammed was viewed in the European 
mediaeval accounts as the "Prince of the Arabs". The Arabs themselves 
were considered as "pagans" and ignorant in accepting the "cunning 
pseudo-prophet". They were generally seen as soldiers, farmers and 
idolaters; furthermore, they were depicted as "rough" men wandering 
in the desert. In addition, the mediaeval accounts pictured Prophet 
Mohammed as advocating what he believed would best please the 
Arabs, "especially lust". Mecca, the Holy City of Islam, was described as 
a "prostitute", and Islam was perceived as being forced on people by the 
sword, this explaining the reason for its spread and its success (ibid., 
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p.200). The polemical writings of early Christian religious writers 
considered that the prophet of Islam was an impostor and the Qur'an a 
fabrication.2 On such literature, the Crusaders were nourished and the 
direct encounter of the Christian West with the Moslem East took place 
on the battlefields of Palestine. 
2.3. CRUSADES AND AFTER 
It is well known to anyone who has studied the diffusion of Islam and 
Arab civilisation in the West that both confront a seemingly 
'ineradicable antagonism' (Sha'ban, 1991, p.i). It is common to trace 
this feeling to the Crusades of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
which generated a 'paranoic repugnance toward Islam' (ibid.). This was 
reflected in canto 28 of Dante's Inferno which consigns Mohammed 
and Ali to the nine bolgi along with the most dangerous sowers of 
discord and disunity. Prophet Mohammed is regarded as the figure 
who promoted the greatest schism in the Christian world, and his 
punishment-being split from chin to crotch- is the cruellest described 
in the Inferno. Allegorical though it is, the Inferno was undoubtedly an 
important and influential reflection of mediaeval thought; the 
Crusades were in progress, though waning, during Dante's lifetime and 
were the most momentous international events of the period. 
In the twelfth century, a related theme appeared in the accounts of the 
Western traveller Mandeville. Nasir commentary on Mandeville's 
Travels, while on a journey to the Holy Land in the latter part of the 
twelfth century, spoke of the "Arabians" and "Bedouins" who 
inhabited the "deserts" between Jerusalem and Syria, and described 
them as "evil", "wicked" and "of malice": "In those deserts dwell 
mickle people that man call Arabians, Bedouins and Ascopards. They 
are folk of full evil conditions, and full of all manner of wickedness 
2Por further information on this area, see Nasir 1979, Daniel 1966, Sha'ban, 1991. 
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and malice," he wrote. ''They are right foul folk and cruel and of evil 
kind". The Arabs were perceived by Mandeville as an "evil kind", thus 
setting them aside from his own "kind", regarding them as an 
"outgroup", a theme which has survived to this day. Mandeville 
proceeded to describe the Arabs as roaming nomads who lived in tents. 
"Houses have they none but tenets, which they make of 
skins of camels and other wild beasts and drink water when 
they may any get. And they dwell in places where they 
may have water, as on the Red Sea and other places where 
they find any water. And oft times it falls that, where men 
find water a [one) time of the year, another time there is 
none found; and therefore make they no house in a certain 
place, but now here, now there, as they may find water. 
This folk that I speak of travail not about tilling of land, 
for they eat no bread commonly, but if it be any that dwell 
near some good town, that they may go for to get them 
bread. They roast all their flesh and the fish that they eat 
uponstone through the heat of the sun" (Quoted by Nasir, 
p.20). 
Whatever the level of accuracy of such a view, Mandeville clearly 
presents the Arabs as "Other" whose lifestyle is characterised by many 
features that mark its difference from the West. 
The Crusaders were one of the first important cultural contacts 
between Europe and the Arabs. This inevitably led to a shifting in the 
prevailing European attitudes towards the Arabs and Islam. Many of 
the earlier polemics were reinforced as Islam developed rapidly so fear 
and hostility increased. However, at the same time, more favourable 
characterisations, such as a chivalry and nobility of spirit, qualities 
which were admired and adopted, had found their way into the 
conglomeration of concepts concerning Arabs in Europe. But the 
Franks (foreigners), who as Crusaders came to save the Holy Land, 
considered themselves far superior to the Arabs, whom they regarded 
as idolaters, worshipping Mohammed as a God. One of the most 
celebrated Arab personalities to acquire a favourable reputation in 
Europe was Salah-el-Din (Saladin). He was the Muslim Sultan who led 
a successful campaign against the Crusaders led by Richard the 
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Lionhearted. Saladin's popularity in Europe was the result of his 
honourable dealings with the Franks. He was witnessed as showing 
mercy towards his enemy. Europeans saw in Saladin a humanity 
which they did not expect the infidel to possess or to understand. A 
new awareness began to develop about the Arabs in Europe: Arabs, 
after all, were not as bad as the Crusaders had been led to believe. They 
were recognised as human beings, who were capable not only of living 
up to universal values but also of showing some superior qualities 
unknown to Western man. At this stage, Western images of the Arab 
were ambiguous consisting of both positive and negative. Although 
the images and interpretations were, and remain reductive, 
stereotypical, and crude, during this period, there was mutual respects 
and a sense of reciprocity that was to evolve, shift and finally erode 
over the coming centuries. 
Saladin's death did not remove the threat posed by Islam to 
Christianity and Judaism regarding the aut~enticity of their scriptures. 
Furthermore, even though Ummayad rule had faded from Spain by 
the twelfth century, the image of the Moslem warrior with the sword 
in one hand and the Qur'an in the other haunted the West even as the 
Turks captured Constantinople in 1453 and established the foundations 
of the Ottoman Empire. Their Empire spread into Eastern Europe and 
negative images of Islam and the Ottoman Empire spread in the West. 
It was assumed that such an empire stood for the perpetuation of 
Islamic misrule and tyranny. Such assumptions remained 
unquestioned through to the nineteenth century (Hussein, 1984, p.6). 
2.4. THE SIXTEENTH & SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 
The number of Western scholars specialising in Arabic studies 
increased in the seventeenth century, as did the number of merchants 
and travellers who dispatched information about the area and its 
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people. Travellers' accounts became popular in England, especially 
those dealing with the "Islamic World". Daniel (1966) remarks that 
"there was a large public for accounts of the Islamic World. 
Proportionately to the books in circulation there must have been more 
travellers' tales even than today" (Daniel, p.17). Nasir (1979) discusses 
the views of William Lithgow, an English tourist, who travelled 
around the area in the first part of the seventeenth century. In his 
Peregrination, he makes many allusions to the "wilde and savage 
Arabs", on his journeys in the Near East. Lithgow tells us that he was 
warned about Arabs by the Venetian Consul in Aleppo, who had told 
him of reports of "Arabs that lay for them in the deserts". From then 
on the "incrusive" and "blood thirsty" Arab was portrayed as lurking 
in the "bush" waiting to rob and plunder. To Lithgow, the Arabs were 
part of the hostile environment: "Everyone of these [Arabs] savages, 
according to his power, dealt with men uncivilly and cruelly, even like 
a wilderness full of wilde beasts, living all upon rapine and robbery 
wanting all sense of humanity", he wrote. 
Lithgow's account of the Arabs is reminiscent of what the first 
American settlers reported of the Red Indians. In one story the Arabs 
were said to use "bows and arrows" against their foes. He also 
distrusted Turks, Moors and Arabs because they were infidels who 
hated Christians, and he warned all travellers who journeyed to that 
part of the world to refrain from "whoredom, drunkeness, and too 
much familiarity with strangers," for it is "impossible he can return in 
safety from danger of Turkes, Arabs, Moores, wilde beasts and ... the 
extremities of heat, hunger, thirst and cold". 
Lithgow classified the "infidels" into two groups: the tolerable and the 
intolerable, the Arabs fell into the second category: "The Arabians are 
for the most part theeves and robbers; the Moores cruell and uncivill ... 
the Turkes are ill best of all the three, yet all sworne enemies of Christ". 
The Arabs were said to hate all strangers. They were seen as a "wilde" 
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and unmanageable group who even "annoyed the Turkes". In his own 
words, Lithgow describes the Arabs as people who "cannot be possibly 
brought to a quite and well formed manner of living but are continual 
spoilers of these parts of Turkes Dominion" ( Quoted by Nasir, p.26-28). 
Therefore, the felonious and evil nature of Arabs became a 
pronounced theme in the accounts of early Western travellers. 
But through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the reports of the 
Western merchants and travellers were not concerned with making a 
clear distinction between Arabs and Turks. In addition, Arabs were also 
referred to as Saracens3 , Moors, and Mamelukes4 : all these were 
described as "dark", "tawny", "black", and of "swarthy complextion". In 
general however, the term Arab was used to refer to the desert Arabs 
(Bedouin); Saracens. In these two centuries the Arabs of the desert were 
portrayed as a separate entity. They were described as "wild", 
"incrusive", "blood thirsty" and "savage". Their main occupation was 
said to be "thievery and looting". This group was perceived as a 
dangerous element that threatened the safety of travellers and the 
stability of the Ottoman Empire. The Saracens were described as cruel 
enemies of Christians, those who fought the Crusaders and later added 
to the sufferings of the Christian pilgrims. Moors were generally 
spoken of as the pirates in the Barbary States. They were portrayed 
primarily as the cruel slavers of Christians. The dominant focal point 
of Western interpretations was at this stage still the religious 
opposition between Christianity and Islam. However, as we shall see 
below, during the eighteenth century the focus of Western 
interpretations shifted from religious to a primarily secular, economic 
and political one. 
3 Saracens were the city Arabs who lived in Syria and Palestine. 
4Mamelukes were generally the Arabs of Egypt. 
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2.5. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
The eighteenth century, in which France and Britain had fought each 
other from 1744-1769 over India, a war which ended with the latter, 
Britain, in control of the sub-continent economically and politically, 
had deeply affected British-Orient relations and marked a turning pOint 
in the Arab image. Britain began to show increasing interest in the 
Orient, particularly in Egypt, as an economic, cultural and strategic 
resource. 
Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 and his foray into Syria had, in 
fact, had by far the greater consequences for the modern history of the 
Orient- and then for Orientalism (Said, 1978, p. 76).5 For the first time, 
as Said argued that 'The Orient acquired a precise intellectual and 
historical dimension with which "to buttress the myths of its 
geographic distance and vastness" (ibid., p.77). 
Until the end of the eighteenth century, Arabs were not viewed as an 
entity by the West; they were lumped together with the rest of the 
people of the Ottoman Empire. Very soon after, Arabs became a focal 
point of Western attention. This was for several reasons: changing 
conditions in Europe, especially the French Revolution, romantic 
sentiments in literature is more accessible to the public, and the 
beginning of modern imperialism (Daniel, 1966). 
According to Norman Daniel, Volney (A French philosopher and a 
traveller) was the ablest analyst of the Arabs, because of the important 
fact that he was fully cognisant of the enmity between Arabs and Turks. 
Volney stated that "on their side, the Arabs regard the Turks as 
usurpers and traitors and only seek opportunities to hunt them". 
Although he admired the Bedouin simplicity and hospitality, he 
5 Kiernan's Lords of Human Kinds 1%9 presents an account of these historical events, 
however he is more concerned with the Far East countries and Turkey. 
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claimed that the Arabs' industry was limited to the making of the tents, 
mats and butter, and their literature consisted of stories like the 
Thousand and One Nights. Volney described Bedouin society: "Good 
faith reigns there, a disinterestedness, a generosity which would do 
honour to the most civilised of men". Volney believed nevertheless 
that the Bedouin exercised a spirit of rapine which they used only 
against their enemies (Daniel, 1966, p.74). Here we can see both 
Romanticism and a certain Negativity bound together. 
In the latter part of the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire had 
gradually became weaker, to the point that the West began to refer to it 
as the "Sick Man of Europe". Napoleon conquered Egypt in 1798. He 
arrived well aware of the ideas and notions circulating concerning the 
Arab and was not alone in his conviction that Arabs were true to the 
portrayal of them in Europe. 
Napoleon had a special respect for the Arabs though he condemned the 
Turks as mercenaries and the Mamelukes as his enemies. Throughout 
his stay in Egypt, Napoleon acted like a true Machiavellian6• This is 
what T. E. Lawrence later tried to do, although initial motives and 
characteristics were very different. Daniel commented on the similarity 
the missions of the two men: "The difference was the actors, not in the 
play" (ibid. p.104). 
Remarking about Western merchants in the Near East, the area was 
seldom visited by merchants or travellers. It was from the accounts of 
such travellers who lacked knowledge of the Arabic language and did 
not have the vaguest notion of the people and their customs that many 
ideas about Arabs began to reach England. Daniel suggests that most 
writers in that period "depended largely on the myths of their own 
creating" (ibid., p.14). 
6 a role of a Westerner who had come to the Arabs to help them because he regarded 
himself as one of them. 
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They went to the Orient with preconceptions and notions which they 
had at home, without mixing with Arabs they built on these. They did 
not bother asking themselves what the Arabs were like, and what kind 
of culture, habits and manners those Arabs had; rather they tried to fit 
them into their already existing images. In this way many, if not all, of 
the Western images about the Orient were largely self-created, aimed to 
suit political and economic and sometimes intellectual needs. It is in 
this sense, therefore, that Orientalism tells us more about Europe that 
it does about the Orient. 
These self-created images about the Arabs were inseparable from the 
English inherent way of thinking concerning the "Other": Africans and 
natives of the New World. Travellers did not only Orientalize the 
Orient, they Africanized Africa as well, the African image was also 
distorted and self-created. In maintaining this argument Curtin (1965) 
argued that the British images of Africa were quite different and 
irrelevant from African reality, particularly the ones in the nineteenth 
century: 
"Reporters went to Africa ... They were sensitive to data 
that seemed to confirm their European preconceptions and 
they were insensitive to contradictory data. Their reports 
were thus passed through a double set of positive and 
negative filters, and filtered once more as they were 
assimilated in Britain. Data that did not fit the existing 
image was simply ignored. As a result, British thought 
about Africa responded very weakly to new data of any 
kind" (Curtin, 1965, p. 479). 
He continues to argue that: 
'The travellers (and even more, the analyst at home) look 
the European Weltansdauung, as their point of departure. 
They did not ask, 'What is Africa like' and what manner of 
men live there', but, 'How does Africa, and how do the 
Africans fit into what we already know about the world'. 
In this sense, the image of Africa was largely created in 
Europe" (ibid., pp 479-480). 
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The Western attitudes towards the Arabs and Africans were not 
different in their ethnocentrism from those which they had about the 
natives of America. Prior to any significant contact between them and 
the Indians, the Westerners already had their own framework of the 
"Others", into which the Indians had to fit. They were conceived as 
savages, immature, bestial, and lacking any 'civilisation'. This "myth 
was carried with the settlers who went to colonise America" (Shaheen 
1980) "for an account of the development of this mythology". 
In the meanwhile scholars were hard at work unravelling the wealth 
of works of theology, as well as medicine and mathematics, written in 
Arabic. Arabic studies had then far surpassed public interest in Arabs. 
Among the numerous English Arabists of that period was Simon 
Ockley. His interest in Arabic led him to write a cultural and political 
history of the Arabs in English in three volumes, entitled The Histonj 
of the Saracens, which was then considered to be a major contribution 
towards knowledge of the Arabs. Ockley's work represents one of the 
earliest attempts to present to the West in popular and accessible 
language, a general account of the nature and achievements of Arab 
Islamic civilisation. Ockley's image of the Arabs was still one of a 
warlike people, however, he also notes their considerable 
achievements in intellectual pursuits and regarded the Arabic language 
as particularly elegant. 
However it seems that what Ockley had to say about the achievements 
of Arabs shocked and surprised many Englishmen. Ockley mentioned 
this attitude in his book stating that "they never met with such folks in 
their lives as these Arabians! They never heard too, they said, of these 
things before, which they of course must have done it, if anybody else 
had." He wrote, "They say that the Arabians are given to romance; and 
for that reason I suppose they are not to be believed (according to 
Aristotle) when they speak truth" (Quoted from Nasir, p. 41). 
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Ockley's statement clearly explains the popular g'eneral attitude 
towards Arabs in England in the eighteenth century, namely an 
obscure, marauding people who are, despite the romantic influence of 
The Arabian Nights, still given to passion and incapable of the kind 
technological development demonstrated in the West. 
Against the background of such ignorance, Ockley was obliged to 
introduce the Arabs to his readers. He described them before Prophet 
Mohammed as "idolaters" and "warlike". He divided them into 
classes: the city Arabs who lived in towns and villages, and the tent 
dwellers who roamed the deserts. According to Ockley, the occupations 
of these Bedouin included horse breeding, the use of weapons, and 
poetry: "Their chief excellence, consisted in breeding and managing 
horses, and the use of bows, swords, and lances. Their learning lay 
wholly in their poetry, to which their genius greatly inclined". Nasir 
points out that Ockley could not emancipate himself from his 
Orthodox Christian theological training. However, he subscribed to the 
general attitude of animosity English scholars held towards Islam, so 
that his views of Islam and Mohammed reflected hostility and 
resentment. Although on the one hand Ockley praised Arabs for their 
learning and achievements, on the other he condemned them on the 
grounds that they were undermining the Eastern Christian church. 
Islam was regarded as a new superstition, and the divine status of the 
Prophet Mohammed was rejected. Nonetheless, Ockley believed that 
Islam and Mohammed succeeded in uniting the disorganised or 
chaotic Arab tribes. Although Ockley resented Prophet Mohammed 
and Islam on religious grounds, we see him transcending his religious 
prejudice when dealing with one of Mohammed's successors, Al 
Mamoun, whom he calls "that noble Caliph7", for cultivating learning 
and knowledge. Unlike others, Ockley did not make any distinction 
between Arabs, Saracens and Moors. To him they were all "Arabians", 
7The term Caliph refers to the office of the successor to the Prophet Mohammad in his 
political and social functions. 
25 
Chapter 2 Arab and Moslem Images in History 
with Saracens inhabiting the East and the Moors being the Arabs of 
Africa. Ockley highly praised Arabs for their love of knowledge, for 
their insight and practical wisdom. However, Ockley had two main 
criticisms of Arab scholars: the first, that they did not, he claimed, study 
Greek historians as much as they did Greek philosophers; the second 
was against those Arabs who did not study other languages, such as 
Greek, considering their Arabic language to be superior. This according 
to Ockley, led Arab thinkers to work in a careless manner, often more 
concerned with the play of words than the substance of meaning. 
Two other notable English scholars of the eighteenth century who 
contributed towards the development of Arabic studies in England 
were George Sale and William Jones. Sale, described as "half a 
Muslim", had studied Arabic on his own and collected many Arabic 
manuscripts. Sale is best known for his translation of the Qur'an, 
published in 1734, with explanations of many of the passages and an 
introduction on Islam. Many European scholars used his book as a 
reference, including Voltaire. In his introduction, entitled Preliminary 
Discourse to the Koran, Sale gave an account of the "Religion, learning 
and customs" of the Arabs. He pointed out that for several centuries, 
Christian writers spoke of them "under the appellation of Saracens; the 
most certain derivation of which word is from shark, the East". Sale 
stated that Arabia, the original habitat of the Arabs, was not as rich as 
ancient legends had us believe, "yet, in reality," he wrote, "a great part 
of the riches which the ancients imagined were the produce of Arabia, 
came from the Indies and the coasts of Africa". According to Sale, 
Arabs, from time immemorial, had lived in groups called tribes. Each 
tribe valued itself for its traditions and thus fought against other tribes 
to maintain its identity. Although tribes often waged war against each 
other, they succeeded in keeping intruders out of their country. Thus, 
Sale reinforced the theme mentioned by earlier English travellers, 
namely that Arabs treasured their independence and liberty. Even the 
Turks could not claim sovereignty over them: "Thus the Arabs 
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preserved their liberty, of which few nations can produce so ancient 
monuments, with very little interruption, from the very Deluge; for 
though very great armies have been sent against them, all attempts to 
subdue them were unsuccessful." Sale was one of the first English 
writers to state that not all Arabs were Muslims, but there are Christian 
Arabs and Jewish Arabs. He praised Arabs for their hospitality and for 
being "exact to their words". Sale also praised the Arabic language as 
being "very harmonious and expressive" (Quoted in Nasir, p. 43). 
However, although he spoke of Arab "excellencies", he mentioned 
"defect and vices" of Arabs. He considered for example, that Arabs have 
a natural disposition for war and a reputation for thieving. Apparently 
the accusations of thieving levelled against Arabs in the accounts of 
early travellers and merchants became an important part of their image 
in Europe. 
In spite of this reputation, a special attraction towards the Arabs began 
to develop in Europe. This appeal is reflected in Sale's works when he 
stated that Arabs have always been celebrated for their quickness of 
apprehension and penetration and for the vivacity of their wit, 
especially those of the desert. Thus a romantic theme begins to appear 
in the works of serious Western writers, especially towards the desert 
Arab. 
Nasir (1979) has criticised a pOint in Sale's account. He believed that it 
was only the Arabs' tribal warfare that enabled the Turks to invade 
Arabia. He was of the opinion that because Arabs were united in "one 
faith and under one prince" they were able to achieve "those conquests 
which extended the Mohammadan faith over so great a part of the 
world". 
In the eighteenth century the Mu'allaqat (The Hanging Poems), which 
were said to have been written in gold and hung in the Kabah in Mecca 
in pre-Islarnic Arabia, were made available to Western readers through 
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William Jones' translation. Jones had earlier learned Arabic at the 
hands of an Arab from Aleppo. The Mu'allaqat represented to the 
Arabs a miraculous achievement by Arab poets. 
Orientalists who studied Arab history and Islam like Sale were far 
outnumbered, however, by those who were inspired by missionary or 
colonialist motives. The religious prejudice against Islam has not 
disappeared in the subsequent centuries, on the contrary, the old 
negative stereotypes were retained and prepared the way for the 
imperial control over the East. 
2.6. THE ARABIAN NIGHTS 
In the eighteenth century a new phase of interest in the Middle East, 
especially Egypt, began to develop in the West. This growing curiosity 
marked a shift from earlier concern about Turks to new interest in 
Arabs. The change in emphasis occurred as a result of several factors: 
firstly, the publication of The Arabian Nights; secondly the Arabic 
studies which were earlier used for Biblical research and which had 
now led to genuine interest in the literature and history of the Arabs. A 
third factor was the growing appreciation of and interest in antiquities. 
Finally, and of great importance for political reasons, this change was 
especially due to the Napoleonic military expedition into Egypt. 
This section will be involved with the publication in 1704 of Antoine 
Galland's translation of the One thousand and One Nights, more 
commonly known as the Arabian Nights. The book is a collection of 
tales believed to be of Indian or Persian origin. It rapidly attained 
universal popularity and among those who translated it into English 
were E.W. Lane in 1840 and in 1855 Sir Richard Burton. The Nights, in 
the complete edition, contains over two hundred tales, all woven into 
one main story, which is essentially as follows. Shahriar, the king, 
28 
Chapter 2 Arab and Moslem Images in History 
finding his wife unfaithful, kills her, and afterwards each successive 
bride on the morning following the marriage meets the same fate. This 
distressing situation causes Sheherezade, the Vizier's daughter, to offer 
herself "to be a ransom for the daughters of the Mohammadans on the 
cause of their deliverance". She "beguiles the waking hour" of the king 
by beginning a story which she interrupts at a point of suspense, 
whereupon her life is spared that she may continue the tale. She 
repeats the device, linking tale to tale, or involving one in another, 
until at the end of the one thousand and first night she asks that her 
life be spared. Her request is granted and the king also makes 
Sheherezade his queen. 
In the West, the historical and cultural accuracy of the depiction of the 
East in The Arabiml Nights was greatly over-estimated. They are 
consulted by scholars for their pictures of the customs and manners of 
the Orient". The tales are described by the World Book Encyclopaedia: 
"The stories of Th e Arabian Nights are of many countries and times, 
but whatever their age or source all have been so transformed that they 
are Moslem to the core, thoroughly Arabian in temper and spirit". The 
Nights have had a lasting influence on the sensibilities of great and 
unknown Western writers alike. Travellers to the Arab world went 
with great expectations to the exotic lands of The Nights; many were 
disappointed. Many tourists, for example, were disappointed upon 
discovering that the realities of the Arab world were far removed from 
the exotic world of The Arabian Nights. 
The eighteenth century might even be called the century of the· 
Arabian Nights in the West. After its publication, the book made a 
deep and lasting impression on the English literature and sensibilities. 
The Arabian Nights appeared in the English language in England in 
1712. Soon it governed the form of a surprisingly large output of 
English fiction. During the eighteenth century, it had become almost 
impossible for the English to view the Orient except through the 
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mediation of The Arabian Nights. The tales acquired a sense of reality 
for the Western reader who was also reading the "true accounts" of 
Western travellers. The image of Arabs portrayed in travel books 
complemented that of The Arabian Nights. 
Exotic names and places had become familiar: Ali Baba with his Forty 
Thieves, and Sinbad the Sailor were some of the adventurers who 
attained popularity in England. Also, Harun El Rashid and the city of 
Baghdad with its gardens on the banks of the Tigris; the colourful 
bazaars of Cairo and Damascus, filled with harems, dervishes, water-
carriers, story tellers and eunuchs. All fantastic aspects of imagery 
mingled with cities of brass and black marble, Jinns, Efreets, flying 
horses and magic carpets. This became the world of Arabs in the eyes of 
readers. 
As a result, the Arabs and their lands became irrevocably associated 
with this magical, exotic and romantic, but nonetheless unrealistic 
world. The old images were hardened and stabilised into real and 
fantasy characters from the world of the tales. 
The fantasy world of the Arabian tales, with its genies, magic, flying 
horses and supernatural birds, reinforced earlier accounts of Western 
travellers: for example, Mandeville's "desert monester" in Egypt who 
was half goat, half man, and Lithgow's birds that flew over the Dead 
Sea and died from its fumes; and the disintegrating apples in the 
Jordan Valley, which crumbled when bitten. Pitts' travel narratives, 
which attained popularity at the time The Nights appeared in England, 
of the mysterious East with the city of Cairo having slave markets, 
veiled women, whores, dervishes, eunuchs and people who were 
"much given to passion" complemented The Night's exotic and 
picturesque scene of harems, princesses, slaves, eunuchs and romance. 
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Thus, the image of the Arabs in the West began to acquire new themes 
of exotic and erotic qualities. These images began to modify or supplant 
earlier themes which, as we have shown, were centred around 
religious intolerance and the myth of the Arab warrior. These new 
images, themes and stereotypes became part of the general attitude of 
travellers towards Arabs in particular and the Middle East in general. 
2.7. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE ORIENT AS A 
DREAM WORLD 
Ideas acquired about Arabs before the nineteenth century had gradually 
defined them as a distinct group in the Ottoman Empire; people proud 
of their identity and heritage. They were represented as resenting 
outside authority and control, thus hating their masters the Turks in 
particular and all foreigners in general. Characteristics assigned to them 
included the tendency to be dishonest, aggressive, and overly 
passionate. Yet favourable qualities were also ascribed to them, such as 
a pleasant exoticism, hospitality and fidelity. Furthermore, the Arabs 
were generally portrayed as two distinct groups: the desert Arabs and 
the city Arabs. Scholars were now depicting Arab civilisation as being 
superior in certain senses and as containing elements that had been 
lost in the modern West. 
At this time, The Arabian Nights, remained influential and was joined 
by the scholarly accounts of learned men, experiences related by 
travellers and soldiers, and reports of the undertakings of diplomats. 
Many translations of The Nights appeared after Galland's. Among the 
better known authors who translated the book was first, in 1840, by 
Edward William Lane, The Thousand and One Night, known in 
England as The Arabian Nights Entertainment. Lane's translation was 
from the Arabic, and he included copious notes. Secondly there was 
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John Payne's translation, written in English prose and verse and called 
The Book of the Thousand Nights and One Night. Then there was Sir 
Richard Burton's translation, in 1885-8, entitled Thousand Nights and 
a Night, with an introduction on the manners and customs of 
Muslims and a history of The Nights. 
The Arabian Nights became an important document for nineteenth 
century writers, poets and students, who utilised it in their attempt at 
describing and understanding the Arab and his world. The book also 
inspired many English writers to imitate, adopt and adapt the tales . W. 
F. Kirby mentions a number of such important works: The Orientalist, 
or Letters of a Rabbi; Oriental Fairy Tales; Tales of the Caliph; The 
Adventures of Caliph Haroun al-Raschid and New Arabian Nights. 
Furthermore, many of the important nineteenth century writers were 
to a greater or lesser degree influenced by The Arabian Nights. They 
borrowed from the Tales and made use of the stories in their works. 
Southey in his poems Thalaba the Destroyer and The Curse of Kehama 
borrows from The Arabian Nights; Moore in his LalIa Rookh includes 
in his fairy tale much of the exoticism and splendour of The Nights. 
Tennyson dedicates to them his Recollections of The Arabian Nights; 
Byron's many works show that he was influenced by the Tales, and 
much of Scott's knowledge of the East came from them. Coleridge's 
famous Kubla Khan reflects, through that fantasy of Coleridge's mind, 
the magic, mystery and spell-bound quality of the Orient.8 
2.7.1. European Orientalists 
Among the best known and influential Orientalist whose work had 
contributed to significantly the Arab image is Burckhardt. He was born 
in Switzerland at the end of the Eighteenth century, but was educated 
8 The importance of figures like Moore, Buron, Tennyson and others is discussed in 
Sharafuddin (1994). 
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in England. After spending two years at Cambridge studying Arabic, he 
was commissioned by the African Association to explore the Sahara 
Desert. It is said that Burckhardt prepared himself for the journey by 
walking barefoot, sleeping in the open and subsisting on water and 
vegetables. In 1809 Burckhardt travelled to Aleppo in Syria, where he 
spent two years studying Arabic and familiarising himself with the 
manners and customs of the people and with the area. He was one of 
the first few Europeans to assume the identity of an Arab and adopted 
the name of Sheikh Ibrahim Ibn Abdullah. He presented a description 
of the social, economic and political institutions of the Bedouin. He 
began by classifying the Bedouin tribes, especially those of the Syrian 
Desert. He described the tent, furniture and dress of the people, 
proceeded then to elaborate upon their diet, arts, customs and 
manners. He portrayed the Bedouin as independent, freedom-loving 
and hospitable. He wrote of his first impressions of the Bedouin and of 
how his European image of them changed, in spite of all their faults: 
"My first view of the Bedouin in their own habitations m 
the Desert was recently after my arrival from Europe, 
while the impressions which I brought with me were still 
very strong. Whatever preference I might give in general to 
the European character, yet I was soon obliged to 
acknowledge, on seeing the Bedouin, that, with all their 
faults, they are one of the noblest nations with which I 
ever had an opportunity of becoming acquainted" (Quoted 
by Nasir, p.59). 
Burckhardt depicts the Arab male as displaying a masculine nature 
when defending his guests willingly risking his own life. He is also 
portrayed him as jealously protective of his women, yet allowing them 
to laugh and talk with strangers. Burckhardt spoke of the Bedoui9 as 
the true Arab who is not corrupted by city life. He is a lover of poetry, of 
oratory and of eloquence. He wrote "a Bedouin will not submit to any 
command, but readily yields to persuasion", he also leads a democratic 
life. "The Sheikh has no fixed authority, but endeavours to maintain 
9 Burckhardt uses the Arabic term "Bedoui" which in English is usually written as a 
Bedouin 
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his influence by the means which wealth, talents, courage and noble 
birth afford. Although the Sheikh can alone decide in minor matters, 
yet when it comes to major problems the opinion of every 
distinguished individual in the tribe must be ascertained" (Nasir, p.60-
61). 
Edward Henry Palmer, known as Sheikh Abdullah, was another 
English figure who developed an interest in the Arabs. He was born in 
Cambridge in 1840, and studied several languages such as Urdu, 
Persian and Arabic. At an early age he was translating English poetry 
into Arabic, "my favourite language". 
In his book Desert of the Exodus, Palmer described the area he was to 
explore as "the great and terrible wilderness", which was infested with 
Arabs. He perceived the natives of this area as primitive and evil. He 
was aware that his attitude towards the Bedouin was at odds with the 
romantic image then prevailing in England, and remarked: 
"I cannot expect respectable and tax-paying Englishmen to 
enter with much appreciation into the Bedawin question, 
and 1 know the prejudice that exists, in this country 
particularly, against the extinction of a romantic and 
interesting race" (Quoted in Nasir, p.66-67). 
The Bedoui was depicted as a renegade and uncivilised robber, of 
whom Palmer insisted that "robbery is not regarded by the Bedawin as 
in the least a disgraceful thing" (ibid.,). Palmer was also interested in 
writing about ancient Arabs who prided themselves upon three things, 
above all: These were elegance in speech, hospitality and the 
camaraderie of robbery. The first two qualities, according to Palmer, 
have gradually disappeared, and what remained was "their daring and 
persistence in making raids". However, the first two characteristics can 
still be perceived in the twentieth century Western images of the 
Arabs, to criticise Palmer, it could be argued that it is rather the third 
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quality which has now disappeared, though it has been replaced by 
similarly hostile images. 
To call the Bedouin "son of the desert" was a misnomer, Palm er also 
likened the Bedouin to the American Red Indians; but he considered 
the latter inferior to the former, who possessed greater independence 
and dignity. 
'The sympathy already wasted on the Red man of North 
America warns me that I am treading on delicate ground, 
but I must nevertheless state my belief that the "noble 
savage" is a simple and unmitigated nuisance. To the 
Bedawin this applies even more forcibly still ..... (Quoted 
from Nasir, p.68). 
This quotation demonstrates the hatred Palmer had for the desert and 
the Bedouin, and he thus stood arrogantly outside of the generally 
favourable picture which was being painted of them by some of his 
countrymen, such as Richard Burton. 
During the same century, two Englishmen of different backgrounds 
and outlook proved to be greatly instrumental in adding to the 
growing conglomeration of ideas and impressions of Arabs. These 
men, Victorian travellers and explorers, were Sir Richard Burton (1821-
90) and Wilfred Scawen Blunt (1840-1922). 
Of the two, perhaps Burton contributed the most to the image of the 
Arabs in England. He was often referred to as Burton of Arabia and was 
known as a flamboyant figure in the annals of English travellers to the 
Arab World. 
Although Burton's portrayal of the Arabs and their world was 
romantically rendered, his general attitude towards them was that of 
ambivalence. The deserts represented a colourful and exciting 
landscape to Burton, the adventurer. He portrayed the wide and wild 
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deserts as a land in which man felt free and emandpated from the 
hypocritical and servile aspects of civilisation. 
Captured by his surroundings, Burton saw the desert as a haven, an 
escape from the drudgery of Europe. "At Lastl" he remarked with 
ardour in the opening sentence of his book, The Gold-Mines of Midian. 
"Once more it is my fate to escape the prison-life of civilised Europe, 
and to refresh body and mind by studying nature in her noblest and 
most admirable form- the nude. Again I am to enjoy a glimpse of the 
glorious desert; to inhale the sweet pure breath of translucent skies that 
show the red stars burning upon the very edge and verge of the 
horizon; and to strengthen myself by a short visit to the Wild Man and 
his old home" (ibid., p.71). 
Burton portrayed the Arabs of the desert more favourably than the city 
Arabs. He was impressed with the nomadic life, the freedom, 
cleanliness and manliness of the Bedouin, as compared to the degraded 
city dweller, of whom he wrote, ''There is degradation, moral and 
physical, in handiwork compared with the freedom of the Desert," and 
continued to insist, " The loom and the file do not conserve courtesy 
and chivalry like the sword and the spear." To Burton the desert 
nomads were the noble Arabs who possessed mercy, whereas the urban 
Arabs were untrustworthy and unattractive. 
As he despised the life of the city, on the contrary, the Arab of the 
desert symbolised for Burton the embodiment of chivalry. He observed 
that "from ancient periods of the Arab's history we find him practising 
knight-errantry, the wildest form of chivalry." He saw in the Arabs the 
origin of love: "I should attribute the origin of 'love' to the influence 
of the Arabs' poetry and chivalry upon European ideas rather than the 
medieval Christianity," he asserted. "Certain 'Fathers of the Church', it 
must be remembered, did not believe that women have souls. The 
Moslems never went so far" (ibid., p. 71). 
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In his account Burton proposed numerous ways for the proper 
treatment of the Arabs. In The Gold Mines of Midian, he divides the 
Arabs into two categories: the Bedouin, and the city Arab, whom he 
identifies with the "Fellah" (the peasant Arab). Concerning the former, 
he described him as "still a gentleman in his native wilds. Easy and 
quiet, courteous and mild-mannered, he expects you to respect him, 
and upon that condition he respects you- still without a shade of 
obsequiousness or servility" (ibid., p. 72). Moreover, "the Bedawi never 
tells a lie, and when told one, never forgets it. His confidence is gone 
forever, and all the suspiciousness of his nature is aroused." Burton 
finds these qualities very useful, for "should we find it necessary to 
raise regiments of these men, nothing would be easier, " he wrote. "Pay 
them regularly, arm them well, work them hard, and treat them with 
even-handed justice- there is nothing else to do". He believed that 
Arabs "respect manly measures, not the hysterical philanthropic 
pseudo-humanitarianism of our modern Government, which is really 
the cruellest of all" (ibid., p.74). 
Burton's account of Islam, as Nasir makes clear, was very favourable in 
comparison to his views of Christianity. Burton wrote that Islam 
"systematically exalts human nature which Christianity takes infinite 
trouble to degrade and debase". 
The second Englishman to be mentioned is Wilfred Blunt, who began 
his career as a diplomat, was attracted to the Arabs for two reasons: first 
he admired them as a sensitive and emotional race of people who 
possessed human qualities which appealed to him; secondly, he found 
them to be oppressed people in need of help in their fight against 
foreign domination, especially against the spread of British 
imperialism. 
He disapproved of the subjection of the Eastern people by the West. 
Although he had great admiration for the French, he resented the fact 
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that the indigenous people of the country were made servants to the 
Frankish Lords. Blunt desired the foremost to help the Arabs attain 
their freedom from the Ottoman Empire. Initially, he believed that 
England would argue for the Arab cause. However, he soon realised 
the contrary, that British Imperialism was a major force which 
inhibited Arab National movements. Nasir refers to Blunt's book, 
Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt, which he looked up 
to England to act as a friend of the Fellahin, "in their actual condition 
of beggary, robbed and beaten and perishing of hunger". But 
disappointed in his country, he exclaimed, "The (Egyptians) did not 
suspect the immense commercial selfishness which had led us, 
collectively as a nation, to so many aggressions on the weak races of the 
world"(Nasir, p.78). Blunt sympathised deeply with the common man 
of Egypt. "The Egyptians," he wrote, "are a good, honest people as any 
in the world-all, that is, who do not sit in the high places, of these I 
know nothing" (ibid.,). 
It is essential here, to provide a brief outline of the position of the 
British Government in Egypt during the nineteenth century in order to 
understand some of Blunt's work. 
First, the British Government became politically, diplomatically and 
economically aware of Egypt's strategic importance at the time of 
Napoleon's Egyptian conquests in 1798. Although the French 
occupation of Egypt lasted only three years, numerous technicians were 
put to work establishing schools and hospitals and commencing 
various other projects. 
In 1801 the French army were driven out of Egypt by the allied forces of 
the British and Egyptian armies. Mohammed Ali, an officer in the 
Albanian contingent in the Ottoman Army, seized power in 1805. He 
embarked on numerous reforms in an attempt to modernise the 
country. One of his accomplishments was the creation of a well-
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disciplined and well-equipped army for Egypt. In 1831 he successfully 
invaded Syria. Nine years later he relinquished his occupation in 
return for international recognition of hereditary rule in Egypt. 
However, Mohammed Ali and his successors involved Egypt in heavy 
financial losses, especially over the expense of the Suez Canal, built 
under the supervision of the French engineer de Lesseps in 1869, 
which was added to the mounting expenses. This exploit, though a 
tremendous achievement, was a cumbersome monetary burden. 
To remedy this grave financial problem, the rulers of Egypt imposed 
heavy taxation on the Egyptians. Despite this attempted solution, 
financially the country became almost wholly dependent on the 
European powers. As a result of internal discontent, Arabi Pasha, an 
Egyptian army officer, led an army revolution against the Khedive, the 
Ruler of Egypt, in 1881. 
In full knowledge of these facts, British forces invaded and occupied 
Egypt in 1882, in order to protect the growing British interests in the 
area, especially since the Suez Canal had become an important trade 
route to the East, and especially to India. 
It was against this background of warfare and politics that Blunt 
perceived the Egyptians and their country. He disapproved of the 
British occupation of Egypt, and particularly of the methods that were 
being adopted by Cromer in his treatment of the Egyptians as the 
conquered people. 
Blunt believed that he could help the Arabs attain their political 
aspirations through the revitalisation of Islam. In his book The Future 
of Islam, he appealed to his countrymen in particular and the West in 
general to view Islam as a positive force which had contributed to 
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human knowledge and values. Christians, he argued, should not fear 
Islam since 
"Christendom has pretty well abandoned her hopeless task 
of converting Islam, as Islam has abandoned hers of 
conquering Europe; and it is surely time that moral 
sympathy should unite the two great bodies of men who 
believe in and worship the same God" (ibid., p. 81). 
Nevertheless, Blunt presented the Arabs who lived away from Turkish 
influences as a most civilised and contented group: "In Nejd above all 
countries of the world I have visited, either East or West, the three 
great blessings of which we in Europe make our boast, though we do 
not in truth possess them, are a living reality: 'Liberty, Equality, 
Brotherhood', names only even in France, where they are written up 
on every wall, but here practically enjoyed by every free man," he 
asserted. He depicted the Arab community as enjoying true democracy 
and real fraternity. "Here was a community living as our idealists have 
dreamed, without taxes, without police, without conscription, without 
compulsion of any kind, whose only law was public opinion, and 
whose only order a principal of honour," he wrote. In addition to his 
involvement with the Arabs and their political problems, Blunt also 
admired pre-Islamic Arabic poetry. Asad (1964), the author of Three 
Victorian Travellers, stated that "the impact of Arabic culture is 
evident in Blunt as a post," and emphasised that Blunt "admired 
Arabic poetry of pre-Islamic times because it was naive in its display of 
emotion, uninhibited, and hedonistic". (Asad, p.93). Blunt, a 
recognised poet, turned into English verse his wife's translation of the 
Mu' allakat and The Stealing of the Mare. 
In general, Blunt depicted the Arabs as a noble race with a superior 
culture, who were not "contaminated" by western civilisation. He 
sympathised with their aspirations for freedom from foreign 
domination and, furthermore, he commiserated with the poor 
common man. 
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These two men lived with Arabs and had intimate contacts with them, 
in which each traveller had presented a different portrayal of the Arabs. 
Asad (1964) described their views about Arabs as follows: "Burton's 
view of the Arab was too grotesque; Blunt's too ornate, too 
sentimental" (ibid., p.x). Nonetheless, their portrayal of Arabs was, 
taken as a whole, colourful and romantic. Burton perceived the desert 
Arab as a noble savage, chivalrous, hospitable, revengeful and free, 
while Blunt admired him for his sensitivity, high tradition and 
aspiration for freedom. 
Eliot Warburton, another English tourist in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, travelled to the Middle East in 1844, having been 
attracted by the colourful image of the East acquired from the portrayals 
of the area and its people by adventurers, writers and poets. His 
experiences were recounted in a book entitled The Crescent and Cross. 
He presented the Middle East as unchanging through time. European 
travellers were attracted by the colourful and exotic nature of the East 
as well as the culture of antiquity. He portrayed the Egyptian city of 
Alexandria and was repelled by it, seeing it as a place whose suburbs 
"are encrusted with the wretched hovels of the Arab poor", being built 
of "filthy lanes, with blank white windowless and doorless walls on 
either side". He compared it to "the handsome square of tall white 
houses", of the French quarter of the same city. Warburton, like many 
of his English contemporaries, was enchanted with the Nile and with 
the antiquities of Egypt. In both romantic and glowing terms, he 
exhorts his readers to abandon the "feverish life of Europe" and come 
away to the majestic Nile (Nasir, op.cit., p.100). 
He also held the desert Arabs in little respect. Although he described 
them as hospitable, he portrayed them in general as wild and fierce. He 
wrote of them: "This reverence for hospitality is one of the wild 
virtues that has survived from the days of the patriarchs, and it is 
singularly contrasted, yet interwoven with other and apparently 
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opposite tendencies. The Arab will rob you, if he is able; he will even 
murder you, if it suits his purpose; but once under the shelter of his 
tribe's black tents, or having eaten of his salt by the way-side, you have 
as much safety in his company as his heart's blood can purchase for 
you" (ibid., p.l02). He explained that Bedouin possessed some desirable 
qualities, such as reliability and bravery. 
Warburton was more fascinated with the history of the Arabs than 
with the living people with whom he made contact. He recalls the 
history of the Crusades, in particular the legendary Saladin and 
emphasises the chivalry and bravery of the Arab warrior. However, he 
was less concerned with current situation in the Middle East and 
tended to reproduce many of the popular stereotypes of the nineteenth 
century thought, despite being critical of other Western travellers. 
2.7.2. American Orientalists 
From the other continent, during the nineteenth century, readings 
from The Arabian Nights and similar literature had preconditioned 
the American traveller even before journeying to the Orient and 
definitely shaped his attitude to things Oriental. Such was the case of 
the writer of "Letters From Asia": 
"The pleasing reflections arising from having persued 
Eastern Tales, which had so often beguiled many of my 
leisure hours, causing the mind to dwell on scenes that can 
exist only in the imagination, almost led me to fancy tha t 
they would be realised in Asia- those beautiful 
compositions often executed, at our theatres, under the title 
of "Turkish music" tending to strengthen the illusion" 
(Quoted in Sha'ban, p.179). 
Travellers in the Orient did not have such reservations to spoil their 
romantic dream (ibid., p.180). And some Americans like George 
William Curtis, Bayard Taylor, Richard Stoddard, and William Alger 
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were ideal examples of the inveterate romantics who drifted down 
with complete abandon into the Oriental world of imagination. 
It was thought that there was something about the primitive state of 
the Oriental, especially the Bedouin society, that appealed to American 
travellers. Perhaps the Arab of the desert was a reminder of the past 
innocence of America before the advent of political, cultural and 
industrial maturity. In a sense, the Arab provided an outlet, an escape 
to the world of romance and simplicity. The Bedouins were lovingly 
described by Curtis (see Sha'ban, 1991) as dignified and sober creatures. 
Curtis rose to the height of his romantic sympathy when he pictured 
the nobility of the primitive dweller of the desert: 
'The Bedoueen is mild and peaceable. He seems to you a 
dreamy savage. There is a softness and languor, almost an 
effeminacy of impression, the seal of the son's child. He 
does not eat flesh- or rarely. He loves the white camel 
with a passion. He fights for defense, or for necessity; and 
the children of the Shereefs, or descendants of the Prophet, 
are sent into the desert to be made heroes. They remain 
there eight or ten years, rarely visiting their families" 
(ibid., p. 186). 
The character of the 'noble savage' was an object of sympathetic 
admiration for many American travellers. A range of other American 
writers also presented a highly romanticised view of the Arab, 
common points in their accounts focus around notions of elegance, 
refinement, hospitality, and bravery. 
The desert setting and the simple, primitive life of Muslims, especially 
the Bedouins, made them particularly attractive to the American 
traveller. In his eyes they were the direct descendants of Ishmael, 
retaining all the wild nature, purity and simplicity associated with that 
original prototype. Sarah Haight (in Sha'ban, 1991) saw this in the 
amazed reaction of the Arabs of Egypt when she showed them a 
compass and explained that they could tell by it where to turn their 
faces when they prayed. The same innocence was displayed by the Arab 
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Sheikh who was taken by Henry Jessop (also see Sha'ban) on a tour of 
the printing press which the missionaries established in Beirut, by the 
hundred of Arabs who flocked to see the USS Delaware in every 
Islamic port, and by the group of Arabs from Muscat who visited the 
United States of America in April, 1840, and were taken by train to 
upper New York. The responses of all of these groups to Western 
society, as described by Americans, similarly revealed the Muslim as a 
primitive, simple man, still in communion with nature. 
The collective life and character of the Arabs, as observed by American 
travellers, confirmed this picture. The pages of travel accounts are 
punctuated with observations of the unsophisticated lifestyles of the 
natives. MilIard, among others, gave a good deal of attention to the 
collective life of the Bedouin Arabs in their natural habitat, following 
their regular daily routine. To him they seemed like "the sons and 
daughters of Ishmael" whose life represented the fulfilment of 
prophecy. And when MilIard got to know the Bedouins well, he did 
not mind their company; in fact, he began to think they were "good 
fellows". Close prolonged association often resulted in a better 
understanding and appreciation of these primitive people and of their 
simple nature. Other American accounts of the Orient praise the 
courageous and reckless willingness to protect or save certain favoured 
travellers. 
This collective image of the Muslims, Arabs or Bedouins· was 
characteristic of the Western, particularly British and American, 
concept of these primitive and remote people. One of the most 
fascinating and idealistic descriptions of the Arabs appeared in Irving's 
analysis, given in Sha'ban, of the Prophet Mohammed's social and 
cultural setting. Describing the Arab of the desert, Irving said: 
'The necessity of being always on the alert to defend his 
flocks and herds made the Arab of the desert familiar from 
his infancy with the exercise of arms. None could excel him 
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in the use of the bow, the lance and the scimiter, and the 
adroit and graceful management of the horse. He was a 
predatory warrior also; for though at times he was engaged 
in the service of the merchant, furnishing him with camels 
and guides and drivers for the transportation of his 
merchandise, he was more apt to lay contributions on the 
caravan or plunder it outright in its toilful progress through 
the desert. All this he regarded as a legitimate exercise of 
arms; looking down upon the gainful sons of traffic as an 
inferior race, debased by sordid habits and pursuit. 
Though a restless and predatory warrior, he was generous 
and hospitable. He delighted in giving gifts, his door was 
always open to the wayfarer, with whom he was ready to 
share his last morsel, and his deadliest foe, having once 
broken bread with him, might repose securely beneath the 
inviolable sanctity of his tent" (ibid., p.187). 
Sha'ban also provides a commentary of the views of Thomas Carlyle, 
who devoted one of his hero essays to the Prophet Mohammed, "Left 
alone with the Universe, by night the great deep Heaven with its stars", 
he said, the Arabs acquired the habits of nobility, generosity, meditation 
and enthusiasm. They are, furthermore, taciturn, but eloquent, gifted 
when they do speak. Mohammed, having been born and raised in this 
setting, uttered words "as no other man's words. Direct from the inner 
fact of things; he lives, and has to live, in daily communion with that. 
"Such a man", said Carlyle, "is what we call an original man; he comes 
to us first hand." His words are "a fiery mass of lifecast-up from the 
great bosom of Nature herself. To kindle the world; the world's Maker 
had ordered it so" (ibid., p. 189). 
Another aspect of Muslim life which impressed some American 
travellers in the Orient is the simplicity of Muslim worship and 
prayers. The call to prayer in a rough, unmusical human voice 
sounded unaffected to Western ears. Many travellers enjoyed recording 
in their accounts their own English versions of the Mu'azin's call to 
prayer. In his Clarel, Melville wrote a description of the morning 
prayer which he entitled "Under the Minaret"; 
"But ere they might accost or meet, 
From Minaret in grounds hard by 
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Of Omar, the muezzin's cry-
Tardy, for Mustapha was old, 
And age a laggard is-was rolled, 
Announcing Islam's early house 
Of orision .... 
.... But, promptly, still 
Each turban at that summons shrill, 
Which should have called ere perfect light, 
Bowed-hands on chest, or arms upright; 
While over all those fields of loss 
Where now the Crescent rides the Cross, 
Sole at the marble mast-head stands 
The Islam herald, his two hands 
Upon the rail, and sightless eyes 
Turned upward reverent towards the skies ... " (ibid.,) 
Echoes of this call could be heard also in poems by William Alger and 
Bayard Taylor, among other American poets. One of Alger's poems 
entitled "The Call to Evening Prayer" describes the enchanting 
atmosphere of Oriental devotion, concluding with this beautiful, 
though not wholly authentic lines: 
"In the prophet's name, God is God, and there is no other.' 
On roofs, in streets, alone, or close beside his brother, Each 
Moslem kneels, his forehead turned towards Mecca's 
shrine. And all the world forgotten in one thought divine" 
(ibid.,). 
The Islamic prayer was as exotic and baffling as the Arab's strange 
language and the mysterious face behind the veil. The traveller often 
tried to penetrate that mystery and to interpret, within the context of 
his Western thinking, the meaning behind the physical motions of 
Muslim prayer. Many travellers were not able to divest themselves of 
preconceptions; to them the prayer performed by Muslims were mere 
physical gesticulations without meaning. Haight made fun of the Arab 
sailors on the Nile who stopped everything when called to prayer, and 
described the Arab "swinging his arms, and prostrating and striking his 
forehead". The Arab, according to the American Lady, left his breakfast 
untasted in order to satisfy his conscience, but in reality he was 
"whetting his appetite by an extra half-hour's gymnastics" (ibid., p.191). 
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What the traveller saw in these motions was only their outward 
appearance and in many cases he insisted on the "seeming" aspect of 
the act of worship. A good example of the stubborn incredulity of 
travellers is the description of these prayers given by William 
Thomson, author of The Land and the Book. "Muslim prayers", 
Thomson said, "are subject for a most interesting study-a scene not 
witnessed in all places in such perfection". The men stood on an 
elevated terrace, having spread their cloaks and rugs, and, Thomson 
said: 
''They are Moslems preparing to say prayers-perform them 
rather, in this most public place, and in the midst of alI 
this noise and confusion. 
Let us stop and watch the ceremony as it goes on. The man 
next to us raises his open hands till the thumbs touch the 
ears, exclaiming aloud, Allah hu-Akbar- 'God is great'" 
(ibid.,). 
Thomson continued to describe the seemingly calisthenic nature of the 
ceremonies in detail, and then observed that "they seem to be wholly 
absorbed in their devotions, and manifest a power of isolation and 
abstraction quite surprising". 
"That is the result of habit and education; small children 
imitate it to perfection. There is certainly an air of great 
solemnity in their mode of worship, and when performed by 
a large assembly in the mosques, or by a detachment of 
soldiers in concert, guided in their genuflections by an 
imaum or dervish, who sings the service, it is quite 
impressive. I have seen it admirably enacted by moonlight 
on the wild banks of the Orontes, in the plain of Hamath, 
and the scene was something more than romantic. But, alas! 
it was by as villanous a set of robbers as could be found even 
in that lawless region" (ibid., p.192). 
Observing some Bedouins at prayer from a distance, another American 
traveller, Charles Leland, thought they resembled sheep, by the way in 
which the heads moved and the vocal sounds were made. 
William Lynch, on the other hand, stood amazed at the devotion of 
Arabs at prayer. He also witnessed the early morning prayers and, like 
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other American travellers looking at the outward physical signs, 
exclaimed over the obvious pride of the worshippers in their religion, 
However, he suggested that, despite their piety, this religion was too 
primitive or savage to rank alongside Christianity, 
Willis and Taylor were also understanding, the latter showing his 
recognition of the exotic but touching devotion of the Muslim in two 
poems which he included in his Poems of the Orient, In "Arab Prayer" 
the Arab character is presented in all its aspects: the romantic, the 
fierce, and the devout. Some of the verses follow: 
"La ilIah i1'Allah!" the muezzin's call 
Comes from the minaret, slim and tall, 
That looks o'er the distant city's wall. 
"La illah i1'Allah!" the Faithful heed, 
With God and the prophet this hour to plead: 
Whose ear is open to hear their need, 
The sun is sunken, no vapor mars 
The path of his going with dusky bars, 
The silent Desert awaits the stars, 
I bend the knee and I stretch the hand, 
I strike my orehead upon the sand, 
And I pray aloud, that He understand, 
Not for my father, for he is dead; 
Not in my wandering brother's stead-
For myself alone I bow the head, 
God is Great, and God is Just: 
He knoweth the hearts of the children of dust-
He is the Helper, in him I trust. 
This is the American Orientalism of the mid nineteenth century, It is a 
complex web of images and stereotypes which emphasise a certain 
romance and dignity in the Arab world, We also observe the 
appearance of a new aspect in the Western interpretation of Islamic 
religion which constructs a notion of zealotary and irrationality, 
2,8. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
In the twentieth century, the West had developed both emotional and 
political involvement with the Arabs, On the one hand, both the desert 
48 
Chapter 2 Arab and Moslem Images in History 
and the Bedouin seemed to have captured the imagination of the 
Westerner: the desert was unspoiled and exciting, a place where the 
spirit is more alive. The Bedouin, although believed to be simple and 
easily manipulated, were true aristocrats with a nobility of tradition. 
There was however, another side to the image of the Arabs, in Britain: 
a hostile attitude which had developed towards the urban dwellers, 
who were represented as debased, corrupt and dangerous. The slums 
and bazaars of the cities were described as places where various types of 
animals mingled with multitudes of people: beggars, dishonest 
turbaned merchants, veiled harems and filthy children. 
The Western stereotypes of Arabs continued to accumulate into the 
twentieth century, the century in which Britain was deeply involved 
both politically and economically with the Arab world. The influence 
of travellers, scholars, politicians, pressure groups such as Zionists, and 
the growing influence of the mass media (motion pictures and the 
press) of this century had exploited the old images held by the British 
on Arabs, reinforced, vulgarised and popularised it. One of the most 
influential writers was controversial but faScinating figure is Thomas 
E. Lawrence better known as Lawrence of Arabia. He was instrumental 
in constructing the contemporary image of the Arabs in both England 
and the West. Lawrence's adventures with the Arabs became so widely 
publicised that fact and fiction became closely interwoven and the man 
became a legend in his own time.1 0 
In June 1909 Lawrence made his first trip to Syria and visited most of 
the castles of the Crusade period. It is claimed that he journeyed on foot 
and on one occasion was attacked by Kurds who robbed and beat him. 
In 1910, he decided to return to Oxford for a short period of time, then 
he returned to Syria, studied Arabic and joined D. G. Hogarth in Oxford 
10 Many books were written on his life, work and journeys. See Aldington (1955) 
Lawrence of Arabia: A Bibliographical Inquiry, Collins, Knightly Simpson, C. (1969) 
The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia. 
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for an expedition on a tour to Palestine and Syria. Lawrence took part 
in the excavations of the great Hittiti mounds on the banks of the 
Euphrates, Iraq. He travelled in the area and claimed to have made 
friends with Sheikh Hamoudi. 
When the first World War broke out, Lawrence was ordered to go to 
Egypt, where he engaged in intelligence work. This signalled the 
beginning of the events about which he wrote and as a result of which 
he became widely popular. 
Lawrence was viewed in England as the British-Arab desert warrior 
who, according to many, became the "uncrowned King of Arabia". He 
was credited with uniting the Arabs and leading them into successful 
battles against the Ottoman Turks. In fact Lawrence was principally a 
liaison officer between the Arabs and the British Government. The 
Arab who yearned for their independence from Ottoman rule had long 
before the advent of Lawrence agitated against the Turks. During the 
war the Arab force, which was composed of Bedouin warriors, was led 
into battle by Faisal, Sherif Hussein's son. Lawrence himself admitted 
this when he described the revolt: "It was an Arab war waged and led 
by Arabs for an Arab aim in Arabia" (Lawrence, 1973, p.21). 
After the War, Lawrence wrote his book The Seven Pillars of Wisdom. 
The work was widely read in Britain and the West and served as a 
source from which pictures of Arabs were drawn. In his book, he 
recorded his experiences and recounted his exploits with the Arabs. In 
addition, he provided a portrayal of the Arabs which generally fitted 
within the framework of their image in the West. The Bedouin 
fascinated Lawrence and he referred to them as both peasants and 
townspeople. He spoke of the desert as the "naked desert under the 
indifferent heaven" with "the effortless, empty, eddyless wind ... 
throbbing past ... born somewhere and had dragged its way across many 
days and nights of dead grass, to its first obstacle, the man-made 
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walls ... " (Lawrence, p.38). The Bedouin represented to Lawrence the 
desert dweller who was "born and grown up in it, had embraced with 
all his soul this nakedness... He lost material ties, comforts, all 
superfluities and other complications to achieve a personal liberty 
which haunted starvation and death" (ibid. p.38). In his book, he 
described the Arabs as dogmatic, simple, superficial and unstable. 
However, Lawrence proceeded to assert that the Arabs at that time were 
incapable of maintaining the momentum of their national 
movements, but a day might come, he warned, although distant, when 
their "wave ... might roll unchecked over the place where the material 
world had been, and God would move upon the face of those waters" 
(ibid. pAl). Apart from the political connotations of his work, Lawrence 
conveyed the image of the Arabs in their traditional romantic 
colourful role, with himself as their leader. 
As mentioned before, Lawrence was viewed by his own nation as an 
Englishman who knew how the Arab mind functioned and could 
correctly interpret both the history and the national movements of the 
Arabs. Moreover, he was seen as possessing the ability to disguise 
himself as an Arab without detection. Needless to say, the Arabs did 
not share the view of Lawrence held in the West. Many Arab 
historians and writers, while giving Lawrence some credit for his 
military services, deny the fact that his disguise was successful and 
doubt whether his understanding of their national movement was 
correct. George Antonius (1938), the Arab author of the book, The Arab 
Awakening, points to the fact that Lawrence's image of himself as set 
in his book The Seven Pillars of Wisdom contradicts Arabs evidence of 
the campaign, and of Lawrence. "It is doubtful," writes Antonius, 
"whether Lawrence was fully conscious of the extent of his limitations, 
though he frequently alluded to them in speech or in his writing. He 
was aware, for instance, that his knowledge of Arabic was far from 
perfect, yet he believed that he was sufficiently fluent in it to pass for an 
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Arab in conversation with Arabs. In that, he showed more self 
confidence than powers of observation, as anyone could tell who had 
heard his pronunciation." Antonius stresses that "it is conceivable that 
now and again, in casual encounters, he may have escaped detection. 
But neither his accent nor his use of words, to say nothing of his 
appearance, could have deceived anyone in Arabia for long: and an 
episode in The Seven Pillars of Wisdom in which he tried to pass for 
an Arab under the scrutiny and cross examination of a suspicious 
stranger, shows the lengths to which he could go in deluding himself". 
Antonius who had personally met and conversed with Lawrence on 
one occasion for three hours, commented, "I was struck with the self 
assurance with which he passed judgement on certain issues, and by 
the startling inconsistency between the professed weakness of his 
Arabic and the uses to which he kept putting it." (Antonius, 1938, 
p.321). 
The role which Lawrence played as an imperialist 'agent' acting in the 
interests of his country made him co-operate with the powerful 
movement of Zionism, whose leaders and advocates were using their 
efforts to sway British public opinion in favour of the creation of a 
Jewish 'National Home' in Palestine - efforts which resulted in the 
Balfour Declaration of 1917. This 'National Home' would form, as 
Lawrence maintained, an important bridge-head for the British Empire 
in this sensitive geographical position. His views on the Arabs had 
reflected his racist beliefs- backward, lazy and incapable of any 
agricultural and intellectual achievement; therefore the Western 
civilisation should be introduced to them through Zionism, to make 
'their desert bloom', and to bring them to a high standard of 
civilisation as well. 
In the mean time, Britain had already made two promises: one to the 
Arabs and the other to the Jews. The Arabs were explicitly promised 
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their freedom and independence in return for their support in the First 
World War. This pledge was made in a number of letters between 
Sherif Hussein, the then leader of the Arab national movement, and 
Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt. (See 
Nasir, 1979, p. 134, & Ingrams, 1972, p.2) On the other hand, the British 
Government, two years later, made a commitment to the Zionists in 
1917 in the Balfour Declaration (Ingrams, 1972, p.7) which promised to 
assist the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine. 
Moreover, these two promises were compounded by a third promise 
made to the French in the Sykes-Picot Agreement: to dissect and divide 
the Arab nation between Britain and France. The promise to the Arabs 
was broken, whereas the promises to both the Jews and the French 
were honoured. This indicates the disregard the British seemed to have 
for the Arabs, believing that "the incorrigible children" could easily be 
lied to and could be put off by a few apt political promises. The Zionist 
claims that the Arabs did not exist in Palestine. Presentation of facts 
about the Arabs and the situation in Palestine was a distortion of 
reality. The Zionist Organisation in London had established contacts 
with the Foreign Office and provided it with "information" about the 
situation in Palestine. In a letter to the Foreign Office dated 3 May 1921, 
the Zionist organisation presented the Arabs as terrorists and fanatical 
murderers, as the result of a riot that had earlier broken out between 
Arabs and Jews in Jaffa (Nasir, op. cit. p.138). 
2.9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
From its very beginning the West has viewed the Arab Islamic East in a 
complex and ambivalent manner. The East has always been regarded as 
potential threat though the forms and manifestations of this threat 
shift and change over the centuries. The East is seen as "Other" and 
"opposite", sometimes this "Otherness" has been interpreted in 
romantic and nostalgic terms as if the East contains elements somehow 
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lost in the course of Western development. At certain moments of 
political, economic or military sensitivity this ambivalent core of 
images has become reduced and skewed in favour of a more hostile 
outlook. 
The complex relation between East and West first became demarcated 
with the rise of Christianity and its encounter with Islam in the 
seventh century. Already Islam appears as a threat however, at this 
stage there is a degree of mutual respect and a dual and reciprocal 
relationship if only on the battlefield. Later, by the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, commercial and political considerations led the 
West to study Islam and the Arab Islamic culture through 
'Orientalism' in order to subject it to imperialist definition and control. 
The negative attitudes of the West towards the Arabs and their religion 
Islam had impeded a true understanding of what Islam really meant 
and how rich the Arab's culture was. But inevitably, a body of errors 
were created through the centuries, which led to racist beliefs that 
dominated the Western culture in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries and determined that the Western image of the Arabs. 
Travellers, writers, and poets (Orientalist in general) had viewed the 
Orient as fundamentally backward, primitive and desperately in need 
of re-generation by the West. These images were popularised and 
institutionalised and became part of the Western culture. However in 
the same time, the Arab world was required by the Western 
imagination to fulfil the role of a fantasy world, composed of riches 
and magic now lost in the modern Western societies. As the West 
developed the romanticised and exotic view of the East, something of 
the dual or reciprocal relation was lost, since it was the West which had 
an almost exclusive power to define the East. In his readings about the 
immense scope of Orientalism and its subject matter, Edward Said's 
study of the same name, contends that "no one is likely to imagine a 
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field symmetrical to (Orientalism) called Occidentalism" (Said, op. cit. 
p.50). 
In summary, the cultural legacy of these shifting and ambivalent 
historical images of the Arab-Islamic East can be divided into two key 
components. Firstly the positive images centring around a 
romanticism and idealisation of the East; and secondly, of growing 
importance the negative images of threat and demonization. Both of 
these components should be seen as images not as "truths", and both 
concern the defining of an alien "Otherness". A number of images 
overlap both these categories, terms such as "mysterious" and "exotic". 
The Western images generated by Orientalism were characterised by all 
of these terms, positive, negative and ambivalent. However, a number 
of examples of Orientalism have been presented which show the more 
positive views gaining temporary precedence over the negative ones. 
The following chapter will provide a detailed exploration of Said's 
work and his use of the term "Orientalism". His approach will be 
appraised as important, useful yet flawed in some respects. We will 
also address the related field of "Modernisation Theory" in a critical 
manner. Chapter four will deal with the erosion of the more positive 
images of the Arab world and the increase of Negativity or 
demonization. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ORIENTALlSM: "SELF" VERSUS "OTHER" 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, some light has been shed upon the principle of 
Orientalism since the time it came into being until recent times. As 
presented, Orientalism has played a very remarkable role in the field of 
Western interpretations of Arab and Islamic culture. Certain basic 
factors in the history and culture of the West have contributed to the 
formation of an immense and influential body of knowledge known as 
Orientalism. As a result of the cumulative efforts of this institution, 
"the Orient has become the object of intense and uncompromising 
feelings in the West" (Sha'ban, 1991, p.ii). In chapter two we dealt with 
the literary accounts of Western travellers to the East. These accounts 
have structured and fed into the modern notion of Orientalism, 
however as we will show something of the "Romanticism" of these 
earlier accounts have been eroded in modern Western attitudes, 
particularly popular and media discourse. Further, we will show that 
Orientalism is internally contradictory including themes of both 
"Romanticism" and "Demonization". As Said's work entitled 
Oriental ism has become the most influential and best known study of 
this kind, it is necessary to begin with a detailed consideration of his 
approach. However, Said's approach will be shown to be flawed. The 
thesis will approach Orientalism through its two central aspects, the 
first can be termed intellectual, this refers to the way of understanding 
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Islam and constructions of "Otherness". The second is a historical 
concerned with relations between East and West and the resulting 
legacy of this movement which structures modern East-West relations. 
The effect of this legacy will be studied through a content analysis. 
The aim is to draw out the political implications of Said's work, to 
reach a position regarding Western notions of non Western cultures 
introducing firstly, a brief discussion of Said's work Orientalism which 
will help to alert us to the polemical nature of this topic. Here the 
relationship between knowledge and power that Said developed from 
Michel Foucault's analysis of cultural systems, in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge and later in Discipline and Punish, will be highlighted 
through the chapter. This chapter will establish a theoretical 
framework in terms of which such an analysis may be undertaken. The 
essential element of this framework is the opposition between the 
Western and non-Western perspectives, between "Self" and "Other", 
leading to the questions of similarity and difference or "Otherness" in 
discursive practices, what constitutes logical ways of thinking, and 
methods of communication. 
Some Western texts on Arab society and culture representative of 
mainstream academic scholarship will be examined. The purpose is to 
give, brief yet specific examples of how the relationship of "Self" and 
"Other" may determine the perspective and thus the orientation and 
language of scholarly writing on Arab culture and society. The 
determination to study these relations is to allow us to understand 
current events and social, economic, and political details is, ironically, a 
strong factor behind the demise of traditional Orientalism, which is 
more concerned with the dead past than with the living, puzzling 
present. In addition to academic discourse, the thesis will consider a 
range of popular and media discourses that tend to represent the Arab 
Islamic East as "Other". This is the purpose of the content analysis. 
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3.2. "SELF" & "OTHER" IN SAID'S ORIENTALISM 
Orientalism, as a body of "knowledge" was developed in the 
nineteenth century to comprehend the non-occidental world and 
preceded the development of the modern social sciences. Therefore it 
has acted as a preconditioning "schematising and dehistoricizing" 
(Asad, 1986, p.7) factor in the study of the Middle East. Orientalism has 
been maintained in part by virtue of the 'self-authenticating and self-
legitimising citationary method' used by Orientalist scholars. 
Said's definition of an Orientalist is "anyone who teaches, writes about, 
or researches the Orient" (Said, 1978, p.2). Said, however, means 
something both more specific and more general than this simple 
definition suggests. He defines Orientalism as "a style of thought based 
upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 
'the Orient and (most of the time) 'the Occident'," and also argues that 
Orientalism is "a corporate institution for dealing with the Orient; 
dealing with it by making statements about it, authorising views of it, 
describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it" (ibid., p.2-3). To 
Said, Orientalism does not study the Orient for the sake of establishing 
the truth of what it describes, and it does not possess a disinterested 
view of the object of its preoccupation. Said's criticism of Orientalism 
reaches a climax when it deals with a work that acquired unchallenged 
authority as a source of information about the Orient: William Lanes's 
Modern Egyptians, which in the 19th century virtually replaced the 
reality of the Orient itself as a criterion of truth about the Orient. As an 
example, Said refers to Nerval, for whom, when he 'borrows passages 
verbatim from Modern Egyptians, it is to use Lanes's authority to assist 
him in describing village scenes in Syria, not Egypt (ibid., p.23). The 
Foucauldian approach to Orientalism as a "discursive formation" 
enables Said to analyse a whole group of texts, constituting a field of 
study for themes, correspondences, affiliations, and silences, and to 
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show how these texts interpenetrate the political and economic project 
of colonising "the East". 
For Said one of the most striking characteristics of Orientalism is its 
textuality, especially the way the truths about a "real place" called the 
Orient are created out of texts that seem to refer only to other texts for 
their authority. This is what he calls the 'citationary nature' of 
Orientalism. What Said is trying to get at is something far more subtle 
and pervasive- what Said calls "a distribution of geopolitical awareness 
into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and 
philological texts" (ibid., p.12). This may work through individuals, as 
Said suggests in a passage noting the obvious point that: 
"if it is true that no production of knowledge in the human 
sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its author's involvement 
as a human subject in his own circumstances, then it must 
also be true that for a European or American studying the 
Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances 
of his actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a 
European or an American first, as an individual second. And 
to be a European or an American in such a situation is by no 
means an inert fact. It meant and means being aware, 
however dimly, that one belongs to a power with definite 
interests in the Orient, and more important, that one 
belongs to a part of the earth with a definite history of 
involvement in the Orient almost since the time of Homer" 
(Said, 1978, p. 11). 
Although it may work through individuals, the fundamental 
structural inequality between the worlds of Western scholars and their 
Third World subjects affects in complex and indirect ways the 
disciplines within which such individuals work. This needs to be 
explored.1 
"Contact between cultures always makes for drama: an 
ontological, communal drama of human differences or an 
existential, intellectual drama in the life of an individual. 
1 Some of the obvious issues are: Who is writing about whom, whose terms define the 
discourse, and as Asad (1986) argues, who translates whose concepts and whose 
language bends to the other. The ways anthropology's colonial and bourgeois origins 
affect the writing of ethnographies has begun to be taken up by a number of 
anthropologists other than Asad, for example Clifford Geertz and CareJton Coon. 
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Superficial contact creates a feeling of strangeness; mOre 
profound encounters risk bringing on the dissolution of the 
self, the shattering of its coherence, the end of the 
certitude, and a traumatic challenge to one's values' (Djait, 
1985, p.51). 
Said was interested in techniques of representation, of how an "Other" 
comes to be constituted. Said's subject matter was the "Orient", an 
exotic cultural system, which had succeeded for centuries in captivating 
the attention as well as causing fears and passions among Europeans. 
Said's "Orientals" are the subject of common institutional discourses 
and narratives who are identified, analysed, and controlled but never 
allowed to speak.2 All share a condition of "Otherness" arising from 
their perceived difference with respect to what is accepted as "normal", 
"true", and "right". 
Said's book is an exercise in textual criticism. Through a careful 
examination of scholarly writings, diplomatic archives, travel 
memoirs, and literary volumes, he comes to demonstrate how the 
Orient was first conceived "textually" by Europeans in the nineteenth 
century. According to Said, all societies acquire their identities through 
an interaction with another: an alien, a foreigner, or an enemy. A brief 
glance at the spectrum of political cultures around the world verifies 
Said's claim that the 'dichotomising technique of differentiation' 
between "Us" and "Them" is an important component of any 
organised system of political thought. Politics both as a discipline and a 
vocation classifies people on the basis of supporter or opponent, 
companion or rival, and most importantly, friend or enemy (Said, 
1985, p. 2). 
2 Orientalism depends indeed on the self-authenticating truism that the Orient cannot 
itself speak, that it demands this exteriority of representation: 'They cannot represent 
themselves; they must be represented" a statement by Marx used as an epigraph and 
quoted twice more (p.xiii, 21, 293). 
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Said contends that this interaction was made possible through a 
discourse of difference that he designates as "Orientalism". He defines 
"Orientalism" as: 
"enormously systematic discipline by which European 
culture was able to manage -- and even produce-- the Orient 
politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, 
scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-
Enlightenment period. 3 According to Said, Orientalism as a 
body of knowledge and system of representation succeeded 
in portraying the "Orient" as Europe's silent "civilisation 
other", The line which was drawn somewhere between 
present-day Greece and Turkey to separate Orient and 
Occident was not much a fact of nature but rather an 
invention of European "imaginative geography" we must 
take seriously Vico's great observation that men make 
their own history, that what they can know is what they 
made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical 
and cultural entities-- to say nothing of historical entities--
such locales, regions, geographical sectors as "Orient" and 
"Occident" are man made. Therefore as much as the West 
itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and a 
tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have 
given it reality and presence in and for the West" (Djait, 
1985, p, 4-5). 
Since the "Self" is invariably linked with the "Other", it was in 
opposition to this designated entity that Europe was able to create and 
maintain its own identity. Among the countries of the Orient, China 
and Japan represented the ultimate exotic "Other", due to their 
geographical remoteness and historical isolation. India, long the jewel 
of the British colonial acquisitions in the sub-continent, was the next 
candidate for "Otherness", becoming more important with the rise of 
the Romanticist movement in the nineteenth century.4 The only 
remaining candidate qualified to serve Europe's needS of a 
representative "Other" was the Muslim world. The Islamic East, or 
Mashreq, was regarded as close to, yet different from, the totality of 
Western civilisation. As a Semitic religion, Islam shared many of 
3Said p.3, however is inconsistent with this definition throughout the book. His 
polemical style leads him to define Orientalism as a "corporate institution"(p.3); 
"form of paranoia" (72); "political doctrine" (240); "mental reality" (44); "discourse" 
(3); "discursive formation" (40) etc. 
4See Zhang Longxi 1988, p.15, and Gauri Viswanathan, 1988, p.85-104 
SWhether such a need is universal and applies to all human cultures is a very difficult 
problem but one which should not be ignored. 
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Christianity's theological principles, yet its geographical proximity, its 
challenging outlook which led to the conquest of European lands in 
the Middle Ages, along with its demonstrated political unity under the 
Ottoman Empire, established it as Europe's great cultural and political 
enemy. Until the eighteenth-century Islam was viewed as a perversion 
of Christianity, and the Muslim world as the province of the 
Antichrist, With the coming of the secular philosophy of the 
Enlightenment, the Islamic world came to be perceived as the 
embodiment of all that was recently left behind in Europe; included 
religion, political despotism, cultural stagnation, scientific ignorance, 
and superstition. 
In other words, the long established misrepresentation of the East in 
Orientalism, even at its most scholarly phase, has its source not only in 
power relations but also in history. According to Said, European 
response to Islamic hegemony over a large part of the world at the start 
of the 14th century produced 'a lasting trauma' (Said, 1978, p.59). As 
early as the 11th century, Erchembert, a cleric of Monte Cassino, had 
described the Muslim armies as 'a swarm of bees', who devastated their 
enemies, while voraciousness or greed was associated with Muslims. 
After the Crusades, no real communication took place between the two 
civilisations, no genuine translation of major Islamic texts was 
encouraged. For Said, what was said about Islam 'comes not so much 
for the sake of Islam in itself as to represent it for the medieval 
Christian (ibid., p.60). Misunderstanding of Mohammed as an 
Antichrist impostor and Muslims as pagans flourished during this 
period. 
The Islamic Orient became Europe's collective nightmare, a world 
prone to stereotypes and exotic fantasies. For Western man the 
"Orientals", who include the "Muslims", "Arabs", "Turks", and 
"Persians", were only occupying a "discursive space". They served as 
Rousseau's ideal type of "noble savage", and as Montesquieu's 
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fictitious travellers to Paris in Letters Persanes. These views are 
nostalgic, the Arab becomes the representative of a former age in 
harmony with nature, while the latter used them as a mouthpiece for 
his criticism of European life at the time. In both cases, the Arab Islamic 
"Other" provided a means for Occidental self-reflection. 
Said has argued, " ... the relation between Orientalists and Orient was 
essentially hermeneutical: standing before a distant, barely-intelligible 
civilisation or cultural monument, the Orientalist scholar reduced the 
obscurity by translating, sympathetically portraying, inwardly grasping 
the hard to reach object" (Said, p. 222). The Orient and Orientals could 
only serve in the capacity of "communities of interpretation" (Said, 
1985, p. 4), as mentioned before, always represented yet never 
representing. The Orient was written about but never able to "write 
back". The Orientalist was always present while the Orient was 
routinely absent. The Orient and the Orientals served as real and 
imaginary "texts" and "subjects" for European authors. The world of 
Western writing and Oriental silence made it possible to represent and 
label a variety of things "Oriental". Such terms as Oriental 
"corruption", "cruelty", "despotism", "essence", "mentality", 
"mysticism", "sensuality", "spirit", and "splendour" soon entered the 
everyday discourse of European observers. The Orient thus came to 
occupy not just a substitute idea but an "ontological Other" which was 
discovered, confined, and "civilised", it can best be described as the 
contrast of opposites: the Orient is what the Occident is not. 
This paradigm of difference was maintained through the discourse of 
Orientalism which was rooted in the rationalism, secularism, and 
universalism of the eighteenth century as well as the romanticism, 
positivism, and colonialism of the nineteenth century. Deeply 
grounded in the political culture of their time, Orientalist scholars 
came to rely on such diverse disciplines as biology, anthropology, 
philology, and lexicography to justify the paradigmatic dominance of 
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the Occident. Academic Orientalism soon became a school of 
interpretation and a source of knowledge about the Orient. The 
accumulated force of this cultural tradition facilitated Western man's 
self-appointed mission of transforming the world into his own image. 
Said discloses the conscious as well as the unconscious collaboration, 
between Orientalists and the colonialist powers, whereby the former 
apprehended the Orient intellectually while the later appropriated it 
physically. 6 Thus, since the eighteenth century such "knowledge" has 
accompanied the process of western military and economic power. 
What made this co-operation possible, according to Said, was the 
common racist, imperialistic, and ethnocentric beliefs of the academic 
Orientalists and the colonialist politicians. The religiously-inspired 
prejudices of the Middle Ages were the historical ancestors for the 
biological and geographical racism of the post-Renaissance era. The 
passage from the feudal system to a capitalist mode of production, with 
the subsequent requirements of capital accumulation, directed Western 
powers to dispatch their troops to the lands of the "primitives". 
Perhaps the most influential factor of all was the ethnocentric and 
Eurocentric culture of modernity, (In his important work, Marshall 
Berman (1988) has interpreted the four major features of modernity: 1) 
that modernity is a uniquely European phenomenon; 2) that it 
transformed the pre-moderns' traditional polarity of an illusory versus 
a real world; 3) that by unveiling religious and political illusions, the 
bourgeois revolutions "uncovered and exposed new options and 
hopes", 4) that the bourgeoisie not only brought forward a free 
economic market but also provided for a freedom "to shop around and 
seek the best deals in ideas, associations, laws and social policies, as well 
6Said refers to Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1789 as an example of how the two 
trends converged. As more and more Orientalist texts were produced, the need arose for 
appropriate institutions to deal with them and their authors, the Societe Asiatique 
(1822), the Royal Asiatic Society (1823), and the American Oriental Society (1842) 
were all established as a combined result of European/Western imperialism and 
Orientalism's massive textual growth (Said, p.99). 
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as in things"7. The universalist nature of the European idea of 
progress, which viewed man in a permanent forward movement, 
could not look favourably upon the diverse Orient. This land of 
antiquity and spiritualism could not merely be abandoned if the 
cherished goal of progress were to be attained, it must be changed. 
Despite their "Oriental" pedigree, Europeans adopted Hellinism and 
Christianity as constitutive elements of their own particular history. It 
was from the position of this borrowed identity that they took it upon 
themselves to represent and judge the Orient as the 'depository of the 
archaic past and eternal stagnation'. 8 
'Orientalism is a discursive phenomenon, internally consistent and 
self-perpetuating in virtual insulation from any correspondence with a 
"real Orient" (Said, 1978, p.5). This 'real Orient' is not only ignored or 
avoided by Orientalists: it is not even perceived by them. In short, 
Odentalism is an ideology, the purpose of which was to reinforce the 
political domination of the West. Said sums up this view by presenting 
Orientalism as a drama that is played out by the Orientalists. 
"In the depths of this Oriental Stage stands a prodigious 
cultural repertoire whose individual items evoke a 
fabulously rich world: the sphinx, Cleopatra, Eden, Troy, 
Sodom and Gomorrah, Astarte, Isis and Osiris, Sheba, 
Babylon, the Ginii, the Magi, Nineveh, Prester John, 
Mohamet, and dozens more; settings, in some cases names 
only half-imagined, half known; monsters, devils, heroes; 
terrors, pleasures, desires" (ibid., p.63). 
Said's analysis of Orientalism is a powerful and persuasive one, and 
any serious study of the subject has to take into consideration. It is 
however, not without its difficulties. First it suffers from a disease not 
unlike the one it seeks to diagnose, which may be called 'anti-
Orientalism'. For Said the West is so thoroughly prejudiced that it 
misrepresents everything. He tries to uncover these prejudices, but he 
7See Marshall Berman, 1988, p. 13-36 and 105-114. 
SSee Samir Amin, 1989, pp 100-101. He provides a critique of Europe's counterfeit as 
well as authentic genealogies. 
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does this so systematically that he falls into the same trap, in order to 
make the evidence fit his theory he is forced to simplify. Secondly, his 
argument alternates between two extreme positions without ever 
facing both of them at the same time. The idea of a perspective, or 
discursive system, or (as used by Foucault) episteme, is in radical 
conflict with the idea of truth, or justice, or 'the real Orient'. The idea 
of a 'real Orient' becomes inseparable and unintelligible without 
reference to a particular episteme . Sharafuddin (1994) criticises Said 
because he thinks that Said's Orientalism is at once a separate cultural 
system which presumably can only be changed by political or military 
defeat, and not by reason, for example, by books, like his own and also a 
form of deliberate prejudice against an objective reality outside the 
system. For all its strength and moral importance, Said's study is 
empirically suspect and methodologically contradictory. 
3.3. ACADEMIC CRITICISMS OF SAID'S INTERPRETATION 
OF ORIENTALlSM 
Two European critics of Said's approach to Orientalism, Maxime 
Rodinson and Bryan S. Turner, contemporaries of Said's will now be 
considered. The fundamental questions concern Said's use of empirical 
material and his general theoretical position. 
Rodinson, a French sociologist trained as an Orientalist, has been the 
most successful in undermining his own discipline by calling into 
question some of its dominant stereotypes. 9 He differs from Said in a 
number of ways. Firstly, he disagrees with Said's assertion about 
supposedly demonizing Western intention when studying different 
societies. For him, the desire to study cultures and societies that differ 
from our own is only a general human tendency shared by virtually all 
9See "Islam and Capitalism", Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981 and "Marxism 
and the Muslim World" New York, Monthly Review Press, 1981. 
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societies. Secondly, tracing the lineage of Orientalism, Rodinson 
contends that the word Orientalism appeared in English around 1779 
and in French in 1799 (Rodinson, 1980, p. 57). In contrast to Said, 
however, he maintains that the eighteenth century's universalist 
vision placed Orient and Occident side by side. The paternalistic gaze of 
Rousseau, Voltaire, and the French Revolutionaries who believed all 
men are born equal perceived the Orientals as foreign but equal. Yet 
this was also an age of exoticism, of conceiving the "Other". The 
translation around 1717 of The Arabian Nights, for example, made a 
"monumental contribution to the growing mystique of the Orient 
(ibid., p.44). 
Rodinson is closer to Said in his overall evaluation of Orientalism. He 
writes: 
'The concept of Orientalism itself sprang from pragmatic 
necessities that forced themselves on European scholars 
devoted to the study of other cultures. This situation was 
reinforced by European dominance over other societies, and 
the result was a greatly distorted vision of things" 
(Rodinson, 1980, p.117). 
Finally, Rodinson contends that Said too often makes the same 
mistake that he himself and other communist intellectuals of the 1930s 
and 1940s committed, that of assuming ..... all foes of the powerful were 
pure heroes, all their ideas the unalloyed truth and all their deeds 
paragons of virtuous action" (ibid., p.xiii). In other words, for Rodinson 
the Orientals, like the proletariat, are not the sole embodiments of 
goodness and purity that Said tries to portray. Rodinson attributes this 
shortcoming on the part of Said to his nationalistic tendencies and 
limited scope of inquiry. 
Bryan S. Turner, a British educated Marxist sociologist, attacks the 
problematic of Orientalism at its core epistemological foundations. He 
contents that Orientalism is based on an idealist epistemology that is 
essentialist, empiricist and historicist. (Turner, 1979, p.7).Turner 
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defines Orientalism as" a discourse which represents the exotic, 
erotic, strange Orient as a comprehensible, intelligible phenomenon 
within a network of categories, tables and concepts by which the Orient 
is simultaneously defined and controlled" (Turner, 1984, p. 24). For 
him, Orientalism is a discourse bent on manufacturing difference, a 
self-validating and closed discourse which emphasises "Otherness" in 
order to account for the "uniqueness of the West"(ibid., 35-36). He 
maintains that for the Orientalists, Oriental history is only a series of 
missing features and absences: of the middle class, independent cities, 
political rights, legal reliabilities, personal property, individualism, 
revolutions anti-authoritarianism, an autonomous bourgeois class, 
bourgeois culture, secularism, capitalism, modernity, etc. For example, 
Turner asserts that the doctrine of Western uniqueness encounters a 
number of difficulties in trying to explain the historical flourishing of 
technology and science in such patrimonial and bureaucratic political 
systems as China and the Islamic Middle East (Turner, 1987 p. 1-23). 
According to Turner, this mode of perception stigmatises the Orient as 
a caricature of the West, a mirror image, an entity antithetical to 
Occidental change. 
Turner's analysis of Orientalism differs from Said's in two important 
ways. Firstly, Turner disproves Said's representation of Orientalism as 
a homogeneous discourse about the Orient. By bringing in the factor of 
social class ideology, Turner contends that Western attitudes toward 
Islam, for example, have not been consistently negative. According to 
Turner, the European Bourgeoisie has perceived Islam favourably for 
its opposition to industrial development (Turner, 1984, pp. 91-104). 
Secondly, Turner disagrees with Said's full abandonment of Marxism 
as an alternative to Orientalism. While acknowledging classical 
Marxism's heavy dosage of Orientalism, Turner believes nevertheless 
that neo-Marxism is still the only perspective capable of putting an end 
to it. He writes: 
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"The criticism of Oriental ism in its various forms requires 
something more than the valid but indecisive notion that 
at its worst Orientalist scholarship was a rather thin 
disguise for attitudes of moral or racial superiority and 
thereby a justification for colonialism. What is needed is 
something other than the objection that some Orientalists 
were less than neutral and objective, or that they retired 
from the real world of Middle East politics to the ivory 
towers of philology, poetry and aesthetics. The end of 
Orientalism requires a fundamental attack on the 
theoretical and epistemological roots of Orientalist 
scholarship which creates that long tradition of Oriental 
Despotism, mosaic societies and the "Muslim City". Modern 
Marxism is fully equipped to do this work of destruction" 
(Turner, 1979, p. 85). 
Said powerfully sums up this kind of Orientalist discourse with the 
maxim: "Orientalism overrode the Orient" (Said, 1978, p.96). Things 
about the Orient "always rose from the specifically human detail to the 
general transhuman one; an observation about a 10th century Arab 
poet multiplied itself into a policy concerning the Oriental mentality in 
Egypt, Iraq, or Arabia". Similarly a verse from the Koran would be 
considered the best evidence of an incredible Muslim sensuality 
(ibid.).This process of misrepresentation is precisely what made the 
Orient appear remote and exotic to the western mind. And therefore, as 
Europe exercised more and more power over the Middle East, the 
Orient itself, in Said's striking phrase, became 'Orientalized by 
Orientalism'. 
The conception of the historical reality in Orientalism is itself an 
example. Orientalism is a 'broadly imperialist view of the world' (ibid., 
p.1S) and Said is clearly engaged in a specific study of imperialism and 
culture. But it is also a way of thinking, a projection of the Oriental 
"Other" that is fundamental, and indeed forms the foundation, for 
Western identity from Homer on, according to Said. Orientalism is in 
dialogue with Auerbach's Mimesis, which Said at once admires and 
revises, showing up the importance for the Western 'representation of 
reality' of the ontologically claimed difference of 'the East'. Aeschylus 
figures as an illustration of the way in which 'almost from earliest 
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times' (ibid., p.5S) the separation from the Orient was instituted, with 
the East held to the all-embracing Orientalist vision. 'Aeschylus and 
Victor Hugo, Dante and Karl Marx' (ibid., p.3) stand together in an 
Orientalism that has a continuity across the centuries and that is said to 
be constitutive of Western identity. Why so? Said's occasional answer 
appears to involve psychological explanation. The Orient is one of the 
West's 'deepest and most recurring images of the Other', defining 'its 
contrasting image, idea, personality, experience', 'a sort of surrogate 
and even underground self' (ibid., p.1-3). It designates a 'collection of 
dreams, images, and vocabularies' (ibid., p.73). 
Orientalism therefore, is a collection of representations of the Orient, 
representation here, being a mode of political control, produced from a 
position of exteriority (ibid., p.20-21). This can be seen as involving a 
profound misrepresentation, 'Islam has been fundamentally 
misrepresented in the West' (ibid., p.272). Orientalism 'overrode' the 
Orient, negated it 'as it is' (ibid., p. 104). Sir Richard Burton's 'firsthand' 
knowledge has Said's respect but he criticises it because 'we are never 
directly given the Orient' (ibid., p.196). Exteriority can be understood as 
forms of thought divorced from the reality. Representation, however, 
is also grasped in a rather different way. If Orientalism overrode the 
Orient, Said talks equally of the latter as an invention of Orientalism 
Calmost a European invention' (ibid., p.1); 'almost' again). The Orient 
is exterior to the representation that exteriorises it and at the same time 
interior to that representation, produced in its representations. Said 
shifts into a general account of representation that leaves no room for 
distinctions between the Orient and 'the Orient': there can be 'no such 
thing as a delivered presence, but a re-presence, or a representation'lO 
(ibid., p. 21). That the Orient is 'not just there' (ibid., p.4) is then a 
1 Orhis seems to be an oddly conceived attempt to stand back from the Derridean textual 
abyss, Said reserves the possibility of something directly given, of a presence delivered 
in non-written language. 
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statement not simply about its presentation in Orientalism but about 
its thereness in any form, it being always, in Said's term, a re-presence. 
The whole complex problem of knowledge and power needs 
rethinking, but according to Said Orientalism leaves 'embarrassingly 
incomplete' (ibid., p.24) such a project. The central appeal to a reality of 
the human as ethical subject is missing. Orientalism's failure was in 
humanity: 'it failed to identify with human experience' (ibid., 328), 
refused 'the human encounter between different cultures' (ibid., p.46). 
'Personal, authentic, sympathetic, and humanistic knowledge of the 
Orient' lost out to 'the archive' (ibid., p.197), with Orientalism 
perceiving 'scholars, critics, intellectuals, human beings' in racial, 
ethnic, and national distinctions' that hold back 'the common 
enterprise of promoting human community' (ibid., p.328). Orientalist 
interpretations did not allow for a reader 'to cross disciplinary and 
traditional boundaries in order to penetrate to the human heart of any 
text' (ibid., p.267); any text, but particularly those of literature which is 
privileged for its disruption of given representations and identities: 'A 
literary text speaks more or less directly of a living reality. Its force is 
not that it is Arab, or French, or English; its force is in the power and 
vitality of words' (ibid., p.291). 
Towards the end of his book Orientalism, Edward Said raised the 
following question: How does one represent other cultures? What is 
another culture? Is the notion of a distinct culture (or race, or religion, 
or civilisation) a useful one, or does it always get involved either in 
self-congratulation (when one discusses one's own) or hostility and 
aggression (when one discusses the "Other")? (Said, p.325). This 
question is, obviously, of great theoretical and political significance for 
the scholars of international and inter cultural relations. Furthermore, 
epistemologists are also concerned with this issue, since it raises these 
questions: 1) Can representation and imagery as acts of "Othering" ever 
be undistorted?; 2) Can such acquired knowledge ever be viewed as 
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value neutral? Said's post-structuralism compels him to answer this 
question with an unequivocal no. 
'The real issue is whether indeed there can be a true 
representation of anything, or whether any and all 
representations, are embedded first in the language and 
then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of 
the representor. If the latter alternative is the correct one 
(as I believe it is), then we must be prepared to accept the 
fact that a representation is eo ipso implicated, 
interwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other 
things besides the "truth", which is itself a 
representation" (Said, 1978, p. 272). 
The following questions immediately come to mind: 1) Is Said's own 
representation of Orientalism value neutral, true and accurate? 
Said argues that a complex set of representations were constructed by 
the discursive field of Orientalist studies that for the West effectively 
became "the Orient" and determined the West's understanding of it, 
providing as well the basis for the West's subsequent imperialist rule. 
The Orient appeared as "a system of representations framed by a whole 
set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western 
consciousness, and later, Western empire" (ibid., p.202-203). 
The central characteristic of this framework of knowledge is its 
essentialism. Analysing Orientalism, Anouar Abdel Malek wrote: 
"According to the traditional Orientalists, an essence 
should exist-sometimes even clearly described in 
metaphysical terms-which constitutes the inalienable and 
commonbasis of all the beings considered; this essence is 
both "historical, since it goes back to the dawn of history, 
and fundamentally a-historical, since it transfixed the 
being, "the object" of study, within its inalienable and non-
evolutive specificity ... Thus one ends with a typology-
based on a real specificity, but detached from history, and, 
consequently, conceived as being intangible, essential-
which makes of the studied "object" another being with 
regard to whom the studying subject is transcendent; we will 
have a homo Sinicus, a homo Arabicus (and why not a homo 
Aegypticus, etc.), a homo Africanus, the man- the "normal 
man", it is understood- being the European man of the 
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historical period, that is, since Greek antiquity" (Abdel-
Malek, cited by Said in Orientalism, p.97). 
Elaborating on this, Said argues that the essence of the "Oriental" does 
not have a great deal to do with the people living in regions designated 
as the Orient, but is more the repository of the characteristics in 
opposition to which people in the West define themselves. The Orient 
is the "Other" in relation to which people in the West establish their 
own identity, usually to affirm the values they exalt and occasionally to 
lament those values they suppress or have lost. 
Said does not provide us with any alternative forms of knowledge of 
the Orient. He argues: 
"The methodological failures of Orientalism cannot be 
accounted for by saying that the real Orient is different 
from Oriental portraits of it. ... It is not the thesis of this 
book to suggest that there is such a thing as a real or true 
Orient (Islam, Arab, or whatever) ... On the contrary, I 
have been arguing that "the Orient" is itself a constituted 
entity, and that the notion that there are geographical 
spaces with indigenous, radically "different" inhabitants 
who can be defined on the basis of SOme religion, culture, or 
racial essence proper to that geographical space is equally 
a highly debatable idea" (ibid., p.322). 
He does allow, though, that "interesting work is most likely to be 
produced by scholars whose allegiance is to a discipline defined 
intellectually and not to a 'field' like Orientalism defined either 
canonically, imperially, or geographically" (ibid., p.326). This implies 
that scholars should abandon the effort to understand any but isolated 
aspects of those regions designated as the Orient, and that all our 
knowledge of these regions should be filtered through established 
academic disciplines. Or more extreme, that all efforts to construct 
narratives about the "Other" be abandoned. 
What Said provides is a framework for analysing cultural processes of 
constructing "Otherness". In Said's case "Others" are loosely Middle 
Eastern Arabs, Palestinians and Moslems. "Otherness" is a status 
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defined in the negative; defined to subordinate and possess. Its flip side 
is the "Us" or "We" whose collective national, European, 'Western' 
identity rests, in part, on these kinds of exclusion)! . Said wrote on the 
political consequences of knowledge for control. As in Orientalism he 
questioned whether one culture could know another in a non-hostile, 
non-political way. His crucial theme, however, was the diffusion of 
negative images of Islam and of the Orient in Western writing, of 
perceptions of the Oriental threat to the West. He wrote of the 
significance of the style of seeing "Others", of how caricatures of Islam 
could be used to justify military aggression. 
Said's book is important, though there remains an awkward tension 
between the apparent goals of humanism, truth and justice and his 
textual! discursive method. He registers unease in his work "about 
cultural, racial, or historical generalisations", in respect of "their uses, 
values, degree of objectivity, and fundamental intent" (ibid., p.96). Any 
and all generalisations are interpretations, identities are made in 
representations. There is a possibility of human truth or objectivity 
that depends not on imagining that we can think about the world 
without representing it but on recognising that there is a world we seek 
to represent, within which we are included. Yet this will influence the 
success of our representations and the success of representations is 
bound up with political questions of intent, effect, and values. That 
there are always social-historical specifications of knowledge, a politics 
of meanings and interpretations, or representations. Questions of 
knowledge, truth and value within the politics of meaning are 
necessarily worked through with reference to and in respect of a 
constantly envisaged human objectivity for which the recognition of 
the historical-social, interpretative- representational construction of 
objects, identities, knowledge, is crucial, not disabling. This recognition 
does not necessarily undermine objectivity and the production of 
llIn Stuart Hall's words, 'identity is always, in that sense, a structured representation 
which only achieves its positive through the narrow eye of the negative' (1992). 
74 
Chapter 3 Orientalism : "Self" Versus "Other" 
knowledge; on the contrary, it is their very condition. It is this kind of 
understanding that Said stresses as 'human' and that Orientalism as 
knowledge fails so inhumanely. 
As mentioned earlier, Said's book must itself begin and end with the 
question of representation: "how can we study other cultures and 
peoples from a libertarian, or non-repressive and non-manipulative, 
perspective?" (ibid., p.24); "How does one represent other cultures?" 
(ibid., p.325). Inevitably this is an issue "in discussing the problems of 
human experience" (ibid.) but then one that, makes the question as 
much one of "Other cultures" as of representation. "Otherness" itself is 
already a representation and representation itself is always involved in 
"Otherness". There is no identity given directly to representation 
because representation itself is the process of identification. To 
represent a culture as "Other", all representations are bound up with 
"Otherness" . 
A more fruitful and balanced approach would be to couple broader 
theoretical and philosophical understandings of modern Arab Islamic 
experience, such as that project begun by Said, with more specifically 
focused studies concerned with the factual details of life in a particular 
period. It should not be assumed that such a reciprocal relationship is 
beyond this scope of contemporary work on the Arab Islamic world. 
Such a project is under way in the work of Patai, Coon, Berque 
specifically, and less successfully by Daniel Lerner. We will now turn to 
an examination of the contributions made by these writers. 
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3.4. PERSPECTIVES ON "SELF"I"OTHER" WITHIN THE 
ACADEMIC TRADITION 
"If we see no nation but our own, we do not give mankind a 
fair chance;-- it is from experience not books, we ou~ht to 
judge of mankind" (Byron in Marchand, letters, p 97).1 
The critique of Western academic scholarship of the modern Arab 
Islamic world derives from a familiar assumption, namely, that 
scholarly interpretation is never neutral or objective but is always 
linked to certain theoretical and methodological perspectives that 
determine the course of understanding and interpretation. It is 
precisely this connection between perspective and interpretation in 
which Sharabi (1990) is interested in , not just in order to find whether 
the connection can be broken and interpretation freed from its 
constraints, but rather to examine the constraints themselves and to 
see how they actually affect understanding and interpretation. 
It is frequently the case that theory and method, far from being free of 
politics and ideology, and thus independently constituted, are 
grounded in convictions, preferences, and interests framed in various 
paradigmatic styles and forms. 
Clearly, perspective shapes understanding and interpretation most 
decisively; thus what we may see and what we may know are 
circumscribed by history and geography, by culture and physical 
conditions; i.e., by factors and forces that come together to form a 
determinate perspective. 
If a Western perspective (in general as well as in specific terms), of a 
specifically Western framework and understanding of the "Other", 
how does a non-Western culture and society get interpreted in a 
Western perspective? How is the relation between "Self" and the 
12J3yron, in a letter to his mother dated November 2nd 1808, reveals a wonderfully 
open-minded attitude regarding his upcoming tour. 
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"Other" established in the interpretation from such a perspective? For 
example, what is the colonial mode of interpretation, and what is the 
post-colonial mode? 
Two points Sharabi (1990) refers to must be kept in mind in this 
context. First, the scholarly disciplines in the humanities and social 
sciences are all initially products of Western experience and thought. 
Second, the kind of knowledge that the "Other", the object of Western 
knowledge -in this case Arab society and cuIture- has of itself is 
therefore essentially Western knowledge even when it is locally 
produced. Modern Third World scholarship is basically derivative 
scholarship, producing and reproducing a Western knowledge. This 
latter fact sheds strong light on one of the major impulses of 
fundamentalist Islam and its insistence on the need for a total break 
with the West and return to Islamic values and categories, that is to 
say, to independent interpretation and scholarship. 
It is important to know how or even if knowledge can be "objective" 
when it is knowledge of an "Other"? Academic scholarship has 
generally approached its subject matter (here, Arab society and culture) 
as though from a position of neutral knowledge. For a very long time 
we have been taught that social and historical reality can be grasped 
and objectively represented in the disciplines of history, SOciology, 
anthropology, psychology, etc., if only we follow valid theory and 
rigorous method. 
'The point of radical criticism is that it is not just ideology 
or stereotyping or hidden interests that distort 
understanding and interpretation of the past and present of 
the "Other", but also the way established academic 
scholarship is constituted ..... Western knowledge is the 
product of European expansion and of world domination ..... 
Thus the social-science disciplines developed in pursuit of 
knowledge of non-Western cultures and peoples are based on 
forms and categories of analysis designed specifically for 
grasping the "Other" ... , the prototypical Western 
discipline invented for understanding non-Western 
(primitive) cultures. Once recognised, the outlook implicit 
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in this orientation readily reveals how values cultivated 
within established scholarship could create the cultural 
contrasts and oppositions between the "Self" and the 
"Other" (primitive! civilised, backward! advanced, 
traditional! modern) that serve to justify Western practices 
in a non-Western world" (Sharabi, 1990, p.3). 
3.5. SELECTED TEXTUAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ARAB 
ISLAMIC CULTURE 
This section will attempt to discuss a selection of texts on Arab society 
and culture representative of mainstream academic scholarship. The 
disciplines these texts exemplify are history, anthropology, social 
psychology, sociology, and intellectual and institutional history. We 
have tried to select a reasonably representative sample of texts which 
relate to the above disciplines. These texts reflect post war European 
attitudes leading up to the period of recent political transformation in 
the Arab world. The chosen writers are Patai, Coon, Lerner, von 
Grunebaum, Abu-Lughod, and Berque. 
Raphael Patai's book The Arab Mind, was written after the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war. In Patai's text, history, culture appear thoroughly 
transparent and comprehensible. It is a perspective that calls for a 
special kind of knowledge, one already determined by a given 
conjuncture of historical forces and circumstances, a knowledge, in 
which the "Other" can appear only as essentially different, as 
simultaneously monolithic and mosaic, both socially and 
psychologically. Patai approaches Arab culture from within. He takes a 
static approach and seems to reflect antagonistic political attitudes. In 
the first preface to his book, Patai informs readers that his "interest in, 
and sympathy for, the Arabs never flagged", and speaks at length of his 
friendship for Ahmad Fakhr ai-Din al-Kinani al-Khatib, "a shaykh of 
the famous al-Azhar of Cairo and a scion of one of the great Arab 
families of Jerusalem" (Patai, 1973, p.3). The preface prepares the 
readers for a harsh process of stereotyping as Patai clarifies one of his 
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contentions in the light of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In 
response to a criticism that the war invalidates his previous 
contentions that "it is part of the Arab mentality to threaten without 
carrying out the threat" and that "in the Arab mentality words often 
can and do serve as substitutes for acts," Patai offers an even more 
simplified explanation. A counter-motivation in Arab personality, he 
points out, is "the drive to restore damaged honour," for "any injury 
done to a man's honour must be revenged, or else he becomes 
permanently dishonoured" (ibid., p.x). Accordingly, in Patai's 
perspective, for Arabs war is a matter of satisfying the psychological 
need to avenge honour rather than an attempt to achieve concrete 
goals such as ending occupation and achieving self-determination. 
Patai legitimises his stereotyping by calling it an abstraction reached by 
processes of generalisation about the Arab mentality, Arab mind, or 
mental characteristics of Arabs as a population and human group. 
According to Sharabi (1990), by defining national character, he means 
"the sum total of motives, traits, beliefs, and values shared by the 
popularity in a national population" (Patai, 1973,p.18). He assumes that 
Arabs are fairly homogenous and that the Middle East, though 
inhabited by a mosaic of peoples "speaking many different tongues and 
exhibiting many different physical features," is nevertheless "the 
domain of one basically identical culture" (ibid., p.3). Conceptualising 
Arab culture as characterised by "coherence, balance and inner 
consistency" (ibid., p.381), Patai sets himself free of any restraints to 
qualify his statements about Arabs and Islam. Patai's oversimplified 
generalisations include: "In contrast to the West, the Arab world still 
sees the universe running its predestined course" (ibid., p.147). "To the 
Arab mind, eloquence is related to exaggeration" (ibid., p.49). "In 
general the Arab mind, dominated by Islam, has been bent more on 
preserving rather than innovating, or maintaining than improving, or 
continuing than initiating" (ibid., p.154). "For the tradition-bound Arab 
mind, there is even something sinful in engaging in long-range 
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planning, because it seems to imply that one does not put one's trust in 
divine providence" (ibid., p.150). "Eloquence is to the Arab an 
achievement akin to the attainment of masculinity" (ibid., p.49). 
How does Patai reach these definitive conclusions and many similar 
others? In the first place, he overlooks notions of plurality of culture, 
cultural variations, and cultural struggle, dismissing the effects of 
social diversity and social class differences. Second, he perceives Islam 
as an external force shaping society - and not shaped by it. Third, his 
quotations are often taken out of context from non-Arab secondary 
sources. Fourth, several of Patai's oversimplified generalisations are 
based on selected proverbs which he believes "yield a fascinating folk 
view of the Arab Character" (ibid., p.22). On the basis of the frequently 
quoted proverb "I and my brother against my cousin; I and my cousins 
against the stranger", Patai theorises about Arab "in-group loyalty and 
out-group enmity" (ibid., p.359), jokes about the absence of a female 
counterpart proverb which would say "I and my sister against my 
female cousins; I against my sister" (ibid., p.36) and views the "Arab 
nation as an Arab family" (ibid., p.42). What Patai fails to realise is that 
Arabs quite often repeat this particular proverb in the context of 
criticising tribalism. He also fails to realise that Arabs frequently repeat 
proverbs to the opposite effect, such as the following aI-jar qabI aI-dar 
(he neighbour has the priority over members of the house) jarak aI-
qarib waIa khayak aI-ba'id (your close neighbour rather than your 
distant brother). Furthermore, Arabs consider these proverbs more 
positively than the first one. Fifth, Patai cites several stereotypes and 
counter stereotypes in Arab culture, taking them at face value as 
accurate descriptions instead of signs of tensions and conflicts in the 
area. He tells us that wise Arab observers had remarked on differences 
in national character between one Arab country and another many 
centuries before the concept of national character was formulated in 
the West. 
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Coon's Caravan: The Story of the Middle East (1952) reflects on the 
relation between "Self" and "Other" as no longer that of European and 
'native' (colonialist and colonised), but between the developed 
industrialised West and the underdeveloped or developing Third 
World. In Coon's perspective, Arab or Middle Eastern society appears 
as a static, mosaic structure. The concept mosaic, the opposite of united 
or uniform, reflects the implicit contrast between the structure of 
modern, industrialised societies and the premodern ethnic and 
religious diversity of Third World societies. Such categories as sect, 
tribe, ethnic group, village, peasant, and nomads, become central terms 
in the social and cultural analysis of those societies. On this view, these 
societies seem to lack an inner core or centre: individuals and groups 
have no distinctive identity and appear only as manifestations of the 
religious, ethnic, and linguistic mosaic of which they are faceless 
products. If mosaic traditional society is defined by the lack that 
differentiation compared to Western society, it is this lack that at the 
same time bestows on it a special symbolic value: "Caravan" becomes a 
metaphor of a society that offers "wisdom long ago forgotten", "basic 
truths about man's relations to man", "basic principles of human 
behaviour" (Coon, 1952, p. 344). 
As an analytical category, changelessness is central to this perspective; 
Coon is not interested in what might be a basic feature of Middle 
Eastern society as in rapid social change. He wishes to approach Arab or 
Middle Eastern society or culture "at rest" and to turn away from 
problems posed by "the newly Westernised Muslim intellectuals" 
(ibid., p.349). He places "Westernised intellectuals" in quotation marks 
because they do not represent the authentic traditional, mosaic society 
to which he assigns value. For him, "the automobile and the movies 
and the parliament and the radio broadcasts" represent the real issues, 
and they are not the ones Westernised "intellectuals" talk about (ibid., 
p.8). But even these aspects of modernisation are not given systematic 
treatment, as they fall beyond the horizon of Coon's perspective. 
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Coon can be seen to be operating within the confines of Western 
ethnography, reducing diversity in order to produce a structural 
account. Instead of a living society in the throes of transformation, we 
have a "system in equilibrium" endowed with "automatic controls" by 
virtue of an organisation of production based on what Coon describes 
as a "fivefold division of labour".13 
Despite his liberal values, Coon ends by projecting a picture of the Arab 
or Middle Eastern "Other" that is so alien as to make the gap between 
West and non-West seem practically unbridgeable. Though he 
nowhere talks of Western as opposed to Arab "thought processes", he 
seems to find it natural that Arabs will for some time yet find it 
difficult to comprehend Western ways: Arabs or Middle Easterners are 
amazed and shocked at our behaviour. 
The question rises here, For whom does Coon write? Not just for those 
who are "interested" in the Middle East or who "are about to go out 
there", but also for those concerned with "the foreign relations of the 
United States in this area" (ibid., p.342). He strives to be neutral, to be 
above the difference and conflicts he encounters in the field: for him 
"both Sunni and Shi'a dogmas are equally virtuous", and the "troubles 
between the Israelis and the citizens of the Arab states are non of [his] 
business" (ibid.,). Sharabi (1990) criticises him by asking then What is 
his business? It is to help those "who are planning to build dams or 
who are estimating the costs and efficiency of local labour for factories 
in which they are thinking of placing investments" to understand 
what people "they or their clients will be dealing with, are really like" 
(ibid.,). 
1 Jrhis is an organisation that presumably affords every member of society a chance "to 
specialise in one way or another, and thus to channel his energy, whether he realise!s] 
it or not, into the most efficient utilisation possible of the landscape by the greatest 
number of people, at a pre industrial level of technology" (Coon, 1952, p.345). 
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3.5.1. Modernisation Theory: The Work Of Daniel Lerner 
"Social change" in the Third World had a special meaning and special 
direction: socio-economic development along Western capitalist lines. 
The sociology of development in the sense of an analytical search for 
the factors obstructing and conditions facilitating the process became 
popular and central in the post war period. This overarching theme of 
development (sometimes called 'Modernisation' or even 
'Westernization') yielded specific studies of industrialisation and 
urbanisation. It also yielded some analysis of changes in the patterns of 
stratification, especially the rise of a new modernising middle class, a 
key concept in this development, pertaining to change and modernity. 
Daniel Lerner's The Passing of Traditional Society (1958) is an 
outstanding example of modernisation theory and of the area studies 
approach in general. "The Other" consists of developing-the not yet 
complete (or equal)-societies of the Third World. "What the [West] is, 
in this sense, the Middle East seeks to become" (Lerner, p.47). In other 
words, the non-Western "Other" is behind but will catch up (i.e., is 
always behind), and that this "Other" has a separate destiny (i.e., will 
always be the "Other"). 
In the area of attitudes and attitudinal change, the emphasis of too 
many studies has been on resistance to rather than the struggle for 
change. According to Lerner, "modernity is primarily a state of mind-
expectation of progress, propensity to growth, readiness to adapt oneself 
to change" (ibid., p. viii). Central to the process of change in this view is 
"an inner mechanism" which makes it possible "to see oneself in the 
other fellow's situation". It is this "empathetic capacity" as a "personal 
style" or "personality mechanism" that determines modernisation 
(ibid., p.49-50). The question for him thus becomes, how can change 
take place "in a land inflamed by Arab nationalism and primitive 
xenophobia" (ibid., p.77). 
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The work of Pye, Schramm, and Rogers follows a similar development 
pattern. Interestingly, however, because they were not really interested 
in the "traditional" attitudes and beliefs, believing them little more 
than obstacles to modern democratic politics, political scientists during 
the early heyday of modernisation theory neglected the scholarly 
tradition of European Islamic and Oriental Studies. It was not until the 
growth of what became known as Islamic fundamentalism in the 1970s 
that real debates about the nature of Middle Eastern political culture 
and political traditions were joined. For the modernisation theorists, 
the specific content of traditional beliefs merited no real attention since 
they would become mere historical relics as secularisation and 
rationalisation proceeded. As Daniel Lerner put it in his very 
influential work; 
"Whether from East or West, modernisation poses the same 
basic challenge-the infusion of "a rationalist and positivist 
spirit" against which, scholars seem agreed, "Islam is 
absolutely defenceless" (Lerner, 1958, p.45). 
Moreover, he continued: 
'This observational standpoint implies no ethnocentrism. 
As we will show, the Western model of modernisation 
exhibits certain components and sequences whose relevance 
is global. Everywhere, for example, increasing urbanisation 
has tended to increase media exposure; increasing media 
exposure has "gone with" wider economic participation 
(per capita income) and political participation (voting). 
The model evolved in the West is an historical fact ... [tlhe 
same basic model reappears in virtually all modernising 
societies on all continents of the world, regardless of 
variations in race, colour, creed ... " (ibid., p.45). 
"Modernisation" for Lerner is in reality nothing but "Westernization", 
"becoming what the West is". The reason he uses the term 
"Modernisation" instead of "Westernization" is, as he puts it, political 
and pragmatic. "For some Middle Eastern leaders, when convenient for 
diplomatic manoeuvre, to denounce the West is politically important 
and explains why we have chosen to speak of "Modernisation" rather 
than "Westernization'" (ibid., p.46-47). For Lerner, and for many of his 
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contemporaries, the essence of modernity was a personality type, which 
Lerner called "mobile" or "empathetic", and the more such 
personalities there were in a given population, the more modern was 
the society, since mobile personalities were literate, activist, 
participatory in a (circular) word, modern. The political context of 
Lerner's study is also of interest since it is apparent that the widespread 
fear of Communism spreading in the Middle East coloured 
conditioned, and influenced much academic work at this time. 
Lerner's major purpose in this work, is on one hand to present 
portraits of the several countries, and, on the other hand, to develop a 
typology of transition to illuminate both the portraits and the global 
movements of peoples they represent. He puts the "Moderns" on the 
one side- they are cosmopolitan, urban, literate, usually well-off, 
seldom devout, and "Traditionals" on the other side- just the 
opposite,14 
In the drama of modernisation, those who have already incorporated 
the trends of the times "The Modems" and those who have not yet 
been touched by them "The Traditionals" present a relatively static 
14rhe story ofthe Grocer and the Chief: In 1950, in a village called Balgat in Turkey, 
Professor Lerner visited that village by tracing the meaning of modernisation. He 
interviewed people, among whom was a grocer and the chief of that village whose 
answers had attracted his attention. In his interviews, with the help of an interpreter, 
he found out that the two men have quite different style. The chief is more 
conservative, traditional, and obedient, and would rather have his sons go to war and 
die for their country, while the grocer lives in a different world full of imaginings and 
fantasies. Most of the villagers did not like him very much. His words were" I would 
have liked to have a bigger grocery shop in the city, have a nice house there, dress nice 
civilian clothes". The Grocer was interested in listening to the radio "we are stuck in 
this hole, we have to know what is going on outside our village". There were no roads, 
and no electricity. A radio at that time, was not found in any of the houses. One of the 
most important questions was asked to some people what if he would do if he was the 
president of Turkey. A shepherd answered "My God! How can you say such a thing? 
How can 1... I cannot ... a poor villager ... master of the whole world". Lerner revisited 
the village after four years. Major changes had happened. The chief was there, his 
two sons have shops to sell western clothes, there was a road and electricity was 
installed. When he asked about the grocer, he was told that he was dead. One man 
said" he was the cleverest of us all. We did not know it then, but he saw better than all 
what lay in the path ahead. We have none like this among us now. He was a prophet." 
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posture. The meaning of events is best clarified by those whom we 
perceive at the moment of "engagement" a moment which occurs 
when an expansive "Se1£", newly equipped with a functioning 
empathy, perceives connections between its private dilemmas and 
public issues. The "Transitionals" are our key to the changing Middle 
East. 
But Lerner, unlike Coon, is interested not in "traditional" society, but 
in its opposite, in society undergoing rapid transformation. For Lerner-
as for such varied modernisation theorists of the 1950s and 1960s as 
Martin Lipset, Lucien Pye, and Karl Deutsch, traditional society in itself 
is of little interest, relevant only insofar as it provides the context in 
which social, economic, and political transformation occurs. 
Therefore, he arrives at his idea of "traditional society" and its mode of 
modernisation in Grunebaum's definition of the challenge 
modernisation represents to Arab society: the infusion of "a rationalist 
and positivist spirit against which Islam is absolutely defenceless" 
(Grunebaum, 1962, pA5). This "rationalist and positivist spirit" 
penetrated Arab sOciety at first only in its upper strata, "affecting 
mainly leisure-class fashion" (ibid.), but after World War 11 and the 
spread of mass media it took a global form, affecting society at large. 
Lerner eschews what he calls "the great debate over Permanence versus 
Change" and focuses on "the personal meaning of social change" (ibid., 
pp. 45-46). Though he admits that it is "large historical forces" that are 
responsible for the post-war social upheaval, he fails to address these 
forces-precisely because of his perspective, in which attitude and 
individual psychology, not "historical forces", form the basic categories 
of analysis. 
It is also important to point out that Lerner's study illustrates not only 
the substantive aspects of the process of modernisation but also the 
methodological approaches whereby modernisation theory has sought 
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to validate its claimsl5. Golding (1974) has reviewed a number of 
modernisation approaches including that of Lerner and he criticised 
the theoretical and methodological assumptions for their idealism, 
psychologicalism, and individualism. Lerner also attempts to deal with 
the role of the Western mass media as an educational and 
developmental tool. Golding (1974) is also critical of this assumption 
since it replicates the above assumptions and downplays indigenous 
economic activity. 
In addition, the methodological approach of Rogers (1969), in a work 
on modernisation greatly influenced by Lerner, reveals a very 
questionable reliance on the notion of empathy. Empathy for Rogers, 
Lerner and others, seems to involve the developed, mature, rational, 
academic Westerner trying to empathise with the undeveloped, 
immature, irrational and non-academic Easterner. 
The essential thesis of modernisation theory is the existence of a global 
unilinear social history in which the West advances along a 
continuum and the non-West remains behind. The parable is valid 
only insofar as the hypothesis that the Middle East transition hinges 
upon its "Transitionals" is true. The failure of existing elites to name 
and share the newly mobile men, to incorporate their aspirations, has 
encouraged them to seek new channels of their own design. To link 
the future with the Transitionals' acquisition of modernity is not to 
ignore those who already are "Moderns". One will look long in the 
West to find the intellectual peers of individual "Moderns" now living 
in each Middle East land. Equally, one will look long to find anything 
resembling illiterate, impoverished and submerged mass so obvious in 
its sociological landscape. The quality of modernisation as well as the 
quantity is important. The aim of modernisation is precisely to narrow 
15 The statistical surveys, questionnaires, and interviewing techniques as well as the 
theoretical frameworks and conceptual models elaborated in the various sub fields, 
e.g., politics, social integration, economic development, and child·rearing. 
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the gap between the bottom and top, to create a substantial "middle" 
sector-to increase the number "Transitional" who compose the living 
reality of transition. Along with this goes the need for a top-to-bottom 
consensus. 
According to Hajjar (1990), Lerner's approach was much more 
sophisticated both theoretically and methodologically, reflecting the 
developments of post-war quantitative methods. In his commentary, 
Berger attempts to integrate Orientalism and functionalist 
modernisation theory. He raises some of the typical problematic and 
policy concerns of this paradigm that emerged in the 1950s: population 
growth, economic development, and political- ideological currents 
(nationalism). He also analyses the modernising role of the new 
middle class, especially the military elite, reflecting the then-common 
issue of stability and change in the non-Western world. The two parts 
of this text remain unintegrated, as if they are separate essays on two 
separate realities. This illustrates the limits of both approaches; Berger 
utilises Orientalism to analyse and interpret the micro-sociological 
aspects of Islamic Middle Eastern society(ies), and employs 
modernisation theory to describe macro-sociological trends. 
In Middle Eastern studies, modernisation theory was informed by 
Orientalist categories in the context of the emergent area studies 
approach. The earliest attempts, highly Orientalized, are those of 
Carleton Coon and Raphael Patai. In sociology, one principle effort 
stand out: Morroe Berger's The Arab World Today (1964). Both Coon 
and Patai conceptualise Islam as the determining power of Islamic 
culture. Berger, on the other hand, is more impressed by the forces of 
change: the operationalized categories of modernisation theory: 
urbanisation, industrialisation, education, nationalism, etc. Although 
Berger notes the impact of these changes on the structure of social 
hierarchy, he dwells largely on the nature, size, and role of the "new 
middle class" - a favourite variable of modernisation theorists. 
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The same sort of Arab stereotyping is reflected in Morroe Berger's book. 
In a separate chapter on personality and values, he attempts to· 
"delineate a group of traits encompassing the Arabs in their variety, a 
kind of modal point which they approximate in varying degrees". 
Realising that the idea of an "Arab personality" is a "formidable 
abstraction" to which he must resort in order to say what "kind of 
person" the Arab is, he makes several sweeping generalisations. 
For Berger, the following generalisations combine to produce the Arab 
personality or general outlook, i.e., what kind of person the Arab is: 
- "The Arabs display the double effect of wounded pride-self exaltation 
and self-condemnation" (ibid., p.136). 
- "The Arab seems to harbour two major contradicting impulses: 
egotism and conformity. The first takes the forms of extreme self-
assertion before others, pride, and sensitivity to criticism. The second is 
reflected in obedience to certain group norms which are resented, and 
an inability to assert independence as an individual with confidence or 
finality" (ibid., p. 136). 
- "By providing ready-made phrases, it [speech) obviates the need for 
thought and originality" (ibid., p.155). 
- "There is a high degree of authoritarianism in the personal make-up 
of Arabs" (ibid., p.157). 
- Arab views of the external world of nature and of the arts display a 
similar rigidity, formalism, and disinclination to look into the 
unknown" (ibid., p.158). 
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- "One aspect of the cultural outlook ... is the Arab's infatuation with 
ideal forms; he clings to them emotionally even while he knows they 
are contradicted by reality" (ibid., p.160)16. 
These are only a few of the many generalisations. In contrast, not one 
positive value is mentioned in the chapter. Berger does not even 
wonder how a human society can function and survive without any 
positive values. For him, it does not seem that there is much of a need 
for explanations beyond merely naming in one paragraph what he 
believes to be the sources of the above Arab personality. These sources 
to Berger, are: "The nomadic Bedouin values that permeated Arab 
society and Islam, the claims of the religious system itself, the long 
history of subordination, crushing poverty, and patterns of child 
rearing which stem in part from these sources and reinforce them in 
generation after generation (ibid., p.136). 
Again we ask, what is the basis for such conclusions? It would be 
expected that sociologists and anthropologists should base their views 
on field research and empirical data. Instead, they rely on a selected 
number of saying, anecdotes, proverbs, quotes, readings, and Orientalist 
scholarship. 
In Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity (1962), a collection of 
articles written in the 1950s, Gustav von Grunebaum addresses such 
themes as Islam's power of expansion and adaptation, Westernization 
and nationalism, acculturation in Arabic literature. 
Grunebaum exhibits little interest in the underlying political issues; he 
is mostly occupied with attempts to theorise on cultural diffusion and 
16see also Rogers E (1969) study on traditional peasant mentality in Modernization 
Among Peasants: The Impact of Communication. This is an important study because it 
demonstrates that such stereotyping is not uniquely applied to Arab or Moslem 
countries. In this case, the study was of South American peasants. 
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transmission by using philological approaches and concepts taken from 
mainstream American social science. He is eager to exhibit his 
familiarity with different European and Eastern languages and his 
erudition is rather fussy. He approaches his object of study as almost 
secondary to the analytical from he bestows on it in the course of his 
investigation, his authorial presence is primary to the text. It is difficult 
not to feel the chill that his indifference toward his subject matter the 
"Other" evokes. He seems at home only with historically distant and 
long dead Arabs, or with non-Arab Muslims, and comfortable only in 
abstract theorising about Islamic symbolism, cultural patterns, and 
diffusion. 
Sharabi (1990) illustrates this effect by the following quotation, in 
which Grunebaum ironically describes how modern Arabs see 
themselves and their history: 
"The creed of Pan· Arab nationalism, genetically but not 
inherently connected with democratic aspirations, may be 
sketched somewhat as follows: This community (to Arabs, 
that is) of the Arabic-speaking peoples, stretching from 
the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic, inhabits regions that 
possess considerable geographical similarities and great 
economic potentialities. The population represents a young 
race that has its origin in the harmonious fusion of various 
human strains which Islam brought together in one crucible. 
Within this community there is no distinction of colour or 
race. The blood mixture has resulted in a great similarity of 
intellectual and moral aptitudes eVen though the variety 
of physical types has been maintained. This Arab "race" is 
extremely prolific, courageous, enthusiastic, enduring, 
patient and guided by the spirit of fairness. The absolute 
superiority of Arabic over all other languages allows it a 
great civilizational role. The influence of Islam confers on 
"Arabism" a sense of spiritual values which sets it off 
against the materialism of the West. What internal 
divisions exist, such as sects or tribes, are but the result of 
ignorance or foreign interference. Add to this the claim, 
made with varying degrees of conviction, that the most 
outstanding features of modern civilisation in the West 
have their origin in the Arab·Muslim tradition and their 
peculiar feelings of being a chosen people derived from 
their central position within Islam, and you have all from 
which historical constructs are constantly being devised 
and revised, all designed to justify aspiration and hope for 
the future in terms of past achievement" (ibid., pp. 211-
212). 
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The message in this passage is clear: "Pan-Arab nationalism" and 
"democracy" are "not inherently connected"; "blood mixture" and 
naive racial conceptions are constitutive of Arab nationalism; the 
Arab's exaggerated regard for their language, religion, and culture leads 
to an unrealistic assessment of themselves and of their proper place in 
the world; Arabs take their political fragmentation and weakness as 
due to mere "ignorance" or "foreign interference," rather than to their 
own division into "sects and tribes"; they compensate for their 
impotence by claiming that "modern civilisation in the West has its 
origin in the Arab Muslim tradition"; they have "peculiar feelings of 
being a chosen people"; they constantly "devise", "revise", and 
"design" history to fit their "aspiration and hope for the future"; and 
they view the future only "in terms of past achievement (Sharabi, 1990, 
pp. 12-13). 
Berque's (1964) study Les Arabs d'hier a demain will give a clear idea 
of the distance separating colonial and post-colonial Western 
scholarship. Berque focused on North Africa and Islam, he gives a clear 
idea of the distance separating colonial and post colonial Western 
scholarship. Berque saw himself and was seen by many Arab scholars 
and intellectuals, as a virtual member of the Arab critical movement. 
As he himself wrote: 
"I feel myself, in Cairo and Beirut, almost a member of that 
Arab intelligentsia. This undoubtedly means renouncing the 
classic exploits of absentee scholarship. But on the other 
hand it means adapting our field of study to the measure of 
my method. I have in fact sought to rely on personal 
observation or local sources. In other words, on first-hand 
experience. And also on communicated experience, since the 
greater part of the facts I have collected or the opinions I 
have quoted come straight from their context of feeling, 
from which they must not be abstracted (Berque, 1964, 
trans., pp. 17-18). 
No matter how closely Berque came to identify himself with the Arab 
position, he remained objectively rooted in a different cultural soil, in 
a foreign perspective. It is not only ideology political, ethnocentric, or 
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racist but also conceptual frameworks, sensibility, and paradigm that 
account for the way the Western scholarly perspective and its discourse 
are ultimately formed and consequently differentiated from those of 
the observed "Other". 
Lila Abu-Lughod (1990), pointed out three central zones of theorising 
within Middle East anthropology: segmentation, the harem and Islam. 
These are the "theoretical metonyms" by which this vast and complex 
area is grasped. The first zone is our main concern. It is perhaps the 
most enduring zone of anthropological theorising about the Arab 
world is known as segmentation, segmentary lineage theory, or 
tribalism. 
The central problem for the theorists is how social order is maintained 
in acephalous (headless) societies like the tribal societies of the Middle 
East in which there is no central authority. The answer has to do with 
the segmentary lineage that balances opposed groups at varying levels 
of socio-political organisation. The result, according to the 
conventional wisdom, is a system of "ordered anarchy". 
Rather than just describe the ideology of segmentation or describe how 
it works, she refers to Meeker who also tries to explain why it 
developed historically. She quotes him saying "The question is not 
whether Near Eastern tribal people actually adhere to genealogical 
principles in their political behaviour, but why they should have 
conceived of such a bizarrely formal paradigm of political relationships 
with such disturbing implications". She describes his assumption that 
"the politically segmenting genealogy is a form of political language" 
suggesting "a play of relationships around a problem of political 
violence" (Quoted in Lila Abu-Lughod, 1990, p.96). Finding segmentary 
politics relatively absent in the tribes of North Arabia, he argues that it 
must be understood as a peculiar adaptation to the circumstances of a 
pastoral nomadic tradition and politics tempered by the interests 
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arising from sedentary agriculture (as in North Africa and Yemen). The 
central and more pervasive Near Eastern problem is the threat of 
violence posed by the possession of aggressive instruments (mounts 
and weapons), a problem Meeker regards as the implicit subject of the 
Rwala poetry he analyses.17 
In a telling abuse of this type of theory, tribalism and Middle East 
"terrorism" have on occasion been explicitly linked, a step which 
suggests that the insistence on the essential segmentariness of Arab 
societies may facilitate their representation as especially divisive and 
violent.l8 
Janet Abu-Lughod's approach to dealing with Arab-Islamic cities has 
undergone significant transformation since her first major work on 
Cairo, published in 1971. Her second book on the topic of urban society, 
Rabat: Urban Apartheid, published in 1980, offers a brilliant treatment 
of social transformation as evidenced through urban development. 
The difference between the two works illustrates an evolution of her 
own perceptions of the sociology of the Middle East. In Cairo, she 
conceptualised the analysis in Orientalist terms and used the main 
Orientalists among her major sources (e.g., Gibb and Bowen, 
Brockelman, etc.), whereas in Rabat she draws more on a political 
l7Lila Abu Lughod (1990) notices that segmentation theory is also a discourse on 
masculinity, all we need to do is consider the way that, for many theorists, honour and 
segmentation are also tied to violence. Violence is implicit in works that posit social 
order as the central problematic. It is explicitly discussed in all works that take up the 
subjects of raids, feuds and disputes. 
l8In an Op-Ed piece in the July 7,1985, New York Times, an Israeli academic named 
Clinton Bailey, denouncing the Syrian backing of the Lebanese "tribal barbarians" who 
hijacked the TW A plane, asserted that "much Middle Eastern terrorism .. can be traced 
to the tribalism that still colors the politics of that region. Tribalism was the natural 
state of nomadic Arabs before they settled more permanently in the early years of 
Islam, and it has never disappeared. The nomadic Arab's independence and concern for 
narrow interests are still apparent, and have meant that Middle Eastern governments 
are rarely able to function as ultimate authorities". In a letter to the editor on July 17, 
anthropologist E. Traube deconstructs Bailley's text to expose the way he uses 
antiquated anthropological concepts which are "self-authenticating devices that have 
operated historically to confirm the value of their conceptual opposites." 
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economy framework and on neo-Marxist sources (See Hajjar, 1990, p. 
176-177). 
Janet Abu-Lughod sets her argument concerning Rabat's 
transformation in the context of Morocco's integration into the sphere 
of European domination and the consequent transformation of 
Moroccan society. In terms of this process she lays the groundwork for 
her later rejection of the concept of the "traditional Islamic city". She 
also rejects the idea, which the French, among others, espoused, that 
precolonized Morocco was a motionless and insular entity. 
Janet Abu-Lughod provides an explicit explanation of her own 
epistemological transformation and a lucid critique of her earlier 
Orientalist approach to the "Islamic City": 
"My own book on Cairo fell into the trap set by the 
Orientalists by accepting many of the earlier authorities 
about the nature of the Islamic city. The edifice they had 
built over the years seemed to me a strong and substantial 
one. Only gradually did it become clear how much a 
conspiracy of copying and glossing had yielded this optical 
illusion" 0. Abu-Lughod, 1980, p.160). 
She (1980) rejects the notion that characteristics of cities in the Arab 
world, or other areas where Islam is the religion, are "Islamic" by 
nature. There is nothing Islamic about camels, arid climates, or small-
scale market arrangements. She does, however, make the point that 
Islam was a crucial contributing factor in shaping cities within its 
realms. 
"First, it made rough juridical distinctions among 
population classes on the basis of their relation to the 
Umma and thus the State ... Furthermore, the frequent 
inability of the state to transcend communal organisations 
and the laissez-faire attitude of the state toward civil 
society left important functions to other units of social 
organisation which strengthened them. Since many of these 
functions were vicinal ones .... and since many vicinal units 
were composed of socially related people, what we would 
call the neighbourhood became a crucial building bloc of 
cities in the Arab world during the medieval and even later 
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times ... Second, by encouraging gender segregation, Islam 
create a set of architectural and spatial imperatives that 
had only a limited range of solutions .. And finally, one 
returns to the system of property laws that governed rights 
and obligations vis-a-vis both other property owners and 
the state. Such customary laws and precedents set in motion 
a process whereby a pattern of space was continually 
reproduced" (ibid., p.163). 
Janet Abu-Lughod takes the issue of urban mosaic structure from its 
common application. Hajjar (1990) describes it as a cultural fact to a 
debatable problematic which must be viewed in a more socio-political 
manner as the juridical and spatial distinction by neighbourhoods. J. 
Abu-Lughod concludes by saying that it is not by edict that Islamic cities 
have similar characteristics (in those cases where they do have), but 
rather by a set of conditions that set in motion processes that generate 
common solutions to common problems (i.e. gender segregation and 
property laws). 
In this auto-critique, Abu-Lughod contributes to the decolonization of 
sociology and anthropology of the Islamic Arab world and presents an 
example of theoretical innovation for apprehending modern Islamic 
Middle Eastern societies. 
These studies represent the modern academic engagements with the 
subject matter. A variety of more recent work has since developed 
building on these foundations, however they are not the concern of 
this thesis, which has tried to probe the formation of such modes of 
enquiry and the relationship to the explanatory concept Orientalism. 
3.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
East-West encounters have always been central to the modern history 
of the Arab Islamic region. The shifts and changes outlined here are 
connected to the rise of the West, but they are not fully reducible to 
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Western influence. Both the complexity of the political, economic, and 
cultural life of the region before the intrusion of Western power and 
the ways in which Western political needs, economic demands, and 
cultural missions intersected with indigenous society are key aspects of 
the modern history of the Arab Islamic world. 
To summarise the thesis so far, chapters two and three have presented 
the basic theoretical approach of this thesis towards the changing 
nature of relations between the West and the Arab Islamic East. On the 
most fundamental level, the West has, over many centuries at least 
since the time of the Crusades, possessed military, economic and 
intellectual power to interpret, categorise and define the Arab Islamic 
East. This categorisation has been actuated through the dualism of 
"Self" and "Other", with the Arab Islamic East perceived in terms of 
difference, absence, lack and exoticism. 
The European West has possessed and exerted its power over the East, 
while at the same time feeling or experiencing the East as threat, or 
potential threat. The existence of unequal power relations coupled with 
the perception of the threatening nature of the East have together 
forged a self-regulating, mode of Western interpretation that is able to 
demonize the Arab Islamic East whenever a situation of political 
sensitivity arises. While the West has traditionally possessed greater 
power and is able to define the East in certain stereotypical terms, at the 
same time it is because the West feels its "superior" position vis-a-vis 
the Arab Islamic East may be changing, that the West feels more 
threatened and it becomes ever more necessary to enclose the East 
within certain stereotypes. The perception that power relations may be 
changing has existed for many centuries. Firstly the West feared that 
the Islamic religion would become dominant over Christianity. More 
recently, Arab economic wealth and oil reserves have contributed to a 
feeling of unease or insecurity in the West. 
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In short, the notions of power and of threat can only be treated 
together, that is in juxtaposition. This thesis claims that these two 
terms provide a sound theoretical and analytical basis for the 
interpretation of the production of Western images of the Arab Islamic 
East. This theoretical foundation has been adapted from Said's work on 
"Orientalism" and his reading and reworking of Foucault on 
power/knowledge. However, it has been necessary to criticise and 
supplement these theoretical approaches which focus on the 
discursive, since this thesis aims to highlight both the historical shifts 
and changes as well as the individual agency, perceptions and 
experiences within Western construction of the Arab Islamic East. 
In order to achieve this aim, chapter two attempted to demonstrate that 
the dichotomy of power/threat can be mapped onto and expressed 
through a distinct historical lineage. This chapter began with an 
introductory theoretical reflection on the historical dimension of the 
changing nature of Western perceptions of the East. These perceptions, 
though of course diverse and contradictory, can be summarised within 
a further dichotomy of romanticism and negativity or demonization. 
That is Western perceptions of the Arab Islamic East seem to divide 
between a romantic idealisation of the East, and the tendency towards 
hostility and demonization. In the latter case, the West generates 
stereotypes and images and skews its perceptions and experiences into 
these negative categories. The latter stages of this thesis will attempt to 
show how the modern Western press plays a fundamental role in the 
formation and dissemination of these negative images. The thesis 
contends that during the course of the twentieth century, the tendency 
towards romanticism has been eroded and replaced by an increasing 
feeling of hostility and negativity towards the Arab Islamic East. In 
order to show the historical nature of these shifts, chapter two specified 
the following schemes of interpretation. 
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Six distinct historical phases were described, first was the early history 
of East/ West relations which was expressed primarily through 
religious, especially biblical and archaic Greek and Roman texts. Here, 
already the Arab Islamic East is portrayed as potential threat, although 
Western perceptions do not seem to fall within the 
romanticism/demonization dichotomy, that structures the later phases 
of interpretation. However, at this stage the East is already viewed in 
fundamentally religious terms as a growing threat to the hegemony of 
Christianity. 
The second historical stage described above was characterised by the 
Crusades and their aftermath. Here East and West entered into direct 
military conflict, generated and sustained by a sense of religious 
difference. The West begins to situate the Arab Islamic East as inferior 
or flawed to the extent that it had fallen under the influence of a 
suspect religion. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
thesis argued, the focus of East/West relations and the Western 
perceptions of the East, was through the latter's trading and 
exploration. Again the West had the power to define and categorise, 
creating its own image of the Orient, though at this stage the West, by 
and large, interpreted the East in romantic and exotic terms, 
emphasising elements of Eastern culture that it felt had been lost 
within Western rationalism. 
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries marked the high point of the 
Orientalist depiction of the Arab Islamic East. The nature of such 
Orientalism as examined by Said, however, has been assessed by 
drawing upon the historical scheme of chapter two, and the theoretical 
dichotomy romanticism/negativity, linked to the notion threat/power 
that we have introduced above, makes it possible to offer an original 
interpretation of the changes in Western interpretation of the East, 
particularly during the twentieth century. 
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Academic accounts tend to make overly strong generalisations about 
contemporary Arab value systems. This sort of isnad (attribution) may, 
at least partly, account for what Edward Said described as "the internal 
consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient ... despite or 
beyond any correspondence, or lack thereof, with a 'real Orient'" (Said, 
1978, p.5). After all, Orientalism has, in dominant Western 
interpretations, served as a system for creating and skewing images of 
the East, in particular by selecting details out of social and historical 
context, hence the dominant view of Arab society and history as being 
constant or unchanging. 
Lacking a firm sense of political, cultural or economic activities, or the 
social life of the Arabs of modern times, many historians have resorted 
to the view of modern Arab history as a reaction to the West tempered, 
in various ways, only by the traditional "Islamic" minds et. The 
conventional sense of "modern" history as being exclusively concerned 
with the rise of the West is being questioned as we pay more attention 
to the many similarities in forms of economy and culture between East 
and West. 
Chapter three expanded the inquiry into the nature of Orientalism 
through a theoretical examination of the work of Said and others. 
Said's work Orientalism argues that since the late eighteenth century, 
Western writers have constructed an image of the Orient centred 
around such claims as the distinctiveness of the "Oriental mind" as 
opposed to the "Occidental mind". These Western assumptions depend 
upon an essentialist view of the Arab Islamic East, since it is presented 
as fixed, unvarying and ahistorical, or at least not fully historical in the 
Western progressivist sense. While the West develops technological 
sophistication, building an empire and spreading "civilisation", the 
East, or Arab Islamic East, is presented as locked within a backward and 
fatalistic frame of mind. Said argued that these images do not 
correspond to any empirical reality and reduce to insignificance the 
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varieties and developments of language, culture, social forms and 
political structures in the so-called Orient. This imagery has been a 
significant part of intellectual thought in the West since the Age of 
Enlightenment, and continues in the post-colonial era. 
Orientalism therefore, is a complex of representations of the Orient; 
representation here, being a mode of knowledge formation, produced 
from a position of exteriority. It can be seen as a profound 
misrepresentation. Orientalism 'overrode' the Orient, negated it 'as it 
is' according to Said. Equally, Said argues that the Orient was the 
. 'invention' of the Orientalist, 'almost a European invention'. This 
aspect of Said's work has been a subject of a great deal of criticism. 
Childs & Williams (1997) have argued 
"if Said denies that there is any actual Orient which could 
provide a true account of the Orient represented by 
Orientalism, how can he claim in any. sense that the 
representation is false" (Childs & WilIiams, 1997, p.106) 
Young (1991) makes a similar criticism arguing "if true representation 
is an impossibility, on what grounds is he criticising the Orientalists?" 
(Young, 1991, p. 130). 
However, according to Childs & Williams, Said's work does not 
necessary make these errors and Said clarifies his stance as follows: 
All cultures tend to make representations of foreign cultures, 
the better to master or in some way control them. Yet not all 
cultures make representations of foreign cultures and in fact 
master or control them. This is the distinction, I believe, of 
modern Western cultures" (Said, 1993, p.120). 
While the general nature of Said's theoretical framework on 
Orientalism was argued to be of considerable importance and value, its 
possible limitations and failings must be kept in mind. Said's work 
opens up the possibility of a thorough historical and cultural 
appreciation of Western discourses of power and techniques of the 
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representation of the "truth" of the East. While Said's approach is 
historical, his application of Foucaultian discursive methodology 
remains problematic. When he wrote Orientalism, Said reworked 
Foucault's emphasis on the Western production of the "truth" of the 
East, in a relatively uncritical way, however in later work, Said became 
more critical of Foucault's methodology. 
"He [Foucaultl seems unaware of the extent to which the 
ideas of discourse and discipline are assertively European 
and how, along with the use of discipline to employ masses 
of detail (and human beings), discipline was also used to 
administer, study and reconstruct- then subsequently to 
occupy, rule and exploit- almost the whole of the nm-
European world" (Said, 1984, p.200). 
Here Said is accusing Foucault of Eurocentricism in his emphasis on 
discourse and of failing to come to terms with the Western exploitation 
of the non-West. 
Although Said's approach is historical he has, like Foucault before him 
been criticised for being selective with historical and empirical data, 
adapting it to suit particular interests or to make his point appear 
stronger and less ambiguous than it might otherwise be (B. S. Turner, 
1979, 1984, 1987, and Rodinson 1980). Further Said's discursive 
methodology renders any appreciation of rooted human agency, 
interactive and perceptual dimensions of cultural life awkward and 
difficult since individuals and their agency are never the centre of his 
analysis. While Said is clearly aware of the limitations of Foucaultian 
methodology in interpreting human agency, and of the problems of 
textualist reduction20 , arguing: 
'There were - and are- cultures and nations whose location 
is in the East, and their lives, histories and customs have a 
brute reality obviously greater than anything that could be 
said about them in the West .. (Said, 1978, p.5). 
20 By this term I am referring to Derrida's well known assertion .. there is nothing 
outside the text .. 
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However, in the recent critical evaluation of Said by Childs & 
Williams, Said is never able to fully come to terms with the important 
notions of "indigenous agency" even in his later works, "he does not 
provide any theoretical analysis of, grounding for, an understanding of 
where agency as resistance originates, or how it functions" (Childs & 
William, 1997, p. 111). 
Following Foucault, Said examines discourse, texts, archives, records 
but rarely looks at human perceptions and agency. In fact, for Foucault 
and Said during this period of his career, any attempt to interpret 
human perceptions or consciousness are likely to be mistaken whereas 
archives and records form a tangible and material resource for the 
analysis of power and knowledge, "the formation of discourses and the 
genealogy of knowledge need to be analysed, not in terms of types of 
consciousness, modes of perception and forms of ideology, but in terms 
of tactics and strategies of power" (Foucault, 1980, quoted in Childs & 
William, 1997, p.99). However, in my opinion, analyses which focus 
purely on texts and archives and which try to avoid talking about 
human individualism and agency are likely to be too narrow and to 
miss many important and interesting features of modern life, 
particularly what Childs and Williams (1997) call "native agency" and 
"indigenous resistance", the perceptions of the Western public of Arab 
Islamic culture, or equally Eastern perceptions of Western culture. 
There are two essential points here; firstly Said's failure to focus on 
human action and agency. Secondly, Said's relative silence concerning 
the possibility of indigenous resistence. It is possible to analyse texts 
and discourse while drawing upon a wider sense of cultural, religious 
and ethnic difference and agency which is real, lived experience and 
which may well be excluded from official archives and records. Future 
research might be developed along these lines. 
Chapter three of this thesis reviewed other criticisms of Said's work, 
primarily by Rodinson and B. S. Turner. These critiques were held to be 
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of considerable importance for the later examination of Western 
representation of the Arab Islamic East made by this thesis. 
Rodinson disagrees with Said's assertion that the West possesses a 
demonizing intention when studying different societies. He continues 
to argue that the eighteenth century culture of Western Europe created 
a rationalist, paternalist and universalist world-view which situated 
East and West as equals or at least potential equals. However, this 
writer finds it difficult to agree with Rodinson's latter point since 
Enlightenment thought also included a heavy dose of exoticism. 
Rodinson is right to resist Said's tendency to imagine a Western 
conspiracy to demonize. For Rodinson, Orientalism is conceived as 
operating in far more pragmatic terms; not as a consistent and self 
conscious discipline but as a range of disparate views. Finally this thesis 
agrees with Rodinson's contention that Said, like other ex-Communist 
intellectuals, tends to assume "All foes of the powerful were pure 
heroes" (Rodinson, 1980, p. xiii), which of course does not follow 
logically. In other words, Rodinson is arguing that Said assumes that 
anyone who is oppressed or made the subject of another's power is 
intrinsingly heroic, simply by the fact that they are oppressed. Here 
Rodinson reveals that Said himself also romanticises Islam at certain 
points in his argument, merely because it was made the subject of 
Western techniques of power and regimes of truth. 
The thesis also found B. S. Turner's approach to Orientalism to be of 
importance, in particular the argument that the West interprets the 
Orient in terms of missing features and absences, such as of a middle 
class and the spirit of individualism, that enabled Orientalists to create 
simplistic "Self" / "Other" dichotomies. Turner, like Rodinson is critical 
of Said's presentation of Orientalism as a homogenous discourse. 
While we agree that Orientalism is a diverse and multiple notion, it is 
necessary to contest Turner's assertion that neo-Marxism is the only 
analytical tool that may undermine Orientalism. In order to 
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comprehend the complex and shifting nature of Western media 
perceptions of the Arab Islamic East, which now operate on a globalized 
scale, the ideological basis of neo-Marxism seems to be inadequate. It is 
difficult to elaborate a sense of the diversity and meaning of the 
cultural and religious within Marxist terminology, and the focus on 
ideology (rather than discourse) often pre-judges data in terms of true 
and false or real and distorted. Such an approach is simplistic and tries 
to take sides by apportioning blame. This is something I have tried to 
avoid throughout the thesis. 
What is needed is to develop a broad understanding of the modern 
period, an understanding that can encompass the rhythms and 
diversity of the indigenous cultures as well as the patterns of European 
penetration. At the same time, we must continue to conduct 
specifically focused studies that can help us understand how people 
lived during a particular period. The two tasks are reciprocal: broad 
understanding provides the framework within which we can order our 
work and enables us to ask significant questions, while the focused 
specific studies can help test and refine our broader understanding. 
Therefore, we will draw selectively upon the notions of Orientalism 
that appear in the work of Said, Rodinson and Turner, while at the 
same time resisting some of the assumptions and preferences of their 
work. My opinion is that much of Said's concept of Orientalism is 
valid, except for certain of his assumptions criticised above. 
Orientalism should be seen as a body or archive of knowledge created 
in order to define an object or "Other". However, Orientalism is a 
diverse notion, one which is inconsistent and changing. Its changes can 
tell us as much about the fears of the West as the changing nature of 
the East. This modified and cautious sense of Orientalism will form the 
background to the historical analysis of Western media perceptions of 
the Arab Islamic East, in particular the way in which Western 
romanticism has been eroded at the expense of increased hostility. 
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In order to emphasise the inter-penetration of East and West, "Self" 
and "Other", Threat and Power and Romanticism and Negativity, this 
thesis will continue to employ the terms "Arab Islamic 
world/culture/people". This is because although ideally it should be 
possible to differentiate between the concepts and components of 
which the separate terms Arab and Islamic consist, within the context 
of the colonial underpinnings of Western politics, economy and 
specially mass media this is no longer possible. In the functioning of 
the Western mass media coverage of Arab Islam in the West, in 
relation to threatening "Others", the terms Arab and Islamic are, 
almost always, juxtaposed as we will demonstrate below. This thesis 
employs these terms (Arab-Islamic) in the juxtaposed forms in order to 
show how Western media understandings always move within the 
space between them. Sometimes it is the "Arabic" nature of the East 
that becomes dominant in the constructions of the Western media, at 
other times it is the "Islamic" nature of the East that becomes more 
important. The primary data of the quantitative analysis (chapter 
seven) consists of newspaper articles that deal with the Islamic religion 
or Islamic culture that take place in Arab Middle Eastern countries and 
not with Islamic events occurring in other countries, for example the 
Far East or Western Europe. 
An alternative approach would have been to question the relationship 
between the Western mass media coverage of events in the Arab 
Islamic world with its coverage of Arab Islamic affairs within Western 
Europe. There are good reasons to suppose that the two influence each 
other, certainly they are not inconsistent. For example the case of 
Salman Rushdie and the publication of the Satanic Verses achieved 
notoriety in the domestic Western media and helped shape Western 
perceptions of the nature of Arab Islamic society. That is, the Rushdie 
affair was used by the Western media to reinforce or exemplify already 
negative views of the Arab Islamic East particularly the reduction of its 
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cultural diversity to the linked themes of Islam and terrorism.21 
However, it will not be possible to cover this issue in this thesis 
because the focus is on only Western coverage of the Arab Islamic East. 
Further the issue of a comparison, in this case between Western press 
coverage of events in the Arab Islamic world and those in Western 
Europe, would raise considerable methodological problems. The 
important point to emphasise here is that Western media prefers to 
focus on Eastern or Arabic Isla'm, not on the diversity of Islam as it 
exists across the world in general. 
The changing relationship or balance between Western perceptions of 
the Arab Islamic East and their relationship to modern Western media 
is central to the forthcoming inquiry. In refusing to submit to the 
homogenised images of the East generated by Orientalism, this thesis 
will attempt to avoid viewing either the West or the East in 
essentialist, monolithic or homogenous terms. The purpose of the first 
two chapters has been to unsettle such homogenising assumptions in 
both Orientalist and anti-Orientalist texts, and to show something of 
the dynamic, shifting, historical nature of East/West relations wherein 
the West generates images of the East. 
The twentieth century has seen the steady but persistent decline of 
romanticism and its increasing replacement by hostility and 
demonization. This is clearly visible in the Western newspapers which 
form the primary data of this thesis. It is this relatively recent, yet, 
fundamental shift in Western interpretations that form the focus of 
much of the forthcoming work. How is this shift to be accounted for? Is 
it inevitable, irreversible and what possibilities does the twenty-first 
century hold for East/ West relations? These questions will be 
addressed over the forthcoming chapters. Chapter four is concerned 
21 Work of this kind has been done by Modood, T. (1992) "British Asian Muslims and 
the Rushdie Affair" in Race. Culture & Difference; and in a recent thesis by Mohsen 
(1990) The British Press Construction of Iran. 1979-1989. 
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with establishing the nature of images of Arab Islamic culture in the 
Western media. The thesis will then examine the structure of the 
modern Western news media itself. Here we will attempt to show how 
stereotypical and skewed images of the Arab Islamic East form the 
foundation of media assumptions. In addition, we will explore how 
the historical-economic and political legacies of Orientalist imperialism 
become linked to shifts in the contemporary form of the Western 
media. The crucial factors are the increasing concentration of the 
ownership of the media and the erosion of state control in favour of 
privatisation. The combined effects are the persistent and increasing 
homogenisation, reduction, simplification and skewing towards the 
negative of Western media representation of the "Other"22 . The 
modern media standardise and then disseminate the already crude and 
reductive images of the Arab Islamic East that were generated within 
Orientalist and imperialist scholarship. 
The latter stages of the thesis will turn to the analysis of how the legacy 
of Orientalism, the theorising of it by Said and others, and our own 
formulation of Orientalism, helps us to comprehend something of the 
nature of recent events that have come to the attention of the Western 
media. 
In the quantitative and qualitative analysis (chapter seven and eight) of 
three chosen media events, we will attempt to establish a number of 
important links between the colonialist and Orientalist legacies of the 
past and the recent Western media construction of the Arab Islamic 
world. The particular points that will be emphasised, and which are 
drawn from Said's notion of Orientalism, are firstly that the "Other" is 
defined from outside, it is not self defining. In this case, the Western 
media "Self" defines the Arab Islamic "Other". As Said argued the 
22 This thesis does not, of course, assume that the Arab is the only stereotypical 
"Other" of the Western imagination. There are a range of additional people and groups 
who are situated in a similar way. 
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"Other" is presented but its citizens are not able to represent 
themselves. 
Secondly, events within the Arab Islamic world that come to the 
attention of the Western media tend to be interpreted negatively. This 
negative skewing of information and interpretation often takes the 
form of the following syllogism: all or most Arabs are equated with the 
Islamic religion which in turn is frequently defined as threatening and 
terroristic, therefore, it appears to the West, particularly during 
moments of insecurity, that all Arabs are potential terrorists. 
Thirdly, the particular form of the contemporary Western media, that 
is the erosion of state control and the concentration of private 
ownership dominated by commercial or market imperatives, tends to 
increasingly standardise and homogenise media information. The 
already reductive and stereotypical images of Arab Islamic culture that 
circulated within Orientalist discourse are therefore hardened and 
further reduced within the contemporary Western media. 
Fourthly, the idea of familiarity is important as an explanatory tool. 
With recent events associated with terrorism such as the Oklahoma 
bombing (see chapter eight), the Western media is faced with the 
unknown, the threatening and "evil". In order to attempt to make 
sense of such catastrophic events the Western media adopts simplistic 
political, and cultural stereotypes to cope with the fear and uncertainty 
generated within its own society. The American media widely assumed 
that Arab terrorists were responsible for the Oklahoma bombing; only 
later did it become apparent that the terrorist was home-grown. Again, 
these current political stereotypes have their source in the Orientalist 
and imperialist legacies of Western experience. 
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Further, Said's use of the terminology of "Self" and "Other" is 
important and valuable, particularly when it is not misinterpreted as a 
crude binary opposition. "Self" and "Other" are not clear-cut, 
particularly where the diversity and range of human cultural 
experience is in question. For example, we will see in the case study of 
the assassination of former President Sadat of Egypt, that for the 
Western media Sadat seemed to occupy a position of both "Self" and 
"Other", or rather "Other" becoming "Self". His position was then 
outside the margins of "Self" / "Other". The Western media seems to 
have subsumed the sense of "Otherness" into terminology that is more 
acceptable to the "Self" i.e. the West. Again, the complexities of the 
"Self" / "Other" relationship are revealed in the second case study of the 
hijack of a Kuwaiti Airways flight. Here, the Western media focuses 
almost exclusively on the British and American passengers, that is 
components of the "Self", to the exclusion of any "Other" actors. In this 
case, Western "Selves" were lost within the threatening environment 
of the Arab Islamic "Other" and the Western media then reaffirmed 
the "Self" identity of the Western actors partly by emphasising the 
"Otherness" of non-Western actors. 
Finally, we do not wish to suggest that the Western media is a 
monolithic structure. Something of the diversity of the Western media 
is revealed by the reporting of the French newspaper Le Monde. For 
each of the three case studies, Le Monde contained significantly less 
coverage and particular less usage of negative terminology than the 
British and American newspapers. However this does not indicate that 
Le Monde was uninfluenced by the French colonial and imperialist 
background. On the contrary this newspaper seem to concentrate only 
on those events which directly concerned its former colonial 
possessions in the Arab Islamic region, and this helps to explain its 
more restricted yet more balanced coverage. Once more Said's 
influential work had also encountered this variance within Western 
media coverage. In fact he noted, in Covering Islam (1981), when 
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comparing the New York Times with Le Monde for the coverage of the 
Iranian revolution, that the two newspapers were at such variance that 
they appeared to be writing about two different countries. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to review and evaluate the 
variety of primarily Western theoretical approaches to the Arab Islamic 
East. The following chapters provide an analysis of specific images and 
representations of the Arab Islamic East throughout the modern 
period, and within the electronic media, particularly cinema and 
television. The study culminates with a content analysis of these three 
case studies concerning Western mass media representations of Eastern 
culture. This analysis aims to provide a series of links with these 
various theoretical approaches and will reinforce and refine the 
evaluations made in this chapter. We will attempt to establish whether 
it is the optimistic or pessimistic interpretations of the effects of the 
media on the stereotyping, that are suggested by our primary data. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE IMAGE OF ARAB ISLAMIC CULTURE 
IN THE WESTERN MEDIA 
"LET'S NOT LEA YE IT TO THE ARABS" 
Who would now trus t the Arab to make th eir ow n settlement? 
The illustration and title were printed on the cover of The Spectator 
ma~azine dated 16 March 1991 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the twentieth century, Arab Islamic countries have faced formidable 
political and social challenges: the struggle for independence from 
colonial dominance, the formation and development of independent 
nation states with all the pressures and problems of modernisation, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, and the emergence of the oil-producing states as a 
major economic power bloc. The history of the Arabs in the modern 
period reflects the continued interaction of the Islamic tradition with 
the forces of change. 
With one Middle Eastern crisis after another, the Western media have 
had many opportunities to represent Arab Islamic cultures. The 
organisation of views follows a very crude political and ideological 
distinction, on the one hand, between "Us" and "Them", and on the 
other, between "our friends" and "the terrorists". The sense that there 
are different cultures, different histories, different claims and 
aspirations; these multiplicities are lost. The prevailing sense in the 
Western media is that the Arab world, as a place, is quite empty, a 
desert with a large pool of oil underneath it, with a bunch of camel 
drivers running around above. 
The dominant image which prevails in the Western media may be 
explained by the mutually alienating relationship between the 
powerful and the weak. The weak reject the humiliation of playing 
according to the rules of the strong. The strong are exasperated with 
what they consider as delinquent behaviour by the weak (McDowall, 
1992, p.25). 
The culture in Arab societies is viewed as an extension of politics in 
which the present political events in the Middle East have caught most 
analysts off guard. Representations are always politically and 
ideologically structured. Inevitably, a body of errors, distortion and 
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stereotypical images are created. A great deal of research suggests that 
the West perceives an 'old enemy' that has crept in by the back door 
(ibid., p.26). Western opinion together bring an assortment of 
irrationalities and caricatures perpetuated over many years, that 
embody images of, for example, Jihad against the unbeliever. Further, 
the religion of Islam is considered the key to understanding the Arab 
world, which is seen as a threatening monolith, so much so that the 
Western press feels justified using phrases like "the Islamic Bomb" or 
"the Arab Terrorist". 
This chapter, therefore will attempt to review studies of the images of 
the Arab Islamic world in the Western media. Within this framework, 
the chapter will start by giving a definition of image and stereotype 
concepts, outlining a selection of image studies research. This will give 
a clear picture to start the second section by introducing the image of 
the Arabs in the Western media. Because of the extensive literature, 
this section will be divided into three sub-sections. The first will deal 
with the Arab image in the mainstream cinema and television, the 
second will be on the Arab image in Cartoons, and the third will be on 
the Arab image in the Western press. 
4.2. INTRODUCING THE CONCEPTS OF IMAGE & 
STEREOTYPE 
There is an abundance of literature concerned with the concept of 
"image" and this term frequently alternates with the term "stereotype". 
Therefore, an attempt to clarify these terms is worthwhile. 
"An image" is a mental representation of an object which is held by the 
general public. It can be either good or bad, but hardly neutral. The 
image of an object has some of the reality concerning the object but 
does not represent the reality itself, for it is conveyed to people 
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indirectly through different means. "An image" can be subject to 
change over time and through personal experience. "Stereotypes" are 
relatively more fixed or deep-seated beliefs based on over 
generalisation, simplification and rumour, about an object or class of 
objects. Stereotypes being relatively more fixed than images, changing 
or mutating only over longer periods of time. 
Stereotypes are collections of fundamental characteristics that apply to 
an individual within any specific group, and are difficult to define, but 
the most widely accepted definition was provided by Waiter Lippman 
(1929). He defined stereotypes as 1) the means of organising images into 
fixed, simplified impressions and, 2) convenient and time and 
necessary saving definitions. He further pointed out that they are a 
defence mechanism and an attack on it is an attack against a person's 
feelings and emotions. 
Linguist, and later US Senator, S,1. Hayakawa (1939), described 
stereotypes as "widely current misinformation" and "traditional 
nonsense". Some stereotypes are totally unsupported by facts and 
others develop from a skewing and over generalisation of facts. 
Stereotypes, in short, are the relatively simple, rigid, general cognition 
of certain groups which blind the individual to the differences among 
members of any ethnic group. 
A report in the New York Times dated October 15 1981, describes 
"Stereotype" as a dirty word among some intellectuals and others who 
feel that, when used to describe members of a race, religion, or 
nationality, it indicates prejudices. 
It is recognised that mass media perform a variety of functions 
regarding the creation of images, and that images would influence the 
pattern of behaviour. Boulding (1961) believes that "behaviour 
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depends on images" (p.6) . In his view, he believes that the messages 
received and the feedback may follow by the individual, account for 
changes in image. Thus, personal reality depends on one's images of 
events which in turn is subject to the flow of images. These studies 
become useful in explaining how the mass media depict a certain 
subject or issue (Dennis, 1978,p.58). Also Kraus and Davis (1976) in 
their analysis of the agenda setting function, explained how the media 
may structure our world for us: 
'Television, newspaper, radio, and film seem to have 
enormous power in shaping public opinion of issues 
confronting society. By just paying attention to some issues 
while ignoring others, the mass media deliberately, or 
otherwise, may set priorities of concern within various 
sections of the public" (Kraus & Davis, 1976, p.21). 
Moreover, image studies are also useful in another respect. As Dennis 
(1978) suggested that this "has implications for a better understanding 
of the internal dynamics of media organisations". The publishing 
material in the press determines "how images will be shaped and 
which ones will be emphasised". 
Looking at image studies research, one finds that image studies have 
been conceptualised as the subjective knowledge of one country about 
another country, whose elements can be neglected, and replaced or 
reformulated. Boulding (1961) argued "it was the images of nations that 
were real and that the real, however, defined was really an image". To 
Boulding images were the basis on which nations communicated. He 
saw images as changing in their elements and in their meaning 
claiming that history was very much a part of the image. 
As far as image studies are concerned, these perceptions also play a role 
in policy making. Politicians in particular seem able to ignore 
information that does not fit their world view or reshape it so that it 
seems to confirm already held beliefs. When policy makers do not 
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initially perceive evidence as conforming to their views, then they may 
attempt to interpret it as if it were compatible with their beliefs. 
Another important point is raised by Harold Isaacs (1958) who has 
argued that "events are shaped by social forces that are normally much 
larger and more powerful than any individual policy maker, but 
insofar as policy makers do play a role, then their images of the people 
concerned (like their images of themselves and their own nation) have 
some part in the process". He continues his argument saying that 
"great events can result from .. .'mistaken' arrangements and images 
and ideas in the minds of men in power". 
4.3. WESTERN VIEWS OF THE ARAB ISLAMIC WORLD 
Rabbi Meir Kahane in Israel (1996) quoted "The Arabs are a cancer, 
cancer, cancer in the midst of us ... Let me become Defence Minister for 
two months and you will not have a single cockroach around here! I 
promise you a clean Israel!"<Ihe Observer Review,21/4/96). 
Hamdi Kandil (1981) wrote on how the Western press reports on Islam, 
in general, and has reflected both hostility and ignorance. It has in 
many cases been an example of what Mort Rosenblum (Quoted in 
Kandil, 1981) called "particular journalism". Reporters have very little 
time to appreciate the intricacies of the political and cultural life of 
Moslem countries. In an article in the International Herald Tribune 
entitled the "Veil's Revival Reflects Women's Status in Islam", a 
serious journalist, for whom Kandil did not mention a name or a date, 
surprisingly suggests that "the Koran gives advice on everything, even 
the proper position for sexual relations". It promises, he says, "that 
after death a man will have sexual relations 72 times a day, and this 
may help to explain why many young Moslem men are eager to die 
and become martyrs" (ibid.,). 
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An article from The Observer, stated "When a year ago, the Oklahoma 
City bomb exploded, the immediate response of both the police and the 
media was that the blast was the work of Islamic terrorists. Men of 
'Middle Eastern' complexion were hastily arrested; there were calls for 
pre-emptive strikes on Middle Eastern countries, and a wave of attacks 
took place on both mosques and Muslim communities across the 
Unites States. 
Is the situation improving? It seems not, in some ways Western 
perceptions of Islam or the Arabs themselves are no more positive 
today than they were at the time of the Crusades. According to Clive 
Kessler, today's perceptions and misperceptions are "descended from 
that time. Thus, wherever Islam asserts itself politically in the 
contemporary world, popular Western perceptions of these 
developments are doubly distorted: by fears inspired by events, notably 
in Iran, and by a whole legacy of adverse European and Christian 
attitudes toward Islam" (Kessler, 1980, p.2). 
In their drive for modernisation and development, Arab societies are 
beset by many difficulties which often express themselves in the form 
of violent convulsions: revolutions, coups or inter-Arab quarrels 
which sometimes manifest themselves verbally, occasionally in the 
language of guns. Another negative aspect related to the development 
process is the syndrome of one-man rule - whether he is a historic 
champion or a despot ruling with an iron fist - and the absence of 
constitutional legitimacy, of democratic institutions and human rights 
guarantees. 
Slade (1981), studied the image of the Arabs in the United States, by 
interpreting a poll on American attitudes. She stated that: 
'The perception of the Arab as threatening the peace and 
security has been grossly caricatured on television ... The 
entertainment media have given us the most extremely 
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stereotyped image of the Arab present in our culture. The 
Arabs remain one of the few ethnic groups who can still be 
slandered with impunity in America" (Slade, 1981, p.143). 
Slade's findings revealed a low opinion of the Arabs and a strong 
majority siding with Israel in the conflict between the Middle Eastern 
nations. The reason she gives about the low opinion of Arabs is that 
Arabs are" anti-Christians and militarily unfriendly toward the United 
States". She also showed that opinion towards the individual Middle 
Eastern nations and leaders was not monolithic. 
In her study, Slade presented a percentage of 44% to 50% of the sample 
described the Arabs as "barbaric, cruel, treacherous ..... (ibid. p.147). This 
showed a more negative opinion of the Arabs than positive, 
concluding that "there is a need to project a more favourable Arab 
image. One hopes the Arab governments will find the means to do so. 
There is also a need to challenge the concept that Islam is anti-
Christian and anti-Semitic" (ibid. p.160). 
Mansfield gives a good example of how Westerners view the Arab and 
the world of Islam. In his book The Arabs, Mansfield (1992) points out 
"any writer who embarks on an attempt to describe and interpret the 
contemporary Arab world to Western readers is confronted by a set of 
formidable difficulties". Mansfield explains that any writer will 
encounter a stereotyped vision of the Arabs and the Islamic religion 
which is associated with them in the western mind. He also confirms 
that the "more complex problem is that the average educated 
Westerner is unaware that he suffers from prejudice towards the 
Arabs" (Mansfield, 1992, p.480). 
Mansfield gives the following example which illustrates with great 
clarity how the Westerner views the Arab and the world of Islam. He 
says: 
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"During our first week at Aramco School on Long Island, 
questions were asked of us to ascertain our general 
knowledge about the Arab world. The questions "What is 
Islam?" and "Who was the Prophet Mohammed?" brought 
forth some interesting answers. One of four members 
thought that Islam was "a game of chance, similar to 
bridge". Another said it was a "mysterious sect founded by 
the Ku Klux Klan". One gentleman believed it to be "an 
organisation of American Masons who dress in strange 
customs". The Prophet Mohammed was thought to be the 
man who "wrote the Arabian Nights". Another said he 
was "an American Negro minister who was in competition 
with Father Divine in New York City". One of the more 
reasonable answers came from our men who said, 
"Mohammed had something to do with a mountain. He 
either went to the mountain, or it came to him" (ibid. p.479-
480). 
This example, to Mansfield's view, shows the attitudes and the 
understanding of the Arabs and Islam in the Western world is based on 
"an equal mixture of prejudice and ignorance". 
This example had led Mansfield to present his book The Arabs with a 
question on the first page of the book "Who are the Arabs?". Before 
answering this question, Mansfield believed that the confusion is no 
one's fault, but as a result of the "historical development of the Arab 
nation through the 'Arabization' of other races (ibid., p.489). 
A great deal has been written about Islam in the past, so logically there 
should not be any problem understanding the faith or its adherents. 
Unfortunately this is not so. As Said pointed out, there has been no 
period in European or American history since the Middle Ages in 
which Islam was generally discussed or thought about outside a 
framework created by passion, prejudice and political interest (Said, 
1978, p.23). 
In his Islam and the West: The Making of an Image, Norman Daniel 
(1966) traces one of the main causes of this confusion which is the 
hostility to the shock that was caused to Medieval Christians by the 
Muslim attitude towards Jesus Christ (Daniel, p.24). The struggle 
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between Christianity and the World of Islam was a conflict between 
equals. Mansfield (1992) described it as "mutual hostility and even 
hatred but there was mutual respect". This has changed during the 18th 
and 19th centuries, when the European Christians had achieved 
technical and material expansion. The hostility was replaced by 
contempt for their lack of practical achievement. 
Islam was condemned because it had entered a period of long physical 
decline. This was the beginning of misunderstanding the image of 
Arabs and the world of Islam in the Western eye. To the West, "Islam 
was a failure" (Daniel, 1966, p.490).1 
The first reaction against the Arab Muslim world dates back to these 
imperial times, but assumes a very different shape. It consists of a 
romantic and often uncritical image of the Arab as the "Knight of the 
desert", the warrior or nomad with his tents and camels, his simple but 
dignified open-air life and his tradition of honour and hospitality. By 
definition, this approach to the Arabs largely excludes towns-people 
and modern urban development2• It is essentially a nostalgic, 
somewhat romanticised way of looking at things, in keeping with the 
poetic and sentimental side of the Western European imagination. 
To call it the 'T.E. Lawrence school of thought' is not really adequate, 
for Lawrence, though he certainly indulged in fantasy, was also quite 
hard-headed about politics and personalities. It is best documented, 
from the literary standpoint, by E.M. Forester (1923), who wrote an 
essay entitled, Salute to the Orient 3. 
1 Said has suggested that Arabs came to occupy "a negative value" in the United 
States. He argues that only Arabs and Islam "presented Europe with an unresolved 
challenge on the political intellectual, and for a time, economic levels" (See Said, 1978, 
p.73-74). 
2 There was very little of this at the time these ideas were at their strongest. 
3 See the discussion in chapter two. 
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It would be a major task to document fully the way in which the 
popular press feeds and creates this stereotype. (it is indeed an 
unresolved issue whether, on almost any question, the press creates or 
merely confirms widely held prejudices). But it is possible to say that, 
without there being signs of a deliberate, concerted and persistent plot 
to discredit the Arabs, the media and especially the press do contrive to 
carry the message that the word "Oriental", which to E. M. Forester 
(1923)4 was a signal for salutation, is the natural adjective for the nouns 
duplicity, servility, despotism and cruelty. To these should be added the 
word muddle, another characteristic associated in western minds 
(sometimes justifiably so) with Middle East governments and 
procedures. 
Derogatory and pejorative stereotyping of the Arabs has been and 
continues to be a pervasive phenomenon in the Western media, 
which has become the major purveyor of stereotypes on the global 
stage. This negative portrayal of the Arabs led syndicated columnist 
Nicholas von Hoffman (1979) to say that "no religious, national or 
cultural group has been so massively and consistently vilified". 
The Arabs have been portrayed in many ways. Prior to the creation of 
Israel, they were thought of in terms of camels, dancing girls and 
pyramids. Following the start of the Arab-Israeli conflict most 
Westerners whose views have been coloured by the growing Arab 
stereotypes in the media began to view the Arab as someone 
"backward, fanatic, scheming, dishonest, unscrupulous, oversexed, 
fatalistic, and lazy. After the 1967, another dimension was added, that 
of the "blumbling cowardly Arab", the "corrupt leaders" and the 
"irrational and fanatic mobs". With the rise of the Palestinian guerrilla 
4 An essay written by E. M. Forester, quoted by Frank Giles (1980): Arab Image in The 
Western Media, London, Morrison Internation, p. 203. 
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movement a new image was added, that of the "fanatic, blood-thirsty 
terrorist" (See Slade, 1981). 
This negative and inaccurate portrayal of the Arabs in the media has 
led linguist Naom Chomsky (1989) to write: "The American press is 
regularly disgraced by racist caricatures of the 'Arab sheikhs' who are 
bent on destroying Western civilisation by raising the price of oil. 
Comparable reference to Jews would be denounced as a reversion to 
Goebbels and Streicher. It is inconceivable that Jews or Israelis could be 
discussed in similar terms outside the literature of the Ku Klux Klan". 
In another comment on the image of Islam by Akbar Ahmed: "Some 
American people felt that Islam had nothing to offer to the world 
except firstly, Muslim men were wife-beaters; secondly, Muslim men 
were anarchists, they exported revolution and so on and took hostages; 
and finally, Islam was the greatest threat after the communists" 
(Ahmed, 1993, p.37). 
Paul Marie de la Gorce (1963) summed up three images which at least a 
section of French opinion has of Muslim realities: the immigrant 
worker who does menial jobs and whose poverty makes him suspect 
in a relatively rich society; the Sheikh spending his oil money 
purchasing blocks of luxury apartments or at the gambling table; the 
terrorist. Of course, this is a caricature, but we must remember that it 
corresponds to a very widespread attitude". 
4.3.1. Cultural Misunderstanding 
Edward Heath, former British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary 
has pointed out that: 
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"if there is better understanding about the substance of 
policy, of background, culture, civilisation, and then the 
possibility of getting a better "image" of that which 
concerns you becomes much more realistic" (Heath, 1979, p. 
147). 
The existence of a credibility gap between the Arabs and Europe, which 
are linked by geographical proximity and historical conflicts of interest, 
is not a new phenomenon. The mutual distrust and fear which 
conditions the perceptions each has formed of the other grew out of a 
series of historical misunderstandings. To cite but a few of the major 
conflicts between them: Islam versus the Eastern Roman Empire; the 
Crusades; the bitter struggle for control of the East-West trade routes 
and, the collision of colonialism with Arab nationalism. As a result, 
relations between the Arabs and the West are fraught with economic, 
military, political, religious, racial and cultural sensitivities. It is 
interesting to note here that no such residual legacy marks the West's 
relations with the Far East, say, or with Africa. 
Indeed, the shock waves created by the most recent clash, that between 
colonialism and Arab nationalism, have not abated yet. The Arab's 
contemporary struggle for independence, unity and the right to enjoy 
their own resources encountered various forms of strong opposition, 
including the use of military force. Ferocious battles were fought over 
an area extending from Baghdad to Suez to Algeria. Although the 
battles themselves might be over, they have left scars, both material 
and emotional, which not only make for an uneasy relationship but 
remain potentially explosive time-bombs waiting for a detonator 
(Heikal, 1984, p.227). 
From these premises, one should ask then, how many aspects of life in 
the Arab nation are misunderstood or ignored by the West? What of 
aspects of partnership - for example, the West needs Arab oil, Arab 
financial resources, and the Arab market. The Arab world, on the other 
hand, is powerless without Western technology and steps towards 
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modernisation, greater political freedom and understanding. What of 
Arab civilisation and culture? The West is mostly ignorant. What of 
the Palestine question as a by product of the lack of understanding 
between the West and Arabs? 
Admittedly, these two worlds, the Arab and the West, are very diverse, 
but it is apparent that each of them has a sufficiently coherent character 
to rank as a cultural community. Moreover, their tendency to cohere 
politically shows that they consider themselves as distinct entities. The 
League of Arab States and the European Community are evidence of 
this. 
To analyse more deeply the causes and reasons that underlie 
misunderstandings between Arabs and the West, let us first look at 
images. When a public-opinion poll is carried out in a European 
country on the "image of the Arab", the answers given by the ordinary 
citizen are testimony to the wide extent of prejudice that separates 
Arabs from Europeans: in these answers, "Arabs, Moslems, 
immigrants, terrorism, oil, Iranians, and Turks are blended together to 
form a constant and very strange image" (El Jisr, 1984, p. 40). The Arab 
is identified with "murky fanaticism, ignorance, and laziness" (ibid. 
pAD). 
How is one to explain these superficial stereotypes that are more akin 
to insult than to objective description? 
Here it is necessary to think more deeply about the origin and exact 
nature of these images. On these points, the Corsendonk conference 
(October, 1982) contributed some useful in sights. It showed that the 
creation of images, which cause misunderstandings, aversion, and 
conflict, is a complex phenomenon. Peoples and individuals 
systematically favour the values of their own culture and are reluctant 
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to examine them critically in the light of observed differences; yet they 
are fascinated by everything that is different. Individuals and peoples 
that are different both attract and repel, both fascinate and invite 
rejection. In every culture, there tend to be two self-images, one of 
which, when deprived of its main reference point, or source of stability, 
promotes feelings of fear and guilt, while the other suggested by the 
term "sociocentrism", provides reassuring images. 
The ambivalence becomes clear once these images, are subjected to a 
more attentive and detailed examination. According to those who took 
part in the conference, the Arab sees the Westerner as the bearer of a 
"strong" culture that is both reassuring and worrisome; he accuses him 
of never matching his words with his deeds and of being violent. But 
the Westerner perceives the Arab as "backward", "clumsy", and either 
naive or "newly rich". Though not lacking in subtlety, wisdom, and 
refinement, he is unable to translate his wisdom and culture into 
effective action. The Westerner criticises the Arab masses for their 
noisy demonstrations, Arab politics for its terrorist sensationalism, and 
the Arab man for his attitude towards the "woman as object"; to the 
European, the Arab seems fanatical and disconcerting. He fascinates 
and irritates the European because the latter finds it impossible to get a 
clear picture of him; both familiar and foreign, he is someone to be 
both pitied and feared, both loved and hated (ibid. pAl). 
Once these images have been described and the process of their 
formation has been outlined, the question arises as to why they have 
become fixed in a rather disparaging form, as is confirmed by surveys 
and daily experience. In brief, what keeps these stereotypes from 
changing? There are several answers to this question. 
In the colonial era, the Arab masses saw the West only in some of its 
brutal aspects: Its technical superiority and its creation of new needs. 
After independence was achieved, the Arab masses drew from the great 
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wells of nationalism and Islam. The conflict between the East and 
West, took on new dimensions. 
Moreover, the information policy of some Arab governments keeps 
alive the resentments of the Arab masses against the West; the Arab 
revolutionary movements also make their contribution and are helped 
in this by the political blunders that Western countries make in their 
dealings with Arabs and, more specifically, in the conflict between 
Israel and the Arabs. 
To sum up: what has given rise to these defective and rigid images is 
the policy of governments, the information supplied by the mass 
media, the Orientalists, the consequences of the struggles and wars of 
liberation, and of colonialism, and current political and economic 
conflicts (especially the conflict between Israel and the Arabs, in which 
the Arabs feel that the creation of Israel constitutes a new Western 
crusade). As one can readily imagine, powerful action in the field of 
information will be needed to make these images change. 
To examine the respective situations in more detail, the 
misunderstanding cannot be explained by the inaccuracy of each 
group's perception of the other. It also stems from the objective 
relationship between the two communities, from situations that are 
more or less false or more or less comfortable, and from tensions in the 
sphere of human relations (ibid. p.4l). 
According to Jacques Berque (1964), the Arabs want to assert themselves 
on their own and to participate in world-wide exchanges. They have 
two incompatible relationships with the West: on the one hand, they 
feel affinities with the West and, on the other they are inclined to 
challenge it. Arab culture recognises that the contemporary world is a 
competitive one and that they must win their own place in it not by 
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pushing aside the former coloniser but by creating a new position for 
itself. On the Western side, however, there is relative indifference, 
while on the Arab side, there is a sense of "Otherness", a need to resist. 
The Arabs aim to establish themselves in a contemporary world one 
sidedly dominated by others and to safeguard the autonomy of the 
Arab individual and of its group identity. Yet they are not sure what to 
do, and so, in cultural terms, are groping for solutions. Puzzled as to 
which of three alternatives to choose: Islam, progressivism, or 
liberalism, after colonisation, there is still resentment among the Arabs 
against the outside world. 
The misunderstanding between Arabs and the West arose, it has been 
suggested, because, when Europe was going through its scientific and 
industrial revolution, the Arab movement for reform and progress 
met with defeat. According to Hicham Djait (1985), however," the 
causes of the misunderstanding and its scope lie even deeper and are 
more varied." 
It is important here to note that the Arab world lays claim to the 
heritage of Islam and links its historical consciousness to that heritage 
in a very close way. Forms of Western rationalism have been unable to 
comprehend the extend of the role of Islam as the basis of Arab culture. 
Starting from these contrasting, and rather subjective, analyses, it is 
possible to find the "points of similarities" between the Arab Islamic 
and Western civilisations. 
4.3.2. Points Of Similarities 
"First, in Islam, prime importance is given not to the 
individual, but to the "Umma". (Community of Islam) 
Secondly, Western thought, in which Christianity and the 
Greco-Roman civilisation merge, is rationalistic, 
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Cartesian, technology-minded, future-oriented, secular, 
and tolerant, while Arab thought, being thoroughly 
Islamic, is fatalistic, past-oriented, superstitious, and 
fanatical. Thirdly, the relationships between the sacred 
and the profane, and between dogma and everyday life, are 
quite differently organised in Arab countries as opposed to 
Europeanones. Islam permeates society and its institutions 
and affects behaviour in a detailed way. It is pervasive 
and immediate. Fourthly, Islam rejects the West but can 
modernise only by reinterpreting itself on the basis of a 
modern, Western point of view. Fifthly, Islam as a culture 
has fossilised into tradition and can no longer renew itself. 
There is an Arab elite that opts for the modern way in the 
technical field and for the traditional way in the cultural 
sphere; it runs the risk of falling into a dualistic, if not 
schizophrenic, way of life. Sixthly, while Europe 
concentrates on process, movement, and creation and lives in 
the continuity of history, Islam has imposed an ideological 
system on the consciousness of the East" (El Jisr, 1984, p.4S). 
What then, are the points of similarity? To study it carefully, one 
should ask first, is it legitimate to set Islam against the West and to 
make Islam take some of the blame for cultural misperceptions? 
Admittedly, the Arab world lays claim to the heritage of Islam and 
links its historical consciousness to it very closely, as Hicham Djait 
(1985) writes. But it would surely be an overly reductionist view of 
Arab culture to consider it as entirely embodied in law schools, 
mystical tendencies, and spiritual choices. In the same way, one would 
belittle Islam if one were to claim that its only possible expression is to 
be found in the varied cultures of the Moslem, and especially Arab 
countries. 
The achievement of the great religions, including Islam, firstly is to 
have shown the particular nature of the ethical awareness and to have 
called on mankind to rise to a truly human and universal conscious. 
Islam has contributed to making the Arabs feel justified in criticising, 
revising and reforming their own culture. This is closer to the true 
meaning of what is termed the "Islamic renewal", which is thus the 
exact opposite of traditionalism and a close cousin of many 
movements in the West. 
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Secondly, the Islamic world, especially in its Arab part, is on the move. 
It is now caught up in currents of ideas, just as the West was at the 
beginning of the present century (e.g., Marxism, nationalism, Free 
market), and in deep movements of religious renewal. Is that not in 
itself a way of adapting to the modern world? 
Thirdly, it is often argued in the West that the modern world 
annihilates culture and alienates man, this is specially true of German 
literature, philosophy and social science.5 Western civilisation, like 
Islamic civilisation, must come to terms with the modern world. 
Someone may ask: "Can Islam hand on its message by bringing the 
modern world under control?" This question can be answered with 
another question:" Can Western civilisation meet all the challenges of 
its own technological progress?" In the light of this, are not Islam and 
the West, despite their apparent conflict, in reality allies? 
Fourthly, since the time when European culture saw itself as the 
summit of human experience, the expression "modern world" has 
undergone a gradual change of meaning. The West today is rife with 
sub-cultures. Europe is witnessing a return to regional ethnicities, a 
proliferation of quasi-religious sects, and perhaps more reassuring an 
increased concern to limit or reassess the drive of technology. In 
opposition to the inhuman nature of rational systems, marginal 
cultures are rapidly increasing. Given these facts, the walls separating 
Moslem consciences from the West may not be as thick as they were 
once. 
It is, of course, a matter of urgency to discover the source of 
animosities, misgivings, and aversions. The age-old obstacles and 
misunderstandings standing in the way of communication among the 
different cultures must be reduced, but it must never be forgotten that 
5 See for example the writings of Neitzsche and Marx Weber. 
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patterns of change in the contemporary world make it necessary to take 
greater care than ever before to respect cultural pluralism. Indeed, any 
culture owes its vitality and permanence to its confrontation with 
other cultures. 
The conclusion reached can be effective as El Jisr (1984) had stated: 
"the cultural homogenisation that threatens the world 
because of the development of communications and the mass 
media is in itself a source of decline. A new approach is 
therefore necessary if the world is not to be engulfed in a 
kind of generalised non-culture. It may be necessary, in 
order to create this new approach, gradually to revise the 
very notion of progress and to give up the idea that its only 
criteria are power and influence". 
4.4. THE IMAGE OF ARAB-ISLAMIC SOCIETY IN THE 
WESTERN MEDIA 
"All knowledge about human society ... is historical 
knowledge ... rests upon judgement and interpretation (Said, 
1979, p.154)... and that interpretation must be self-
conscious in its methods and its aims if it is to be vigilant 
and humane, if it is also to arrive at knowledge. But 
underlying every interpretation of other cultures ... is the 
choice facing the individual scholar or intellectual: 
whether to put intellect at the service of power or at the 
service of criticism, community, and moral sense" (ibid., 
p.164). 
Today the mass media serves a purpose. To the audience, it informs 
and entertains. Its reality is a patchwork of facts and opinions generally 
supplied by media professionals. News is often merging reality with 
fiction in order to capture the audience attention. The impacts of this 
result, shapes and crystallises the audience perceptions, beliefs, and 
interpretational frames and behaviour choices. In Manufacturing 
Consent, (1988), Chomsky's concern "has been to inquire into the 
relation between the corporate image and the reality. In contrast to the 
standard conception of the media as cantankerous, obstinate, and 
ubiquitous in its search for truth and their independence from 
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authority, we have spelled out and applied a propaganda model that 
indeed sees the media as a societal purpose". 
Here, the Arab Islamic world is poorly represented in the West in 
terms of media coverage. At this moment in time, it is in the media's 
interest or in the interest who control them to portray the image of 
Islam as linked to an Arab person, who is always portrayed as a 
contemptible character (cowardly, barbaric, ignorant, and fabulously 
wealthy) with all the cultural connotation that has been propagated 
about such a person, (riding camels, open deserts, harem, excessive and 
unearned wealth). 
Arabs are often humiliated in novels, motion pictures, editorial, 
cartoons, magazines, newspapers and school textbooks. The picture of 
the image of the Arab in the Western media serves many purposes. 
First, it gives an initial negative backward image of the culture. And 
second, it gives the impression that the Arab person is either unhappy 
with his own culture as soon as he is implanted in the Western 
culture, he takes a different attitude, or he is a hypocrite; whereby he 
likes to satisfy both cultures to his ad vantage. The essence of this 
picture is that the Arab culture is inferior to Western culture. This was 
the initial image which was portrayed in the early seventies, when the 
Gulf States tourists came to Europe or the United States and explored 
its treas ures. 
Since 1967 war and with the formation of many Palestinian fighters 
(terrorist Groups), the image of terrorism has been linked to Arab 
culture, as mentioned previously. This has been done in a subtle way. 
For instance, when the news reader identifies a Palestinian Freedom 
Fighter, they are neither identified as a "Palestinian" nor a "Freedom 
Fighter" but as an "Arab Terrorist". And going back to the wealthy Gulf 
States, they are not identified as the "Saudi" nor the "Kuwaiti" and 
neither the "Emirates", even though they are from a distinct cultural 
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background from the "Palestinian", they are all identified and 
therefore, linking "Arab terrorism" and "Arab wealth" by using the 
word "Arab". 
The upsurge of the "Intifada", the "Hamas Group", and the "Hizbullah 
Group" in Lebanon and "Fundamentalist Groups" in various 
countries, has only added momentum to the already deeply engrained 
tendency to link Islam with terrorism, militancy, fascism, etc. 
The all-pervasive stereotypes are subsequent transferred to cable 
systems, video cassettes and government and private television 
networks. In time, a single film, distributed via several different media 
delivery systems in many nations, could reach between 500 million 
and one billion viewers. Six films could potentially reach an audience 
of three to six billion. 
4.4.1. The Arab Image In Mainstream Cinema & 
Television 
From its virtual beginnings, the cinema has been drawn towards 
Orientalism, a phenomenon defined by Edward Said as "a Western 
style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority on the 
Orient". 
Cinematic images of the Arab are omnipresent. The fantasy has become 
part of Western folklore, preventing a bond of trust and friendship 
between Arabs and the West. It feeds into purile entertainment 
programming and perpetuates an "uncle Abdul" image. 
In the films of Rudolph Valentino, Arabs were always rejected by 
Western women. In "The Sheikh" and "Son of the Sheikh", the 
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women never really succumbed to Valentino's charm until they found 
out he was an Englishman, not an Arab. 
The films have been used as propaganda to label the TV image of Arabs 
as blackmailers, as terrorists, and as oil-rich desert sheikhs without 
integrity. Stereotyping tends to be self-perpetuating, providing not only 
information but, as Waiter Lippman wrote seventy years ago, "pictures 
in our head." These pictures of Arabs reinforce and sharpen viewer 
prejudices. In other words, they may cause to view others not as 
humans but as caricatures. 
Television shows are entertainment, but they also provide important 
symbols. Ms. Joan Rivers, in one of her shows6 , commented: "We had 
an Arab move in next door to me. They bought Charles Bronson for a 
watchdog." Rivers also noted that a place where she once worked in 
Los Angeles was purchased by Arabs and went on to suggest the whole 
world was under their control. Finally, she came to Arab fashions, 
telling viewers, "I'm not sure if it's the wife or the husband because 
they're all in bed sheets." As Shaheen had indicated that behind every 
flicker on the TV screen is a definition of what is and what should be. 
There is an absence of feeling for who the Arabs are and what their 
culture really consists of. 
Television does not show Arabs as artists, poets, diplomats, statesmen, 
philosophers, craftsmen, farmers, cement workers, bankers, scientists, 
businessmen, teachers, or family members. How many Americans are 
aware that Arabs were pioneers in introducing hospitals and travelling 
clinics and like every minority, have made positive contributions to 
our society. Television has failed to offer such positive portrayals. 
Instead, it has perpetuated and continues to perpetuate the myth that 
there are no creative or humane Arabs. 
6 Quoted by Jack Shaheen, 1979, p. 24 
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The fantasy image of Arabs in the forties had successfully dominated 
the cinema. The Thief of Baghdad, 1941, AIi Baba and the Forty 
Thieves, 1944; Arabian Nights, 1942; A Thousand and One Nights, 
1945; Sinbad the Sailor, 1947, were among the many fantasy films 
which portray the Arabs in a colourful setting with intrigue, desert 
chases, battles, flying carpets, genies, and flying horses, and was 
compatible, in a fanciful way, with the British Orientalist tradition of 
the previous century. 
The Thief of Baghdad is a good illustrative example telling a typical 
Arabian fantasy tale: 
"Through the wickedness of Jaffar, His Grand Visier, Ahmed, the 
rightful king of Baghdad, is thrown into prison. There he meets Abu, 
the little street thief. They manage to escape and get to Basra, where 
Ahmed sees the Sultan's lovely daughter and immediately falls in love 
with her. The Sultan, however, promises her hand to Jaffar. She 
escapes, while Ahmed and Abu are captured. By Jaffa's magic, Ahmed 
is blinded and Abu turned into his dog. The ship on which the princess 
has escaped is attacked by slave-traders and she is brought back to Basra 
and sold to Jaffar, in whose house she must lie in a magic trance until 
Ahmed comes to awaken her. She is taken off to sea by Jaffar, but as he 
embraces her so the spell on Ahmed and Abu is broken. The rest of the 
film tells how by the help of a Djinni in a bottle Abu steals the All-
Seeing Eye and finally on the magic carpet arrives in the nick of time to 
stay the Grand Visier and re-unite the lovers" (As quoted in S. Nasir, 
1976, p.153). 
Lawrence of Arabia seems to be the most popular film from which 
many people in the West have drawn their Arab image. The main 
image which the film tried to sustain and popularise is the 'Bedouin 
lifestyle' of the Arabs, and the 'superiority' of the English through 
Lawrence, without whom the 'Bedouin' could not have united nor 
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won the battle against the Turks. Although the Arabs are colourfully 
portrayed, they are depicted as fierce-looking warriors possessing a 
'strange' and 'alien' value-system different from that of the English. 
An underlying theme was the Arab rulers as scheming, (admittedly) 
intelligent but lacking in principles who, at times, frustrated 
Lawrence's efforts, even though they supposedly sought the same ends. 
On the television all the worst possible images of the Arab from blood 
feuding Bedouin, cruel, cowardly, decadent, sex-maniacs, to the oil 
blackmailer are offered consistently to the viewers. "To be an Arab in 
the America of the 1970's", J. Shaheen (1979) argues, "is to be 
continually ridiculed by the media, especially television". The anti-
Arab image runs through most, if not all, of the programmes which 
have included Arabs (e.g., Cannon, The Bionic Woman, Charlie's 
Angels, Six Million Dollar Man, One Day at a Time, The American 
Girl, The Pirate, Vegas, and The Professionals). 
The 'Desert' Genre is not what it was when the British, French, 
Spanish and Italians were effective colonial powers, or before the 1973 
oil crisis, yet it persists (the latest example being the Betrolucci film, 
The Shelterin& Sky, in which three young Americans venture into the 
deserts of French North Africa in 1974). The earliest examples would 
have been the translations of The Arabian Nights and the 20th century 
stories of the French Foreign Legion. Some of evident thematic 
oppositions are; 
Africa! Arabia 
Islam 
Nomad 
Desert 
Feudal Monarchy 
Nobility 
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Christianity 
Settler 
Garden 
Democracy 
Meritocracy 
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Subsistence Industry 
Kismet (Fate, Destiny) Planning, Preparing 
Tradition Change 
Cruelty Compassion 
This search for the structural oppositions in genre texts can be applied 
widely and has the potential to reveal a great deal about the power 
relationships which underlie our use of stereotypes. 
The findings which have been maintained by Mora Asi (1981) who 
found in his study of the Middle East coverage in the 1970s, that Egypt 
had gained more sympathetic coverage in 1979 than the rest of the Arab 
world. However these analyses failed to take into account the political 
context of Sadat's diplomacy, including the internal opposition to his 
opening of discussions with the Israelis. In many ways the Western 
media created an image for Sadat (Kind, innovative, courageous, peace-
maker, a statesman of vision and a great leader) which inflated the 
man and imprisoned him, to a certain extent, so that he was caught in 
a process which finally led to his demise (See chapter eight). 
An interesting development in television coverage is the return to the 
old image of Islam as a barbarous and potentially a dangerous religion 
to Western democracy and Western interests. This Islamophobia is 
made salient and 'legitimated' through Khomeini 'practising' the 
Islamic code of punishment. The film Death of a Princess, which was 
shown in the USA in 1980, reinforced this image, and the Civil War in 
Lebanon was presented as a war between Islam and Christianity 
harking back to Medieval conflicts, if in a modern gUise. 
In his work, Covering Islam (1981), Edward Said has shown how the 
current media reinforced the Islamophobic image of Islam through its 
coverage of the American hostages and Khomeini. He also argues how 
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the media has held Islam responsible for the price of oil, the energy 
crisis and its dislocating effects on Western societies and for much of 
the upheaval in the Arab world. 
As noted earlier, most of these films, documentaries and news 
coverage have been screened in both the USA and Britain. In the case 
of the British production Death of a Princess, shown in 1980, it fed the 
already developed feeling of Arabophobia and Islamophobia. The film 
caused strained relations between the British Government and the 
Saudis who withdrew their ambassador from London as a protest 
against the film, which in their opinion insulted Islam and gave an 
erroneous picture of Arab society in general and their royal family 
affairs in particular. The film is a 'dramatised documentary' (though 
not documentary in the pure sense because those who spoke were not 
principles but actors), of a well-known execution of a young Saudi 
princess for her admitted misdeeds with her lover, incorporating a 
critique of the corruption of the Saudi Royal family. In his search for 
"the truth" of her execution, Anthony Thomas, director of the film, 
has echoed notions of Western cultural superiority by depicting the 
Arab values, customs, norms, moral code of punishment in Islam as 
strange, cruel, exotic and remote from the Western viewers. 
Jack Shaheen has examined today's screen artists who convey another 
view. He claims their works perpetuate three basic themes: Arabs as 
crudely etched comic foils, money mongers, and assassins/ slave 
traders. 
In the films Best Defense and ProtocoL Arabs are exploited as comic 
foils. They appear as buffoons - inept in the bedroom and on the 
battlefield. 
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Protocol starring Goldie Hawn illustrates the typical Hollywood 
caricature. Hawn plays a cocktail waitress out to seduce an Arab emir 
(prince). Why? Because the United States wants to build a military base 
in the emir's kingdom, called "Elohtar," or "Rathole" spelled 
backward. 
Best Defense is an insulting caper by screenwriters Gloria Katz and 
Willard Huyck, the same husband-wife team responsible for 
stereotypical images of India and Indian people in Indiana Tones and 
the Temple of Doom. Eddie Murphy plays an American Army officer 
stationed in Kuwait whose job is to mold Kuwaitis into fighting men. 
He complains about camel dung and "all this Lawrence of Arabia bull". 
The film depicts Murphy making love to a Kuwaiti. Afterwards he 
quips, "Thanks for the belly dance". So much for the screen image of 
Arab women. Best Defense is riddled with offensive one-liners. When 
some Kuwaiti children throw stones at Murphy's tank, he roars: "Okay, 
you desert rats - now you die7". Later, as Murphy leads the Kuwaitis in 
battle, he shouts, "Pull out your prayer rugs". Aside from 
dehumanising Kuwaitis, the film is inaccurate. Anyone who knows 
the Middle East would never show Iraq bombing Kuwait before the 
Gulf War in 1990. Moreover, Kuwait has never sought assistance from 
American military personnel until 1990. The film was made in 1984, 
when Iraq was an ally against Iran, a Persian nation. 
Best Defense is based on Robert Grossbach's 1975 book about US 
involvement in Vietnam, Easy and Hard Ways Out. Why did the 
producers change the setting to Kuwait? and why did they film it in 
Israel? 
7 The term "desert rats" is clearly meant in a perjorative sense, which is quite removed 
from the similar terms which are used as a form of military camaradarie amongst 
British and American troops. 
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One of the most prevailing themes is that the Arab in a burnoose is 
buying up, and subsequently destroying, chunks of our world. Beware! 
The Arabs Are Coming. In Network, movie-goers are warned that 
Arabs are "going to own what you read and what you see. "Arabs are 
screwing us; they're trying to buy the country. I don't want the banks 
selling my country to the Arabs," exclaims actor Peter Finch. Paddy 
Chayefsky wrote Network's screenplay. He tags Arabs as "medieval 
fanatics". And this movie won four academy awards. Would Network 
have been released had Chayefsky, a Jewish-American, replaced Arab 
with Jew? Would such a change be considered entertainment? or 
racism? 
The assassin and slave trader images often appear within the same 
film. Two assassin images exist: the contemporary and the primitive 
assassin. The up-to-date killer appears in Black Sunday. Although the 
film takes place in the United States, the villain is an Arab woman 
terrorist. She tries to kill thousands of spectators, including the 
President of the United States, at a Super Bowl game. The hero of this 
ludicrous film is an Israeli officer. One wonders what he is doing in the 
United States. In Black Sunday the assassin seeks to set off an explosive 
device in an airship hovering over the football stadium. However, 
Black Sunday is relatively mild compared to Wrong Is Right (1982). 
Here, Arab terrorists want to drop atomic bombs over New York City 
and Tel Aviv. A United States general, fed up with Arab villainy, 
advises: "Push the button, Mr. President. No more Arabs. No more oil 
crisis". A Senator offers reinforcement: "Hit 'em with everything 
you've got - Let's kick ass". Following this diatribe, viewers see scores 
of American planes bombing Arabs. 
In the recent film "Executive Decision" (1996), a plane has been 
kidnapped by some Islamic fundamentalists. Naji Al Husseini is the 
leader of the terrorists. In the movie, it is shown that these terrorists 
who are French Algerians and Iraqis, lost their families in the Gulf 
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War, have been killing innocent people. They use some Islamic verses, 
calling themselves the soldiers of Islam. In the plane there was a nerve 
gas bomb meant to explode over the United States. While the plane 
was in the air, an American war plane comes to the rescue. The 
professional soldiers headed by Kurt Russel managed to activate a 
passage to the plane and made a stable vacuum so that they will be able 
to enter the passenger plane. Kurt Russel plays a role of a non 
experienced man, but as the main actor, his job is to isolate the bomb 
from the power sources with the help of his specialised men. Of course, 
they managed to diffuse the bomb and attacked the terrorists. In the 
film, the Moslem Fundamentalists were not called terrorists but 
"scorpions" . 
In the seventies, eighties, and nineties, we still see the role of the Arabs 
as: 
• Committing suicide in the name of 'The Eye of God". 
• Screaming "Death to America" and "Death to the Jews". 
• Beating up Americans on Arab soil. 
Ashanti, a Warner Bros. film, fuels hatred between blacks and Arabs. 
Filmed mostly in Israel, we see Arabs smuggling blacks out of Africa. 
They hope to sell the blacks as slaves to wealthy sheikhs. Ashanti may 
be one of the most morally suspect popular motion pictures of this 
decade. The producers totally dehumanise Arabs. Peter Ustinov stars as 
the Arab Slave Trader, Suleiman. Worry beads in one hand, cane in 
the other, Suleiman is an Arab Nazi. His three sons are uncouth and 
aggressive. One is a homosexual who abuses young blacks, the other is 
dangerous, and the third is dumb. They represent the Hollywood's 
version of the Arab family. The screenplay implies that neither 
brotherly love nor intelligence exists among Arabs. 
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Suleiman explains to a potential customer: "People do not go up in 
price like petrol." Suleiman takes his blacks, places them in chains and 
forces them to trek across desert sands. We see Arabs drink water while 
the blacks display parched lips. A new stereotype is introduced: The 
Arab Fattening House. After their desert march, blacks are fed insect-
ridden food. Their Arab captors prepare them for the Saudi Slave 
Market. The blacks must regain the weight lost during their desert 
journey. 
Ashanti creates a sharp division among blacks and Arabs. When the 
cinema is used as ugly propaganda, a virulent form of prejudice is 
generated. Ashanti promotes racism by contending falsely that Arabs 
are sexually perverted slave traders. 
Motion pictures that feature Arabs fail to act as a bridge between West 
and East. Producers and writers could have matured to a point where 
their films would be able to enhance cultural relations between 
societies. They could produce documentaries which chronicle the 
achievements of Arabs and Europeans and Americans with Arab roots. 
The portrayal of the screen Arab conveys a disturbing myth: All Arabs 
look/ think alike. This myth, similarly has no credibility when 
homogenising other groups- the people of France, England, Israel or 
the United States, for example. 
Being alike, in prime-time entertainment shows, the West depicts 
Arabs as cruel, cowardly and decadent people. Arab leaders and their 
associates are seen: 
"as men who are either blood-feuding Bedouins or oil black-
mailers. They·re depicted as sex-starved pimps, cheats and 
back-stabbers. Oil rich desert sheikhs own camels and 
cadillacs or a large, sleek, black limousine, and inside are 
these swarthy looking fellows with shades on - very 
sinister. And there are clouded windows in these 
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limousines, they can see out but you can't see it ...... Arabs are 
also seen taking advantage of innocent, fourteen year old 
American virgins. And Hollywood perpetuates the myth 
that Arabs take great pleasure in white slavery rings. 
Television implies that Arabs are not content with their 
own mythical harems; they must force captive blondes from 
the United States" (Shaheen, 1984, p. 22-23). 
Another study by Jack Shaheen (1988) analyses the stereotype of the 
Arabs in the Western media and asserts that fair portrayals and 
accurate information are essential to appropriate foreign policy 
decision. Shaheen emphasised that "today's most obvious stereotype is 
that of the Arabs". It is magnified through television programs, motion 
pictures, news reports and other resources of the media. His analysis 
confirms that the image of the Arab is so pervasive that it threatens to 
engulf public opinion and influence foreign policy in the Middle East. 
He claims that most Americans know little of the Arabs, their customs, 
or their accomplishments. 
The result of a national poll revealing American perceptions of Arabs 
were published by the Middle East Iournal. They were similar results as 
Slade's mentioned previously. The descriptions which were often used 
of the Arab as "Barbaric and cruel", "treacherous", "warlike", "rich", 
and "mistreaters of women". 
In another analysis by Shaheen about the Arab images in television 
entertainment programs from 1975-76 through the 1984-85, he found 
out that the stereotypical Arabs were found in more than 100 different 
programs and films. His conclusion was based on a range of myths: 
• Arabs are wealthy. 
• The dominant religion of the Middle East, Islam, is radical. 
• Arabs are sex-maniacs. 
• Arabs are Bedouins, unfriendly and dishonest. 
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• Arabs are buying America. 
• Iranians are Arabs. 
• The Oil Producing Countries are synonymous with Arabs. 
Shaheen, in his final result could not find a single positive portrayal of 
Arab characters. 
Such powerful messages of the Arabs and Islam, Waiter Lippman 
(1929) has described how the electronic 'screen' accomplishes the entire 
process of the observing, describing, imagining and relating certain 
events or ideas for the viewer. Further, the construction the media 
produces may be neither accurate nor moral. 
In eight other studies done by Adams and his colleagues (1981) on 
television news, using content analysis and interview techniques to 
show how US network television captures elements of Middle East 
affairs. Adams sees the Middle East as "the new Vietnam ... the crucible 
for the US foreign concern". 
A range of topics emerges from the studies: 
• The ethnocentrism of international news. 
• The pro-Israeli attitudes of the media elites. 
• The influence of former president of Egypt Sadat's television 
image on Middle East coverage. 
• The interaction of linguistic and presentational forms. 
• The contribution of documentaries to the American 
perception of the Middle East. 
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• Foreign versus domestic orientations for reporting the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
• Television definition of Iran through the coverage of the 
hostage crisis. 
Adams· suggests that "the key finding of these studies would predict 
some notable changes in public opinion". He argues that if media 
messages helped moulding public opinion, Americans would have 
been more sensitive to Arab nations and more sympathetic to 
Palestinians. 
4.4.2. The Arab Image In Cartoon 
In the Washin~ton Post a series of cartoons by Herblock are qUite 
typical. He shows an Arab labelled "OPEC" playing blackjack with a 
man sitting in his underwear labelled 'US Energy Non-Policy', all the 
chips are stacked in the Arab's favour and the US has only three chips 
left; there is a huge mallet beside the Arabs; the American has a large 
lump on his head and is saying to OPEC who is dealing the cards; "Hit 
me again" (Ghareeb, 1979, p.71). 
Such a cartoon gives an image showing the Western hostility and 
ignorance towards the Arab. Cartoons representing the Arabs became 
more popular in the same characteristics with a moustache and a beard, 
shadowy jowls, a hook nose, flowing Aba and Kaffiyah, and wearing a 
dark eyeglasses as shown in page 88. He goes barefoot or wears sandals, 
at times carrying a dagger and more recently a Kalashnikov. The 
background is usually a desert with oil rigs, or with a limousine. He is 
shown with a face that gloats, leers, scowls, or laughs fiendishly. 
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Predominantly, however, and adding more description to the above, 
the Arabs in the cartoons are presented as having primitive clothes and 
features looking as evil, sinister and unpleasant as villains would. 
Contrary to this image is that of the Israelis. Israel is always portrayed 
in Western clothes, with Western features looking much the same as 
Westerners. Obviously, this portrayal is no more than a continuation 
of the old Western racist attitudes towards the "Others". The press 
portrayal and presentation of Arabs as the "Others" and the belief that 
Jews belong to "Us" - the Westerners, has created hard psychological 
barriers difficult for the Arabs to break through to present their views. 
"In a conversation on the Middle East conflict with an English 
clergyman from the church of England he made these revealing 
remarks which shows the "'Us" and the "Them" argument: Soon after 
the 1967 war in June, I 'was talking to a young and highly intelligent 
clergyman of the Church of England. He admitted that he knew very 
little about the controversy in the Middle East and asked me to explain 
it to him. For perhaps half an hour I tried to do so and to make him see 
why the Arabs felt so bitter about the injustice that had been done to 
them in Palestine. When I finished, he said that I had told him many 
things of which he had been quite simply unaware - and then he made 
a revealing comment. "You know", he said, "when people like myself 
think about the Middle East, the Jews seem, well quite like ourselves, 
but the Arabs .... " (and here he was searching for the right way to 
express himself), "the Arabs seem .... something different" (Adams, 
1981, p.89). 
4.4.3. The Arab Image In The Western Press 
Apart from this highly effective linguistic device in influencing 
opinions, the bias and skewing in the press and magazines is 
pervasive. In his evaluative study of the Middle East news coverage in 
146 
Chapter 4 The Image Of Arab Islamic Culture In The Western Media 
seven American news magazines, July-December 1956, namely US. 
News and World Report, News week, Time, The Nation, New 
Republic and the New York Times, Michael Suleiman has found a bias 
and misrepresentation of the Arabs. Among these magazines, he finds 
that the US News and World Report has concentrated on the nomadic 
aspect mode of life in the Arab World, followed by News week, Times, 
New York Times, and Nation, and the absence of such characteristics in 
New Republic. He also finds that the attributed traits of dishonesty and 
unreliability are higher in US News and World Report than in the rest. 
Arabs are also depicted as undemocratic, disunited and their standard 
of living is low. What is interesting in Suleiman's findings is the 
absolute absence in all news magazines of the Arab desire for security 
and peace. Their achievements, moreover, were minimised and rather 
neglected. Concerning their attitudes towards Arab leaders, these news 
magazines have been anti-Arab leaders particularly the US News and 
World Report and the News week, and pro-Israeli leaders (See M.W. 
Suleiman, 1961). 
This construction has continued to persist even after that period. 
Following the same procedures of his first study, content analysis, 
Suleiman had analysed the coverage of the same American news 
magazines from May-June of the 1967 war, and from October-
November of the 1973 war, to detect any change of attitude and 
coverage since the 1956 invasion of Egypt. The overall results of this 
study are not much different in coverage and nature from the previous 
study, though slightly improved and moved towards balance in the 
case of the 1973 war (M.W. Suleiman, 1970, 1974, 1975). 
All these magazines, according to Suleiman, were anti-Arab 
particularly anti-Nasser, except Times and The Nation, and pro-Israel 
in the 1967 period. Nasser was seen as the cause of all the trouble, and 
his 'dictatorial attitudes' and 'association' with Communism were 
highly stressed; he also epitomised all that is bad and hateful. There 
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seems to be a reluctance on the part of the American magazines to 
criticise Israel, even on the editorial pages or in a feature article. "Very 
seldom", Suleiman says, " did I come across any reprimand of Israel or 
the Israeli without any accompanying justification (ibid., 1970, p.139). 
He goes on in his findings to maintain that "only occasionally is the 
Arab point of view presented, and even then it sounds strange and 
unconvincing to a reader who has been saturated with the pro-Israeli 
stance". 
Disunity, nomadism, dishonesty, unreliability, cowardliness terrorism 
and inefficiency are the most dominant images of the Arabs in the 
magazines; in the 1967 period, in contrast, Israelis are depicted as 
efficient, heroic and self-reliant (Suleiman, 1974, 1975). However, the 
bias against the Arabs in the newspapers and magazines is found in the 
use of loaded or evaluative words, misleading or emotional titles, 
'carefully selected' size of type for title or sub-titles, and incomplete and 
erroneous stories, as well as in the placement of articles. 
As mentioned before, Edward Said's book called Covering Islam (1981), 
a major exploration of how Islam has become a pervasive explanatory 
concept in the news. Said explains how Islam has been used as a 
scapegoat for everything in Islamic societies which is difficult for the 
news media to explain to the West. In other words, the news media 
plays an important role in fostering and maintaining a central 
consensus vis-a-vis Islam. 
In his study, Said's main concern was the examination of the "Iran 
story". He demonstrated how the coverage of the revolution and the 
hostage crisis were portrayed to the West as how the world of Islam 
functions. 
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He compared the French newspaper Le Monde with the American 
newspaper New York Times. His findings shows that Le Monde had 
presented more accurate records of what was going on, while the New 
York Times tended to be guided by "the crisis and news-worthiness". 
His emphasis on the coverage between the European and the 
American newspapers, was as if each was writing about a different 
country. 
As a result, Said claims that Islam has been condensed to inaccurate, 
ethnocentric and hostile cliche which shows that "all knowledge stems 
from interpretation is situational: it depends on who is doing it, for 
whom, at what historical moment". To him "knowledge of Islam" is 
no exception whether it was portrayed by the media or other sources8. 
In another study, Daugherty and Warden (1979) also compared the 
editorials of the New York Times. Washington Post. Christian Science 
Monitor, and The Wall Street Iournal about their treatment of the 
Arabs and Israelis from 1967-1977 to find out the degree and nature of 
biases in the forming of images. They found out that New York Times 
and Washington Post were critical of the Arabs and supporting Israel. 
The Wall Street Iournal was seldom a partisan, but when it was, it took 
a pro-Israeli and anti-Arab posture. 
Basing his argument on empirical studies and entitled "An Evaluation 
of Middle East News Coverage in Seven American News-Magazines 
July-December 1956", Suleiman concluded that: 
"The Israeli were presented as Western-like and 
democratic. The Arabs were presented as the "bad-guys", 
8Contrary to what Said had claimed, Anabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi had criticised 
his work saying that he cuts through the rhetoric of "value-free research" to reveal 
scholarly imperatives as the results of political preferences. She adds that his 
analysis of the politics of interpretation is "somewhat incomplete without developing 
a more precise interpretation of political reality, particularly of the media and 
academy" (See Srebemy-Mohammadi, 1984 & 1985). 
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the aggressors against the "peace-loving" Israelis.· Israel's 
main concern was presented as being her own "security" 
with no bad intentions on her part. When Israel attacked 
her Arab neighbours with more than average ferocity, her 
actions were justified as "reprisal raids" (Suleiman, 1987, 
p.78). 
Neither is the coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict free from stereotype 
and distortion. The unfortunate fact is the image of the Middle East 
conflict has been badly blurred since 1948 by the imbalance presentation 
of the media (Ghareeb, 1993, p.ix). As pointed by Ghareeb, Israel is 
usually referred as "a little, but brave and heroic nation", while Arab 
nations are seen as "backward, ignorant, and bloodthirsty". Similarly, 
acts of terrorism by an Arab is depicted in the media for what it is, but 
the same act committed by an Israeli is usually depicted a "retaliation 
or seeking out terrorists" (ibid., p.x). 
The American press and magazines have, in fact, viewed the Middle 
East, to a certain degree, through an Israeli perspective and in quality 
and quantity the reporting and the exposure have been pro-Israel and 
anti-Arab. 
The imbalance in media coverage of the Arabs is manifest in many 
ways. The most striking one is the partiality of the press terminology in 
accepting the Israeli terms and language of the conflict. For instance, 
the June-war of 1967 has become the 'six day war', the October war has 
become the 'Yum Kippur War', Palestinian guerrilla has become 'Arab 
terrorist', the occupied Arab territories have become the 'captured' or 
'liberated territories', and the West Bank of Jordan has become 'Judea 
and Samaria'; Arabs have become 'terrorists', Israelis are 'commandos' 
(see E. Ghareeb, 1977). 
In a letter published in the Christian Science Monitor (An American 
regional publication) of July 9, 1974, Anna Patterson made this ironic 
comment concerning the skewed perceptions of the Palestinians: "Why 
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is it that when individual Palestinians kill, the news media term it 
"slaughter", or "a massacre", but when the Israeli government kills or 
bombs, the news media term it a "reprisal" or "retaliation" or say it is 
"understandable"? Why is it not a massacre when the Israeli 
government shoots down a Libyan airliner killing 108 innocent 
people? Is it "understandable" when the Israeli government bombs 
Palestinian refugee camps or Lebanese apartment buildings killing 
men, women and children? Is it not a slaughter when the Israeli 
government bombs Palestinian homes - if one can term tents and 
shanties homes? 
The same finding has also been maintained by Janice M. Belkoui (1978), 
who found that the Arabs in the 1967 war were depicted as threatening 
and aggressive in the communicating of their message to the world, 
contrary to the Israelis who were "more likely to tell, say, or announce 
than to threaten or warn" (ibid., p. 736). Israel is viewed as an extension 
of Western civilisation and culture. An excellent example of this 
portrayal was reflected in Time Ma~azine which gave a stirring salute 
to Israel in an editorial in 1970. It stated: 
"Israel is a democratic, modern stabilising force in this 
chaotic and brutally backward corner of the world. The 
Israelis have created a nation and made the desert bloom. 
Thereby more than earning the right to national existence. 
Israel needs US support to survive, and if Israel were some 
day to fall, US interests would suffer." 
Another pattern followed by the media is to use terms for Israeli action 
as "defensive" and Arab action as "offensive." The October War 
becomes the "Yum Kippur War", though with equal justification, it 
could be called the "Ramadan War." The "June War" becomes the "Six 
Day War." The territories occupied after June become the 
"administered territories," the "Harem al-Sharif" in Jerusalem 
becomes the "Temple Mount". 
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4.4.3.1. The War In The Persian Gulf (1990) 
It is worthwhile here, to present a good example, examined in The 
Guardian 23 January 1991 on how the Western press covered the Gulf 
War and how the "West" and the "East" sides were reported and 
analysed during the war. The title of the study was "Supporting Our 
Boys: Genre and the Gulf". 
It is also worth mentioning that coverage on the most recent Gulf crisis 
was no exception. It is also not free from propaganda blitzes. According 
to Hamid M. Mowlana, in the Gulf War, the propaganda and 
communication strategy surrounding the conduct of war entered a new 
dimension not seen in previous conflicts. While the American and its 
allies were ready to mobilise and control communications media to 
their advantage, producing press conferences, bulletins, in-field 
interviews, and home audience and citizenry participation in support 
of their war efforts, their further strategy called for a new total 
destruction of Iraq's civilian communications and power infrastructure 
(Mowlana, Gerbner and Schiller, 1992, p.35). 
In the coverage of the Gulf War, most good ideas for materials have 
been tried and tested many times before, but it opens up many 
questions. The Guardian published a listing of the opposite expressions 
which the British press had used to describe the same actions carried 
out by the 'Allies' and the 'Iraqis'. 
Examples were: 
WE 
Take out 
Neutralise 
Dig in 
Launch first strikes 
Pre-Emptively 
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THEY 
Destroy 
kill 
Cower in their foxholes 
Sneak missile attacks 
Without provocation 
Chapter 4 
Precision bomb 
OUR MEN ARE .... 
Boys 
Lads 
Professional 
Lion-hearts 
Cautious 
Confident 
Dare-devils 
Loyal 
Desert Rats 
Brave 
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Fire widely at anything in the 
skies 
THEIR MEN ARE .... 
Troops 
Hordes 
Brainwashed 
Paper tigers 
Cowardly 
Desperate 
Cannon fodder 
Blindly obedient 
Mad dogs 
Fanatical 
There are two ways to make use of this material. The first is to study 
the lists in terms of language. Most of the time both sets of descriptions 
are loaded with overt comments, but sometimes the descriptions of 
'Them" are badly factual, while the descriptions of "Our" side are 
consciously obscured. Thus 'neutralise' for 'kill'. The expressions listed 
refer to stereotypical conditions. 
Stereotypes are often misunderstood as negative statements about 
individuals or groups, but that negative can only exist inside a power 
relationship with a positive stereotype. A classic example in the list 
above is 'brave' versus 'fanatical' to describe soldiers on the two sides. 
The stereotype of Arab people (and indeed of most oriental people) 
makes great use of the supposed fanaticism of religions like Islam. 
During the 1980s, this was evident in the 'mad mullah' jibes at Iranian 
leaders. The force of the stereotype is in contrast with Western 
"accidental" peoples who are presented as 'rational', with religious 
faith which is concerned with 'caring' and 'compassion' rather than 
'zealotary'. Soldiers who are 'brave' know of the dangers but put the 
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ideals they support before their own safety. Soldiers who are 'fanatical' 
have lost their rationality. Thus two religions which share many 
common characteristics are presented as diametrically opposed but 
with one holding the higher moral ground. 
Therefore stereotypical oppositions play a major role in genre texts. 
The conflict of opposing forces gives a narrative drama and raises 
expectations of a victory for one 'side' over another. 
Similar oppositions operate in other genres. In those genres which 
refer to colonial or imperial narratives, the central opposition is 
between the occidental or 'known' world and the Oriental or "Other" 
world. The media coverage of the Gulf War still represents a colonial 
narrative as far as the tabloid press and some of the broadcast media are 
concerned. 'Our lads' take on the "Other" - a mysterious enemy who 
must be depicted as inferior in the power relationship. To do this, the 
headline writers and cartoonists must draw on the set of oppositions 
which have been developed in the stories written by Europeans about 
clashes with the Arabs of North Africa/Middle East/ the Gulf9 . 
4.5. THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF NEGATIVE IMAGES 
It has been apparent for some time now that the main thrust of the 
prejudice against Arab Islamic culture in the West has been located 
around three central areas: politics, religion, and oil. Arabs tend to be 
depicted as 'belligerent warmongers', 'religious fanatics', and as 
'covetous desert tribesmen' seeking to deprive the West of its very 
lifeblood. 
9 Despatches from the Gulf War, edited by Brian MacArthur, 1991. 
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The crux of the matter is, since the first Arab-Israeli War, the Middle 
East still suffers from inaccurate characterisation in the Western media. 
Ghareeb gave five major reasons why the media failed to cover the 
Middle East fairly: cultural bias; the herd mentality within the prestige 
media; the Arab-Israeli conflict in which Westerners are a staunch 
supporter of the latter; media ignorance of the origins and history of 
the conflict; and the determined and sophisticated Israeli lobby 
(Ghareeb, 1983, p.19). During the twentieth century, A Jewish 'Zionist' 
influence became increasingly marked in Western and specifically 
British societies. By the post war era, this influence had matured into a 
sophisticated pro-Israeli media lobby (Nasir, 1979, p. 134). 
Certainly in dealing with the roots of prejudice Zionism has played its 
role in skewing facts and manipulating images. The Zionists have 
skilfully exploited Western fears and anti-Arab prejudices to create an 
exaggerated negative image of the Arabs and Arab culture in the 
United States and Western Europe. It is largely this distortion - rooted 
in existing Western bias and hostility - that accounts for the West's 
moral indifference to the Zionist depredations committed against the 
Palestinians. Through clever manipulation of the media and popular 
literature, Zionism has sharpened and in many cases given new life to 
Western anti-Arab and anti-Muslim prejudices. 
In his attempt to find out the underlying reasons and origins of the 
source of distortion of the Arabs' image in the West, Sharabi (1984) 
claims that it is not merely ignorance, but rather a specific kind of 
knowledge rooted in religious and racial antagonism toward the Arabs 
and Islam. 
Said claims that the mass media had reinforced the stereotypes by 
which the Orient is viewed: 
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"all the media's resources have forced information into 
more and more standardised models. So far as the Orient is 
concerned, .... three things have contributed to making even 
the simplest perception of the Arabs, and Islam into a 
highly politicised .... matter: one, the history of popular 
anti-Arab and anti-Islam prejudice in the West...; two, the 
struggle between the Arabs and Israeli Zionism; three, the 
almost total absence of any cultural position making it 
possible either to identify with or dispassionately to 
discuss the Arabs or Islam" (Said, 1978, p.26). 
There are many factors contributing to skewed or inadequate reporting 
by some Western reporters and analysts. Some bias came from the 
historical animosities arising out of the Crusades, the Ottoman 
domination of East till the First World War, active Muslim 
participation in the war of Independence in 1857 in India against 
British occupation, and more recently due to Zionist propaganda. But 
this tendency is also created by the negative messages sent by the Arab 
world itself, for example, the hijacking of aeroplanes resorted to at one 
stage by the Palestinians, the occupation of the American embassy by 
students in Tehran, the absence of genuine democracy in most of the 
Muslim countries, and Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait. As 
pointed out by Sajjad, "some of these events are misunderstood and 
misinterpreted and blown out of proportion of their significance as a 
result of the inherent biases against Arab and the Muslim world" 
(Sajjad, 1993, p.81). 
Based on the same thoughts and ideas, Sharabi had pointed out four 
sources for the distortion of the Arab image in the West. The First is 
anti-Muslim ideology which dates back to the Middle Ages; the second 
is the racism of the age of Imperialism; the third is the anti-Arab 
propaganda of Zionism, and the fourth is the behaviour of the Arabs 
themselves (Sharabi, 1984, p.176). 
Anti-Muslim ideology in the West begins with Europe's earliest 
clashes with the Arabs and Islam. In the ninth Century, Charles Martel 
fought the Arab armies at the gates of Paris and the Cid inflicted the 
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first defeats against the Muslim conquerors of Spain, marking the first 
victories of Medieval Christian Europe against rising Islam. 
It is perhaps curious but at the same time explicable that "these views 
should have developed so markedly among the British, with their long 
connections with and in the Arab world. Some of it was undoubtedly 
due to living among and having to deal with "an alien culture and a 
mystical and little understood religion" (Ciles, 1984, p.204-205). Some of 
it is due to simple ignorance. As Sharabi pointed out earlier that a great 
many ordinary Western people make no distinction for example, 
between Arabs and Iranians. The course of the Iranian revolution, and 
the austere and intolerant views of the Ayatollah Khomeini, will 
certainly confirm many in their belief that Islam (and hence "the 
Arabs") is a harsh and unattractive variant of civilisation. The same 
ignorance, encouraged by the almost inevitable tendency of news 
editors to lump together parts of the world for ease of presentation 
(Latin America, the Middle East, Iron Curtain, Europe etc.) tends to 
regard "the Arabs" as one homogenous (though scarcely united) whole, 
responding to the same influences and reacting in the same way. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. 
And then there is the obvious pOint about language. Here it is a 
question not just of inability to understand what Arabs are saying to 
one another or writing in their newspapers, but of English translations 
which is often misleading. The Jordanian Prime Minister, Wasfi Tell 0 , 
was murdered in Cairo by Palestinian extremists. Their leader was 
reported, in the British Press, as saying "Yes, I killed him and I drank 
his blood." This repulsive description naturally sickened anyone who 
read it, and seemed to confirm ideas about Arab barbarism. 
10 Quoted by Frank Giles (1980) in the Arab Image in the Western Media, p. 205. 
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But in reality this is a typical piece of Arab rhetoric: the reference to 
drinking blood really meant "I've had my revenge". This does not alter 
the fact, of course, that a man was brutally murdered; but it does 
explain, if not justify, the reasons for the killing. 
Another dimension of Western negative feeling is the resentment 
over Arab oil wealth. Almost any number of examples can be cited of 
press treatment of this theme, varying from the openly mocking, 
hostile and even racist to reasonably detached and fair description. A 
good example of the latter is provided by an article in The Observer. It 
is headed "Why London is the new Mecca", and is a piece of highly 
readable reporting, whose light, humorous touch is revealed in the 
opening sentences: "the idea was supposed to be that we (i.e. the 
British) went to the Middle East and disrupted their ancient traditions 
and culture; not the other way around". This quotation is illustrative 
of contemporary Western perceptions, within informed circles, of the 
position of Middle Eastern culture in relation to the culture of the 
West. 
4.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
For several years, this threatening, shifty-eyed, hook-nosed, dirty, 
sulking Arab image continually appears. The images of the Arab 
Islamic world presented within the Western media in recent years 
show a shift away from the contradictory images of the past, both 
positive and negative, to more consistently hostile imagery. This seems 
to have been the case particularly in the post war period and especially 
during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. During wartime, stereotypes of the 
enemy proliferate that is understandable. However, the West is not at 
war, nor has it ever been at war, with the Arabs. During the Cold War, 
Americans had a hate -image of all Communist nations. Yet Arab 
nations are not controlled by Communists. Then, Why? Could it be a 
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Zionist conspiracy? No, the answer is not that easy, but one can 
conclude that the ugly Arab image exists in part because of ignorance, 
indolence, and fear - fear of pressure groups that consider any balanced 
view of Arabs to be Arab propaganda. But the negative image generally 
persists because no Arab - Americans are an integral part of the creative 
force in Western cultural production, the writing and directing of 
entertainment. 
The skewing of the Arab-Islamic image in the Western media has 
occurred as a function of power, and in this instance style and image 
are direct political indices of power. Thus we must conclude that any 
drastic attempt to correct negative images of Islam and the Arabs is also 
a political question involving the use and deployment of power. 
Much of what we know about the world through the mass media 
serves the social construction of reality about what we form opinions 
and towards which we direct our actions. 
Not being able to understand the Arabs and in particular the religion 
"Islam" fully and being impatient with it, the West will always 
consider Arab Islamic society as problematic and a deep threat to them. 
Novelist Joseph Conrad and film maker D.W. Griffith preached the 
importance of teaching others to see. Sadly, for the past few decades all 
we have seen in movie theatres are barbaric Arabs. This clouded screen 
image offers not understanding, but propaganda disguised as 
entertainment. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE STRUCTURING OF THE NEWS MEDIA 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
"News and truth are not the same thing. The function of 
news is to signalise an event, the function of truth is to bring 
to light the hidden circumstances" (Lippmann in Weaver, 
1994, p.63-64). 
"a society might conclude that institutions other than 
government are better than government at determining 
truth. Worried about government biases, about the self-
justifying tendencies of government and other 
bureaucracies ... we may conclude that allocating truth-
determining power to the sociology of the market place is 
likely to be a better procedure for determining truth" 
(Schauer in Lichtenberg, 1990, p.211). 
In this thesis, the "news" as a "medium" will be focused on as a genre 
or mode of knowledge. It is also, in effect, a special type of political 
power. With the growth of readership and commercial activities on the 
one hand, and the progress of technology on the other, the 'press' 
started operating on a commercial basis relying increasingly on 
advertising revenues. Since the turn of the century, it began to grow 
into giant enterprises, owned by industrial and financial 
conglomerates, operating on a 'mass circulation' basis. Accordingly, 
this chapter will be involved in discussing certain views that are 
interrelated with each other. These views consist of a great body of 
literature, related to the significance of the structure of ownership and 
control of the news values. That is the criteria by which media 
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professionals exercise value-judgements and preferences which guide 
the process of news gathering, selection and presentation. In this 
chapter, it is necessary to examine how the operation of value 
judgement and preferences relates to images and representations of the 
Arab Islamic Oriental culture. 
5.2. THE POLITICAL & ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE MEDIA 
The mass media are 'so deeply embedded in the political system that 
without them political activity in its contemporary forms could hardly 
carry on at all" (Negrine, 1994, pAl. From this premise, this section will 
be devoted to the relationship between media and politics, utilising the 
two dominant, but competing views, broadly known as the "Marxist" 
and the "Liberal Pluralist" (see section 5.3). Although the debate 
between them over who controls the media has been a long-standing 
one, the most vigorous controversies in recent years, have been located 
within Marxism rather than between them and the Liberal Pluralists 
(Gurevitch et aI, 1982). Viewing ownership as the primary and ultimate 
source of control, the Marxists maintain that the individuals groups or 
classes which own the basic means of mass communication have the 
power to determine the content of the media. 
Thus, the control and ownership of the media strongly influence their 
content and their autonomy in relation to economic and political 
interests, as many theories, often of a Marxist perspective have pointed 
out. The pluralistic search for an alternative model has often lead to 
new forms of inquiry. 
At the present time, nobody can rationally contest the importance 
which control and ownership of the media have on their content in a 
capitalist system. Therefore, one has to be aware that, even in a 
capitalist system where free market and laissez-faire notions should be 
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dominant, the State continues to play a role, often more indirect than 
direct, in the world of communications. The general trend in recent 
years has been a disengagement of the State in this area, normally 
leading to a diminished influence. However, political pressures remain 
ever present, even if the State affirms its will to leave the public media, 
and its ownership indeed decreases, totally free of any influence of its 
part. Taking the example of Great Britain, Whale emphasises that 
because "the government has given the BBC a license ... , politicians 
often expect the BBC to sub serve the ruling regime" (Whale, 1977, 
p.119 ). This nostalgia for state-controlled media appears, for example, 
through such action as the direct intervention of the police when it 
was ordered by the Thatcher government to seize a report on Northern 
Ireland ("Real Lives") argued to be biased in favour of the Republicans. 
It is also a very frequent reaction for a government to begin to criticise 
the media when facing situations or difficulty. 
In addition, the weakening of the overt influence of the State in the 
media market does not automatically remove indirect or covert forms 
of influence. Even if the media become controlled by private interests, 
the link with the State does not always disappear. Negrine, for 
example, argues that many media entrepreneurs "have sought political 
support and have, in turn, been sought by politicians" (Negrine, 1990, 
p.137). They were forced to "court" politicians and it seems natural that 
after reaching their aim with the help of politicians, they feel obliged to 
"thank" them in some way. While Bagdikian (1983) stated that "media 
conglomerates turned a blind eye to official corruption and failed 
programmes during the Reagan era in order 'to protect a political ally', 
media conglomerates are not independent watchdogs serving the 
public interest but self-seeking, corporate mercenaries using their 
muscles to promote private interests" (Bagdikian, quoted by Curran in 
Curran & Gurevitch, 1991, p.87). 
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Furthermore, some owners of media, especially the· "moguls" like 
Maxwell, Murdoch, or Berlusconi, often closely control their editorial 
and political line in order to defend their personal views and use the 
"media outlets under their control as megaphones for their social and 
political ambitions" (Murdock, 1990, p.7). They, then, often set an 
"official climate", establish general goals and understandings and 
appoint the managerial and editorial staff, which will supervise and 
directly influence the output. Knowing the main ideological tendency 
of the media they work for, journalists will censor their material 
themselves. 
Further, one has to evoke another major obstacle to a real autonomy of 
journalists", the economic factor. In a capitalist system, "the media 
need to earn money, which implies some constraints. Competition 
which exists in the communication markets often leads to "rapid" 
homogenisation of content that increasingly makes most newspapers 
and broadcast programs uniform in basic content, tone, and social 
political values" (Bagdikian, 1985, p.100). Another important factor to 
be taken into account is advertising. A growing part of the media's 
financial resources comes from advertising. In order to please its 
clients, the media is urged to aUract a certain kind of audience, 
especially people with substantial incomes, which directly influences 
its content. This dependence on capital can sometimes lead to a "bank 
minority control" that can happen in cases of long term debts (Zeitlin, 
1974, p. 1100). The content of the media in such a situation will then be 
strongly influenced by advertising interests and oriented in ways to 
earn money to maintain a balanced situation. 
Therefore, the financial structure of the media has provided the media 
owners with the power to influence into the economic order and to be 
integrated within it. Thus, due to their economic power the media 
acquire a legitimating role towards the construction of the social 
consensus and can function as ideological apparatuses which 
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contribute to the maintenance of the established order. However, this 
structuring role of the media is only one side of the coin. Their political 
significance goes far beyond the economic determinism of "who 
controls the media?" (Negrine, 1994, p.2). The involvement of the 
media in the political establishment, does not simply transfer the 
media output to 'weapons in the arsenal of class domination' 
(Miliband, 1969, p.211). The news media have the ability to form a 
complex networking with the dominant political actors. A web of 
communication is established among powerful media and politicians, 
who try to influence each other. Consequently, the convergence 
between media and politics is not a linear process. There is actually a 
mutual interaction and a strategic bargaining between media and 
political establishment. "Each feeds off the other, each informs the 
other and the subsequent reactions are reciprocal and continuous 
rather than unilinear and in one direction" (Negrine, 1994, p. 14). 
Although the major media are committed to the maintenance of the 
ongoing system, at the same time, through their own particular 
economic power, they have the ability to seek political advantage. That 
means, the media as ideological mechanism tries to create its own 
political role in society, its own space or discourse. 
5.3. MODELS OF MEDIA 
Many Marxist and neo-Marxist based theories have developed the 
analysis of these economic constraints. The basis of all these analysis is 
what is called by McQuail as the "dominance model", which views 
"media as an instrument in the hands of, or service of, a dominant 
class, elite or power-holding group" (McQuail, 1987, p.S8). He sums up 
by saying that "the characteristics of mass media that support the 
dominance interpretation are: their centralisation, their availability for 
control at source by a few; their unidirectionality; their standardisation; 
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their attractiveness and prestige for dependent mass publics" (ibid., 
p.59). 
The idea of an ideological reproduction by the mass media is defined 
within classical Marxist theory. In "The German Ideology", Marx insists 
that "the class which has the means of material production has control 
at the same time over the means of mental production so that, thereby, 
generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental 
production are subject to it" (quoted in Murdock & Golding, 1977). 
As regards the situation today, McQuail affirms that "these views are 
supported in modern times by evidence of tendencies to treat 
concentration of media ownership by capitalist entrepreneurs and 
correlative evidence of conservative tendencies in content of media so 
organised" (McQuail, 1987, p.59). 
These basic Marxist theories have been progressively developed 
through different generations, each of them insisting on a certain factor 
that appeared determinant for them. A number of these theories will 
be presented and examined in order to understand the two dominant 
and competing views. 
First is The Political Economic Theory: this approach associated with 
authors like Murdock, Golding, Curran, Curtis and Hood, who 
emphasised the centrality of economic ownership, the indirect 
influences exerted by the state and the structures and logic of the 
market. As McQuail points out, "the media institutions have to be 
considered as part of the economic system", and the consequences 
observed are "the reduction of independent media sources" and the 
fact that "the voices which survive will largely belong to those least 
likely to criticise the prevailing distribution of wealth and power" 
(McQuail, 1987, p.64). 
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Second, and closely related to the Political Economic Theory is the 
Propaganda Model maintained by Herman & Chomsky. They (1988) 
stated that "the powerful are able to fix the premises of discourse, to 
decide what the general populace is allowed to see, hear and think 
about, and to "manage" public opinion by regular propaganda 
campaigns". They propose that the journalists are not to blame, even 
though they have no real autonomy in their choice of making their job 
because "the media serve the interests of state and corporate power, 
which are supportive of established privilege and limiting debate and 
discussion accordingly" and which make "the choice of topics and 
highlighting of issues, the range of opinion permitted expression, the 
unquestioned premises that guide reporting and commentary and the 
general framework imposed for the presentation of a certain view of 
the world" (Chomsky, 1989, p.10-12). What is the distinctive feature of 
this approach is the emphasis on the political economy and its 
relationship to definitions of "Self" and "Other". 
Third is The Critical Theory which is developed from the work of the 
Frankfurt School and authors like Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse 
during the mid-twentieth century. This group of theorists provide a 
more "culturalist" approach. With this trend, the concept of dominant 
class ideologies are taken one step further than that within classical 
Political Economic Theory. This occurred mainly through the 
commercialised mass culture being able to assimilate the traditional 
working class values. Closely related is The Hegemonic Theory of 
media which developed from the work of Gramsci and concentrated 
"less on the economic and structural determinants of a class-biased 
ideology and more on ideology itself, the forms of its expression", thus 
recognising "a great degree of independence of ideology from the 
economic base" (McQuail, 1987, p.66). 
Part of this ideology-centred theory is the Social-Cultural or Radical 
Culturalist Approach, associated with the Birmingham Centre for 
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Contemporary Cultural Studies such as Stuart Hall, which attribute 
"the media's subordination principally to ideological control, in 
particular to the unconscious internalisation of the assumptions of the 
dominant culture by journalists, and their reliance on powerful groups 
and institutions as news sources" (Curran, 1990, p. 139). This refers 
clearly to the "primary and secondary definers" model of HaW This 
trend also concentrated on the use of mass culture, to integrate and 
subordinate potentially deviant or oppositional elements in society. 
However, Marxist theories are not the only ones to present models of 
media. Some pluralist theories have opposed the Marxist pessimistic 
visions, whilst still aware of the disadvantage of the existing situation, 
they have proposed models that often appear as dated as the Marxist 
ones. 
Pluralists see the world in a different way. They see "society as a 
complex of competing groups and interests, none of them 
predominant all the time" (Gurevitch et aI., 1982, p.1). No one is really 
dominating the others, but this does not mean that there is no relation 
of dependence. Indeed, Curran (who has transformed from Marxism to 
more pluralistic views), Gurevitch and Woollacott insist that "pluralist 
analyses tend to emphasise the mutual dependence between media 
professionals and the representatives or spokesmen for other 
institutions" (Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott in Gurevitch & 
Curran, 1982, p.21) while Blumler emphasises that: 
"researchers should view the political communication 
process in holistic terms, regarding the contributions to it of 
the various actors involved- the sources and originators of 
messages, professional communicators, as w'ell as members 
of the public- as enmeshed in relations of dependence and 
conflict, conjunction, and disjunction with each other" 
(Blumler, 1983, p.l72). 
1 See Hall S. "Culture, the Media and the 'Ideological Effects' in Curran et al 1977. 
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From these basic principles, pluralists have tried to draw some 
theories. 
The Free Press Theory is the first theory about the press, on a historical 
level and has its origins in the "libertarian theory" of the seventeenth 
century, defended by authors like Siebert, Milton and Mill. The central 
value of Freedom of the Press applies to the ownership that should be 
private, even though any interference with the market should be 
avoided, the financial interests playing an obvious role against a real 
independence of the media. 
Many of these principles have certainly influenced Marxist thinkers, 
especially concerning the limits of the independence allowed by private 
ownership. The difference remains however that this theory does not 
condemn the system in its whole, but only sets a certain number of 
principles in order to reach a free press society within the democratic 
system, while the Marxists think that a total change through 
revolution is needed. This theory is lacking in precision and would be 
highly problematic when applied to empirical reality. Thus, it does not 
concretely explain how private ownership could be independent from 
economist interests. It can act more a reference point for other theories. 
A second and more precise theory based on pluralistic principles is the 
Social Responsibility Theory after w.w.n. 
The imperfections and failures of a free press, denounced by the 
Marxists amongst others, had appeared more clearly. Private 
ownership had shown its limits. Thus, some principles were 
reaffirmed, such as the assumption that the media do serve essential 
functions in society, especially in relation to democratic politics, the 
emphasis on maximum independence of the media, an acceptance that 
certain standards of performance in media work could be stated and 
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followed. The main idea was that "under conditions of private 
ownership, the media professional is not only responsible to consumer 
and shareholder, but also to society at large" (McQuail, 1987, p.116). 
The disadvantages of private ownership were admitted but were also 
considered to be curable within the capitalist system, as soon as the 
press and the journalists became really aware of their duties towards 
society in general. 
The problem with the Social Responsibility Theory appeared very 
quickly. It could not avoid complicity in the bureaucratic state and in 
the self-serving of media organisations and professions. "Self-
regulation by the press and accountability of large broadcasting 
organisations have not prevented the growth of media institutions 
which dominate from the power centres of society" (McQuail, 1987, 
p.122). Even some pluralistic thinkers admitted the failure of this 
model. 
This is for example the case of the Democratic-Participant Media 
Theory. It is a recent trend, rather than a fully fledged media theory. 
Fundamentally, the Democratic-Participant Media Theory, developed 
by authors such as Enzensberger, which was a reaction against the 
commercialisation and monopolisation of privately-owned media and 
against the centralism and bureaucratisation of public broadcasting 
institutions. It also claimed "a sense of disillusionment with 
established political parties and with a system of parliamentary 
democracy which has seemed to become detached from its grass-roots 
origins, to impede rather than facilitate involvement in political life" 
(McQuail, 1987, p.122). The idea was, thus, to have the media close to 
their audience, to make them really "serve" the citizens and not the 
media organisations or professionals. 
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Finally, this tendency argues for the increased participation of people in 
the democratic process, which supposes that media and journalists 
become more independent in the way they report politics. The actual 
situation is far from being like that, as Lang & Lang show: 
"the mass media, by the way in which they structure and 
present political reality, may contribute to a widespread 
and chronic distrust of political life ... It is a projective 
character and constitutes a defensive reaction against the 
periodic political crisis known to affect a person's destiny 
as well as against what are defined as deliberate efforts to 
mobilise political sentiment" (Lang & Lang, 1966, quoted by 
Blumler and Gurevitch and Curran, 1982, p.254). 
Keane (1991) identifies a 
"new public service model" which would reject the claim 
that this model "presupposes" a doctrine about human 
beings. It is guided by a form of democratic scepticism 
which acknowledges the fact of complexity, diversity and 
difference and harbours doubts about whether anyone 
person, group, organisation can ever be trusted to make 
superior choices on matters of concern to citizens" (Keane, 
1991, p.167). 
He also thinks that "public regulation of the market should ... aim to 
break down media monopolies, lift restrictions upon particular 
audience choices and popularise the view that the media of 
communication are a public good" (ibid., p.155) and "could help to 
expose the hidden socio-economic and political powers, heighten 
awareness of the deep uncertainties in risk estimation and 
management" (ibid., p.177). The social responsibility of the media is 
still emphasised, but any ideological reference is rejected. 
By and large, the most developed theory about an independent media 
space that could really ensure the development of democracy among 
citizens within the capitalist system is the concept of Public Sphere 
proposed by Habermas. According to him, the development of early 
capitalism brought into being an autonomous arena of public debate 
and favoured the "emergence of an independent, market-based press, 
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created a new public engagement in critical political discussions" 
(Curran in Curran & Gurevitch, 1991, p.83). From this state of facts, 
Habermas extrapolated: 
'"a model of a public sphere as a neutral zone where access 
to relevant information affecting the public good is widely 
available, where discussion is free of domination by the 
state and where all those participants in public debate do 
so on an equal basis. Within this public sphere, people 
collectively determine through the processes of rational 
argument the way in which they want to see society 
develop, and this shapes in turn the conduct of government 
policy. The media facilitates this process by providing an 
arena of public debate, and by reconstituting private 
citizens as a public body in the form of public opinion'" 
(ibid., p. 83). 
As Garnham points out, the indisputable strength of this Public Service 
Model is that it "tries to develop a set of social relations which are 
political rather than economic" and "to insulate itself from control 
from the state" (Garnham in Golding et aI, 1986, p.4S). However, this 
"Public Sphere'" model of the media arena completely independent 
from any influence but remaining within a capitalist system appears 
very attractive on a theoretical level, but could only operate amongst 
freely informed citizens. Curran indicated that "the classic pluralistic 
perspective of the media as an autonomous fourth estate has run into 
as much flak as the classic Marxist vision of the media as an ideological 
state apparatus" and that "an intermediate perspective situated 
between these two positions has emerged as dominant with reciprocal 
shifts on the part of researchers in both pluralist and radical camps" 
(Curran, 1990, p.l44). 
It is possible to claim that the public has an influence on the content of 
the media. Whale (1977) illustrates this idea by showing how the 
readers of The Daily Mirror, at the beginning of the century, forced its 
owner, Lord Northcliffe, to change its content in a way to please them. 
The main reason for his acceptance to change was of course economic, 
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but in the end, "a group of readers had made its choice" (Whale, 1977, 
p.83). 
Following this logic, some speak of a "consumer sovereignty"; Whale 
asserts that "it is ... the readers, in the end, who are the figures of 
power" (Whale, 1977, p.82). Seiden (1974) also defends the idea that the 
real power of deciding the content of the media stands in the hand of 
the public. Basing his argument, he goes on to generalise that "it is 
with the audience and not with the media that the power resides .... its 
influence over the media is exercised in its day to day operation rather 
than as some vague, intangible desire on the part on those who own 
the media" (Seiden, 1974, p.S). He also claims that "news organisations 
are seen as having a mixture of three types of goal: audience-revenue 
goal, advertising-revenue goal; non-revenue goals" (Tunstall, 1971, 
p.260). However, he argues that "sweeping assertions on the subject of 
either the control of, or the autonomy of, news gatherers are ... 
extremely unlikely to be of general validity. There are differences 
between fields .... , there are differences in the three major work roles 
[employee, news gatherer and competitor-colleague] and substantial 
autonomy in one role tends to accompany substantial control in 
another role" (Tunstall, 1971, p.278-279). 
In his model of 'Primary and Secondary Definers', Hall (1978) argues 
that there is "an over-accessing to the media of those in powerful and 
privileged institutional positions" (Hall et aI, 1978, p.S8). According to 
him, "the primary definition sets the limits for all subsequent 
discussion by framing what the problem is" and therefore, "the media 
are frequently not the 'Primary Definers' of news events at all; but their 
structured relationship to power has the effect of making them play a 
crucial but secondary role in reproducing the definitio~s of those who 
have privileged access ...... to the media as 'accredited sources'" (ibid., 
1978, p.59). 
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According to Epstein, who expresses his scepticism by arguing that: 
"journalism can serve as an important institution for 
conveying and circulating information, and signalling 
changes in the direction of public policy and discourse, but 
it can not serve as a credible investigator of the "hidden 
facts" or the elusive truths which determine them" 
(Epstein, 1975, p. 18). 
The 'structured relationship to power' of the media, which Hall refers 
to, has been shown by several studies. Tunstall focused on "The 
Westminster Lobby Correspondents" (1970), Si gal on the "Reporters 
and Officials" in Washington (1973), while Gieber and Johnson (1963) 
suggested that collaborative links tended to develop, with sources more 
or less coming to "assimilate" reporters. 
Curran argues that: 
"Primary definers sometimes offer conflicting frames of 
reference to the media; that the concept of primary definer 
is simplistic in that it fails to acknowledge that some 
accredited sources are more influential than others; that it 
is implicitly a temporal in that it ignores the way in 
which changes in the balance of social forces alter the 
composition of primary definers; and lastly, that it 
overstates the passivity of the media" (Curran, 1990, 
p.143). 
On the other hand, Schlesinger strongly opposes this, "Primary and 
Secondary Definers" model. Indeed, Schlesinger criticises the fact that 
in Hall's model: 
"there is no space to account for occasions on which the 
media may take the initiative in the definition process by 
challenging the so-called primary definers and forcing 
them to respond- as for instance, in investigative journalism 
dealing with scandals inside the state apparatus, or when 
leaks by dissident figures force undesired and unintended 
official responses, or when accidents occur and official 
figures are caught on the hop" (Schlesinger in Ferguson, 
1989, p.67). 
There are a number of conflicting theories over the ownership and 
control over the media and wide variety of models which purport to 
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explain their operation. While it is obviously too simplistic to claim an 
overt and determining relationship between the ownership of the 
media and the form of media representation, it would be extremely 
dangerous not to investigate these links. 
Following this review of some literature background on the media in 
its political and economic role and giving a descriptive picture on the 
models of the media, in spite of the different views cited; the next 
section will present the framework of ownership and control of the 
media. 
5.4. OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE PRESS 
Among the neglected fields in traditional mass communication 
research to which the new researchers have directed their attention is 
the issue of the structure of ownership and control of the mass media 
and how that affects the production and content of media. Although 
sociological work on this field is still relatively scarce in Britain, 
nevertheless, there has been an effort to fill this gap. Amongst the 
earlier studies in this particular area is Murdock and Golding's (1974) 
contribution in which they argue that the content of the media and the 
meanings carried by their messages are primarily determined by the 
economic base of the organisations in which they are produced. Since 
then, Murdock and Golding have been engaged in advancing a 
structurally grounded view of the role of the media, focusing on the 
relationship between ownership and control of the media and the 
power structure in society and also on the ideological significance of 
meaning in the media message and its effects in reproducing the class 
system (Murdock and Golding 1977). 
Analyses of the development of the ownership and control of the press 
cannot fail to observe the increasing concentration of ownership of the 
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press in a few hands. It is argued that the most significant effect of this 
process is a reduction of diversity of paper voices, restriction on 
selection of newspapers, and the encouragement of ideological and 
political consensus. Analysts in this tradition also argue that it is not 
enough to assert that the media are owned by capitalist conglomerates 
and infer from this that the press is manipulated by these owners for 
the dissemination of political propaganda. Murdock (1977) has, for 
example, distinguished between two dimensions of control- the 
"personal" and the "structural". The former type of control refers to 
direct influence exerted by owners of the media through a system of 
interlocking share holdings and dictatorships between the media 
organisations and other industrial and commercial concerns on the 
other, providing thereby a complex of channels for direct intervention. 
The "structural" type of control refers to indirect consequences of the 
commercialisation of the press, indicating that the organisational goal 
of maintaining and increasing profitability works in such a direction 
that it ensures the content of a newspaper to be consonant with its 
commercial interests. But it has also been argued that one must guard 
against the danger of attributing too much importance of purposive 
action in terms of an ideology of commercial interests. Indeed, 
newsmen do not ordinarily operate with immediate reference to the 
press organisation's profitability. Instead, as has been pointed out, there 
is a diversity of constraints exerting themselves on the journalists' 
operation. As Murdock & Golding (1974) have argued, "it is ... necessary 
to demonstrate how ideology is produced in concrete practice" (ibid., 
p.207). 
Such analyses usually begin with a recognition that the modern mass 
press is a big business which aims to produce newspapers as 
commodities. The key to this process is, therefore, the conversion of 
information into a commodity. Since its distribution is subject to 
criteria of commercial survival rather than some kind of intrinsic and 
social need the press is driven to search, not just more readers, but for 
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the 'right' readers- those which fit the marketing pattern set for a given 
publication. As Curran (1978) has pointed out, advertising exerts: 
'pressure for popular papers to move into the middle of the 
market in order not to be identified with '"the down-at-
heels'" (Curran, 1978, p.70). 
And therefore, 
'taken as a whole, the new popular journalism .... (provides) 
.... a very different construction of reality from the early 
militant press, encouraging a positivistic identification 
with the social system. A view of the society as a system of 
class exploitation ... (gives) ... way to a new definition of 
reality in which different actions of the community were 
portrayed as being interdependent, with shared interests in 
common in the form of '"the national interests'" (ibid. p.72). 
According to him, this is a direct consequence of the fact that 'four 
corporations now control 99.9% of the popular national newspaper 
market' (ibid., p.73). 
In a similar vein, Murdock & Golding (1977) argues that the 
consequence of concentration of ownership of the press is that "the 
range of material available will tend to decline as market forces exclude 
all but the commercially successful" and that "this excludes those 
voices lacking economic power or resources" (Murdock & Golding, 
1977 p.37). 
"The underlying logic of cost operates systematically, consolidating the 
position of groups already established in the main mass media markets 
and excluding those groups who lack the capital base required for 
successful entry. Thus, the voices which survive will largely belong to 
those least likely to criticise the prevailing distinction of wealth and 
power. Conversely, those most likely to challenge these arrangements 
are unable to publicise their dissent or opposition because they cannot 
command the resources needed for effective communication to a broad 
audience" (ibid. p. 37). 
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This happens because, according to them, "pressure of rising costs cause 
all media to attempt to maximise their audience "(ibid. p.38). "In order 
to maximise audiences, production must minimise risks by 
concentrating on the familiar and on formulae which are as similar as 
possible to the tried and tested" (ibid. p.39). Hirsch & Gordon are quoted 
approvingly, in arguing that: 
'the increasing conformity of the British quality press, in 
style and in substance, is an example of this fundamental 
tendency of oligopolistic competition to serve the centre of 
the market at the expense of minority tastes' (ibid.,). 
They pointed out that this indeed applies to the UK national press as a 
whole and contend that: 
'it is important ... to realise that rather than "minority 
tastes" we are talking of minority political views. What is 
excluded by the convergence to the centre ... is the voice of 
the politically powerless'(ibid.,). 
In relation to Western representations Arab Islamic cultures, following 
Said's terminology, the "Other" is simultaneously excluded from the 
"Sel£- representation", while being (mis)represented by the dominant 
cultural groups, in this case the West. Further, the commercial 
imperative, of increasing importance in media corporations, leads to 
the minimisation of the reporting of political events in favour of a 
more commercially viable focus, for example entertainment and 
leisure. 
It is not accidental that so many studies in this tradition exhibit a 
tendency to fall back to the 'conspiracy' thesis despite constant 
assertions to the contrary. As a matter of fact, these assertions so often 
give the impression that they serve partly as self-warnings for analysts 
on this subject. One reason for the constant presence of the danger to 
slide back to conspiracy theories seems to be their being confined to the 
liberal principles of the 'freedom of expression', the 'people's 
democratic right to know', and so on, which are alleged to be the 
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principal role of the press. During the press struggle against overt 
political control, private, independent ownership of the press was said 
to be the pre-condition for 'impartiality' and 'balance'. Now the 
common enemy is no longer the government, but the market. 
Hence, Westergaard (1977) indicates that while 
'the independence prescribed for the media as essential to 
their postulated task of enlightenment has been commonly 
defined as independence from government, it is precisely 
that sector of the mass communications industry ostensibly 
most free of state control- the commercial press- to which 
the ascription of independence in any effective social sense 
is most evidently invalid' (Westergaard, 1977, p.10l). 
He contends that 'the logic of media "dependence on capital" ... (is) ... 
more a matter of the logic of inertia than of subjection to active 
manipulation' (ibid., p.102), and that this is basically caused by the 
concentration of press ownership and its dependence on advertising 
revenues. The pressure to attract advertising revenues constantly push 
the press towards homogenisation and commercialisation2 , direction 
in which: 
"this hierarchical twist to the market logic of newspaper 
publication which, above all else, explains the twin 
features that so distinctively disqualify the press from the 
role of "fourth estate" claimed in it: the diminution in the 
number and diversity of newspapers on offer, head for head 
of population, on the steps down from establishment and 
bourgeois public to wage earning public; and the shallow 
character of such "radicalism" as newspapers specifically 
addressed to the latter kind of public mix into their recipe 
for sale" (ibid. p.103). 
It is within this framework that Murdock and Golding (1977) had 
argued that, 
"the determining context for production is always that of 
their market. In seeking to maximise this market, products 
must draw on the most widely legitimated central core 
2 For example in the British Media the popularity of the SUN, the NEWS OF THE 
WORLD. BSKYB channels. 
178 
Chapter 5 Structuring the Media 
values while rejecting the dissenting voice or the 
incompatible objection to a ruling myth. The need for easily 
understood, popular, formulated, undisturbing, assimilable 
fictional material is at once a commercial imperative and 
an aesthetic recipe" (Murdock & Golding, 1977, pAO). 
In general, one can conclude that major media owners have common 
goals and outlooks particularly in economics and politics. Bagdikian's 
(1985) view is expressed by claiming that "media owners' goal is based 
on propagandistic purposes" and the "concern with narrow control of 
the media does not require a belief that corporately owned media are 
devoted to their owners' personal propaganda". He indicates that the 
major media carry much that their owners personally disagree with. 
"But this does not prevent propagandistic use by emphasising certain 
issue and de-emphasising others, by pursuing some subjects 
relentlessly and quickly abandoning others". An important earlier 
work to mention is The Media Monopoly, in which Bagdikian (1983) 
provides an agenda for reducing media monopoly power, although he 
recognises the paradox that the requisite changes in power require a 
discussion and debates which monopoly will not allow, he states that: 
"Corporate power, exercised through the media and 
government, openly ridicules governmental functions that 
serve ordinary people, while demanding that government 
further enrich private fortunes" (Bagdikian, 1985, p.238). 
In his research on the subject, he found out that by the early years of 
the 1980s, media networks were controlled by only 50 corporations. All 
interlocked with huge corporations and multinational banks, by 1984, 
this figure had been reduced to 44 in 1984. Bagdikian claims that this 
level of concentration is reinforced in its effects by the growing non-
me.dia conglomerates who control the media. He stresses the fact that 
21 of 50 members of the universe of the 500 largest "individual 
corporations", on which most of the 21 media giants are companies 
like Gannet! and ABC are exclusively media companies formed by 
growth and diversification within the media sector. 
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He offers extensive information on the growth of newspaper 
monopoly, and explains that concentration and conglomeration of the 
media with their ill-effects are reinforced by the growth and power of 
advertising. "Concentration and conglomeration", to Bagdikian, "make 
for a high degree of profit orientation, and thus greater sensitivity to 
sponsor needs, and the interest of sponsors tend to narrow the range of 
acceptable content and limit meaningful controversy". He argues that 
the " economics of sponsorship tend to enhance concentration, as 
value of sales strengthens the power of dominant firms" (Bagdikian, 
1985). 
From these premises, the control and ownership of the media by 
private interests leads to intense competition promoting the 
concentration of form3, and finally to a limitation of choice. This 
economic factor thus tends to become predominant and forces the 
media to respect a certain number of "rules" in order to survive. 
5.5. IMAGES & STEREOTYPES 
"A stereotype is a socially-constructed mental pigeon-hole into which 
events and individuals can be sorted, thereby making such events and 
individuals comprehensible: 'mother', 'patriot', 'businessman', 
'neighbour', on the one hand, versus 'hooligan', 'terrorist', 'foreigner', 
on the other, are some specific instances of stereotypical categories 
which give substance to the homocentric" (Fowler, 1991, p.17). Thus, it 
is of fundamental importance to realise that stereotypes are creative. 
Referring to Fowler, they are categories which: 
"we project on to the world in order to make sense of it. We 
construct the world in this way, and our relationship with 
3 As seen in Bagdikian's evaluative study shows that in 1983, 50 corporations were 
controlling 87% of press circulation and 1 % of owners were controlling 34% of daily 
papers sold. 
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newspapers makes a major contribution to this process of 
construction" (ibid. p.17). 
World images are easily stereotyped, which is not necessarily presented 
as negative, but can be seen in a fixed angle by the media so that it 
might bring us a serious problem of global communication and 
understanding. It has been argued that "people rely on the media for 
their impressions or images of foreign countries and that the press can 
give a misleading or unfavourable picture of other countries, either 
because of the influence of news values which favour bad news or 
because of an editorial attitude of approval, usually the latter" 
(McQuail, 1977, p.258). Those stereotyped images have been recognised 
mostly in the developing countries, but what accounts for the images 
of the world? 
First, both national and international news tends to concentrate on 
elites rather than masses. Elliot and Golding (1973) stated that mass 
media have an impact on the political elite. Chu (1985) argued that the 
big power media centres attempted to promote a relationship with the 
local government institutions, big corporations or influential 
individuals. Thus only a limited number of elites control access to the 
media. 
Second, there is a concentration of the Western views, since Western 
news agencies and newspapers are the product of a Western editorial 
style which apply to its audience. Semmel (1977) argues that: 
''The reported foreign news is concentrated among the 
economically-ad vanced, politically-prominent, and 
culturally-western societies; that is, the pattern of foreign 
news coverage is Western-oriented, big power dominated, 
and Eurocentric" (Semrnel, 1977, p.317). 
Third, coverage of the developing countries tend to be negative, 
reporting mainly on bad news (catastrophe, corruption, social disorder, 
conflict, national failure and so on). Lent (1977) and Hester (1976) 
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discovered that the coverage of the developing countries concentrated 
on conflicts and crisis. McQuail (1977) also found that coverage of the 
developing countries particularly South East Asia and Southern Africa 
received heavily negative news patterns. News come to be 
sensationalised in the coverage of hunger, flood, riots etc. Therefore 
the developing countries called for more 'development news' that 
"emphasises the process of social, cultural and political change rather 
than bizarre occurrences" (Chu, 1985, p.6). 
As news tends to be simplified and homogenised in form, certain 
groups of stereotypes are reproduced repeatedly. Though the 
reproduction of stereotypes may be unfavourable to any cultural 
groups, the effects are particularly strong in defining perceptions of 
those excluded from "Self-representation". 
The production and dissemination of stereotypes is also influenced by 
the financial costs of various kinds of news coverage. According to 
Ostgaard (1984), the coverage of complex or culturally distant issues 
requires greater capital expenditure on the part of the media owners 
and so are more likely to go unreported unless there are a particularly 
strong relationships between the countries concerned. 
Therefore, one can conclude that the news reporting of the developing 
countries in the Western media is not covered in any depth and the 
specific cultural variations tend to be limited, so that the images of 
those countries are more open to (mis)representation by the Western 
media. For these reasons make it clear that the images of world news 
reporting occur as a result of a variety factors, such as internal 
organisation, news gathering practices, and the selection and 
presentation of a number of stereotypical images. Therefore, an attempt 
to examine the formation of news events, and the formation of news 
values, is in fact a multi-faceted and complex process, in which 
stereotypical images form the major currency of negotiation. The 
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occurrence of a striking event will reinforce a stereotype, and 
reciprocally, the firmer the stereotype, the more likely are relevant 
events to become news. 
In an implicit way, news values are rather to be seen as qualities of 
reports. That is to say, they are not simply features of selection but, 
more importantly, features of representation; and so the distinction 
between 'selection' and 'transformation' ceases to be absolute. In other 
words, an item can only be selected if it can be seen in a certain light of 
representation, and so selection involves a culturally determined act of 
interpretation. 
5.6. NEWS VALUES 
Sociological studies of media, and in particular the press, have shown 
that the manufacture of news is framed by: 
"a distinctive set of journalist criteria of news worthiness, 
and by the routine practices of gathering and processing 
through which these values are operationalised" 
(Murdock, 1980, p.60). 
Ostgaard (1965) and Galtung & Ruge (1965) studied what made news 
'newsworthy' by listing twelve event features. They discovered criteria 
used by journalists in the attention for and the selection of news 
events. According to them, the most dominant news factors are 
"frequency, threshold, unambi~uity, meanin~fulness, elitism and 
negativity" which in their opinion, make an event newsworthy. Some 
of these news factors have been relatively neglected by researchers (for 
example, threshold. unambi~uity, and frequency) while others have 
received a good deal of attention particularly, eliticism, 
meanin~fulness and ne~ativism (Murdock, 1981). 
183 
Chapter 5 Structuring the Media 
Each of these factors will be examined in order to· appreciate and 
understand how the manufacture of news is framed. 
Frequency refers to the time-span which an event unfolds and will be 
understood. If an event happens within the same time frame as the 
news medium operates (it would be 24 hours in the case of daily 
newspapers), it will be considered as more newsworthy. For instance, a 
murder takes little time and its meaning is easily conveyed to the 
audience. Threshold refers to the size of an event. If an event causes a 
"big enough splash", there is a great possibility that it will be reported. 
Wars and sensational or apparently inexplicable murder cases are 
examples of this. The more shocking a murder is, the more coverage it 
will receive and it is more likely to and hit the headlines. Unambiguity 
refers to simplification of an event. Meaningfulness: Refers to two sub-
sections; Cultural proximity; in which news gatherers tend to pay 
attention to an event which is culturally familiar. In this sense, it could 
be a measurement of ethnocentrism. Relevance; even if an event 
happens in a culturally distant region, it will be newsworthy if there is 
a relevance to the news gatherers' 'home' cultures. News which 
happens in a distant country might be presented in a more negative 
form. 
In reviewing the literature concerning proximity, which is sometimes 
referred to as a 'self-interest', or 'narcissism' in Peterson's terms (1981), 
there seems to be a frequent tendency in newspapers to report and/ or 
devote a large proportion of their coverage to international events 
involving their own nation, or other nations and areas close 
politically, economically and sometimes geographically to the 
newspapers' home country, and that share some similar problems (See 
Peterson 1981, and also Schlesinger, 1978). 
According to Fowler (1991), meaningfulness is founded on an ideology 
of ethnocentrism, more inclusively, homocentrism: a preoccupation 
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with countries, societies and individuals perceived to be like oneself; 
with boundaries; with defining 'groups' felt to be unlike oneself, alien, 
threatening. Presupposed is what several media specialists have 
helpfully identified as a consensual model of society. This is the theory 
that a society shares all its interests in common, without division or 
variation. Consensus is the affirmation and the plea of all political 
parties, expressed in appeals for 'one nation', for people to 'pull 
together', and so on. In the press, this ideology is the source of the 
consensual "We'" pronoun which is used often in editorials that claim 
to speak for "the people". How "We" are supposed to behave is 
exemplified by the regular news reports of stories which illustrate such 
attributes as fortitude, patriotism, sentiment, industriousness. But 
although consensus sounds like a liberal, humane and generous theory 
of social action and attitudes, in practice it breeds divisive and 
alienating attitudes, a dichotomous vision of "Us" and "Them" (ibid., 
p.16). 
Elitism as a news factor can involve persons and/ or nations. Elites 
possesses a natural salience. By definition they enjoy a prominence 
above the mass: 'names make news'. In his study of television 
newsmen, Epstein (1973) has confirmed the high priority given to 
events involving persons of prominence. The celebrity of an elite 
person is a focus of attention not because of what they do but as 
Chibnall argues; 
"because of what he is or what he represents. He is an 
image, an embodiment of popular fantasy, a projection of 
the ideal and an object of commercial interests and 
exploitation"(Chihnall, 1979, p. 27). 
The findings of Epstein have also been confirmed by Sande (1971) who 
studied foreign news coverage in several Norwegian newspapers4. 
4 On this point see see also Golding & Elliott, 1979. 
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Ne~ativity: Negative or conflictual events can be treated as more 
newsworthy than positive news because they happen quite frequently 
and unexpectedly take less time to become news. Interpretations of 
negative events can be perceived as more clear cut than the variety of 
positive events which can be interpreted in a number of ways both 
depending on the individuals involved. In addition, if an event has 
such elements as violence, crime, catastrophe and so on, it will easily 
become a news item and be reported in a sensational manner. This 
could be because information about a specific event has an attractive 
quality to the audience in terms of its definition of the normal 
(Murdock, 1981). Tunstall (1971) has maintained that riots, as an 
example of negativity, with violence and physical danger, 'fulfil all the 
requirements of big news'. Although Tunstall here referred to a 
particular riot which happened in 1965 in Watts, Los Angeles, 
nevertheless his comments are valid in most of the situations where 
negative events have additional interest because of the unpredictability 
and unexpectedness which is inherent in the event. Here we see how 
news values seldom operate in isolation from each other. Golding and 
Elliott (1979) have also supported the Galtung & Ruge hypothesis 
regarding negativeness, maintaining that "Bad news is good news". 
Thus, news values are a result of the productive needs of an 
industrialised news corporation. And the people who work for such 
corporations will display mixed ambitions, allegiances, politics and 
abilities as individuals. Within the corporation they are subjected to an 
extensive division of labour. Beyond the corporation there are its 
competitors, and the occupational ideology of the journalist and 
broadcasting professions. Within these contexts news values operate to 
produce a standard product out of the contributions of all such people, 
practices and beliefs. In other words, the media provide us with a 
picture of what is happening only in a very selective sense: 'they 
structure the pictures of the world which are available to us and in 
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turn, these pictures structure possible modes of action' (Halloran et aI, 
1970, p.313). 
However, one could ask here what does make an event newsworthy? 
Hartmann and Husband (1973) distinguish two kinds of characteristics 
which make events newsworthy. According to them, conflict or threat 
and deviancy make news. Information on both these topics has a real 
importance to society, and for various reasons, people enjoy reading 
about them. Conflict is the material which makes the news just as it is, 
the material of drama and literature. Material that can be couched in 
terms of conflict or threat therefore makes better 'news' than that 
which cannot. Another feature that makes events newsworthy is their 
ability to be interpreted within a familiar framework or in terms of 
existing images, stereotypes and expectations. The framework and the 
expectations may originate in the general culture or they may originate 
in the news itself and pass from there into the culture. 
5.7. NEGATIVE NEWS 
As this study is concerned with how the Arab Islamic world is 
portrayed in the Western media, it is very useful to look at Galtung & 
Ruge (1973) study on foreign news, in the Norwegian press. This will 
enable us to see what factors govern news values and why negative 
news is preferred to positive news. 
Galtung & Ruge mention in their study four factors influencing the 
transition from events to news. And they consider them to be 
important at least in the Northern Western corner of the world. These 
factors are: 
a) The more the event is about elite countries, the more likely to 
become news. b) The more the event is about elite people, the likely to 
187 
Chapter 5 Structuring the Media 
become news. c) The more the event is viewed in personal behaviour 
of certain individuals, the more likely to become news. d) The more 
negative the event is in its results, the more probable that it will 
become a news item. 
Galtung & Ruge (1973) commented that: 
"news is elite-centred in terms of nations or in terms of 
people, is hardly strange. The actions of the elite are, at 
least, usually and in short-term perspective more 
consequential than the activities of others. This applies to 
elite nations as well as elite people". 
They argue that these factors are not independent of each other, but 
interestingly inter-related. They also hypothesise three things when 
these factors are operating together. First, the more events justify the 
factors mentioned, the more likely they will become news (selection). 
Second, once a news item has been chosen, what makes it news will be 
enhanced. And third, both selection and distortion will take place at all 
steps in the chain from event to reader (replication). 
Galtung & Ruge concluded that the cumulative effects of these factors 
should be considerable and produce an image of the world different 
from 'what really happened'. 
However, their study is not the only explanation of the negative 
aspects of events as being newsworthy. Other studies relate this matter 
to the status quo in the flow of information from developed countries 
to developing countries and they accuse the Western media of looking 
for information concerning violence, war, crime, corruption, disaster, 
famine, etc. and the result would be a distorted and negative image of 
people and countries of the Third world. Masmoudi (1979), for 
example, blames the Western mass media organisations of cutting, 
filtering and distorting the news, as well as imposing their own way of 
seeing the world upon the developing countries. He explains that the 
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Western mass media present Third World communities when indeed 
they do show interest in them-in the most unfavourable light, 
stressing crisis, strikes, wars, street demonstrations, etc. (Masmoudi, 
1979, p.l72). 
Obviously such a stress on negative events will lead to stereotyping. 
When the Western mass media report the Middle East, the coverage 
often appears with stereotyping. For example, the Shiite Muslims in 
Lebanon or the Palestinians are often covered either as 'Islamic 
fundamentalists' or 'Arab terrorists'. In fact these problems are due to 
many factors. One of these factors is that the 'irregular coverage given 
to most parts of the world necessarily results in chaos, crisis and 
catastrophe dominating the picture of world events in the news media 
(Elliott & Golding, 1973, p.22). A second factor is the ideological 
interests of Western political and economic elite. A third factor might 
be expressed in the various beliefs about news and news policy held by 
publisher, executives and journalists. 
Nevertheless, in the treatment of foreign news, other regularities have 
been suggested by Elliott and Golding (1973) which help to explain the 
way the event is covered and dealt with in order to be newsworthy: 
"Such regularities are ethnocentrism, event orientation, 
human interest, story cycles and story perspectives. Some of 
these perspectives reflect direct British or Western 
interests: others seem to be a consequence of the 
discontinuance flow of information, the need to simplify 
and the superficial fragmentation of reality which these 
entail. But all these perspectives have ideological 
consequences in the same way as the other general 
regularities' (Elliott and Golding, 1973, p.28). 
What is clear from studies that are done on news production is that 
news is not a neutral and natural phenomenon, nor a mirror of what 
actually has happened. It is rather the manufactured production of 
ideology. The myth of objectivity and neutrality falls when we study in 
depth media organisation, and the complex relation in the process that 
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govern what is decided to be news values. From research studies that 
are done on broadcasting (Beharell, et. al., 1980, Epstein, 1973, Golding 
& Elliott 1979, Schlesinger, 1978, Elliott, 1977, 1978), one can gather two 
important factors: First, the importance of contents; and second, the 
situating of news contents in relations to external influence, e.g. 
politics, ideology, and in some instances, the bureaucratic process of 
producing the news, although even this process has been associated 
with ideology. Further there are a range of internal factors influencing 
the structure of news reporting. The upshot is always that news 
messages are weighted in a particular way, but presumably could be less 
biased if aspects of news process were changed in order to minimise the 
importance of external influences on the content (Altheide, 1985, p.54). 
Moreover the Glasgow University Media Group (1980) argue that news 
is never a series of facts or a simple mirror of external reality. Rather it 
is a cultural product and the accounts and description of the world 
which it gives are produced from within specific interpretative 
frameworks. They explain that its accounts are formulated from within 
limited assumptions as to the nature of the social and industrial world. 
These assumptions are guided by beliefs about what the problems of 
our society are and how those problems might and should be solved. 
These beliefs give order and form to news accounts, they determine 
what information is to be declared as 'newsworthy' and are implicit in 
the normal practices of journalists. 
Ideology in the Glasgow University Media Group view is not some set 
of alien ideas imposed, propaganda like, upon willing and unwilling 
hearer or reader. Rather, it is the representation of sets of events or 
facts which consistently favour the perceptual framework of one group. 
News talk occurs within a cultural framework which stresses its 
balance and impartiality. Yet despite this, analYSis reveals that it 
consistently maintains and supports a cultural framework, within 
which viewpoints favourable to the status quo are given preferred and 
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privileged readingsS. And finally, Schlesinger (1978) examined the 
practices and ideology which lie behind the making of the news by 
Britain's most prominent broadcasting organisation. He argues that 
news does not select itself, but is rather the product of judgements 
concerning the social relevance of given events and situations based on 
assumptions concerning their interest and importance. He points out 
that the 'reality' it portrays is always in at least one sense 
fundamentally biased, simply in virtue of the inescapable decision to 
designate an issue or event newsworthy, and then to construct an 
account of it in a specific framework of interpretation. He considers 
news must be assessed as a cultural product which embodies 
journalistic, social and political values. In short, 'it cannot be, and 
certainly is not, a neutral impartial or totally objective perception of the 
real world' (Schlesinger, 1978, p.165). 
S.B. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The powerful and crucial role of news media must be emphasised. 
Knowledge and information are provided about certain situations, 
especially where individuals have no first hand experience. They 
spread images and stereotypes and transmit and legitimise the ideology 
of those in powerful and privileged institutional positions. 
The process of legitimisation and the transmission of dominant ideas 
does not occur, of course, in a conspiratorial manner, but rather 
through controlling mechanisms of socialisation through which media 
professionals learn how to absorb the imperatives or ethos of their 
profession. Media professionals, moreover, are socialised into the 
norms and values of the institution of journalism constructed within 
particular organisational structures. Therefore they have to meet the 
5 See the discussion in (Beharel~ et. al., 1980). 
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criteria of selecting and producing news which can implicitly serve the 
political and economic interests of the hegemonic class. The effects of 
selection and omission should leave a large segment of society 
informed but instead they are left with impoverished information in 
certain matters which concern their political, economic and social 
reality. 
Since the possibility of a wide spread Western conspiracy cannot be 
taken seriously, the thesis does not over-emphasise the impact of 
particular individual owners of the media on the ideological 
structuring of images of the Arab Islamic "Other". However since the 
weakening of the state power to intervene and plan certain aspects of 
media content, in the resulting privatised media sphere so few people 
now own the vast majority of the media. This can only serve to further 
homogenise, standardise and stereotype images of the "Other" whether 
Arab Islamic or the members of any other cultural group that is at 
times held in an inferior position. 
More important here are the organisational and institutional 
structures of media production and dissemination, the core of 
dominant news values, and the wider cultural stereotypes at work in 
modern Western societies. The particular structuring of news values in 
the modern Western media clearly favours the increase in negative 
images, and the continuing erosion of more positive ones. Numerous 
studies have shown the importance attached to negative, simplified, 
sensational or tragic news. Recent events in the Arab world have 
provided a resource for Western media institutions. It has been 
possible to show the Arab world in such a negative way because of the 
broad historical-political legacies of Western imperialism. These 
historical conditions bonded to contemporary media demands and 
news values have brought about a situation of unparalleled hostility of 
the West towards the East. 
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The central argument in this chapter was to approach news values in 
an historically aware manner in order to emphasise the increasingly 
important network of linkages between news values and media 
ownership and the historical-cultural legacy of imperialism. The 
specific form of the contemporary news media is based on 
entertainment, leisure, and profit seeking, at the expense of a detailed 
analysis of events of a historical and political nature. 
In this thesis, an attempt to observe the continuity and change of 
images of the Arab world is being construed as an aspect of long-
established ethnocentric cultural bias. In spite of that, it must be 
expected that different images will achieve salience as the relation of 
the 'Orient' to the West is redefined in terms of material economic and 
political changes. Regarding such developments, reference will be 
made to the operation of news values within the Western (American, 
British and French) press. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONTENT ANALYSIS: RESEARCH 
METHOD, BACKGROUND AND SOURCES 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Content analysis is concerned with systematically exammmg how 
many times a thing was said or repeated over a given time-period. As 
Hartmann & Husband (1974) put it, it is "the most adequate 
methodology to study media messages as many researchers have 
demonstrated". 
In this chapter, a definition of content analysis will be presented 
followed by the procedure for conducting a content analysis in this 
study. This involves the sampling procedure, selection of newspapers, 
and the description of coding schedule. All these categories will enable 
us to generate data which can answer many of the research questions, 
such as, how much news on Arab affairs is reported? What are the 
main topics? What are the main characteristics of the news? What 
news values can be found in Arab affair news? What kind of an image 
of Arabs and Moslems is presented? 
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6.2. CONTENT ANALYSIS: DEFINITION 
Among the earliest definitions of content analysis are those employed 
by two practitioners Lasswell (1948) and Lazarsfeld (1948), which 
stressed the importance of quantification and analysis of manifest 
content as the characteristics and requirements of this kind of study, 
and these have been emphasised in some subsequent definitions of 
content analysis. 
They also defined it as a "technique which aims at describing, with 
optimum objectivity, precision, and generality what is said on a given 
subject in a given place at a given time" (Lasswell' 1952, p.34). This 
definition emphasised the coding of the manifest content. 
A classic definition was proposed in 1952 by Berelson. 
"content analysis is a research technique for the objective, 
systematic and quantitative description of the manifest 
content of communication" (p.13). 
Before analysing this definition more closely, it is necessary to define 
the distinction between reliability and validity. Reliability refers to the 
consistency of a measure. This notion can be taken to comprise two 
elements: these are external and internal reliability. External reliability 
refers to degree to which a measure is consistent over time. Internal 
reliability inquires whether the chosen scales are measuring a single 
idea or more than one, hence a good level of internal reliability would 
demonstrate a high degree of internal consistency. The question of the 
validity of a particular measure is concerned with whether that 
measure really relates to the concepts that it is claimed to be measuring. 
Breaking Berelson's definition down into its main components, four 
adjectives are highlighted : "objective", "systematic", "quantitative", 
and "manifest". Objectivity means that each step in the research 
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process must be defined so precisely that another researcher doing a 
separate analysis can apply them to the same body of content and 
secure the same result. Systematic, refers to the selections made which 
must be based on a formal, predetermined and unbiased plan; in other 
words all ·of the relevant content must be analysed within all of the 
relevant categories. The term "systematic" is also taken to mean a 
method by which an analysis is designed which secure relevant and 
unimpeachable data in order to answer a scientific problem. 
Quantitative simply means the recording of numerical values or the 
frequencies in which the various defined types of content occur. 
Finally, manifest means the apparent content, that is content that must 
be expressed in a direct, simple and unambiguous manner. It should 
deal with "reading on the line and not between the lines". 
Clearly Berelson's definition of the correct methodology for content 
analysis lays particular emphasis on the importance of quantitative 
analysis since the latter is more obviously susceptible to use within a 
strictly empirical framework. 
According to Holsti (1969), objectivity implies that each step in the 
research process must be carried out on the basis of explicitly 
formulated rules and procedures. Systematic means that the inclusion 
and exclusion of content or categories is done according to consistently 
applied rules. The quantitative aspect is based on counting the amount 
of something found in a random selection of some forms of 
communication (Berger, 1991). Likewise, Holsti (1969) defines content 
analysis as "a technique for making inferences by systematically 
identifying specified characteristics of messages", and in addition, 
Krippendorff (1981) considers it a good technique for creating 
replicatable and valid research, this approach has been very influential 
for example Budd (1967) approaches content analysis as a: 
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"systematic technique for analysing message content and 
message handling- it is a tool for observing and analysing 
the overt communication behaviour of selected 
communicators" (Budd, 1967, p.2). 
Although this definition is wider than that employed by Berelson since 
it refers to message handling as a suitable topic for analysis, it still 
basically follows the principle line of his definition. 
More recently, Krippendorff (1981) stated that: 
"content analysis is one of the most important research 
teclmiques in social sciences, it seeks to understand data as 
a collection of physical events but as symbolic phenomena 
and to approach their analysis unobtrusively" (ibid., p.7). 
Quantitative newspaper analysis was used in order to meet the 
demand for ethical standards and for empirical inquiries into the 
phenomenon of the newspaper (Krippendorff, 1981). In fact, content 
analysis enables us to handle large volumes of data. 
The interactive nature of content analysis was well summarised by De 
Sola Pool as follows: 
"It should not be assumed that qualitative ones merely 
mechanical methods for checking hypothesis. The 
relationship is a circular one; each prOVides new insights m 
which the other can feed" (De Sola, 1959, p. 192). 
It is exactly this circular relationship between complementary 
methodologies which will be employed in analysing the portrayal of 
the Arab Islamic world in the Western press within this research. 
As Krippendorff (1981) stated that content analysis makes it possible to 
reflect attitudes, interests and so on, qualitative analysis is used in 
depth which means it is neither a frequency of occurrence of the 
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context nor a measurement of stylistics features. Therefore, it is ideal to 
use both quantitative and qualitative content analysis to reinforce each 
other. 
However, qualitative analysis may also be legitimately employed to 
uncover information that may not be immediately apparent with 
purely quantitative analysis. Holsti (1969) states that: 
"the quantitative-qualitative dichotomy is a false 
problem. Measurement theorists are generally in agreement 
that qualitative and quantitative are not dichotomous 
attributes but fall along the continuum ..... (Holsti, 1969, 
p.ll). 
The content analyst therefore should use qualitative and quantitative 
methods to supplement each other. 
De Sola (1959) also cautioned that we should not assume that 
qualitative analysis is merely intuitive while quantitative analysis is 
merely mechanical. For this reason qualitative supports illuminate and 
expand on the data provided by quantitative analysis. 
In undertaking a content analysis study, Stemple says that: 
''The investigator must deal with four methodological 
problems: selection of the unit of analysis, category 
construction, sampling of content and reliability of coding" 
(Stemple, 1981, p.122). 
Selection and definition of categories must be clearly stated and they 
should reflect the research influences. 
Finally, according to Holsti (1969), content analysis is useful when there 
is difficulty in access to data, for example, a restriction in time or space 
and so on. Besides, content analysis is also helpful when we have to 
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cater for a large amount of data which is beyond our ability to 
undertake. Hence, it will be possible to analyse and make inferences 
from only a sample which is selected for in the study. In this way, 
content analysis has some advantages of analysing data because of its 
characteris tics. 
Moreover, content analysis makes it possible to divide the messages in 
the mass media into component parts and this division provides a base 
from which subsequent aggregation of the parts may be affected with 
the aim of saying something meaningful about the message and its 
structure provided that the categories into which the message is 
divided are mutually exclusive, exhaustive and relevant in the 
theoretical context of overall research. 
The particular content analysis used in this thesis is thematic analysis. 
Along with the coding unit, it is necessary to specify what setting is 
considered adequate to establish the precise meaning of that unit. This 
is known as the context unit. For a word, the content unit will probably 
be its sentence, for a theme it may require a paragraph or a page or even 
a chapter. In deciding which context unit to use, the most important 
thing to bear in mind is that it should be large enough to provide the 
background necessary to permit accurate judging, but not so large that 
coders become confused (Budd, et. aI, 1967, p.36). 
On the same line, Berelson (1952) argues that: 
··the theme is among the most useful units of content 
analysis, particularly for the study of the effect of 
communications upon public opinion, because it takes the 
form in which issues and attitudes are usually discussed. 
But it is at the same time among the most difficult units of 
analysis, from the standpoint of reliability, especially if it 
is at all complicated (Le., more than just a simple 
sentence)'". 
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Berelson states that the theme has been referred to in content analysis, 
as an assertion, a statement, a proposition, an idea, an argument or an 
issue which could be a sentence, a part of a sentence, or even a single 
word. 
There is a significant methodological problem that the content analyst 
has to contend with: that is category construction. This is an important 
phase in the research process because categories are in essence, "a 
conceptual scheme, pigeon holes in which content units are to be 
classified" (Stemple, 1981, p.95). It is said that no content units' analysis 
is better than its categories (Budd, 1967 p.39), and Berelson even went 
so far as to say that content analysis stands or falls by its categories 
(earney, 1972, p.159). According to Budd, categories must meet three 
primary requirements. They must answer the questions originally 
asked, be exhaustive and be mutually exclusive (Budd, 1967, p.39). 
There are many ways for the construction of categories. For the purpose 
of the study, the theme for categorising content has been chosen. One 
of the advantages for using thematic categories is that they often enable 
the analyst to construct ingenious form of analysis. A theme, according 
to Carney, is an incident, thought process or view point which can be 
seen as a coherent whole (Carney, 1972, p.159). 
Berelson is more straight forward: "a theme is an assertion about 
subject matter" (Berelson, 1952, p.138) and Budd stressed that what is 
important under theme categories is that the analyst must be able to 
detect the major motifs in the content and recognise them in their 
various statement forms (Budd, 1967, pA8). 
Following Budd's methodology, all the assertions in the materials 
under study, were jotted down. Then, assertions were re-analysed in 
an attempt to determine the themes. The purpose is to discern trends 
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and see if there are any changes in thematic patterns during the period 
under the study. The materials are also coded simultaneously for 
trajectory or direction, this refers to interpreting the actual movement 
of events and this is highly subjective. According to Budd, 
"determination of direction is one of the most frustrating problems for 
the analyst because it is one area in which the element of subjectivity is 
difficult to control if not eliminate altogether" (Budd, 1967, p.50). In 
order to be useful, said Budd, "definitions of directions must be broad 
enough in scope to cover almost every situation that might arise but 
not so general that they fail to provide the desired discrimination" 
(ibid., p.53). 
Apart from theme and direction categories, another relevant category is 
that of the source. According to Berelson, "a source" is a person or 
group or object in whose name a statement is made" (Berelson, 1952, 
p.157). The purpose of this part of the research is to identify the 
frequency of the sources used. So far as foreign reporting goes, there is a 
tendency to rely o'n exclusively organisational sources almost to the 
exclusion of the powerless and the less articulate groups. 
6.3. CONTENT ANALYSIS: CRITICISM 
Some criticisms are concerned with how content analysis remains an 
apparently inflexible method of academic territoriality, that is primarily 
concerned with linear description. James Curran (1975) comments on 
the boundaries of its usefulness: 
"the limitations of content analysis can confirm or refute 
specific hypothesis about newspaper content using 
procedure that minimise the subjective element inherent in 
unsystematic analysis. But the results of a content analysis 
are necessarily defined by the questions in the form of 
content categories that are asked" (Curran, 1978, p.133). 
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while Rosengren(1981) criticises the definitions of content analysis as 
being inadequate for it is insufficiently elaborated and restricted in its 
applicability by the explicit quantitative requirement (Rosengren 1981, 
p.12). He strongly attacked Berelsonian content analysis and described it 
as: 
"naive, positivist, characterised by fetishism of 
quantitative techniques and lack of theory" (ibid.,). 
Thus, content analysis is no longer restricted to the explicit (manifest)-
quantitative production of data, but is increasingly concerned with the 
analysis of the latent as well as manifest meanings of messages. This of 
course does not mean that content analysis is not founded upon 
quantitative assumptions. 
Of course, content analysis utiliSing this model is not immune from 
criticism nor is it free from limitations. However, it is a technique 
which can yield a valid and useful understanding of the 
communication process in general, and the press in particular, on the 
condition that the researcher using it articulates an explicit theory of 
communication to which statistical and quantitative aspects of content 
analysis are still directly relevant. It is of utility as long as the researcher 
has met the primary requirement for categorisation during the 
designing of her research, namely exhaustiveness, exclusiveness, 
accuracy and adequacy. Moreover, in advocating a flexible use of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches it would be improper to imply 
that they constitute independent techniques in any absolute way. 
Furthermore, Oliver Burgelin (1972) writes of the method's blind spot, 
its inability to explore the meanings suggested by its calculations: 
'traditional content analysis is essentially quantitative. Whatever its 
aim may be, its method is always to itemise and enumerate. We may 
not be able to ascertain with absolute certitude what the text means, but 
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we can ascertain with absolute certitude, that the item 'Stalin' appears 
ten times more often than the item 'Lenin'. Structural analysis, by 
contrast, only rarely enumerates. It would be pointless to deny that it is 
sometimes possible to draw certain inferences from the fact that the 
word 'Stalin' occurs more frequently or less frequently in a text. But in 
itself this fact is unintelligible if we do not take account of what the text 
says each time about 'Stalin' (Burgelin, 1972, pp. 318-319). 
However, Burgelin comments on content analysis are important, 
especially his discussion about the inferences of units within the text. 
6.4. METHODOLOGY 
The main objective of this study is to analyse authors and their 
locations, the subject of the material, the actors who were quoted, the 
themes, the classification related to the Middle Eastern countries 
whether it is political, economic, religious or cultural. Finally, the 
crucial terms used by the printed media to describe the Arabs and 
Islam. It is felt that content analysis provides a fruitful means of 
addressing these issues. Therefore, the study will be a combination of a 
quantitative and qualitative content analysis which can be sufficient 
enough to examine the work. Thus, the quantitative will be concerned 
with counting the frequency and cross tabulations. While the 
qualitative will be involved in an evaluation of the materials within 
which the quantitative data occurs. 
6.5. SELECTION OF NEWSPAPERS 
Six Western daily newspapers were selected. Three British papers 
which are The Times, Daily Express and Daily Mirror. Two American 
papers, the Washington Post and New York Times and finally, the 
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French newspaper, Le Monde. The aim of selecting these newspapers 
was to use all the various and different points of views from the 
Western side in order to understand how the West understands other 
cultures and the ways they portray pictures of contemporary reality of 
the Arab world. The reason for selecting these specific newspapers was, 
in the case of the British newspapers, in order to appreciate possible 
class differences and relationships, in the perceptions of Arab Islamic 
cultures. To this end, the Times was chosen as representative of the 
establishment and elite, the Daily Express, since it is a middle class 
newspaper and the Daily Mirror which caters for popular working class 
tastes. Further, the aim was to take three newspapers with different 
ownership and editorial perspectives. In case of the American 
newspapers, the researcher selected the most established and widely 
available publications. Le Monde was chosen because it is a high quality 
yet popular newspaper which has a particular interest in North African 
post-colonial affairs. 
Each of these newspapers, accordingly, has its own different 
professional sense of newsworthines, its own distinctive technical 
framework, its own distinctive organisation and its own perceived 
sense of audience. Taken together these in total form a specific 
characteristic style or what is usually referred to as "the social 
personality" of a particular newspaper (See Hall et all 1978). 
Finally, the information for the selected newspapers were found in 
Colindale Library in London, then were obtained and coded there. 
However, after a review of literature, it would be interesting to 
examine each newspaper by studying its historical background. This 
will be useful in later stages. 
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6.5.1. Background Of The S elected Newspapers 
6.5.1.1. The Times 
The Times of London, a newspaper founded in 1785 by John Walter as 
the Daily Universal. received its present name in 1788. During the 19th 
century, the paper became closely associated with the voice of the 
government regardless of the party in power. A continuing emphasis 
on book reviews led to the establishment in 1902 of the weekly Times 
Literary Supplement. It was purchased by Lord Thomson of the Fleet 
(Roy Thomson) in 1966. The Times had a circulation of 350,000 in late 
1978 when publication was suspended for a year by disputes over the 
introduction of a labour-saving computer-typesetting process that 
caused a reduction in the work force. Then in 1979, the first issue 
following the strike was printed on November 13. But, in 1980, The 
Times journalists went on strike for a week in August for a 21 percent 
pay increase". In 1980 The Times was purchased by the publisher 
Rupert Murdoch. 
The Times is sometimes spoken of as one of Britain's leading papers 
though its reputation has been somewhat diminished, particularly 
since the paper was taken over by Rupert Murdoch. His aggressive pro-
Conservative outlook which he insists must be reflected in his papers 
resulted in the exit of one of the most reputable Times editors, Harold 
Evans in 1982, followed in 1983 by an exodus of other journalists who 
were angry and frustrated at the way in which their paper had acquired, 
"a conservative propagandist tone under Murdoch's new Thatcherite 
editor Andrew Neil" (The Times, 1985, p. 104). The Times news 
coverage is extensive, especially of politics, and its readership is 
concentrated in the higher echelons of society. Politically, the paper has 
traditionally shown more sympathy for Conservative than Labour 
politics. 
Being an independent Conservative publication, The Times aims to 
give solid news coverage but with a brighter look than in the past. 
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Despite being criticised for its more 'popular' look, which has gained it 
a large number of younger readers, The Times is still the national 
newspaper of the British establishment and maintains its international 
reputation as one of the world's leading publications. 
It is considered to be pro-American where it takes a wide but 
conservative view on the most international situations, and 
concentrates on the political rather than social aspects of foreign news. 
It also has a good Middle East coverage, reporting frequently on Arab 
issues particularly from the Gulf States, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. 
Christopher Walker has been the Middle East correspondent for The 
Times, having worked on the paper for over 20 years. He was The 
Times Moscow correspondent for three years, Israel correspondent 
between 1979-1985 and before that, correspondent in Ireland for six 
years. He has reported both the Gulf War and the peace process in 1990-
1991 and his brief covers all Arab countries as well as Israel. He was 
based in Cairo from 1988 until April 1994 when he returned to Israel. 
He believes he is the only Middle East correspondent for a British paper 
who has been based for long periods in both Israel and an Arab 
country.! Walker believes that Islamic fundamentalism is a threat but 
wonders if it is in danger of replacing Communism as the Western 
bete-noire. He thinks the fanatical fundamentalist movement poses 
the greatest threat to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. "I foresee a domino effect. 
If one country goes the others will be threatened." 2 
The current daily circulation of The Times is in the region of 675,000 
and the editor is Peter Stothard. Since some of the problems of John 
1 Quoted in the Voice 1991. 
2 Walker says a possible danger would then be that fundamentalist states might starve 
the West of oil. He said: "Oil is the reason people are so interested in the Middle East. 
If Kuwait had still been a fishing port I don't expect the West would have responded so 
effectively to the invasion" (Voice International Report, 1991). 
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Major's administration The Times has moved towards more 
independent political view point. 
6.5.1.2. Daily Express 
Traditionally a supporter of the Conservative party, the Daily Express 
has also recently become more independent in political outlook. The 
Daily Express upholds the traditional right-wing values of its large, 
middle class mostly Conservative readership. The paper is highly 
suspicious in its approach to anything or anyone left of centre. 
The Daily Express is extremely loyal to tried and tested foreign friends 
of Britain- particularly to the· USA. It rarely, if ever, criticises 
Washington policy and it is strongly opposed to any Communist 
country or dictatorship, but normally friendly to any moderate country 
or state. Although it welcomes any move towards democracy, The 
Daily Express is always highly suspicious and wary of change. For 
instance, it welcomed the collapse of the Berlin Wall but immediately 
questioned the possible negative effects of a united Germany becoming 
the largest of the European states. In terms of greater European 
integration, it is always highly suspicious and is quick to support the 
British Conservative government, and one of the last to support any 
move towards greater European unity. 
The Daily Express is traditionally pro-Israel, never forgetting the 
treatment of the Jewish people by the Nazis during the Second World 
War. The paper, with considerable difficulty at times, attempts to 
justify Israel's policies on the West Bank and Gaza (Voice, 1991). 
It is basically against Libya and Iraq and is highly suspicious of countries 
like Syria and Iran. It is against the PLO - seeing it as a "terrorist" 
organisation despite the presence in its midst large numbers of 
moderates "extremist" labels. The paper regards Yasser Arafat as a 
"cartoon" figure who has now gone over to the "enemy", Saddam 
207 
Chapter 6 Content Analysis: Research Method, Background and Sources 
Hussein. It is normally friendly to moderate Arab countries like Egypt 
and the Gulf States, who do nothing to create trouble in the world 
outside but sensibly mind their own business. 
The paper has no correspondents - staff or otherwise - in Cairo, the 
Emirates, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon or Damascus. A freelance correspondent 
from Cyprus covers most of the Middle East helped by two stringers 
who work for the Ierusalem Post. It is therefore, ill-eqUipped to 
discover what is happening in Arab countries. 
The Daily Express tends to view Middle East news from an Israeli 
perspective. Editor Sir Nicholas Lloyd took his son Oliver to Israel for 
his bar mitzvah. Sir Nicholas' wife Eve Pollard- until recently editor of 
the Sunday Express - is known for pro-Jewish sentiments (ibid.,). 
Although it is a supporter of the peace process, The Express has shown 
concern about extremism. 
The current editor of The Daily Express is Paul Polts, the newspaper 
was established in 1900 and the current circulation is approximately 
1,256,000. 
6.5.1.3. Daily Mirror 
Daily Mirror is the traditional tabloid of the Labour-voting working 
class. Once known for its solid news coverage, it has become 
increasingly sensationalist in recent years in order to compete with its 
tabloid rivals like The Sun and The Star. However, it will always 
support what it sees as the working man and in any dispute or strike 
usually interprets a story from the worker's point of view. 
It had a more positive attitudes to what was the Soviet Union, 
especially since the Wall came down. This reflects a general policy that 
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in most situations internationally it will take what it sees as the 
"people's side". It is generally in favour of the United States but not as 
sycophantic as many of the tabloids in their coverage. 
Daily Mirror is very limited in its coverage, but it is pro-peace. It is also 
pro-Israel. Although it has one columnist Paul Foot who has declared 
himself on the side of the Palestinians, the Mirror is primarily critical 
of all Arab states and is particularly against the republican regimes of 
Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria. It is solidly against the PLO and dismisses 
Yasser Arafat as something of a joke figure. 
The proprietor was, until 1991 Robert Maxwell MC, Mirror Group 
Newspapers. The carnivorous "Bob" was also owner of the Sunday 
Mirror, the European and the People. He had bought a large part of 
Marev, Tel Aviv's second biggest daily. He underwrote the 
International Conference on the Holocaust for one million pounds. He 
was President of State of Israel Bonds (UK) and a keen supporter of 
Israel in all its activities. 
The current editor is Piers Morgan and the current circulation is 
approximately 2, 561,000. 
6.5.1.4. Washington Post 
The Washing:ton Post is the most influential newspaper within the 
Washington community despite its nation-wide and international 
distribution. Its position on national and international issues is liberal. 
The Washing:ton post was founded by the independent-minded 
Democrat Stilson Hutchins in 1877. He sold the paper to Frank Hatton, 
a Republican cabinet member and Berian Wilkins, a former 
Democratic congressman in 1889, after he purchased the Daily 
Republican, the Post's only morning competition in 1888. In 1905 John 
R. McLean, owner of the Cincinnati Enquirer, bought the Post, and 
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expanded circulation and revenue of the paper. In 1916 Mclean's son 
Edward, an acquaintance of President Warren Harding, became the 
publisher and switched the allegiance of the paper to the Republican 
party. In 1933 the Post was bankrupt, and Eugene Meyer, a California 
born financier bought it for $825,000 at an auction held at the door step 
of the Post's building. 
From 1933-1943 under the leadership of Meyer, the Post tripled its 
circulation and increased its advertising space. When President 
Truman appointed Meyer to be the first president of International 
Bank of Reconstruction and Development in 1946, he was succeeded by 
his son-in-law, Philip Graham, who had been an assistant publisher. 
In 1950, the Post bought Washington's CBS station; in 1953 the Post 
bought the TV station WMBR in Jacksonville Florida. In 1954 the Post 
purchased the last rival in the DC. area, the Washington Times-Herald. 
The circulation of the Post and Times-Herald paper rose to 380,000. 
In 1959 Philip Graham assumed the position of publisher and president 
of the Post upon the death of Meyer. In 1961 Graham purchased the 
News week magazine for the Washington Post Company. In 1962, the 
Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News Service was formed to 
syndicate columns, articles, and features appearing in both papers. 
In 1963 Katherine Graham became the president of the Post following 
her husband Philip's death, and the Washington Post Company bought 
49% of the stock of Bowater Mersey Paper Company in Nova Scotia, 
Canada. 
The Post began to publish the "Pentagon Papers" on June 18, 1971. In 
1972, the staff, most notably Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, at the 
Post began to cover the "Watergate Scandals". The Post was voted "Best 
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Newspaper for investigative Reporting" by the American Tournalism 
Review, March 1993. 
On the broader subject of the Arab World, the Washington Post has 
shown a degree of empathy toward the Arab people. It criticised 
congressional debate over the arms sale to Saudi Arabia in 1985. The 
Post urged the US government to make a clear distinction between 
moderate and radical states. When Saudi Arabia turned to China for 
missiles in 1988, the paper expressed shock, but avoided either 
condemning or condoning the Saudi action. Instead it criticised the US 
government for creating such a situation by consistently rejecting the 
Saudi's arms sale requests. 
However, in an editorial "Kow-towing to Saudi Arabia", dated April 
16, 1991, the Post took Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to task for their policy 
of refusing entry to Americans carrying passports with Israeli stamp, 
this was in reference to Senator Frank Lautenberg who was refused 
entry to the Gulf states for having Israeli stamp on his passport from an 
earlier trip to Israel. 
The current circulation is 823,449 (Daily) and 1,158, 329 (on Sundays). 
6.5.1.5. New York Times 
The city of New York had seen the birth and the death of seven 
newspapers called the New York Times during the 19th Century. The 
New York Times started as conservative in such a way as shall best 
promote needful reform (Berger, M p.7 in the story of New York 
Times). The founder of the 8th New York Times was called Henry 
Raymond. He had a political career and he was known as the godfather 
of the Republican Party. He was elected as a congressman in 1862. His 
New York Times was effectively a party organ, in favour of business, 
commerce, growth and against slavery and the South. When Raymond 
died in 1869, his Times was so successful that his partner, George Jones, 
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refused an offer of a million dollars. For a decade, the paper was 
powerful, respected and profitable, but refused to support the official 
Republican candidates, so when Jones died in 1891, the paper was dying 
too. 
During the 1930s, a German-Jewish immigrant, Adolph Ochs, bought 
the paper. He turned New York Times to be a bankers' paper, with a 
special financial section. Another daily column was started, headed 
"arrival of buyers" simply a list of visiting businessmen. It became a 
permanent Times feature, running 2,000 names a day by 1946. 
In 1904, Carl Van Anda joined the paper who also turned it to have 
combined scoops and exhaustive coverage, exclusive and weighty 
business coverage; the Times became a quality paper. Since then, it was 
modernised, and its layout assumed the form it was to retain for the 
next sixty years. The circulation increased 24 times higher than when 
Ochs had bought the paper. 
The New York Times, during W.W.!, increased its circulation and 
strove to be impartial in its news and features. It achieved national and 
world-wide prestige and built a large reportorial organisation and 
European news service. From a daily circulation of 82,000 at the turn of 
the century, to 250,000 when W.W.! began, the circulation jumped to 
390,000 by the end of the war. In the years following the war, it 
increased further its circulation, mainly because of its coverage of 
W.W.I. According to Davis (1921), it presented the official views of the 
warring nations and its editorial analysis of the causes of the war were 
reasonably accurate. 
The war had not only made the Times into a national institution, it 
had also changed the character and the social root of serious American 
journalism. 
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During the second World War, America became a global power. The 
New York Times, which had seen the war coming had chosen sides in 
advance, and became a great international newspaper. It was 
independent and hungry for news. 
This paper was known to be read by policy makers, that its editorials 
and reports are published by other local papers, and influences the 
judgement of editors all over the US ( Cohen, 1963, p.131). 
Journalism had become "a profession and attractive to elites" 
(Commentary magazine, March 1971, "Dan Moynihan's words"). A 
similar process took place in France, where Le Monde was to be staffed 
with men who had served De Gaulle, and in Britain where men from 
The Times worked in with government departments that were all 
mobilised in fighting a total war against Nazism. 
In the course of 1976, what became known as the New York Times 
began to emerge, a four section paper: one section of national and 
international news, another of metropolitan news; a business section, 
and a different advertising generator section each day- sports, science, 
living, home, weekend- each of them a daily magazine. 
In summing up, the New York Times is a prestigious paper, with a 
wide circulation, interested in foreign affairs, relying on 
correspondents as well as news agencies. 
The current circulation of the New York Times is 1,209,000 (Daily), and 
1,762,000 (on Sundays). 
6.5.1.6. Le Monde 
Le Monde is a paper with a liberal crusading tradition, widely read by 
the French Intelligentsia. Readership includes most of the opinion 
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formers who determine the political and economic character of France. 
In short, 'anybody who is anybody in France reads Le Monde'. 
Le Monde was founded, as an act of France's liberation, by the authority 
of General De Gaulle in December 1944. The reformist, liberal-left 
current of the liberation meant equally that Le Monde was to be 
guaranteed its freedom from direct official control. The paper was fated, 
then to be a curious hybrid, part official journal of France, part free and 
independent voice. 
"Le Monde's first ambition is to assure the reader of information that is 
clear, true and as far as possible, rapid and complete" read the first 
editorial on 18 December 1944. "But our epoch is not one in which we 
can be content to observe and describe", it went on. Le Monde 
announced from the beginning its right to judge and to advise. Much 
would depend upon the calibre of the men chosen to edit the 
newspaper. One was a self made man, an anti-fascist journalist and 
Resistance intellectual Hubert Beuve-Mery. 
Le Monde reflected the long post-war agony of France. The paper was 
formed in a series of crucibles; the joy of liberation, the tumults of 
Indochina, of Algeria, of the military coups of 1958 and 1961, the quasi-
dictatorship of de Gualle, the domestic terror of OAS and the wave of 
plastic bombs. 
To its friends, the paper remains brilliant, avowedly elitist, honest and 
reliable. To its critics, Le Monde can be transparently self-important, 
pompous and often out of touch with the concerns and lives of the 
bulk of the population. Nonetheless, critics of the 'Right' who disagree 
with its left-wing views still consider it an essential 'read'. Le Monde is 
quoted abroad as the authoritative voice of the French government in 
spite of its many criticisms of that government. 
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In terms of political orientation, Le Monde is mildly Left-of-Centre, and 
is alert to any signs of racialism. Human rights is a prominent theme. 
Stylistically, it shares as much with news magazines as with 
newspapers. It is critical of Islamic fundamentalism. Its elegantly-
written prose concerns itself with analysis and thoroughness rather 
than immediacy. Unlike other French dailies, Le Monde has made 
little use of news photos. It tends to concentrate more on reporting of 
hard news. Moreover, it treats foreign news much more 
comprehensively than other French dailies and has the most complete 
staff of foreign correspondents, some of whom have established 
considerable reputations 
Le Monde is particularly well-informed about North Africa, with 
extensive contacts in both governments and opposition circles dating 
back to the 1950s. 
Unlike the other newspapers, Le Monde is owned by the limited 
company which is unorthodox, not quoted on the Bourse (Paris 
Foreign Money Market). Its one thousand shares are split between 
nominees, a company of readers, a group of private and public 
companies and the staff (which includes journalists, clerical workers 
and other employees). The journalists have a veto on major decisions. 
It has managed to operate smoothly and efficiently, largely due to one 
man, its editor Andre Fontaine who saved the paper economically. 
The current editor of Le Monde is Jean-Marie Colombani, its 
circulation is approximately 362,000. 
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6.6. SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
The reason behind the sampling rationale comes from theory and 
studies that have used content analysis in studying newspaper. Merrit 
found: 
"that a random sample of four issues' per year of a 
newspaper is nine-tenths as good as an independently-
chosen random sample of twelve issues per year" (Merrit, 
1965, p.328). 
However, this will depend on the period being studied and the purpose 
of the study. 
Stemple (1952) attacked the methodological problem of determining 
adequate sample size for subject matter published in daily newspapers. 
A sample consisting of 6, 12, 24, 48, issues were compared to the 
averages for the entire year and to each other. His conclusion was: 
"our results indicate that for a single category all five of 
the sample sizes do an adequate job and that increasing the 
sample sizes beyond twelve does not produce marked 
differences in the result" (Stemple, 1952, p. 334). 
Therefore, the period suggested for content analysis extends from 1978 
to 1993. In the selection of this particular period, the options are either 
to choose specific periods which are related to specific events, or to 
show a specific period and look at everything that has been covered in 
the press within that period without restriction to particular events. A 
decision to choose the second option is taken because it gives a 
consistent picture of the continuity of the coverage of the Arab Islamic 
world. 
For that reason, the years selected 1978-1993 gave a consistent picture of 
the continuity of the coverage of events which are covered in the 
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Western press. Having examined the huge amount of articles in the 
newspapers, it was decided to study the selected papers at the selected 
date (shown in table 6.1). It was also found that the FI' Profile Database 
(A free text store press items under different subject- headings) was not 
as reliable as searching from cover to cover. Therefore, a complete 
coverage was made through scanning each story in each article of all 
the selected newspapers. 
A random starting date was selected at the beginning of January 1978 
(lst January, then 2nd of February, 3rd of March as shown in the table 
below). If the selected date happens to be on Sunday, the coverage of 
the date follows which is Monday, will automatically be examined. 
Thus, one day in every month was coded, covering all the sixteen 
years. 
Hence, the decision to use 12 issues per a year should be adequately 
represented every suggested year in the plan. 
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78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
Jan 2 13 25 6 18 31 12 24 6 17 29 12 24 5 17 29 
Feb 2 14 26 7 19 1 13 25 6 18 1 13 26 6 18 1 
Mar 3 15 27 9 20 2 14 26 7 19 2 14 26 7 19 2 
Apr 4 16 28 9 21 4 16 27 8 20 4 15 27 8 20 3 
May 5 17 29 11 22 4 16 28 9 21 4 16 28 9 21 4 
JUIl 6 18 30 11 23 6 18 29 10 22 6 17 29 10 22 5 
Jul 7 19 31 12 24 6 18 30 11 23 6 18 30 11 23 6 
Aug 8 20 1 13 25 8 20 31 12 24 8 19 31 12 24 7 
Sep 9 21 2 14 26 8 20 2 13 25 8 20 1 13 25 8 
Oct 10 22 3 15 27 10 22 2 14 26 10 21 2 14 26 9 
Nov 11 23 4 16 29 10 22 4 15 27 10 22 3 15 27 10 
Dec 12 24 5 17 29 12 24 4 16 28 12 23 4 16 28 11 
Table (6.1)3 :The Dates Randomly Selected for the Study 
The total number of items found in the six daily newspapers came to 
3712 items, which indicates that Arab world was covered extensively. 
3 The reader will note that the numbers do not run sequentially, for example Jan 2nd and 
Feb. 2nd, the reason here was because of the New Year and not all the chosen 
newspapers were published. Further, since Sunday newspapers were not included in the 
study, some of the other figures are again not sequential. 
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Year Times DExp. DMirr. WPost NYT. Monde total % 
1978 60 6 6 35 55 83 250 6.8 
1979 9 5 7 32 62 46 161 4.3 
1980 90 7 8 28 72 55 260 7 
1981 101 8 4 33 56 42 245 6.6 
1982 56 6 3 39 42 64 210 5.7 
1983 96 6 5 34 60 51 252 6.8 
1984 54 3 8 37 49 47 198 5.3 
1985 55 8 4 38 46 42 193 5.2 
1986 66 14 6 43 52 59 240 6.5 
1987 59 13 5 36 30 46 189 5.1 
1988 53 16 3 43 39 46 200 5.4 
1989 58 8 2 26 27 43 164 4.4 
1990 80 29 17 69 70 76 341 9.2 
1991 130 35 27 108 98 73 471 12.7 
1992 45 12 5 39 40 51 192 5.2 
1993 39 4 3 22 27 51 146 3.9 
Table (6.2): The Numbers of Articles Referring to Arab Islamic News 
Items over the Sixteen Year Period 
There is a considerable difference in the number of items which had 
been published through the chosen sixteen years. In table (6.2), it is 
shown how many items each newspaper had covered of the Arab 
world. 
Each item will be studied intensively in which it can be anything from 
an international news or an advertisement. If it covers any news about 
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the Arab world, the item will be selected no matter what classification 
it comes under. 
6.7. CODING SCHEDULE 
Holsti (1969) defines coding as the process whereby data are 
systematically transformed and aggregated into units which permit 
precise description of relevant content characteristics. The rules by 
which this transformation is accomplished serve as the operational 
link between the investigator's data and her theory and hypothesis. 
Coding rules are thus a central part of the research design and in 
preparing them the analyst makes a number of decisions: 
-How is the research problem defined in terms of categories? 
-What unit of content is to be classified? 
-What system of enumeration will be used? (Holsti, 1969, p.94). 
6.7.1. Categories 
The categories are looking at the possible notions of imbalance and bias 
within the content. These categories are: the main theme of the 
headline, the main topic of the lead, location of the correspondent, 
source of the messages, actors quoted and appeared, and crucial terms. 
These categories are intended to cover major research questions. 
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6.7.2. Units 
There are two kinds of units: recording and context units. Holsti (1969) 
argues here that it may be possible to classify a recording unit without 
some further reference to the context in which it appears. But he 
explains that recording units cannot tell the author's attitude if they are 
seen by themselves. They should be looked at within the context unit 
which is the largest body of content in order to know his attitude 
towards certain issues, e.g. democracy. 
6.7.3. Enumeration 
Systems of enumeration vary considerably in precision and in time 
required to code a given sample of data, and depends on the 
discrimination of categories. To follow two kinds of enumeration: 1) to 
count whether the unit is mentioned or not, 2) to enumerate how 
many times the unit appears in the article. 
However, without a theory to inform the analyst, he/ she is without 
any guides for his/her coding decisions. In short, unless he/she can 
state explicitly why he/she is analysing documents, he/she cannot 
intelligently work out a plan on how to do it. 
Upon this, a sophisticated schedule has been designed in order to 
answer the questions of the study. Because the selection of papers were 
in different languages, the coding schedule was translated into Prench 
in order to code the French newspaper Le Monde. 
The main categories concerned are the authors and their locations, the 
selection of the themes, the actors quoted and appeared, the political, 
economic, cultural and religious factors have been categorised, then the 
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language (crucial terms) which have been used in the press to define 
the Arab Islamic World. 
6.B. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the present research, the themes are defined as manifest assertions 
under which are subsumed 'idea units' that deal with Arab Islamic 
culture. There are activities involving Arab Islamic society in 
relationship with each other or with foreign people or entities. 
Moslems and Islam in Arab countries, accordingly, are the main 
concern in any theme that will be analysed for the purpose of this 
study. Those themes will further be analysed according to the sources 
(i.e. who said it and reported it), actors quoted (i.e., individual, 
International Organisation etc.), relationships of conflict or co-
operation, other people or entities in the theme, crucial terms (i.e. 
whether a verb, an adjective, or an adverb describing them); and the 
content type (e.g. religious or cultural). 
In addition to the explicit, news-worthy events concerning the Arab 
Islamic world in the Western media, the research also selects a number 
of salient themes which are derived from the sixteen year period 
covered by the research. The figure of sixteen years was taken because it 
dates back to the Iranian revolution of 1978, and the flourishing of 
Islamic fundamentalism. A number of crucial events have unfolded in 
this period. Most notably the Civil War in Lebanon, the Iran Iraq War, 
a number of Western hostage-taking episodes and associated terrorist 
activities and growing Western fears of the Arab Islamic world. These 
are the central themes which have conditioned Western media 
representations of the "East". 
As a consequence of the strategy adopted here, and because of the range 
of events and themes in the period of analysis, there are large number 
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of possible themes, subjects and actors which appeared in the sample. 
Therefore, chapter seven will analyse the frequency and cross-
tabulation of occurrences of all the topics and will discuss and examine 
the findings thoroughly. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the various fields and sub fields of academic inquiry, competition for 
prestige, influence and position has been governed by implicit and 
explicit ideological and professional values, set by the scholarly 
institutions. In this situation, development within the various 
disciplines has remained uneven. The theories and methods, applied 
to the general field of Arab or Middle East studies have remained 
anchored in the concepts and vocabulary of nineteenth-century 
historiography and social sciences. 
It is not just ideology, stereotyping or hidden interests that distort 
understanding and interpretation of the past and present of the 
"Other" or 'Them", but also the way established academic scholarship 
is constituted. Therefore, Western knowledge is the product of 
European expansion and of world domination. Thus the social-science 
disciplines developed in pursuit of knowledge of non-Western 
cultures and peoples are based on forms and categories of analysis 
designed specifically for grasping the "Other" or "Them". 
What was overlooked were not the analytical categories or methods of 
interpretation, whether academic or radical, but those special values 
and insights implicit in an exclusively Western view or perspective on 
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the (non-Western) world. Above all, this has involved an attempt to 
replace the hegemonic Western discourse regarding the "Other" by an 
independent discourse, one produced by Arab Islamic self-
understanding, representing "Our" interpretation, and grounded in 
"our" experiences and concerns. Though still in the process of 
formation, the emerging discourse has already begun to deploy its own 
analytical vocabulary and to fashion its own critical approaches) 
Since the Iranian revolution and the rise of Arab, Turkish, and other 
Islamic political movements, many Western analysts merely revised 
standard Orientalist interpretations to accommodate these new 
realities. R. H. Dekmejian's Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in 
the Arab World, a study commissioned by the US. government, said 
"the causal relationship between spiritual-social-political turmoil and 
fundamentalist ascendance has been a recurrent pattern in Islamic 
history ... "(Dekmejian, 1985, p.ll). For Dekmejian, the Islamic 
fundamentalist is a fanatic (he uses the Arab term mut'asib) who 
exhibits a severely pathological psychological profile. His text is a 
transparent wedding of simplistic Orientalism with unsubstantiated 
assertions based on modern psychology, sociology, and political science. 
This fusion of Orientalism and modern social science is not limited to 
the analysis of Islam. It is the core framework of modernisation theory. 
Throughout this chapter, it will be crucial, in presenting and 
interpreting this data, to distinguish between events -which refer to 
those news items which reveal a strong degree of Western 
involvement or interests, and themes-which are illustrative of 
Western perceptions of the Arab Islamic world. 
1 See Said Orientalism 1978, and in particular Sharabi, Theory, Politics, and the Arab 
World,1990. 
225 
Chapter 7 Data Analysis and Results 
7.2. FINDINGS 
In this chapter, the purpose is to produce data that detects any changes 
in media coverage. This data will then be analysed and interpreted 
according to the theoretical and methodological terminology that has 
been outlined. In particular the question of shifts or changes in the 
Western perceptions of the Arab Islamic world will be addressed. This 
will be studied through the Western press (English, American and 
French newspapers) between the period 1978 to 1993. This chapter 
presents the results of the statistical analysis with a description of the 
figures and tables which are used to represent the findings. 
There are 3712 items which appeared in the six chosen newspapers for 
the selected years 1978-1993. The present study involved a rigorous and 
systematic search of all material relating to the Arab Islamic world 
including major news articles, news briefs, advertising copy, 
photographs, cartoons, and non-news items such as articles dealing 
with cultural and religious issues. Each of the content categories are 
described in terms of the press attention given to them. Some cross-
tabulations are shown for major variables indicating the relationships 
between these variables and comparing and relating to each other. 
Selected Newspapers 
As shown in table 7.1, most of the items (28.4%) stemmed from the 
English newspaper, The Times, the figure for Le Monde was 23.6%, The 
New York Times 22.2% and Washington Post 17.8%; whereas the 
popular dailies like Daily Express had published 4.8% and Daily Mirror 
3% of items in the sample of Arabs and Islam. 
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Newspapers Percent Cum Percent 
The Times 28.4 28.5 
Daily Express 4.8 33.3 
Daily Mirror 3 36.3 
Wash. Post 17.8 54.2 
NYTimes 22.2 76.4 
Le Monde 23.6 100 
Table 7.1: The Percentages of Arab Islamic Coverage in Each of the 
Selected Newspapers 
Types Of Classification 
One of the most general classification in table 7.2 is "Overseas news" in 
which most of the items were found 64.6%. The remainder is made up 
from home news 3.1%, advertisement 3.9%, Economy 3.6% and Events 
11.3% and a variety of other categories listed below. 
Page Classification. Percent 
Home news 3.1 
Parliament 0.9 
Overseas News 64.6 
Analysis 1.4 
Editorial 0.6 
Comment 0.3 
Letters 2.1 
Opinion 0.4 
Review 0.1 
Economy 3.6 
Events 11.3 
Features 1.6 
Culture/Art 0.8 
Technology 0.2 
Environment 0.3 
Sports 0.2 
Separate photo 0.7 
Interview 0.1 
Government Discussion. 0.2 
Advertisement 3.9 
Diary 3 
Others 0.8 
Table 7.2: Types of Items 
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Position of the Item 
Table 7.3 shows that 86.7% of the items have been printed in the inside 
pages. News stories reserved for the front pages are those judged by 
media professionals to be of the greatest interest. The selection depends 
on the values and the interests of the Western reader. News stories 
which are judged to be important and are covered in the front pages are 
main events, like the Gulf War, Peace treaties, Lockerbie disaster, 
Western hostages, and other significant events. 
Position Percent 
Front Page 12.1 
Inside Page 86.7 
Back Page 1.2 
Table 7.3: Positioning of News Items 
Visuals 
The proportion of stories with photographs printed in the selected 
Western press is 20.4% as shown in table 7.4. This proportion is 
relatively high, although some large number of items presented more 
pictures per an item. 
Number of Visuals. Percent 
Number of Photo. 20.4 
Number of Diagram 3.1 
Number of Cartoon 0.8 
None of above 75.7 
Table 7.4: Percentages of Visual Material 
Subject 
As shown in table 7.5, subjects were classified in different categories. 
The table below, describes the frequency of the type of subjects in each 
item. "Arab Politics/lnternal" 24.6%, shows the highest percentage, 
then the "military" 18.9% category which refers to wars and military 
actions that took place in the Arab world during the period of the 
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study. Subjects such as "Law, Crime" received 12.6%. This will include 
actions of terrorism such as assassination, bombing, and kidnapping. 
Subject Percent 
Arab Politics/Internal 24.6 
Arab Politics/International 7.1 
Arab Politics/ Regional 6.1 
Culture/Education/Art 1.8 
Military 18.9 
Environment 0.6 
Disaster 1 
LawlCrime 12.6 
Peace Movement. 9.7 
Personalities 2.3 
Religion 1.2 
Science 0.7 
Sports 0.2 
Trade/Industry. 9.9 
Others 3.3 
Table 7.5: Percentages of Certain Subjects in the Selected Newspapers 
Main Countries Concerned 
In table 7.6, Israel (23.4%) occupied the highest percentage. This refers to 
the Israeli differences with the Arabs, their settlement, their conflict 
with the Palestinians and their peace treaty. Since the Gulf War, Iraq 
scored a high rate of 18.8%. This includes Iraq's relation with the Arab 
World and the West and its internal affairs. It is interesting to observe 
that Yemen Arab Republic, though encountering major problems 
(boundaries, neighbour relations, internal conflicts, war between the 
two Yemens) has occupied only 0.6% of all the items. This might 
indicate the existence of a systematic selectivity of interests that 
dominated the news scene. 
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MCC Percent 
Algeria 3.2 
Bahrain 0.2 
Egypt 9.1 
Iraq 18.8 
Israel 23.4 
Jordan 3.5 
Kuwait 4.6 
Lebanon 16 
Libya 5.1 
Morocco 1.9 
Other Mr. St. 1.5 
Other Gulf St. 2.7 
Palestine 14.8 
PDR Yemen 0.6 
Saudi Arabia 7.1 
Iran 4.6 
Syria 5.5 
Tunisia 2 
Yemen A R 0.6 
Others 18.6 
Table 7.6: Percentages of Appearance of Main Countries Concerned in 
the Selected Newspapers 
7.3. LIMITATION OF NEWS VALUES 
Coverage of the Arab world in the selected newspapers, did not consist 
of one single event. Instead it contains many events and issues due to 
the changes of the economic and political situation through the years. 
The distribution of the news items has varied significantly from year to 
year and consistently between newspapers. (See Appendix 3, table A18). 
In the Western newspapers selected in this study, news items about the 
Arab Islamic world are selected according to a limited number of news 
values. These can be summarised under such headings as negativity 
and elitism. 
The limited range of news values plays an important role in directing 
attention towards particular events, themes and people of the Arab 
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world presenting them by definite stereotypical perspectives. Such 
perspectives offer a specific version of reality about the Arabs which is 
most likely to serve the interests of the Western policy makers and 
political leaders. 
7.3.1. Authorship And Location 
In table 7.7, Correspondent 26.9% received the highest category. This 
table is also related to table 7.8, because the author and his location 
shows its importance in producing the news. The media locates their 
correspondents in major cities in order to have easy access of 
information. But in the Middle East, most of the correspondents have 
been located in Tel Aviv/Jerusalem (14.5%) and Lebanon (10.9%) 
occupied the highest percentages. This shows that the author has been 
located in a country where current political events are of greatest 
interest for the West. The inter-relation between the correspondents 
and their location, is also significant, this will influence the way in 
which news is produced in terms of the proximity of the reporter to the 
events they are reporting. Israel and Lebanon are twice as likely to be 
the location of stories as the next most frequent location, Washington 
DC 
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Author percent 
ANA 0 
AP 5.9 
Correspondent 26.9 
Diplomatic Correspondent 3.3 
Diplomats 0.1 
Editor 1 
Staff 0.7 
Joint Correspondent 0 
Local News Agent 0 
Middle East Correspondent 0.1 
Middle East News Agent 6.5 
Military Correspondent 0.4 
Official 1.3 
Other News Agent 11.4 
Political Correspondent 0.2 
Reader 1.5 
Reuters 8.5 
UPI 1.6 
Unknown 30.5 
Others 2.9 
Table 7.7: Percentages of Categories of Authorship 
Location Percent 
Algeria 2.2 
Iraq 3 
Bahrain 0.8 
Lebanon 10.9 
Dubai 0.4 
Egypt 5.4 
Jordan 2.1 
Kuwait 1.8 
London 3.2 
New York 1.9 
Other Arab States 6.2 
Other Asian States 0.3 
France 1.8 
Saudi Arabia 1.9 
Syria 1.9 
Tel Aviv/Jerusalem 14.5 
Turkey 0.1 
Washing. DC 6.5 
Unknown 27.8 
Others 7.7 
Table 7.8: Percentages of the Frequency of Western Reporters in Certain 
Locations 
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In tables AI, A2, A3 in Appendix 3 & Figure 1 in Appendix 4, the 
authors have been divided into two groups. Correspondents, editors, 
staff are classified in one group called "Staff", while the other different 
agencies such as Reuters, AP, UPI, etc. were grouped together as 
"Agency". 
In table AI, "Agency" group have written more extensively on 
"terrorism" 7.8%, while the "Staff" group evidently interpreted the 
"Gulf War" as being more important 10.2%. This indicates that the 
"Staff", located in the Gulf Area, where it had become more easy to get 
access and was therefore, convenient for the reporting of the event. 
The figures for the category 'Arab Politics/Internal' the "Agency" 
reported 483 items, while the figure for the "Staff" was 417 items. In the 
second category 'military', the "Agency" figure was 389 items and 
"Staff" 306 (table A2). This shows that both "Staff" and "Author" are 
drawn towards clashes and conflicts which took place in the Middle 
Eastern areas. 
Figure 1 in appendix 4, shows that The Times contains 779, Daily 
Express 161, Daily Mirror 94, and Le Monde 500, these newspapers 
depend heavily on the "Agency" rather than their own "Staff". While 
the Washington Post 420 and The New York Times 507 relied more on 
their "Staff" rather than other "Agencies". The total percentage of 
"Agency" reporting is 56.4%, while the figure for "Staff" reporting is 
43.6%. This demonstrates the degree to which the Western press is 
relying upon "Agency" reporting, although the figures vary from 
publication to publication. There also appears to be a difference 
between European and American newspapers with both the 
Washington Post and The New York Times relying, to a greater extent 
on "Staff" than "Agency". 
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From the data analysis we derived 72 crucial terms (see table A3 in 
appendix 3). In order to make this large amount of data more 
manageable, factor analysis was employed to reduce it to smaller sets. 
This is a multi-variable statistical procedure, used primarily for 
reduction and management of data and the investigation of variable 
relationships. The 72 crucial terms were condensed into five categories. 
Each of these categories consisted of verbs, nouns, and adjectives that 
were judged to be thematically similar. Then the five categories were 
evaluated in relation to a range of other variables such as actors and 
authors. The purpose was to examine to what extent these categories 
were applied to specific actors by the authors. 
In table A3, it is noticeable that the correspondents had used certain 
terms very extenSively. For example, they used the grouping 
"aggression" 38 times, "Murderer" 99 times, "Enemy" 204 times, 
"Struggle" 272 times, and also "Good" 33 times. The percentages of each 
writer's article made up of these key terms is given in table A3. The 
least frequently used grouping of terms was "Good", and this 
demonstrates something of the extent to which Western newspapers 
deal with the Arab Islamic world in a negative way, with terms such as 
"murderer", and "enemy" being used far more than the term "Good". 
The research found that Le Monde used the fewest of these crucial 
terms and showed a more neutral approach to reporting on the Arab 
Islamic world, while the highest percentage of the use of these crucial 
terms or labels was demonstrated by The Times newspaper. This 
indicates that the authors of articles on the Arab Islamic world are 
allowed to express themselves with strong, and often negative attitudes 
towards Arab society and specifically Islam. This is revealed through 
their use of vocabulary. The implication of the frequent use of negative 
terms will be drawn out in the discussion below. 
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7.3.2. Actors/Personalisation 
An analysis of tables A4-A12 in Appendix 3, indicates the salience of 
personalisation of the relating of news with specific persons in the 
reporting of the Arab world. Each of the actors emerge with differing 
frequencies across the years of the sample as their personal power and 
international significance waxes and wanes. Authoritative 
personalities often make news because of the power they represent 
nationally or internationally and the public is often familiar with their 
personalities and actions. Most of the actors shown are considered to be 
official actors who are widely recognised by Western media and by the 
general public. 
Therefore, actors will be identified by name and by their appearances in 
media articles, and on those occasions where they were quoted. Table 
A4, shows that officials (total of appearance and quotation 814) are the 
category of actor which appears and is quoted most frequently in the 
chosen newspapers. Those officials are considered to be the figures of 
greatest local national and international significance who are 
positioned to influence or even manipulate media coverage. This 
indicates they could provide the press with their own version of reality 
and this version of events is more likely to be taken seriously given the 
power and influence of such actors. 
Among the Arab actors, table AS, the Saudi Royal family was the most 
frequently appearing of all the Arabs in the Western press. The 
frequency with which they appeared and were quoted was 288 separate 
occasions. 
Table A6 shows, in spite of the limited period, Sadat, the former 
president of Egypt, had been the centre of attention in the Western 
press during the period of 1978-1980. The frequency of his appearances 
in the selected newspapers comes to 249. This can be attributed to two 
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important issues: firstly the peace treaty with Israel and secondly his 
assassination, both widely reported. 
In table A7, from the personalities selected, Arafat has the most 
frequent appearance at 521. This might be attributed to the continuous 
leadership of Arafat in the Palestinian authority where the appearance 
of the Israeli officials, Shamir who appeared 260 times, Begin who 
comes after with figure of 223, if we add these figures to those for Peres 
and Rabin we find that the combined figures for these Israeli actors 
only then become comparable to the figure representing the appearance 
of the Palestinian leader. During the period of the study (1978-1993), 
several Lebanese presidents took charge of the government. No one in 
particular was specified because the civil war was occurring and the 
role of the president was very limited. 
As table A8 shows, HezboIIah (Party of God), Fatah (the main military 
wing of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation), Hamas (Islamic 
Resistance Movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and Islamic 
Jihad appeared a total of 247 separate occasions. These Islamic 
movements had appeared in the Western press during the period of 
the study. The difference in the frequency of each of these movements 
might be attributed to the date of the establishment and the degree of 
involvement with the public affairs (political, economy, social, security 
etc .. ). 
In table A9, Saddam Hussein, received the highest degree of interest by 
the Western press with 544 appearances. This might be related to the 
involvement of Saddam in two major wars: The Iranian -Iraqi war and 
the Gulf war which both took place during the period of the study. 
While the other Iraqi Political Figures appeared 362. Hafez AI-Assad, 
president of Syria, comes next with 335 appearances. King Hussein of 
Jordan and Khomeini of Iran received similar figures. 
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Among the "International & Regional Organisation", as shown in table 
AID, we found that the United Nations appeared 479 times. This 
indicates that the UN played an extensive role in all the international 
affairs, while the appearance of the other international organisations 
depends on their more limited roles, and becomes dependent upon 
specific incidents or occasions. During the period of the study the most 
frequent appearances, shown in table A11, were the "Foreign 
Spokesman". 
Table Al2 gives the total figures for the frequency of all appearances of 
actors appeared and quoted. This table demonstrate the much greater 
frequency of appearances by Western actors compared to Arab Islamic 
ones. It becomes clear from this data that although the Western media 
is keen to present certain types of images of the Eastern world, it is less 
willing to consult Arab Islamic actors directly and is content to rely 
upon Western actors interpretations of the East. 
The news items on such prominent media personalities attribute to 
these individual specific qualities, for example their temperament and 
ambition. Reference is also made to these individuals importance in 
directing international relations, in particular, this becomes obvious 
with the example of president Clinton or any of the major Western 
leaders. 
7.3.2.1. Description Of Arab Leaders In The Six Newspapers 
As has been indicated in the data presented there are certain degrees of 
variation between the selected Western newspapers. However in 
general terms Arab leaders might be viewed as 'kings', 'sheikhs', 
'powerful', 'conservative', 'moderate', 'rulers', 'maintaining ties with 
the US', and 'aware', while other terms frequently used were 'radical', 
'furious', 'worried', and were considered 'dictators', 'frustrated', 
'aggressive', and 'murderers'. 
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A selected number of key Arab actors were chosen for further analysis, 
their details are presented briefly below and in the following chapter 
events involving these actors particularly Sadat will be examined in 
more detail. 
AnwarSadat 
The president of Egypt from 1970-1980 was portrayed as 'sincere', a 
'peacemaker', 'the courageous man of peace', 'popular', 'generous', 
'brilliant', 'firm', and 'trusted'. He 'stood in defiance of the enemies of 
the peace', and 'praised by the West', 'embraced enemies', made a 
historic leap', 'did right', 'favoured peace', and 'had popularity'. 
But on the other hand, Sadat was felt to be 'impatient', 'hated by 
Islamic fundamentalists', 'doomed as traitor by fellow Arabs', he was 
known for being 'assassinated', and 'had a violent death'. 
Hosni Mubarak 
President of Egypt (1980-1993) was depicted as 'fair', 'disciplined', 
'efficient', 'talented', 'US closest Arab friend', 'practical', 'listens', 'gets 
directly to the point', 'concentrates on problems', 'serves interests of 
masses', 'broadens his narrow political base', by allowing 'more 
democracy'. He 'scored with Arabs', 'released dissidents', 'pledged with 
peace'. He was also described as 'a moderate president', having 'doubts 
about PLO', 'leans for separate Palestinian state'. He was seen as 'facing 
problems', and 'dares not to relax'. 
Saddam Hussein 
President of Iraq, (1979-present) was depicted during the 1980s as 
'winning support', 'hoping', 'cultivating popular image', 'strong man', 
'born survivor', 'pumping money', 'shrewd', 'fit', 'pragmatic', 'close to 
people'. He declared 'amnesty for Kurds', 'courted Shiite', 'promoted 
himself to president'. He was described as 'Sunni', 'revolutionary', 
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'peasant's son', 'moustachioed face', 'shopping in West for weapons', 
'Soviet client'. However, the descriptive terms switched during the 
Gulf War after which he was seen as 'arrogant', 'butcher of Baghdad', 
tyrant', 'menace', 'merciless', 'arrogant', 'radical', infidel', 'implacable', 
'enemy', 'aggressor', 'ruthless', 'his opponents risk jail or shooting'. 
Saddam 'does not inspire affection', 'imprisons his opponents and 
executes them'. He 'started war with Iran', he 'invaded Kuwait' and 
'killed his best friends'. 
Islamic Movements 
They are most frequently depicted as 'brutal', 'barbaric', 'killers', and 
'fanatics'. 
Muslims in Lebanon, in particular, were seen as 'feuding' and the 
different 'militias are fighting each other'. The 'Shiite' are the 
'backbone of Amal party and militia' as well as of the 'Islamic Jihad 
Organisation'. The 'Shiite' were viewed as 'fiercely nationalistic', some 
are 'pro-Khomeini', 'fought against Israel'. 'Hezbollah' was considered 
as 'violent', in opposition to rival Shiite movement 'Amal'. The 
'Islamic Jihad Organisation' was regarded as an 'obscure', 'Shiite 
Muslim', 'loyal' to Khomeini'. Jihad members were viewed as 
'attackers', 'murdered Americans', and 'wanted foreigners out'. The 
'Sunni', in Lebanon are the cornerstone of the 'Murabitoun'. They 
were pictured as 'backing the PLO' and 'fighting Israel' and 'funded 
and supported by Libya'. For illustrations of these important themes 
see figure 8. 
Yasir Arafat 
As a 'PLO chairman', he was portrayed as a 'hero', 'able', 'strongman', 
survivor', 'smart', 'shrewd', 'patient', 'symbol of Palestinian cause', 
'holding PLO together', 'bearing olive branch and a freedom fighter's 
gun'. He 'won important diplomatic recognition', 'lifted his fingers in 
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a triumphant V for victory'. Furthermore, Arafat was viewed as 
'moderate', 'Fatah leader', 'runs the PLO and increased sympathy for 
his cause'. However, a number of widely reported Middle Eastern 
conflicts culminating in the Gulf War for example, has shifted the way 
he was depicted as 'terrorist', 'violent', 'desperate', threatening', 
'sceptical', and 'attacking'. 
Hafez Al-Assad 
President of Syria (1971-present) was frequently depicted as 'interested 
in peace', 'optimistic', 'knows how to stand up to the enemy', 
'supported Iran', 'determined'. He was described as 'tough', 'not a 
friend of Arafat', 'Alawite'. He was also seen as 'radical', 'ruthless', 
'dangerous', 'traitor', 'angry', 'anti-Saddam', 'Iraq's nearest enemy'. He 
'rejects moderation' and shows that 'there is no Middle Eastern 
settlement without him'. 
Muammar Oaddafi 
The President of Libya 'denies he is a terrorist', 'regards capitalism as 
exploitative and communism as godless', 'tries to repair relations with 
the US'. But on the other hand, he was viewed as 'unpredictable', 
'dictator', 'extreme radical', 'dangerous', 'trouble maker', 'vicious, 
'criminal', 'ludicrous', 'lunatic', 'irritant', 'world's public enemy 
hostile to the US', 'suspicious', 'militant', 'promoter to terrorism' and 
'radical'. In addition, Qaddafi was depicted as 'helping Iran', 'using 
assassination abroad as an instrument of his policy', 'planning terrorist 
attacks', 'financing international terrorists', 'arming Muslim 
Guerrillas', 'threatening training rebels', 'menace', and 'killing 
dissidents'. 
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7.3.3. Crucial Terms 
The data presented has shown that the representation of the Arab 
Islamic world, in the Western tends to be negative, reductive and 
stereotyped. The Western image of Islam and the Arabs described in 
many research studies is defined as a threat to Christianity (see Said, 
1981, Shaheen, 1984, and Suleiman 1974), and often is linked to 
'fanaticism' and 'barbarism'. Other studies show that there are 
variations in the use of language to describe certain events in the 
Western press. They tend to focus more on stories with elements of 
negativity. The crudest form of "Us" versus 'Them" (Said, 1981, p. 8) in 
the coverage of Iran is in The Times and Le Monde. This summarises 
the whole distinction between the Western values of 'Us' and the Arab 
Islamic values Them'. Normally Them' is perceived as an 'enemy'. 
There are 72 crucial terms given in table A13, which are classified into 
five groups according to Factor Analysis. The analysis of these terms, 
shows the identity of the sources and their influence on the definition 
of Arabs and Islam, the cultural values and their role in the selection 
process and the authors' attitudes about Arabs and Islam. In this table, 
many terms refer to war action which arises as the largest category such 
as "enemy" 21.7%, "militia" 19.15%, "killing" 16.5%, "shelling" 14.85%, 
"threat" 10.5%, other terms describe their titles and actions such as 
"terrorist" 10.7%, "guerrillas" 7.3%, "aggressive" 4.1%, 
"fundamentalist" 3.7%, "thug" 3.5%, "kidnapper" 3.1%, "murderer" 
2.9%, "rebel" and "militant" 2.7%. 
From this data, one can conclude that the cultural values of the West 
are a strong basis for interpretation of the way in which the press use 
certain terms to describe the Arabs and other cultural groups. In the 
case of Arab Islamic actors and events these are centred around a 
number of crucial terms such as 'fanatic', 'terrorist' and 'threat'. 
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7.3.4. Themes And Events 
In the content analysis themes are more broadly based than terms and 
are at a higher level of abstraction. They summarise those issues which 
have been presented in relation to the development of news items. 
Thus themes can potentially either indicate the centrality of certain 
conceptions, images or persons in that they occur at both levels in a 
discourse, or potentially can indicate the sub-plot within dominant 
definitions where alternative or complementary imagery is employed. 
Analysis of table A14 & A15 indicates that conflicts and terrorism are 
recurrent themes in the reporting of the Arab-Islamic world. Wars are 
also amongst the most salient events. 
One needs to ask, when considering the Western influence in 
reporting the Arab world, about what sort of themes the Arabs have 
been covered in the Western press? and how are these themes 
presented? To answer this, the most frequent themes selected for the 
topic (confined to 37 themes/ events), can be regrouped into four 
classifications. The frequency of the themes indicates their importance. 
These are derived from elements of news values in the western media. 
For example, the event of the "Gulf War" derived from the elements 
of importance and negativity, while the event of "Western hostages" 
presented cultural and personal values. 
As table A14-A15, shows the Gulf War 10.2% scored highest in the list, 
Terrorism 7.8%, Arab West Relations 7.4%, Middle East Peace 6.7%, 
Civil War 5.3% Western Hostages 5.3%, Palestinian-Israeli Conflict 
4.8%, Iran Iraq War 3.7%. The Internal Affairs are the least mentioned 
such as Economic and Military Inter Arab Relations 0.7%, or Lockerbie 
0.9% in which the coverage of the Lockerbie didn't appear in the dates 
selected, Scandals 0.6%, Poverty 0.4% and Environmental Issues 0.6%. 
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In table A16 & A17 in Appendix 3, 376 articles were written on the Gulf 
War. But through the years selected, the Middle East Peace had 
occupied the highest number in the first three years (1978,1979,1980) of 
the study. In 1981, 27 items were written on Arab West Relation. While 
37 items in 1982 were found as the Arab Israeli Conflict. But in 1983 the 
Arab West Relations had increased to 33 items. This shows that more 
positive, or potentially positive themes did appear, but they were not 
so common as a the negative ones. For example, the highest number in 
1984, was the Civil War 30 items. Terrorism was 33 items in 1985 and 
increased in 1986 to 58 items. But Military Action, 28 items, took over 
in 1987. The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict had become the centre of 
attention in 1988 (28 items), and 1989 (22 items). In 1990 and 1991, the 
Gulf War had become a major event, 213 and 157 items. After the Gulf 
War, in 1992, the Middle East Peace started to proceed (20 items) and in 
1993,23 articles were devoted to the PLO-Israeli Peace. 
The data emerging from the analysis of table A18 & A19, shows the 
coverage of the Gulf War was the highest 10.2% among all themes and 
events (as indicated in the Washington Post 101 items, New York 
Times 83 items and Daily Express 37 items). The coverage of terrorism 
appears in 7.8% of cases, where The Times contained 93 items about 
terrorism which is the highest number among its items. The Daily 
Mirror was more interested in the Western Hostages issue about which 
it published 23 items. Le Monde was more concerned with Political and 
Economic Reform, 81 items. Its interest lay mainly in the African-Arab 
countries such as Morocco and Algeria. All these themes/ events in the 
Western press are aligned to the interest of the West and these themes 
and events as mentioned before are selected according to the criteria of 
news values of elements of importance and negativity. 
This shows that some themes gain more prominence than others. 
Themes about the Gulf War and Terrorism occupied the highest 
percentage among all. Despite the fact that the Gulf War started at a 
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later stage, its coverage was more important than all the others. The 
Gulf War is particularly important to the press because the West was 
involved directly. 
Other themes would show elements of cultural values and personal 
interests such as Western Hostages, Arab West Relations. News about 
the Western hostages is considered far more important than news 
about the Arab detainees in Lebanon because the Western hostages are 
Americans and Europeans and has a common cultural background 
with people in Britain or America. 
7.3.4.1. Self-Interest 
In the press coverage analysed, themes which are concerned with oil 
and OPEC meetings, Arms and Weaponry sales, Arab and West 
relations are very prominent. Table A14 in Appendix 3, shows that the 
newspapers had discussed Arab Islamic events very much in terms of 
implications for Western interests. This gives a pointed political 
interpretation through the discussion of oil as a political weapon in 
Arab hands. The press coverage analysed has discussed the investment 
of the Arabs in positive projects in their countries. Interestingly, the 
portrayal of the Arab wealth in terms of the resentment it has attracted, 
founded upon conspicuous consumption in the West, has not emerged 
as a major issue, as might have been expected from contemporary 
cartoons. 
As for the Arab West relations 7.4% as indicated above, shows that this 
topic has been predominantly discussed in the terms of Western 
political pressure being applied to the Arab world in order to attempt to 
influence their behaviour in line with the Western goals. The more 
specific Western interest is identified in terms of supplying Arms sales 
2.7% (table A14 in Appendix 3 and figure 2 in Appendix 4) and also 
they show that the economic negotiations would reflect the main 
economic interest in the Western newspapers between Western 
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countries and the Arabs. It also takes account of the economic 
negotiations between the Arabs themselves. Beside issues like Arms 
sales (3.1%), Aid, oil reserves and sanctions occupy high ratings. 
But in figures 3 & 4 in Appendix 4, one notices that the Western 
newspapers during the period of the study, have no interest in 
expanding its information on issues related to religious matters, 
especially to matters related to Islamic traditions. Therefore, the 
religious factor seems the least attractive to the Western media. The 
highest percentage was the category "Islam versus Christianity" 0.5%. 
Le Monde had published around 11 article explaining the Sharia law of 
Islam. This might tell us that many Algerian Moslems live in France, 
and as a newspaper, Le Monde would like to satisfy its readers by 
presenting information that concerns their original country. Also 
regarding the cultural factor, the newspapers were less interested in the 
Arab culture. But some like Le Monde had viewed the historical 
background as an important category. 
7:3.4.2. Conflicts, Wars And Terrorism 
Most of the themes/ events noted down are mainly concerned with 
conflicts, violence, and wars. Civil war in Lebanon, Gulf War, Iran-Iraq 
war, terrorism, political, military and problems constitutes over half of 
the issues raised which is consistent with the traditional "Orientalist" 
belief of anarchy amongst Arab states as argued by Said in 1978. Also 
the wars would indicate the way in which the press have reflected the 
flow of conflict in the Middle East. In the themes/ events, the categories 
which is related' to wars has been a continuing theme in the reporting 
of the Arab world, for example, the Gulf War which was estimated the 
highest of all the categories. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict which also 
is related to the relation of the Palestinian with the West had 
predominantly shown that the Palestinians have been labelled as 
"terrorists" while Israeli violence is shown in more positive terms. 
This occurs in all the selected newspapers which indicates a more 
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negative coverage of the Arab-Islamic world with the exception of 
Israeli events. 
Therefore, most of the themes are related to negative interpretations in 
order to be defined as newsworthy. So news about internal divisions, 
violence, and terrorism are the sort of news journalists would look for 
in their coverage of the Arab world. 
From the themes, only two categories were selected and combined. 
These two categories are "Terrorism" and "Islamic Fundamentalism" 
(figure 6 & 7 in Appendix 4). News about terrorism and Islamic 
fundamentalism are selected because of their frequency, the negativity 
which has serious implications for the stability of the Middle East and 
for the interests of the West particularly oil and security and because 
more positive themes were so rare in the selected newspapers. 
It was within the purview of the present study to examine the leading 
press image of "Terrorism" and "Islamic Fundamentalism". Having 
demonstrated the importance of portraying and defining the Arab and 
Islamic world in the Western press, it is necessary to direct attention to 
a more concentrated analysis in the next chapter, in order to study 
three events that took place during the years of the study and after. The 
events will be based on these two categories, "Terrorism" and "Islamic 
Fundamentalism" and will be analysed qualitatively in all the chosen 
newspapers, to see why and how it is presented in such an attitude 
about the Arab Islamic world. 
7.4. SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter has presented the main findings revealed by 
the data. These are firstly the high concentration of negative and 
reductive terminology, the reporting of Arab Islamic affairs is done 
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largely in terms of conflict, wars and terrorism. Further, there was a 
disproportionately frequent appearance of certain key figures in the 
Western newspapers deemed to be more friendly or accessible to 
Western interests. The data showed clearly that related to this, was the 
tendency for the Western media to present Arab Islamic themes and 
events through the actions and words of Western political actors. 
Finally, there was some degree of systematic difference between the six 
newspapers. For example the two American newspapers appeared 
more willing to use staff reporting of the Middle East rather than 
relying on "Agency", while Le Monde did not carry visual images and 
was more interested in North African Islamic countries, however, such 
differences are relatively easily linked to those countries financial or 
colonial background and do not significantly alter the general pattern 
of Western reporting of the Arab Islamic world. 
It appears that the Arab Islamic world is still considered to be of great 
interest for the West. This has been the case for many centuries and the 
form which this interest takes has been summarised by the term 
"Orientalism". However, recent events, dating from around the 
beginning of this study, seem to have had the effect of shifting Western 
perceptions of the Eastern world in a significant and fundamentally 
negative fashion. The Eastern world has certainly suffered a number of 
conflicts, some of them violent, however, these events are 
disproportionately over-emphasised by the Western media. In 
particular, this thesis will suggest that this shifting of Western 
perceptions should be thought in terms of the dichotomy between 
"Self" and "Other" or ""Us" and "Them", and the long standing need 
of the Western world to secure itself against threatening or alien ideas 
and influences. 
These cultural conditions have, recently, become bonded to 
increasingly homogenised, reductive and stereotypical media 
reporting. As the media in this form has encountered a number of 
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major events such as war, hijacking, and violence, the image of the 
Arab has become further skewed towards negative. At the same time, 
the more positive dimensions that were included in the Orientalist's 
vision have been eroded. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Qualitative Analysis of the Image of Islamic 
Arab Countries: Three Case Studies of 
Terrorism and Islam 
8.1. INTRODUCTION: A CRITICAL APPROACH TO 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Qualitative research methodologies have become increasingly 
important in recent years, particularly in the study of social and 
cultural processes. A great deal of qualitative research has taken place 
in the field of mass communication. Textual/ discursive analysis may 
involve content, semiotic and narrative analysis. While most content 
analysis studies are quantitative in character, qualitative analysis offers 
a greater variety and flexibility of interpretation and so was felt to be 
more appropriate for the study. Content analysis breaks up the data 
into recurring themes, topics or terms, which are then isolated and 
counted. In the present study, it was felt that qualitative analysis could 
document the most important cultural meanings concerning both the 
past and the future shape of that particular culture and its perceptions 
of the "Other". 
The qualitative analysis performed in this thesis aims to draw upon 
the notion of Orientalism and to emphasise something of the ethical, 
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religious and political aspects of Arab Islamic culture beyond the form 
in which they are represented by the Western media. It is necessary to 
make clear that the writing of this thesis occurs within a distinct 
historical and cultural perspective. That means every writer exists 
within a cultural specificity that cannot be transcended for the sake of 
scientific objectivity. 
B.2. INTRODUCING THE CASE STUDIES: 
There is, a range of difficulties associated with the selection and use of 
case studies. The cases should be chosen for good reasons and in the 
case of terrorist events there are relatively few cases to choose from in 
comparison to other social scientific phenomenon, for example, case 
studies of work and leisure. Case studies help us to develop assertions 
and generalisations about the case, however, it is not necessary to 
assume that they offer an objective description of reality since 
according to Denzin (1994) "the purpose of case studies is not to 
represent the world, but to represent the case. Criteria for conducting 
the kind of research that leads to valid generalisation need 
modification to fit the search for effective particularisation" (p.245). 
-
The exact nature of the qualitative analysis that will be presented is 
.necessarily idiosyncratic. While a critically aware discursive approach 
was deemed to be useful here, it was felt that it would be unwise to 
pursue the discursive, or more specifically textualist approach to some 
of its more excessive conclusions.! The relationship between power 
and knowledge and the understanding of the representation of the 
"Other" are important to this analys. It is important to remember here 
that Said has been accused of both these failings, both in the study of 
IThat is, while I find Foucaul's or Said's discursive approach crucial to this kind of 
analysis, It was felt that the textualist philosophy of Jacques Derrida would not be 
easy to apply to this kind of work. 
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Orientalism and more recently in his 1993 Reith Lectures2 (Childs & 
William, 1997, p.97). My reading of the Western newspapers will be 
critical in an attempt to uncover the discursive structuring of 
newspaper accounts of the Arab Islamic "Other" in order to present its 
"truth". In other words, my analysis tries to show how the Western 
newspapers present an account of the Arab Islamic world which suits, 
or in the words of Childs & Williams (1997) is "congenial" to the West, 
in the guise of the "truth" of the East. I will consciously avoid the 
tendency of some work in this area to blame all the problems of the 
world on the West. The accounts of the Arab Islamic world given in 
the Western press are not held to be monolithic, for example I will 
emphasise the differing character of reporting in the French newspaper 
Le Monde as well as the divergence between British and American 
newspapers. Said has noted that in recent decades the locus of Western 
power has shifted from Europe to America, which may help to explain 
some of the differences between the British and French newspapers 
and the American newspapers. Further the French newspaper Le 
Monde demonstrated a very individual response in its coverage of 
Arab Islamic events. While it was less concerned to emphasise the 
unstable and terroristic nature of these cultures, its newspapers 
coverage will still marked by a clear attitude of self interest towards its 
former colonies. 
The three case studies chosen for the research are all examples of 
terrorism as it has been understood in the Western media. The three 
events chosen illustrate the functioning of Western stereotypes in 
present press interpretations and also demonstrate the flaws and limits 
of Western media stereotypes. The Western understanding of Islamic 
fundamentalism is central to the formation of these stereotypes. So, the 
three case studies are recent examples of the way in which the Western 
mass media has interpreted major world events involving Arab 
2 See discussion in "Said: Knowledge and Power" (pp. 97-119) in An Introduction to Post 
Colonial Theory by Peter Childs and Patrick William (1997). 
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Islamic actions, and specifically the ways in which negative and hostile 
stereotyping dating from the age of imperialism, find their way into 
contemporary news reporting. 
The role of the analyst in this study has been to select viable case 
studies which are examples of the functioning of the Western media in 
relation to Arab Islamic culture. The reporting of these events in the 
selected newspapers has been analysed in a manner which draws upon 
both structural factors, these are economic, political and cultural aspects 
(macro level) as well as trying to probe individual actors and agency 
(micro level). In order to gain a general appreciation of the 
presentation of Arab Islamic actors in the Western press, it has been 
necessary to combine several related approaches. Central to such a 
project is the study of the process of meaning and experience as 
opposed to information, experiment, and measurement. Qualitative 
textual analysis can take many forms, even within the investigation of 
mass media reporting. It can focus on the graphical, phonological, 
stylistic and rhetorical strategies employed within a particular text. 
However, what is important for this study is the interpretation of the 
case studies in relation to the discursive and ideological nature of the 
Western mass media. We have pursued a critically aware discursive 
analysis, which interprets texts and is to that extent also textual, but 
also draws upon a sense of wider human agency and cultural and 
religious factors which are not only to be found within texts. My 
analysis is therefore discursive, while critically aware of the possible 
limitations of Foucault and Said methodologies, and which is also 
textual in the sense in which Van Dijk (1991) defines and uses it, not in 
a sense of there being nothing outside of the text which is associated 
with Derrida and some branches of Post structuralism. Van Dijk (1991) 
has indicated, as a multi-disciplinary enterprise, discursive analysis is 
able to relate structural accounts of media messages and "various 
properties of the cognitive and socio-cultural context" (p.10S). This 
means that evaluations made by this thesis make use of both macro 
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and micro level analysis, that is, both economic and political forces as 
well as cultural values and individual, everyday and ethical agency. It 
is necessary to combine the two, and this study includes a consideration 
of macro level themes such as oil wealth, arm sales, debt and aid and 
then develops a qualitative interpretation which is able to focus on the 
micro level of individual actors, for example President Sadat. 
Having examined the coverage of the Arab world in the six newspapers 
from 1978-1993, it is now appropriate to extend this by moving to a 
more detailed interpretation of illustrative news stories. 
'Topics are an important aspect of news report and crucial 
.... Beside their prominent discursive functions, topics 
reflect many dimensions of the psychology and sociology of 
news. They represent what news-makers construe to be the 
most important information about a news event. The 
selection and textual prominence of topicS result from 
routines of news-making and embody criteria of journalistic 
decisions about news worthiness of events" (Van Dijk, 1991, 
.71). 
'Terrorism" was the most frequent theme in the news analysed in 
chapter seven and it will be studied in a more detailed qualitative 
analysis. For this purpose, this chapter will analyse three events (two 
major and one minor), involving the subject "Terrorism" and "Islamic 
Fundamentalism". These two themes are a description of certain acts 
which involve hijacking, bombing and assassination, and suggest 
reliance on violence as a way to promote social, political and religious 
change. For this study we have chosen a number of events that 
occurred in different continents over a number of years. It was felt that 
this choice of events had the advantage of offering a more general 
sense of Western media comprehension of events of this kind in the 
Arab Islamic region. This makes it unlikely that the form of media 
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reporting and the interpretations of these events is an isolated, 
untypical or accidental phenomenon. Further it was decided to limit 
the number of events to these three in order to manage finite 
quantities of data. 
We restricted the study to an interpretation of the news coverage of 
one day shortly after the event. This methodology was chosen for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it was felt that on the first day of reporting 
the Western media could be seen dearly to be grappling with the 
"Other" and the unknown. At this stage, the cultural and political 
assumptions underlying Western media reporting were at their most 
visible, as Western journalists attempted to systematise new events 
within existing cultural stereotypes. In short, on the first day of 
reporting the Western media was most visibly jumping to conclusions. 
Such a method also afforded large amounts of data which have to be 
managed within certain themes and categories. In the case of the 
hijacking of a Kuwaiti flight, the sixth day rather than the first day was 
selected because no detailed reporting was available until this time. 
We recognise that the notion of "interpretation" brings with it a 
number of difficulties. In the analysis of cultural records such as 
newspaper reporting, it is the interpretation of these texts which forms 
the crux of any research. Some recent work on qualitative methodology 
in the social sciences has been concerned with problems of 
interpretation, Denzin & Lincoln (1994) refers to the "crisis of 
interpretation". Recent Poststructural and Postmodernist critiques 
have problematized the attempt to establish any final or authoritative 
readings of a particular text. They argue that any researcher's "gaze" is 
always filtered or refracted through a multiplicity of particular cultural, 
ethnic, linguistic and gendered assumptions. Further research 
"subjects" cannot be expected to provide exhaustive and objective 
accounts of their beliefs and perceptions. According to 
Poststructuralists, and this category includes Edward Said, the subject 
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of research always remains "Other". Further the researcher's 
reconstruction of the "Others" lived experience remains to some extent 
a my th or story. In this approach, no discourse is allowed to gain a 
privileged position to define or locate the meaning of a text, or in 
particular to speak for or represent the "Other". 
Such theoretical work reflects upon most social scientific analysis, 
including the present one. The researcher is aware that her approach 
involves imposing interpretations upon an object, in this case certain 
Western newspapers. However the researcher is not claiming to speak 
for or represent a group which is confined to a position of cultural or 
ethnic "Otherness". Nor does she maintain that Western media 
discourse is fixed and homogenous. The interpretations made in this 
research are presented clearly and are open to revaluation and 
reinterpretation by any reader. The researcher is aware of her own 
cultural background and geographical location, on the one hand, 
studying within the Western European academic environment, while 
also drawing upon personal experiences of Arab Islamic cultural 
diversity. Perhaps this situation is able to facilitate an approach to the 
issue of Western mass media representations of the Arab Islamic 
"Other" which avoids the simplistic reduction to political sides. The 
status of the insights given in the qualitative analysis then are not 
presented as final or definitive. They are part of ongoing process of 
interpretation and evaluation. Nevertheless, by avoiding simplistic 
ideological reduction or "taking sides" and essentialist or monolithic 
presuppositions, it is felt that my approach has a great deal to offer. The 
status of the analytical claims, therefore, aims to be independent, not in 
a sense of neutral or absolute but rather as facilitating a renewed 
dialogue between the competing rationalities of East and West. That is I 
am arguing that both East and West possess their own, though partially 
divergent, rationalities. However where the West traditionally 
presented itself as rational as opposed to the irrational East, it is more 
accurate to speak of their divergent or competing rationalities. 
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To recap, the nature of my analysis is then evaluative and 
interpretative. It draws upon a critical reading of the textual/ discursive 
approach to qualitative research such as that outlined by Jensen (1991) 
and by Van Dijk (1991). It aims to incorporate both a structural; that is 
political and economic mode of analysis, as well as an appreciation of 
the micro level of human actors and their perceptions. Again I wish to 
stress that I will avoid political sides and I have resisted the temptation, 
as a writer from the East, to claim knowledge of an authentic or 
essential Arab Islamic East. In fact I am arguing that claims concerning 
the essential nature of any people or culture are always highly 
problematic and in the case of the West defining the essential nature of 
the East, detrimental to East/ West relations. The insights and 
evaluations that I offer are not neutral, in the sense that I do not deny 
that I write from a particular cultural background, but they represent 
many years of interest in the nature of Western perceptions of the Arab 
Islamic East. Ultimately, these interpretations are subjective but are not 
mere speculation, they are shaped by the reading of a diverse range of 
academic sources, often of very different perspectives. Therefore, I feel 
that other readers, on encountering these or similar Western news 
reports would be able to perceive or deduce very similar 
interpretations from the ones I have offered. 
To place these events in historical context, the 1980s began with the 
Iranian hostage crisis and ended with an ongoing hostage dilemma in 
Lebanon with terrorist groups holding several American civilians 
captive. The period in between witnessed a multitude of ever more 
shocking terrorist strikes against the West. In 1983, for example, 
explosive-laden trucks blew up the American Embassy and us Marine 
barracks in Beirut, killing a total of 258 Americans. In 1985 Navy diver 
Robert Stethem was murdered during the hijacking of TWA flight 847 
in the early stages of a seventeen day hostage ordeal. A few months 
later terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and killed 
a wheel chair-bound New Yorker, Leon Klinghoffer. Toward the end of 
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the decade, a terrorist bomb caused the mid air explosion of Pan Am 
flight 103 and the death of 270 persons aboard and on the ground in 
Lockerbie, Scotland. These events show something of the background 
and the context of Western-Islamic relations in the decade prior to that 
which is the focus of the present study. 
In this chapter, the following three events are selected: Firstly, the 
assassination of Sadat, secondly, the hijacking of a Kuwait Airways 
flight, and finally the Oklahoma bombing of a federal building. The 
immediate reporting of the event is analysed in the same six chosen 
newspapers (Ihe Times, Daily Express, Daily Mirror, New York Times, 
Washington Post, and Le Monde). 
The aim of this chapter is to show how the image of the Arab world 
and in particularly the characterisation of the religion Islam has 
changed through the years by examining the way the press construct 
these events in the six Western newspapers. One assessment suggests: 
"At the heart of Western misinterpretation, stereotyping, 
and exaggerated fears of Islam is a clash of viewpoint. The 
stereotypes of the 'Arab' and 'Islam' in terms of Bedouin, 
desert, camel, polygamy, harem, and rich oil shaykhs 
have been replaced by those of gun-toting mullas or 
bearded, anti-Western fundamentalists. Western fears and 
antipathy are fed not only by media reports and recent 
events but also by an overlook on life which is often 
antithetical to that of Islamic activists" (Esposito, 1992, p. 
198). 
The analysis will assess this claim and introduce further evidence 
concerning the role of Western liberal values in the presentation of the 
argument about how Islam and Arabs are portrayed. 
Our interpretation of the three case studies will emphasise how salient 
the notion of terrorism, and more importantly its equation with 
Islamic fundamentalism, is within the Western imagination. We will 
turn towards a detailed qualitative interpretation of each of these three 
257 
Chapter 8 Qualitative Analysis 
events as they are portrayed or represented in the Western press. The 
portrayal of Islam and its equation with fundamentalism is examined 
in relation to the accusative nature of the Western press as it deals with 
the non-Western actors. Another central theme is the evident 
economic and commercial self interest of the West in its representation 
of Arab Islamic affairs. 
Therefore, this qualitative analysis will consider first how the value 
system of Western society organised a great deal of the presentation of 
terrorism in the Arab Islamic world. This will be done by examining 
words, sentences and paragraphs, in the news items in all the six 
newspapers. The analysis will also demonstrate which actors were 
focused on and the kind of discourse carried about Arabs and Islam. 
This will be achieved by noting the names of figures and other sources 
of news and highlighting statements attributed to them. 
The qualitative interpretation then, will follow the pattern of analysis 
given above. This takes the form of a "Self" /"Other" dualism, and it 
has been traditionally and continues to be the Western "Self" which 
has the power to locate and define the Arab Islamic "Other". In 
addition to its position of power, the West also perceives the Arab 
Islamic East as a threat, that is a threat that may upset existing power 
inequalities whereby the West is able to benefit economically. 
However, the specific area of concern for this thesis has been the 
shifting or mutating nature of Western characterisation of the Arab 
Islamic East. The romanticization of Arab Islamic culture that is 
present in many of the accounts of Western travellers and writers, 
explored in chapter two, is no longer a feature of Western media 
reporting of Arab Islamic affairs. These accounts exhibit varying 
degrees of hostility, distrust and even demonization. 
Therefore, we will observe below how the qualitative analysis affirms 
many of the central theoretical contentions of chapter three. The 
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chapter will offer a distinct critical framework, which will be developed 
through the qualitative data analysis, and which will apply the central 
dichotomies of "Self" / "Other" and "Romanticism" / "Demonization". 
This critical framework uses the above dichotomy as an approach to 
the description of the following four themes. Firstly, that the "Other" 
within the "Self/"Other" pairing, is never allowed to be self-defining, 
rather it is represented through the favoured categories of the "Self". 
Secondly, that these categories take the form of negative interpretations 
which tend to be circular or self-fulfilling. I recognise that since any 
case study is necessarily partial, selective and interpretative, it cannot 
finally demonstrate that Western press perceptions will always take a 
negative form. However, the press coverage analysed in this study 
seems to involve perceptions which are structured as follows; Arabs 
are always seen as Islamic, while followers of Islam are assumed to be 
fundamentalist, and therefore predisposed to terrorism. Therefore, the 
whole of Arab Islamic cultural diversity is reduced to the notion of 
terrorism in certain of the press reports. Thirdly, turning to the nature 
of the Western press, the concentration of ownership, reduction of 
state intervention and the hegemony of market considerations has led 
to the standardisation and homogenisation of representations of the 
"Other" in the Western press. In the case of representations of Arab 
Islamic culture, this stereotyping has hardened and skewed the already 
limited characterisations of the Arabs which circulated in Orientalist 
discourse. And finally, when faced with shocking or threatening events 
in the Arab Islamic world, the Western media is confronted by the 
unknown. It is, therefore, forced to secure its "Self" against the "Other" 
and this is done by drawing upon familiar media themes and 
stereotypes. Of course these four themes are interrelated and mutually 
reinforcing. 
But firstly, some literature on terrorism, relating it to Islamic 
Fundamentalism, will be introduced, and then evidence will be given 
through the development of the case studies to demonstrate how and 
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why such events have been constructed in the light of the approaches 
already discussed. 
8.3. TERRORISM AND ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
Noam Chomsky (1993) reveals that the explicit definition found in the 
US Code, international conventions, officials or quasi-official US 
documents, and other such sources, according to him, agree that: 
.. terrorism is the 'calculated use of violence or threat of 
violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or 
ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, 
coercion, or instilling fear'" (US Army Operational Concept 
for Terrorism Counteraction in Chomsky Archive, 1993). 
The goals, targets and methods, as Martha Crenshaw (1986) has 
observed differ from group to group and from incident to incident. 
Still, it is possible to construct a typology of terrorist goals and targets, 
especially if one views terrorism as the result of rational political 
strategies and not as the consequence of psychological forces that 
compel certain people to commit violent acts. 
It is essential to understand that there are three types of goals for the 
international terrorists: The tactical or short term, the strategic or long 
term, and the universal or overlapping. The tactical or short term goals 
are incident-specific, the strategic ends are peculiar to certain types of 
groups, and the universal objectives attempt to advance both tactical 
and strategic designs (See Chomsky, 1993). For example, a group that 
stages a hijacking and demands the exchange of its hostages for 
imprisoned comrades is pursuing a short term or tactical goal that 
might be achieved by one single action. It is conceivable that the same 
group has strategic or long term objectives such as winning national 
independence for people it claims to represent- surely an end that will 
not be achieved by one hijacking or bombing. Regardless of whether a 
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group manages to realise or further its tactical or strategic goals as the 
result of major acts of terrorism, it will get the attention of its target 
audience, spread fear and anxiety among citizens, and demonstrate the 
inability of a targeted government to protect its citizens. The leader of 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, George Habash, 
recognised early in his terrorist career that by committing violence "we 
force people to ask what is going on" (Crenshaw, 1990, p.18). 
Another influential definition of terrorism is the Orwellian, however, 
this is perhaps too cynical to take seriously; Chomsky (1993) has 
recommended that "terrorism": 
"is perpetrated by official enemies; terrorism that we or our 
clients conduct does not fall under the concept. Conceivably, 
a definition of that sort might have been employed in 
5talinist Russia ...... Note if we were to adopt the 
Orwellian definition, we would have to inquire no further 
into the doctrine of scholarship, media, and the 
intellectual community generally: it would be true as a 
matter of logic that terrorism is conducted by them against 
us. But there is a more interesting fact: to maintain the 
standard doctrine, it is necessary to adopt the Orwellian 
definition, the one we would ridicule if the commissars in a 
totalitarian state were to sink to this level'· (N. Chomsky 
Archive, 1993). 
What he meant by the standard doctrine system is by no means 
satisfied with the "manipulation of truth that devalues political 
language so thoroughly that no self-respecting commentator thinks 
twice about saying whatever words are most convenient" (ibid.,). 
Chomsky gives an example of The Times newspaper in the description 
of the official enemy. The 1983 bombing attacks on the American 
Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut. He defines international 
terrorism as terrorism crossing national borders, and continues to say 
that "We are to understand, then, that the victims of the terror (the 
Marines in Beirut) were in their own country and the Lebanese who 
bombed their barracks are outside invaders" (ibid.,). 
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His serious criticism, also refers to the current crisis in the Middle East 
between Arab governments and Islamists, as well as the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, which contributes to the increasing stereotypes of Islam as a 
violent, war-crazed religion. To begin with, there is the media's 
mistaken association of Islam and Muslims as synonymous with Arabs 
and the Middle East in which Arabs only account for 18% of the 
Muslim population world-wide. But "in Western eyes, any mention of 
religion, or talk of Islamic laws or institutions smacks of militancy and 
fundamentalism" (Sajjad, 1993, p. 85). In other words, in the Western 
imagination Arab equals Islam, Islam equals militancy, and therefore 
Arab equals militancy. 
The phrase 'Islamic fundamentalism' might conjure up to the non 
Moslem a string of disturbing images: masses demonstrating in the 
streets, book burning, and terrorism. By extension, Islam is seen as a 
threat to the Western world and democracy. However, a closer 
examination of the tenets of various fundamentalist groups may 
provide a different perspective. Dr. Hassan AI-Turabi (In a speech in 
Madrid 2nd of July 1994) claims that "fundamentalism is anyone who 
is faced with challenge, he is provoked and he responds by mobilising 
his energy. This is exactly the reason for fundamentalism, or the rise of 
Islam today. It is an immediate response to the Western challenge .... 
the Americans first called it fundamentalist because they have a 
fundamentalist Christian movement and they thought that this must 
be another reactionary, dogmatic, religious movement. Unfortunately, 
they know very little about it because Orientalist literature is about 
history, not about the current history of the Islamic world." 
Like Dr. AI-Turabi, John Esposito (1992), one of the few balanced non-
Muslim American scholars on Islam wrote: 
''The 'f' and 'I' words, 'fundamentalism' and 'terrorism' 
have become linked in the minds of many. Selective and 
therefore biased analYSis adds to our ignorance rather than 
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our knowledge, narrows our perspective rather than 
broadening our understanding, reinforces the problem rather 
than opening the way to new solutions" (Esposito, 1992, 
p.173). 
In identifying the "f" and "t" words, a distinction must be made 
between terrorism and fundamentalism. There is a great tendency to 
link terrorist or radical activities in the Middle East directly to the 
Islamic Fundamentalist movement. It is necessary, however, to clearly 
distinguish between such activities and fundamentalism as a religion. 
In addition, the mass media are also frequently blamed for fuelling 
increased brutality on the part of terrorists by allowing them greater 
publicity. In this view the 1988 downing of Pan Am flight 103, the 
hanging of the US Marine Lt. Col. William Higgins, a member of the 
United Nations peacekeeping force by his Lebanese kidnappers in 1989, 
and other terrorist spectaculars in 1980s were in part responding to the 
fact that "those who spill the most blood will make the biggest 
headlines"(Wilkinson, 1986, p.6). The argument here is that terrorists 
heighten the threshold of violence to assure the media coverage they 
want. Unwittingly, the media's appetite for superlatives, first, and 
records, encourages not necessarily more but increasingly spectacular 
and brutal incidents. According to Alex Schmid and Janny De Graaf: 
"Ordinary things done by ordinary people are not news. 
Extra ordinary things done by extra ordinary people are big 
news. Due to its moral value indifference, the news value 
system does not distinguish between the pro- or anti, it is so 
much easier to produce an extraordinary bad event than an 
extraordinary good event, the temptation to win access to 
news-making the easy way is real enough" (Schmid & De 
Graaf, 1982, p.21S). 
Islamic fundamentalism must be seen as a political and cultural, not 
just religious movement. Rather than assuming its emergence took 
place in the late 1970s and 1980s, it can be argued to have always existed, 
at least in potential form. However, in the recent period Islamic 
fundamentalism has defined itself in response to Western, or 
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primarily American cultural imperialism. The overriding aim of 
Islamic fundamentalism has been the preservation or transformation 
of a specifically Islamic cultural identity. It is therefore, not sufficient to 
view Islamic fundamentalism as necessarily anti-Western, it is rather a 
deeply rooted cultural response to increase Western imperialism, 
whether military, economic, or media based. The term Islamic 
fundamentalism developed, in the Western imagination from the 
political events in Iran in the late 1970s, and since that time the term 
has become generalised, particularly in the Western media, across the 
entire Arab Islamic world. This generalisation has greatly exaggerated 
the notion of terrorism which rather than being central to Islamic 
fundamentalism is in fact a bi-product. 
8.4. EVENTS 
8.4.1. 
Sadat 
The Coverage Of The Assassination Of President 
On the 7th of October 1981, President Sadat of Egypt was assassinated in 
Cairo by a group of Islamic Extremists who had hoped to stage a coup 
d'itat and declare Egypt an Islamic Republic. During the two hour 
military spectacular, Sadat had appeared relaxed, even jovial and was 
seen at times smoking his pipe. There was no indication he expected 
any trouble to occur during the parade. The assassins struck while all 
eyes were turned skywards to watch air force craft Mirage flyover head. 
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Newspaper News Item Picture Diagram/Maps 
Times 13 20 2 
Daily Express 1 1 18 0 
Daily Mirror 7 7 0 
NYTimes 18 24 2 
W. Post 16 10 4 
Le Monde 4 0 0 
Total 69 79 8 
Table 8.1: The Coverage of the Assassination (7th of October 1981) 
As a major event, news items had appeared in almost every page of all 
the selected papers. The material consisted of full coverage of the 
assassination, Sadat's biography, the peace treaty he signed with Israel, 
the sales of arms to Saudi Arabia. Most of the selected newspapers had 
covered this event extensively except for Le Monde. 
A brief introduction to the context in which this event occurred is 
necessary here. First, Sadat as a president of Egypt signed the peace 
treaty with Israel in 1979, in which he turned most of the radical Arab 
and Islamic world bitterly against him. Second, he was firmly opposed 
to the demands of the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups in 
favour of strict enforcement of Islamic law as traditionally interpreted, 
And lastly, he moved hard against the Soviet Union in which he 
changed partners for his nation from Moscow to Washington. 
This analysis will cover the following effects highlighted in the 
Western media after the coverage of the assassination of Sad at; the 
portrayal of Sadat, the portrayal of Mubarak, the notion of Islamic 
fundamentalism, the form of accusation, and finally the leaders' 
reactions. We will see here the separation in the news coverage 
between the Arabs and the West, or between "Them" and "Us". 
Further, effects that will be considered include the process of Arms 
sales to Saudi Arabia, the peace treaty and the coverage of Sadat's 
political activity. 
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8.4.1.1. The Portrayal Of Sadat 
The Times described him as "the peasant's son" who "tried to bring 
peace to the Middle East", "had many enemies", "An E&yptian Leader 
Who Signed a Peace Agreement with Israel"!, "He Went To 
Ierusalem". "Sad at no doubt had more enemies than Kennedy". He 
was also, by most standards, "a less powerful figure", "the leader of a 
small impoverished country rather than of a superpower". "The 
Courageous Man of Peace", and "straightforward and frank". "His 
simplicity, his calmness and his slight detachment from the day to day 
events which he cultivated enabled him to keep his eye firmly fixed on 
the long run of events". 
"But most important he was a humanitarian unafraid to make peace". 
"His courage and skill reaped a harvest of life for his nation and for the 
world". "Anwar Sadat was admired and loved by the people of 
America". "America has lost a close friend", "the world has lost a great 
statesman" and "mankind has lost a champion of peace". "He will 
remain in history as an example of courage, dignity and loyalty". He 
was "one of the too few men of peace" whose "vision and wisdom 
brought nations and people together". "In a world filled with hatred, 
he was a man of hope", "in a world trapped in the animosities of the 
past, he was a man of foresight", "a man who sought to improve a 
world tormented by malice and pettiness". 
The Daily Mirror praised him as "The Man Who Lived for Peace", it 
earned him a host of enemies in the Arab world". "He was a marked 
man after he launched his courageous peace drive with Israel". He told 
French reporter Robert Lacontre a week before his assassination 
"Terrorism is all around us. I shall no doubt be assassinated next week. 
The Third World War has already started but the world refuses to 
realise it". The newspaper described him as 'The President of Peace 
1 The underlined description refers to the headlines. 
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Who Predicted His Assassination", 'The peace loving president", and 
"the corner stone of the Middle East". "He was the first Arab leader 
with the courage to sit down and sign an agreement with the Jews". 
"He may be the last for a very long time". "Like other men of peace 
who sought to silence the guns, the guns have instead silenced him". 
He was "A Champion", "A Man Without Fear", and "loved the God of 
Islam", "the brown mark in the centre of his forehead came from 
touching his prayer mat five times a day as he bowed towards Mecca". 
The Daily Express chose to refer to him as "handsome, in a grandstand 
taking the salute of his troops". "From Peasant to President", "A Brave 
Man of Hope", and "A Firebrand Who became Champion of Peace". He 
was "the people's man" and "reviled by some of his Arab neighbours". 
"He kicked the Russians out of Egypt and forged new links with 
America". "He worked towards liberalisation through his country's 
Socialist system, raising the living standards of his people and 
encouraging foreign investment". "He showed an uncanny knack for 
bold initiatives throughout his 11 years of rule". He was "an Arab", and 
considered to be "more than a great man". He was "a glimpse of 
promise in a hopeless world", "a determined figure", and "had his own 
extremists", but "chose not to be pushed by them". "He was also the 
kingpin of Western influence in the Middle East", and "the man on 
whom the whole intricate peace process called Camp David depended 
for its very existence". He became "the implied enemy of 
Communism". 
Washington Post and New York Times gave considerable coverage to 
Sadat and gave him an image of "a very controversial figure", "a son of 
the fertile Egyptian soil", "his dark skin, he was ridiculed as the black 
donkey" 2, "the developing world's first media president", "a brilliant 
manipulator of the foreign press", "a soldier", "political leader" and 
2 His father was Egyptian and his mother was Sudanese. When he was a boy, he was 
ridiculed by Egyptian boys. 
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"world figure". He was "always the consummate nationalist", and 
"drove his country down new paths by the sheer force of his 
personality". But he was a "brave man", "a man of peace with a lofty 
vision of reconciliation", and "Was Key US. Ally". He was "one of the 
great fighters for peace in our generation", "a martyr to peace" and "an 
unpretentious man". "Sadat is irreplaceable; no successor can fill this 
void". He was "a man of destiny and courage who never seemed very 
concerned about his personal safety". 
In the New York Times, Fouad Ajami (as an Arab and a writer) wrote 
an article under the title: "Sadat's Tourney" in which he described him 
as "a conspirator", "a plotter", had become "King of the land". "From 
humble origins in the delta, he had climbed to the summit". "The man 
who once looked at the outside world with awe and resentment- the 
awe of the villager, the resentment of the bitter nationalist- would 
storm and charm distant capitals", "turned him into a great myth" and 
became "another pharaoh", "a father of the Egyptian Family", "A man 
with luck and guts", and "a lucky soldier", "a solid, pro-American 
anchor of stability in the Middle East". He was "commander of the 
military" and "a key factor in his rule", and he had a "facility for taking 
the pulse of Egypt's masses". 
While Eric Pace of the New York Times called him; "the Daring Arab 
Pioneer of Peace With Israel ", "a peasant born and brought on the 
basks of the Nile", "had many quirks". "He wore elegantly-cut British 
style suits, though even as president he liked to stroll around his 
native village in a long Arab shirt". "He never learned to dance", "a 
world martyr", "a prince of peace" and "An Extraordinary Man". "Mr. 
Sadat did not just make peace with Israel, he made himself the 
personification of it". 
This description shows something of the hostility felt by the Western 
media, when it encounters the sentiments which oppose the dominant 
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values of the West. This also applies to groups and values operating 
within a particular society as Chibnall (1977) has shown. Legitimation 
includes identification of "people like us" who carry the values of the 
democracy, civilisation, freedom of expression, tolerance, and 
moderation; and not the values of fundamentalism, darkness, 
intolerance, and codes of cruelty and rigidity with which the press 
identify Muslims. But in sadat's case, he co-operated with the West 
and became their friend. The images introduced by the newspapers are 
images which are not attributed to Arab leaders in general. sadat had 
clearly become a special case for the West. 
8.4.1.2. The Portrayal Of Mubarak 
The President-to-be after the assassination of Anwar sadat, Hosni 
Mubarak was described briefly in The Times as "a robust", "soldierly", 
and "optimistic man"; "whose wife is the daughter of a Welsh family 
from Pontypridd". He has also been "Mr. Sad at's chief link with the 
politicians in the party". He was looked at as the "man of decision". 
The Washington Post described him as "an able political operator with 
his hands on the levers of power", but also "not a sadat". Mubarak is 
considered to be " loyal follower of Sad at's policies, including the policy 
of peace with Israel". Though he is regarded as "sadat's clone", and 
"has shown himself as an energetic and practical leader", "a loyal to 
sadat's foreign and domestic policies", he is still viewed as somehow 
inferior to sadat. "He travelled to hostile Arab countries in an effort to 
explain why Egypt was entering a peace treaty with the Israelis". He is 
"a very moderate, impressive person" who was "not just a passive 
official but a direct participant, well involved and trying to solve 
problems". It was clear that "other Egyptian officials looked to him for 
leadership and respected him". Mubarak "has a reputation for easy-
going affability", and "has shown, on issues that troubled Egypt, a hard 
edge that allowed sadat to remain the detached statesman". 
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Similarly, the New York Times described him only as "Mr. Sadat's 
protege and closest ad visor". 
The second part of this analysis will examine the portrayal of the 
Islamic fundamentalism in the western press. 
8.4.1.3. Islamic Fundamentalism 
All the six selected newspapers had pointed out that president Sadat 
had many enemies, those who opposed to his rapprochement with 
Israel, Islamic fundamentalists and Colonel Qaddafi. 
Although senior Western diplomats in Cairo, The Times (7 October 
1981) suggested, "voiced concern at the rapid growth of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Egypt", there was a genuine feeling at the time that 
the president had become over sensitive to criticism and "may have 
over reacted". It continues to say that "he was firmly opposed to the 
demands of the Muslim Brotherhood and other activities for strict 
enforcement of Islamic law as traditionally interpreted". 
"There were no signs in Egypt of mass disapproval, and elements of the 
treaty were under constant attack from the left-wing and Muslim right 
wingers". "Islamic speakers were particularly incensed that any 
agreement should have been signed which left the Muslim holy places 
of East Jerusalem under Israel control". And "in a number of long 
speeches broadcast live on television" President Sad at lumped together 
right and left-wing politicians and "accused them of attempting to 
whip up discontent between Egyptian Christians and Muslim 
fundamentalists" (The Times). 
As mentioned above, Mr. Sadat was harsh toward fundamentalist 
groups, such as the Moslem Brotherhood and the Islamic Association. 
He banned both groups, calling them "illegal". He said that "he would 
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not tolerate mixing religion and politics and that these groups were 
using mosques to denounce him", 
In an offhand way, Sadat had ordered the arrest of "more than a 
thousand people in a massive crack-down on sectarian extremists and 
secular opposition elements to his regime", But it was obvious at that 
time that there was also speculation that "Muslim right wingers may 
have infiltrated the Army and plotted an uprising against the 
president", And as it happened, Sadat "died at the hands of a group of 
his own soldiers", 
The assassination were variably identified in the newspapers as 
follows: 
In Beirut, three different groups claimed responsibility for the attack. 
However, well placed sources in the Egyptian Army, who requested 
anonymity, said that the attackers, led by a lieutenant, were six 
members of an artillery unit. Two of them had died, one speared by a 
lance, while the remaining four were being interrogated last night. 
"The sources said that the men were members of a Muslim 
fundamentalist group", An anonymous caller to news agency offices in 
Beirut, however, claimed that the assassins were "free officers" 
belonging to an organisation headed by Lieutenant Saad AI-Shazli, a 
former Egyptian chief of staff, In a broadcast on Libyan television, 
Shazli hailed the assassins as "patriots" but did not himself claim 
responsibility for the attack (The Times, The Daily Express, The Daily 
Mirror, The New York Times, The Washin&ton Post and Le Monde), 
In addition one of the groups also claiming responsibility for the 
assassination was an exiled Egyptian opposition group identifying itself 
as the "Rejection Front for the Liberation of Arab Egypt", A previously 
unknown group styling itself the "Independent Egyptian Liberation 
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Organisation", also claimed responsibility. Another group, the "Front 
for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners", which threatened to 
attack "world figures" said in a telephone call that the Egyptian 
Liberation Organisation comprised "free Egyptians operating within 
the framework of the Front" (The Times). The Front has claimed 
responsibility for a string of bomb attacks against Palestinian targets in 
Lebanon in recent weeks. The assassination of sadat was carried out "to 
affirm to the world that he (Mr. Sad at) must keep his hands off Copts 
and Lebanese" (The Times). 
The Daily Express quoted Shazli, the ex-chief of staff to Sadat and once 
ambassador to London who declared: " Sadat betrayed Egypt and the 
Arab cause and allied himself with Zionism and imperialism. The 
violent measures Sadat took against his political foes should be 
returned by counter violence. Nothing was left for us but violence". 
In the immediate aftermath of the event, two main theories seemed to 
have evolved as the Washington Post had revealed in terms of its 
political implications and in the images it presented. 
"One is that the Moslem Brotherhood had found fanatical 
supporters in the military and was behind the attack. A 
second involves the reported claims of Shazli's group 
which would link Egyptian exiles, Libyan support and 
probably connections within the Egyptian military through 
Shazli. Although Shazli has tried to put together a 
broadly based coalition of dissident groups opposing Sadat, 
in April 1980 he also specifically denied that his group 
included the "extremist" Moslem Brotherhood. Some 
. sources here said a conspiracy within the military had to 
be a strong possibility"(Washington Post. 7/11/1981). 
If Shazli's group was indeed involved, it would indicate an entirely 
separate aspect of the internal opposition that had been building 
against Sad at's government, before and after the crackdown on the 
Moslem fundamentalists regarded as the most serious danger to his 
regime. Washington Post had reflected the view of the Egyptian 
authorities which have been investigating Shazli's organisation, and 
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the last prosecutor general charged that it had received $3 million from 
Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi via Syria and that: 
"all the Arab members of the anti-Sad at Steadfastness and 
Confrontation Front were backing it. The front, consisting of 
South Yemen, Algeria and the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation in addition to Syria and Libya, was formed 
following Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in November 1977. Its 
main objective has been to work for the overthrow of the 
Sadat government and block the Egyptian-Israeli peace 
process from going any farther. Shazli's group consists of 
dissident Cabinet ministers and journalists who are 
predominantly leftists, as well as some communists, 
according to the Egyptian prosecutor general, Abdul Kader 
Ahmed Ali. Among the many mysteries of today's 
assassination of Sadat is how the assailants managed to 
infiltrate the Army artillery unit in the midst of what 
were obviously stringent security precautions taken for the 
military parade" (Washington Post, 7/11/1981). 
The Washington Post, under the heading: Sad at May Have Had 
Warning Signs of Assassination Attempt, describes a number of US 
specialists, sifting through bits of information and claims of 
responsibility for the attack by an Egyptian exile group headquartered in 
Libya, and said they had no hard evidence at the moment nor any 
conclusions about who killed Anwar Sadat and why. The specialists, 
however, disclosed the following points: 
"During a crackdown in recent weeks by Sad at on many 
domestic foes, including Islamic Fundamentalists and such 
fanatic Islamic revivalist groups as the Moslem 
Brotherhood, evidence of planning for a coup against the 
Egyptian president was uncovered. Among the plotters, 
sources said, were some military people who had a 
connection to the Moslem Brotherhood (Washington Post. 
7/11/1981). 
Here we have shown something of the attitude of the Western media 
to Arab culture as characterised by the equation of Islam with 
militancy. 
8.4.1.4. Accusation 
The scale of accusation in the news media is similarly very 
considerable. After the attack, Washington Post described how 
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anonymous telephone callers to news agencies in Beirut had said that 
an extremist Egyptian exile group linked to Libyan leader Muammar 
Qaddafi had claimed credit for the shooting. But "unofficial Army 
sources said they believed the attackers, were part of a rightist Moslem 
organisation that was a target of a major government crack-down last 
month. The government made no comment on the identity of the 
assailants" (Washington Post, 7/11/1981). 
Then the newspaper underlined its message by accusing and using the 
unofficial army sources statement that "they believed the assassins 
were part of the "Gamaat Islamiya", or "Islamic Groups", a right-wing 
Moslem organisation, that was a major target of Sad at's crackdown. 
The majority of more than 1,500 persons detained were 
fundamentalists but there also were Christian extremists and leftist 
elements who had been increasingly critical of his peace treaty with 
Israel and his close alliance with the United States. 
One can surely conclude, from this data that the West believes Moslem 
fanatics threaten several other nations friendly to the West, in 
particular "Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Algeria" (Washington Post, 
7/11/1981). 
The same theme runs through the New York Times when it wrote 
under the heading "Assassins Portrayed as 'Islamic Fundamentalists", 
and it reported that the: 
"Reagan Administration officials said during the day that 
at least one of the six suspects in the assassination had 
links to an Islamic fundamentalist cult called Takfir 
walhigra, which reportedly had been formed in the 1980's 
to advocate 'sacred terror'. Five members of the sect were 
sentenced to death in 1977 for the murder of Mohammed 
Hussein al-Zahabi, an Islamic scholar and former Egyptian 
Minister of Religious Affairs. This sect is among several 
Islamic groups that had been critical of the secular tone of 
the Sadat Government. The President who had aroused the 
ire of many religious fundamentalists by signing a peace 
treaty with Israel, further antagonised them with his 
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crackdown last month against Islamic extremists and 
Egyptian's Coptic Christian minority". 
And in another article, under the heading, Who Murdered President 
Sad at? It claims that "Islamic fundamentalists" within the Egyptian 
Army was the characterisation offered by Secretary of State Alexander 
M. Haig Jr. to a group of senators. He mentioned discontent among 
some Egyptian officers with the peace treaty that Mr. Sadat signed with 
Israel. Reagan administration officials said "their information was that 
six uniformed men had taken part in the shooting, that three were 
killed and that the others were captured". The newspaper also reveals 
that "the government -supervised Egyptian press reported that 
Egyptian intelligence had uncovered anti-Government plotting by 
Soviet agents in league with Egyptian religious extremists, leftist, 
Nasserites, educators, journalists and others". 
Moreover the New York Times regarded the event as "probably the 
work of the Islamic fundamentalists who have been financed in the 
past by Libya, but whose opposition to Mr. Sadat stemmed from their 
own anti-Western ideology. Whether Mr. Mubarak tries to make peace 
with the fundamentalists or presses ahead with close ties to the United 
States and with the peace arrangements with Israel are crucial 
questions". 
8.4.1.5. Leaders' Reactions 
The assassination of Sadat threw the Middle East into turmoil and 
caused alarm in Israel and Western capitals. All the chosen papers 
show the West mourning a man of peace, while many in the Arab 
world rejoiced. As the Daily Express noted "there will be rejoicing today 
in the capitals of radical Islamic states that Sad at's outrageous 
experiment with peace may now at an end". "Such rejoicing will no 
doubt be shared in Moscow, for Sadat was the implied enemy of 
Communism". In Syria, people chanted "this is the fate of the traitor", 
in Tehran radio hailed "the death of a traitor and mercenary". 
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In the next section, statements will be compared between the "Arabs" 
and "Western" leaders or officials to show how the press had portrayed 
this event from two different perspectives. 
8.4.1.6. The Arabs 
The 22 nation Arab league which boycotted Egypt, and as all the papers 
had written on how they urged rebellion against Sadat believing that 
he had sold them out to the Israeli and it was the time that they wanted 
him out of the way. Under some headings, the commentary clearly 
exaggerated, with words such as "Sadat's Arab Antag:onists Salute his 
killers" or "Jubilation in Beirut", and firing their weapons into the air 
in celebration. Syrians danced in the streets of Damascus chanting "The 
traitor is dead". 
His arch enemy Libyan dictator Colonel Qaddafi called many times for 
his assassination. The Daily Mirror and The Times, reported that 
"Colonel Qaddafi the Libyan Leader, welcomed the assassination. He 
said Libya was not planning to intervene in Egypt but that his armed 
forces would be ready to do so if asked by the Egyptian Army and 
people". He said "Sad at's death had buried forever the hatred between 
Egypt and Libya". 
While "Mr. Yasser Arafat said: 
'This operation carried out by the great people of Egypt, 
though its courageous armed forces has proven that the 
Palestinian cause lives in the soul of this people who could 
not forgive the one who gave up Jerusalem. Have I not said 
that the flood when it comes will take away all the agents 
and traitors" (The Times). 
And Mr. Salah Khalaf the PLO security chief said: 
"shake the hand who pulled the trigger. We declare to the 
world that the yellow betting slips have fallen with the 
onset of spring to put an end to the policy of capitulation 
today Sadat, tomorrow (Sudanese President 
Nimeiry)." ...... Anwar Sad at, the mercenary dictator of 
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Egypt ... joined his old friend Mohammed Reza Shah" (The 
Times). 
In Jordan, Mr. Adnan Abu Audeh, information minister stated that the 
killing: 
"proves that any attempt at a Middle East settlement 
which ignores the Palestinian question is doomed to 
failure ... Any formula for a bilateral settlement which 
does not take into consideration United Nations resolution 
cannot result in a peaceful settlement" IThe Times). 
He hoped that all countries which had attempted to isolate the 
Egyptian people within the Arab world would go back on their 
decisions. 
The Washington Post quoted Salah Khalaf, known as Abu Iyad one of 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation chief Yasser Arafat's closest aides 
who declared "We shake the hand that fired the bullets". Anwar the 
"Tyrant and slaughterer", Ba'ath Party, Tewfik Salha, told the rally: 
"Traitor Sadat has met his inevitable fate, the fate of every traitor. Let 
all the other traitors in the Arab world expect that fate". Qaddafi was 
also quoted as warning Egyptians that anyone who takes "the path of 
Sadat will meet the same end". Qaddafi reportedly said that "several 
Egyptian military officers had taken refuge in Libya asking for mercy 
and forgiveness and Sadat's assassination should mark the end of 
tensions between Libya and Egypt". While Iran's state-run radio, in a 
broadcast monitored in Ankara, said Sadat was " a treacherous and 
mercenary pawn of Zionism and imperialism". In Paris, exiled former 
Iranian preSident Abol Hasan Bani Sadr said Sadat "abandoned the 
deep internal problems of his country to devote himself to external 
affairs, and he paid for it". Lebanese Prime Minister Chafiq Wazzan 
said in a statement quoted: "It is the lesson of history. The Camp David 
involved the Arab world in a series of divisions and conflicts allowing 
for continuous arrogance, arbitrariness and aggression. It inflicted 
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victims and destruction on Lebanon. It was Camp David which killed 
Sad at". 
The New York Times reported from the United Nations, that M. 
Allagany, the acting head of the Saudi mission, who expressed sorrow 
"that this had to happen at a crucial stage". Noting Saudi opposition to 
Mr. Sadat's policies, he said, "We hope that our sister country will 
rejoin the Arab states". An aide to Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, 
said "Sadat has fallen with all his shame, giving way to a dawn of 
freedom in Egypt," and the Libyan radio said, "congratulations to you 
noble and free sons who avenged, restoring your dignity". 
On the other hand, Sudan condemned the assassination and said that 
"Khartoum stood with the Egyptian Government against all forms of 
conspiracy, sabotage and aggression"(The Times). 
Mr. Essebsi, the Tunisian Foreign Minister said: 
"I am a Muslim. He is A Muslim ... even if we do not have 
the same appreciation of the (Middle East) problem. We 
pray for him'" (The Times). 
The Daily Express had interviewed Jehan Sadat who expressed her grief 
by saying: 
'"Anwar is my man. But he's his own man. There is a 
fearless, determined, lonely and dedicated part of him 
which even I can't touch. And I would never try to touch it 
or to stop him doing what I know he must and will do'". 
And finally, Mubarak stated (as the Washington Post quoted a part of 
his text): 
'"The leader was assassinated by an evil and treacherous 
hand, and although we have lost the leader ... we would 
not stop pushing the peace wheel in compliance with the 
mission carried by the leader'". 
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8.4.1.7. The West 
The Western leaders or officials had been portrayed, in the press, as sad 
mourning a dear friend. 
First Reagan stated publicly: 
"President Sadat was a courageous man whose vision and 
wisdom brought nations and people together. In a world 
filled with hatred, he was a man of hope. In a world 
trapped in the animosities of the past, he was a man of 
foresight, a man who sought to improve a world tormented 
by malice and pettiness." ..... "But most important he was a 
humanitarian unafraid to make peace. His courage and 
skill reaped a harvest of life for his nation and for the 
world. Anwar Sadat was admired and loved by the people 
of America. His death today, an act of infamy, cowardly 
infamy, fills us with horror. America has lost a close 
friend, the world has lost a great statesman and mankind 
has lost a champion of peace" (IheTimes, 711011981), 
And Le Monde added: 
"A Washington, le president Reagan s'est declare "tres 
emu" (shocked). 11 a declare: "11 est scandaleux et tragique 
qU'une telle violence frappe un homme qui symbolise le 
devouement a la paix" (LeMonde, 7/11/1981). 
The Israeli prime minister, Begin said sadly that "President Sadat was 
murdered by the enemies of peace" (Daily Mirror). While Washin&ton 
Post described Begin as "emotionally mourned the loss of one of the 
great fighters for peace in our generation". 
The Daily Express reported how Former Presidents Jimmy Carter and 
Gerald Ford warned of the consequences of Sadat's death. Former 
President Carter shed tears for his "best friend", in which Carter added 
that: 
"When I talked to leaders of some of the other weaker 
countries such as Saudi Arabia they publicly would 
condemn Sadat for his move toward peace with the Jews, 
but privately they expressed to me their administration for 
him and their quiet support... .. They know that stability in 
the Middle East is a prerequisite for their own survival. 
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Sad at's commitment (to peace) showed extreme courage" 
(Washington Post). 
The Defence Secretary Cas per Weinberger, speaking before Sad at's 
death said: "If anything should happen to him, it would be one of the 
most serious losses we could have because he's one of the most 
stabilising forces in that very volatile region" (The Times). 
As described in the Daily Express millions of Jews throughout the 
world filled synagogues to overflowing for "Kol Nidre", the annual 
service for their dead, "one name in particular will be on their lips: 
Anwar Sadat, an Arab". The American Jewish leaders who also 
mourned Sadat "he was a man of peace who pursued it courageously," 
Maxwell Greenburg, chairman of the anti-defamation League of B'nai 
B'rith, said Howard Squadron, President of Major American Jewish 
Organisation said the murder was "a tragedy for the civilised world" 
(The Daily Express, 7/11/1981). 
Therefore, in analysing the Arabs and Moslem leaders relationships 
with the West, Bauman (1990) argued that it is obvious that the 
opposite attitudes of "Us" and "Them" were very marked in the 
treatment of the news articles. It was viewed in a context of conflict 
between the "in-group and the out-group". The press classified the in-
group as the West which was defending Western values, and the out-
group as the Muslim groups upholding the value of "Islamic 
fundamentalism". Manifestations of this argument were framed in the 
form of the West versus the Arab Islamic world, freedom of expression 
versus Islamic fundamentalism, Western values versus Islamic values 
and so on. But who is responsible for the construction and the 
reinforcement of this state of oppositional values? Bauman (1990) talks 
about a body of resourceful activists, or professional spokespersons 
whose practices are responsible for the imaginary unity of interests and 
beliefs of a community, class, gender or a nation (in-group). This body 
could be a political party, a trade union, or governments whose main 
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aim is to try to formulate the discourse on the unity of the in-group 
which is in their ideology a benevolent unit as well as to try to 
construct the aggressiveness and evil deeds of the out-groups (Bauman, 
1990, pp. 40-50). 
The Western leaders and officials, in the news articles, had been given 
an image around the Western values of democracy and tolerance 
which were legitimate values threatened by the Islamic and Arab 
values of fundamentalism and violence. The "symbolic forms" of 
social and political1ife in the West in general were treated as superior 
to the cultural symbols of Islam and Muslims. 
To summarise, the findings show that the dominant Western values 
of Eurocentrism form the basis for analysis, specifically the way in 
which it treated the "Other" and how it presented "Itself". Where the 
news items had opened up the argument over the merit of Western 
cultural values, seen from the writers' and officials' perspectives, 
which defined the issue as the threat represented by Muslims and 
Arabs showing "intolerance" and "violence". In relating to the conflict 
between two opposing political and cultural values the Western values 
are conceived as superior to Arab Islamic values. 
8.4.1.8. Arms Sale To Saudi Arabia 
The death of Anwar Sadat threw all US policy in the Middle East into a 
state of instant uncertainty, and most immediately affected President 
Reagan's controversial proposal to sell five sophisticated AWACS 
surveillance aircraft to Saudi Arabia. 
Questions of Middle East politics persisted, "on one aspect of Mid East 
policy, the assassination served only to reinforce the administration's 
plan to sell AWACS advanced radar planes to Saudi Arabia", the 
White House immediately made clear. White House communications 
director David Gergen said to The Washington Post 7/10/1981: "In the 
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president's view this tragedy in no way lessens the urgency of the sale. 
In fact it increases the urgency". He rejected the view that Sadat's death 
underlined the instability of the region, saying instead that it highlights 
the need to strengthen moderate forces such as Saudi Arabia. 
'The administration sees the AWACS sale as an important 
component of its efforts to forge a "strategic consensus" 
among moderate, pro-Western MidEast countries, Its central 
idea, as described by Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr. 
is not to seek an alliance of these disparate and, in some 
cases, feuding countries, but to help them individually to 
resist threats from the Soviet Union ..... and to encourage 
their co·operation with US plans for defending the region 
in the event of a wider emergency ..... however, that scheme 
had stirred doubt and opposition from a congressional 
majority concerned that Arab countries receiving advanced 
US weaponry might use them against Israel and that the 
real threat to these nations comes not from outside forces but 
from their own internal political instability"<Ihe 
Washington Post 7/10/1981). 
There are good reasons to support the deal, and good reasons not to 
because "The $8.5 billion Saudi arms package, of which the AWACS 
planes are a big part, would fill the coffers of some United States 
defence contractors and help offset the $14 billion we're paying Riyadh 
this year for imported oil. Score a plus for the supply siders" (New York 
Times, 7/10/1981). 
What the episode had demonstrated was that the Reagan 
Administration thought that all it needed to do was to "defend 
American muscle. Muscle can do a lot. It is great for moving 
mountains. But it is not so great for repairing broken crystal. Like Mr. 
Sad at's presidency, the Saudi throne is a fragile vessel. Keeping it intact 
requires more than AWACS and promises of undying support" (New 
York Times). Here The New York Times is presenting its own critique 
of US Government Policy, 
In fact, there may be nothing that the United States Government, for 
all its pledges, could have done to keep that particular regime in one 
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piece. It may have been that the fight over the AWACS was about the 
competing power of the Israeli and Saudi lobbies. But behind that 
"grunt-for- grunt TV wrestling match is the more important reality of 
the commitment we have made to the Saudi monarchy. We have 
linked our own interests to its survival". At this time, President 
Reagan said that he would not let Saudi Arabia "be an Iran" or fall into 
the hands of "anyone that would shut off" its oil supplies to the West. 
The Western interest in the Persian Gulf then was to insure a steady 
supply of the oil they needed. Although less than 20% of the oil they 
used came from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. So long as they needed the 
oil, they would have a stake in the kind of regimes, that ruled in the 
area. And as the Washington Post described it "AWACS planes aren't 
the problem. They're only the symbol of what the problem is about". 
8.4.1.9. Peace Treaty 
Having discovered that the Soviet Union was unwilling to help the 
Arabs achieve military victory over Israel, and unable to help them 
achieve a peaceful settlement, Sadat drew the logical conclusion: "the 
Soviet card had to be discarded. The American card had to be played, 
and everything had to be staked on it" (The Times, 7/10/1981), also 
adding that "the most important, and perhaps the most enduring 
aspect of this achievement was that it formally acknowledged for the 
first time the legitimacy of the state of Israel. The significance for 
Israelis of the readiness of a powerful Arab country to recognise their 
right to exit can scarcely be over estimated" (ibid.,). 
The Western view was seen as The Washington Post had reflected it by 
saying "Sadat had three basic inclinations to remain firmly within the 
sphere of Western democracies, to work for peace and to alleviate 
poverty in his own country". 
"Sad at's peace initiative was so highly personalised, the 
new leaders may move away from that approach 
somewhat, not thrOWing it over but gradually turning 
toward sadafs original purposes ..... sadat never intended 
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"a separate peace" with Israel that did not deal with the 
Palestinian Problem. It remains to be seen whether Egypt 
under new leadership can move more forcefully on behalf of 
the Palestinians and restore the Arab consensus without 
destroying the still-delicate relationship with Israel front 
were the future of the negotiations on Palestinian autonomy 
and the scheduled return to Egypt next April for the major 
part of its Sinai territory lost in the 1967 war" 
(WashinGton Post),7 [10 [1981). 
8.4.1.10. Sadat's Political Activity 
Sadat's career as president was, in a way, one long act of faith: faith in 
the West, and particularly the United States, as potentially better allies 
for a poor and struggling country than the Soviet Union; and faith in 
the response of ordinary people in the Middle East. 
"Sad at had transformed Egypt, taking the country far from the old 
Nasser image of an imperialist nation destined to be the revolutionary 
pace-setter of the Middle East. Peace, he insisted, would bring stability, 
wealth and much- needed economic modernisation at home" (Daily 
Express, 7/10/1981). 
His two most extra-ordinary acts as leader were the decisions to go to 
war against Israel in 1973; and to go to Jerusalem, personally in search 
of peace four years later. 
Peace made it pOSSible for Sad at to draw close to the United States 
which provided military and financial aid. The US had poured well 
over £1 billion worth of the most modern arms into Egypt, and had 
opened joint bases. This included F16 supersonic fighter bombers, M60 
heavy tanks and Hawk missiles. While, being sided with the West, 
most of the Arab states had suspended economic aid and moved the 
Arab League headquarters from Cairo to Tunisia. To them, Sad at broke 
all chains. "He expelled the Soviet military advisors, revived the 
country's spirit with his bold drive across the Suez Canal in 1973, 
released thousands of political prisoners, liberalised the national 
economy, restored relations with the United Sates and in the grandest 
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gesture of all journeyed to Jerusalem to challenge Israel to make peace. 
Though a devout Moslem he never allowed religious considerations to 
affect his judgement of what was best for Egypt. Plotting the revolution 
that was to overthrow the monarchy in 1952, he rejected an alliance 
with the extremist Moslem Brotherhood because he and Nasser saw 
the Brotherhood's fundamentalist program as a step backward for 
Egypt." (The Washington Post and The Times). 
Under Sad at, as quoted in the Washington Post, Egypt had adopted the 
motto "Science and Faith" but his working policy was "no religion in 
politics, no politics in religion". But despite his claim to have re-
established the "rule of law" and transformed Egypt into a "state of 
institutions" that would survive a change of leadership, he never 
succeeded in creating a self-sustaining political system. 
He claimed that "Egypt was a democracy while the countries of his 
Arab opponents" upon whom he poured such venom as the "dwarfs" 
and "goatherds", when they criticised his peace policy "were portrayed 
as tyrannies and dictatorship" (The Times). 
He also considered Qaddafi as "a lunatic" and perhaps his bitter est 
enemy. The West had predicted "a significant chance of an Egyptian-
Libyan war" (Washington Post) in the wake of the Sadat assassination. 
"If Egypt seems to be winning, the Soviet Union and Cuban forces 
might intervene". 
Most of the resentment in the Arab world revolved around the fact 
"that Mr. Sadat had made himself an outstanding world figure, on who 
transcended the bickering and power struggles of Arab countries. There 
was some fawning in the statement, but also some truth" (New York 
Times). 
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In this section, we have analysed Western news coverage, in six 
newspapers, of the assassination of President Sadat in 1981. The 
principal actors, groups and themes involved have been identified and 
interpreted separately. It was clear from the news coverage that 
president Sadat was regarded as a special case for the West, that when 
assassinated he came to be seen as respected, honest and working for 
peace. This placed him in contrast with other Arab leaders and groups 
who were characterised as being warlike and untrustworthy. With the 
exception of Sadat, in this news coverage other Arab Islamic actors are 
regarded as "Other" or ''Them'' with all the negative suggestions that 
this involves. 
8.4.2. The Coverage Of The Hijacking Of Kuwait Airways 
The 11th of December 1984, the sixth day of hijacking, is analysed. This 
event involves some Lebanese Shiites led by a member of Hezbollah 
who had hijacked a Kuwaiti Airlines plane flying between Bombay and 
Kuwait. The release of the "Kuwait 17" (thought to be members of 
Islamic Jihad, arrested for series of bombings in Kuwait City) was 
demanded. After a few days, hostages were released and the hijackers 
were captured in Iran. The two American newspapers (Washington 
Post and New York Times) were concerned more with the state of the 
American hostages. The relationship between the US and Iran was 
deteriorating at that time and the main concern was to have the 
American hostages out of Iran dead or alive. 
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Newspaper News Item Picture 
Times 4 3 
D Express 2 2 
D Mirror 1 0 
NYTimes 2 2 
W. Post 3 3 
Le Monde 1 0 
Total 13 10 
Table 8.2: The Coverage of the Hijacking of Kuwait Airlines (11th of 
December 1984) 
8.4.2.1. Description Of Hijackers & Motives 
In an interview by The Times, Daily Mirror, Washington Post, New 
York Times, and Le Monde, Captain Harry Clark, the freed British pilot 
of the hijacked Kuwaiti Airbus described the leader of the hijackers, a 
man named Hassan as "absolutely psycho", "a killer", and "a crazy 
man". The hijackers, "speak Arabic with a Lebanese accent", 
"sometimes they behaved like animals and at other times they 
suddenly became very kind". They were "totally unpredictable". The 
hijackers said they had "performed their final rites and had strapped 
explosives near the fuel tanks", They were in their "early 20's dressed 
in modish Western clothes", "Two, behaved relatively politely; the 
third, apparently the leader, a large man with a squeaky voice, who 
took to carrying the plane's fire axe tucked in his belt, was excitable and 
bullying". "They would threaten them putting revolvers to their 
heads, They would take people from their seats, beat them all over 
their bodies, stub cigarettes out on their faces and all the time scream 
abuse at them in Arabic". "It was psychological torture" and "sheer 
hell" (Washington Post, 11/12/1984). "The hijackers took two Kuwaitis 
to the plane's steps and pretended to shoot them. But they dragged the 
men back inside, ordered them to lie still, ripped their shirts and 
splattered them with tomato ketchup". "The hijackers had threatened 
to blow up the Kuwaiti Airways airliner and "appeared ready to die". 
Le Monde described it as "Ultime menace", 
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They were "too well organised" (New York Times). Nobody on board 
knew what the hijackers main demands were. But the demand was the 
release of the 17 convicted terrorists held by Kuwait, three of them 
sentenced to death, who were jailed for roles in the suicide truck 
bombing of the American and French embassies in Kuwait a year ago. 
Those 17, mostly Iraqis, Shiites were affiliated with al-Dawa3 • Many of 
the group's members have been operating from sanctuary in Iran 
provided by Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini's Government. 
The storming of the plane was a "theatrical act" and a "camouflage for 
collusion". The hijackers were overpowered by a special Iranian 
securi ty unit. 
IRNA (Iran News Agency) said one of the security men managed to 
disarm a hijacker on the gangway and push him down the stairs. The 
two others entered the plane throwing smoke bombs and managed to 
disarm the remaining three hijackers without any bloodshed "within 
seconds". Other security men hidden under the airliner were reported 
to have opened fire. The hijackers were last seen leaving the aircraft 
with their hands raised. There has been little indication as to what 
would happen to them. US sources was sceptical about the way in 
which the hijacking was ended and Iran's role in the drama. 
8.4.22 Iran's Role 
On the hijacked Kuwaiti aircraft that settled on the tarmac of Tehran 
airport, two American passengers were murdered and the death of two 
Kuwaiti passengers was faked, while other passengers were faced with 
what wanton cruelty. The Times argued that "a waiting game is 
acknowledged to be often the best way of handling hostage-takers, and 
it can be granted that Iranians have superior knowledge of the mental 
state of Shiite fanatics" and "Iran's. treatment of its new prisoners 
3 An underground Shiite Moslem group that opposes the Iraqis Government of President 
Saddam Hussein 
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matters so much, not just in a retributive sense, but to the whole 
international community". "Agence France Pr esse", the French news 
agency, reported from Tehran that Iranian authorities said little about 
what they planned to do with the four hijackers who were captured. 
Adding to that the New York Times affirmed that "though much 
remains to be learned about the hijackers and their motives, it would 
be heartening to find that Iran is truly committed to resisting 
terrorism". The Daily Mirror was curious about the hijackers who were 
in custody and wondered whether they were being "treated as heroes 
on champagne and caviar". 
8.4.2.3. Cri ticism 
In its "opinion" column, written under the heading: Intolerable 
Fanatics, the Daily Express asked "Were the Lebanese hijackers abetted 
by the Khomeini regime, which is also Shiite- and equally fanatical? 
The Americans, Israelis and Kuwaitis have their suspicions." 
There is a big question mark regarding this quotation. It appears that 
the hijacking was by Lebanese Shiite terrorists, the passengers were 
Americans, Kuwaitis, British and Pakistanis, the place was in Iran, and 
the people who must be concerned were Americans, Kuwaitis, and 
English. Why did the Daily Express mention Israel? and how did Israel 
become a part of this event? The Daily Express is mirroring the British 
conservative ideology that is nationalistic and patriotic, pro -Israeli and 
highly suspicious of the Arab world. This is particularly demonstrated 
by the inclusion of Israel since there were no Israeli passengers aboard. 
The Washington Post quoted George Shultz, who had been making a 
case for pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes, saying that "a great power ... 
must bear responsibility for the consequences of its inaction as well as 
for the consequences of its action". 
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The New York Time's concern was Iran's promise to put the hijackers 
on trial and they first wanted the two surviving Americans back in 
United States custody. Also the newspaper addresses a number of 
unresolved questions, including these: 
"why did the Iranians wait so long to storm the plane? 
American experts say there were a number of opportunities 
for such action during the six days including at least one 
when most or all of the hijackers were outside the plane on 
the airport tarmac. Why would the hijackers ask for 
service personnel to come aboard to clean the plane if, as 
they said, they were about to blow it up? The request 
provided a perfect opportunity for Iranian security men to 
come aboard unchaIlenged ....... One official questioned 
whether the storming of the plane was a "set-up surrender" 
intended to save Iranian face and protect the lives of the 
hijackers". 
During this event, the main concern is to identify the image 
simplification that occurred and the cultural ideology of the West. This 
can be summarised as 1) Liberalism, Democracy & Freedom of 
Expression which is "Us" and 2) Islamic Ideology of Fundamentalism 
which is "Them". From reading the Western newspaper coverage it 
was clear that the West still regards itself as the centre of democracy 
and freedom of speech and that any country that does not demonstrate 
similar political principles comes under suspicion and Arab Islamic 
countries are interpreted in this way. 
In general terms the news coverage presented in the Western 
newspapers showed an overwhelming concern for the Western 
passengers, however, non-Western passengers taken hostage were 
completely ignored or excluded. Similarly in the interviews following 
the release of the hostages, it was only Western hostages whose 
opinions were recorded. These excluded "Others" included, in addition 
to Arabs, Pakistani and passengers from the Far East . Further the 
Western media declared, before the event was resolved, that the 
Western hostages must be brought out of Iran either dead or alive, so 
deep was the apparent hostility to Iran since the fall of the Shah and 
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the start of the Iranian revolution. It was also noted that some Western 
commentators were keen to draw in Israel into this hostage crisis. It can 
be speculated that the reason for this was that Israel might act as an ally 
to the West, since it is regarded as a friend in an otherwise hostile area. 
The ultimate aim of the hostage taking was the' release of a number of 
imprisoned terrorists in Kuwait. This aim was largely over-looked by 
the Western media since it had been completely ruled out by the 
Kuwaiti Prince Jaber Ahmed AI-Sabah, and also by former President 
Reagan. The fate of the terrorists remains unknown to this day, 
however sections of the Western media had assumed that these people 
were enjoying 'a champagne and caviar' lifestyle. 
8.4.3. The Coverage Of The Oklahoma Bombing 
During the course of undertaking empirical work for this thesis, the 
Oklahoma Bombing occurred. Although it falls outside (1978-1993) the 
time-span of the study, the event was so salient, striking and 
illustrative in the reactions and assumptions of the West about the 
Eastern "Other", it was felt that it had to be included. 
On the 20th of April 1995, a terrorist car bomb exploded outside a 
federal office building, collapsing the north face of the nine-storey 
concrete building, injuring hundred of workers, and killing at least 31, 
including 12 children who attended a day care centre. 
The volume of the coverage in the selected newspapers was strikingly 
similar. The three English newspapers (The Times. Daily Express. and 
the Daily Mirror) had carried the same photographs on their front page, 
which shows a rescue worker cradling a toddler injured in the blast. It 
was also noticeable that all the five newspapers described the terrorist 
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in the plural because they were almost certain that the work was by a 
group of terrorists. This also was confirmed in the headlines (two in 
The Times and one in the Daily Express). 
Relying heavily on reporters' on the scene descriptions of the bombing 
and its aftermath, the media recorded also the utterances of survivors, 
rescue workers, eyewitnesses, families and friends of victims, and other 
ordinary residents of the shell-shocked city. Otherwise, political leaders 
(Le. US president, the governor of Oklahoma, the mayor of Oklahoma 
City, members of Congress), law enforcement officials (from the FBI, 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and firearms, local and state police, etc.), 
rescue co-ordinators (from the Oklahoma City Fire Department, the 
area's medical facilities, etc.), and other public figures were the 
dominant news sources. Analysis and commentary were provided by 
the press themselves (reporters, editorial writers, columnists) and by 
experts in terrorism, trauma, and other fields dealing with the 
consequences of disasters. 
Newspaper News Item Picture Diagram/Maps 
Times 5 2 1 
D Express 4 4 1 
D Mirror 3 9 1 
NYTimes 9 15 2 
W. Post 8 12 2 
Total 29 42 7 
Table 8.3: The Coverage of The Oklahoma Bombing (20th of April 1995) 
8.4.3.1. After The Bombing 
Many questions were raised like "what kind of people are we dealing 
with here ... people who kill children?" (Daily Mirror), "What could be 
their motive to hurt that many innocent people?" As stated in the 
New York Times "It was an act of cowardice, and it was evil". 
Washington Post quotes Clinton saying "let there be no room for 
doubt. We will find the people who did this. When we do, justice will 
be swift, certain and severe", and the New York Times quotes Clinton 
saying "These people are killers and must be treated like killers", and 
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Attorney General Reno said "Federal prosecutors would seek the death 
penalty against the bombers". 
8.4.3.2. Suspects 
"The bureau issued an alert for three men seen driving away in a hired 
brown Chevrolet pick-up truck with darkened windows just before the 
explosion. The passengers were described as Middle Eastern with dark 
hair and beards: one was in his early twenties and the other aged 
between 35 and 38 (The Times). 
David McCundy, a former state Congressman, pointed to "Islamic 
fundamentalist activity in Oklahoma". He said in The Times "they 
have had recent meetings and conventions in Oklahoma, where they 
were inciting people to violence and terrorist acts. They are connected 
with groups such as Hamas, which have been involved in terrorist 
activities" . 
The blast was described as "Moments after the bomb it was like a scene 
from the Middle East", or as mentioned in the New York Times in the 
heading, "In Shock, Loathing, Denial: 'This Doesn't Happen Here" and 
moreover it adds "how can anyone have so little respect for human 
life .... It's not Jerusalem. It's not Baghdad. Its not Bolivia. Its 
Oklahoma". The Times adds "It was like Beirut: everything was 
burning and flattened". But it had hit the American heartland. As 
horrifying pictures of the destroyed Federal Building were projected 
onto television screens, reporters, and radio talk show hosts compared 
the wreckage with strikingly similar images of bombings that had hit 
US embassies in Beirut and elsewhere a decade or so earlier. There 
were also references to the 1993 World Trade Centre (WTC) bombing in 
New York and the four men, all Moslems, already sentenced to lifelong 
prison terms for the most devastating act of international terrorism 
that had so far happened on American soil. Moreover, when the 
bombing in Oklahoma City occurred, the trial of Egyptian Sheikh Omar 
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Abdel Rahman and nine of his followers was taking place in a Federal 
Court building in downtown Manhattan. The Islamic fundamentalist 
preacher and his co-defendants were charged with a conspiracy to bomb 
major buildings and transportation links in New York a few months 
after the WTC bombing. 
8.4.3.3. Accusation 
The accusation had appeared in the headlines. The Times, under the 
heading "Up to 250 Missin& in US Bombin&; Terrorists from Middle 
East head FBI's list of Suspects", and "US A&ents try to unravel 
network of Islamic Militants", While the Daily Express had this 
heading "Slau&hter of the Children: Moslems and Waco maniacs 
suspected over one-ton car bomb". 
No one had any idea who was responsible for the explosion. But the 
American authorities were believed to be concentrating their inquiries 
on the Middle East. All the newspapers quoted that the FBI was 
reported to have "been closely watching several Middle East groups in 
recent months and yesterday it asked the Pentagon to lend it ten Arabic 
speakers". 
The Daily Mirror quotes: 
"No 1 suspects were Islamic terrorists from the group which 
blew up New York's World Trade Centre in 1993 killing six 
people ...... One theory was that the bombing may have 
been the work of an Islamic group '" Last week a TV 
documentary on Islamic Jihad claimed that fanatical 
supporters of the group had formed an active cell in 
Oklahoma City. A group calling itself "The Nation of 
Islam" called a TV station 45 minutes after the blast and 
said it was responsible" (Daily Mirror. 20/4/1995). 
Three basic theories about who staged the bombing were formed in the 
newspapers: Muslim radicals; extremists who hated the federal 
government, including white supremacists active in Western states, or 
people seeking vengeance for the bloody federal assault on the 
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compound in Waco Texas of the Branch Davidian religious group. A 
number of law enforcement sources and private terrorism experts said 
that the bomb apparently used bore the basic characteristics of devices 
that Muslim extremists had detonated in such places as Beirut, 
Lebanon and Buenos Aires. One source, apparently close to the 
investigation said that the FBI had received claims of responsibility 
from at least eight groups, seven of which seemed to be of Middle 
Eastern origin. The New York Times reported that the FBI were aware 
of the "activity of Islamic student groups meeting recently in 
Oklahoma City, Dallas and Kansas City. Federal authorities have long 
feared that the groups may have had ties to a radical elements, 
including the militant Middle Eastern group Hamas. Leaders of Hamas 
and another militant group, Islamic Jihad, were among the speakers at 
an Islamic conference held in the Oklahoma Convention Centre in 
1992". 
Perhaps not surprisingly, most Americans concluded almost instantly 
that international terrorists had struck again within their borders and 
that Islamic fundamentalists were the logical suspects. More 
surprisingly, almost all terrorism experts consulted by the media 
pointed in the same direction. But as soon as Timothy McVeigh was 
identified as the primary suspect, the assumed foreign and Islamic 
connection fell by the wayside; suddenly, there was no doubt at all that 
home-grown terrorism, not the foreign variety, was responsible for the 
Oklahoma City carnage. 
The purpose of the coverage of this event directly after the blast was to 
identify the people who carried out this bombing. Conceivably it 
turned out to have had a purely personal purpose- an act of vengeance. 
But unfortunately the press had rushed into accusing Islamic groups 
who thought to have had a political motive as the World Trade Centre. 
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8.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The present analysis has revealed both the persistence of certain topics 
and themes primarily "Terrorism" and "Islamic Fundamentalism". 
However, it is also noticeable that over time there has been a change in 
certain stereotypes, some have been more resistant than others. As we 
have seen, there was a common presentation of the anti-Arab and 
Moslem image, many of these images can be seen as building upon the 
history of Orientalist images. It was apparent in the study of the 
Western newspapers that the historical ambivalence and the tendency 
to romanticise the East had been largely eroded, to be replaced by an 
increasingly hostile view. 
The treatment of the news items in the six newspapers derives from a 
major ideological determinant: this is the role of the dominant cultural 
values in organising commentary into the oppositional attitudes of 
two conflicting worlds; the Western world and the Arab Islamic world. 
The news items were involved in structuring an image of Islam and 
Arab Muslims which had its roots in the powerful myth of historically 
grounded images of the West as a nation of "liberty", "tolerance", 
"freedom of expression", "the home of free man", "the mother of 
parliaments" and " a civilised democracy" (Husband and Chouhan, 
1985, pp. 272-275). 
The cultural superiority of the West is a dominant theme in presenting 
the West and the East (Islam). Islam is represented in negative images 
and the Muslims are portrayed as fundamentalists who are threatening 
the values of liberal democracies. 
In comparing, the coverage of these three events and the images they 
conveyed reveals something of the ideological values of the West in 
general, and are very much strengthened in the central organising 
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ideas of these issues. The values of democracy, freedom of expression, 
tolerance, moderation, and secularism were all "legitimate and rational 
values" of the West opposed by the perceived "illegitimate and 
irrational values" of Islam which are centred on Islamic 
fundamentalism, Islamic punishment, intolerance, censorship, 
fanaticism, threat, and religious authoritarianism. 
Viewing Islam and events in the Muslim world through the prism of 
violence and terrorism has resulted in a failure to see the breadth and 
depth of contemporary Islam. Therefore, a "threat" news discourse was 
used by the press. It can be likened to the negativity criterion of news 
values. This adoption was noted on many occasions. The themes like 
Western hostages-taking, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism in 
the context of their representation of serious threat to the West and 
pro-West and Arab countries, are the sort of themes which 
demonstrate the "threat" discourse. The precise nature or 
interpretation of this threat has shifted and evolved over time. We 
noted in chapter two, the shifting of such characterisations, where the 
definition of "Self" and "Other" had once been made through religious 
terminology, and then literary imagination, the twentieth century has 
witnessed a hardening of Western attitudes to the Arab Islamic world 
in secular, political and economic terms. 
Esposito (1992) explained this threat as a belief which has been 
"informed by the impact of the Iranian Revolution, the spectre of its 
export, the identification of Qaddafi and Khomeini with world wide 
terrorism, the image of Anwar Sadat slain by Islamic extremists, and 
the denunciation of the West and attacks against Western installations 
and personnel by shadowy groups in Lebanon and elsewhere. Many 
watched and warned of other Irans or of radical groups seizing power 
through political assassination". He claimed that "many faces of 
contemporary Islamic revivalism tended to be subsumed under the 
monolith of "Islamic fundamentalism" which was equated with 
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violence and fanaticism, with mullah-Ied theocracies or small, radical 
guerrilla groups" (Esposito, 1992, p.209). 
The perpetuation of stereotyped images, misrepresentation about 
Islam, Arabs and the Middle East conflicts has been the main focus in 
this chapter. As far as the images are concerned, one final point should 
be addressed here. It is about Islam and Islamic movements which 
need not be seen as a threat but as a challenge. It is arguable that this 
challenge need not always result in a threat to regional stability or 
Western interests. Certainly those groups, whether secular or Islamic, 
who attempt to impose their will through assassination and violent 
revolution are a threat. Furthermore, as Esposito noted, many 
contemporary Islamic movements often appear to challenge the very 
principles of self-determination and intellectual and political pluralism 
that the West espouses. Therefore, populist movements that 
participate in political life constitute a twofold challenge. On the one 
hand, governments in the Muslim world and in the West that espouse 
political liberalisation and democracy are challenged to extend to their 
opposition and to minorities the very principles of political pluralism 
and participation which they now demand for themselves. All are 
challenged to recognise that democratisation is a process which entails 
experimentation and is necessarily accompanied by success and failure 
(See Esposito, 1992). 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
9.1. IMAGES OF THE ARAB-ISLAMIC WORLD IN THE WEST: 
HISTORY 
The first stage of this thesis attempted to elucidate a number of crucial 
historical shifts or mutations in the form of Western representations, 
understandings and discourse on the Arab-Islamic world or "East". We 
argued that the basic form of this relationship is structured by a 
"Self"/"Other" or "Us"/"Them" dichotomy, which has over the 
centuries, oscillated between the poles of Romanticism/Negativity. 
The second stage was to collect, classify and evaluate primary data 
relating to contemporary Western news reporting of the Arab Islamic 
world. 
Chapters one and two introduced and traced this general scheme of 
historical change beginning with the primarily religious engagement of 
West and East, exemplified by the Christian Crusades during the 11th 
century to a relationship characterised by expanding Western trade and 
travel to the East. This was followed by and facilitated the 
phenomenon of Orientalism which maintained and developed the 
"Self" / "Other" dichotomy through an exoticising or romanticising of 
East by West. At this pOint Western Romanticism and Western 
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Negativity can be seen as equally important characterisations of its 
representation of the East. The next crucial historical change in 
Western interpretations of the East comes with the shift from an 
Orientalism comprising both Negativity and Romanticism to a 
situation where Romanticism begins to erode and Negativity becomes 
hardened and in Said's terminology 'standardised' or 'homogenised'. 
Throughout this phase, the basic structure "Self" and "Other" is 
retained and the newer forms of Negativity are still refracted through 
Orientalist assumptions. 
Central to this shifting historical relationship has been the 
disappearance of a sense of reciprocity between East and West, that is of 
a kind of dual relationship between them. It has been argued that this 
reciprocal relationship was retained in the military struggles between 
Christianity and Islam and persisted in the accounts of Western 
travellers and traders. However in the nineteenth century an 
increasingly secular, scientific and rational West began to contrast itself 
with a superstitious, irrational and backward East. At this time, the East 
could appear as a mystical or spiritual "Other" that retained certain 
qualities recently lost in the West. By the twentieth century, 
representations had again shifted, with the West exaggerating the 
backwardness and irrationality of the East in increasingly negative and 
decreasingly romantic terms. This thesis does not wish to claim that 
the more positive, romantic and exotic images have been entirely 
destroyed. They continue to play a role, but have been severely 
restricted in favour of far more negative images. It is a reasonable 
assumption that the emergent media of the Western world have 
played an important role in constructing, standardising and 
disseminating these more negative views. 
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9.2. ORIENTALlSM: THEORETICAL ISSUES AND 
PROBLEMS 
Conclusion 
The precise role of the Western media in determining how the 
Western masses view the Arab Islamic East is particularly difficult to 
determine. The thesis has outlined a number of conflicting theories of 
the media, ranging from the Marxist to the Pluralist and the Free Press 
schools of thought. The study has tried to resist the tendency to view 
the West in crude or monolithic terms. Consequently, in presenting 
the functioning of the Western media as it represents the Eastern 
world, we have employed terms such as standardisation, skewing, 
reduction, simplification etc., rather than terms such as fault, distortion 
and lie. These latter terms seem to suggest that the West could 
somehow present a true or authentic East. The study found Said's 
approach to be useful in this respect. However, Said was criticised for 
failing to emphasise individual human agency and meaning creation 
in competing accounts of both East and West, and for overestimating 
the homogeneity of the West and the unity of the of Orientalism. 
Said's early work represents the beginning of what is now called post 
colonial studies. However, more recently Bhabha, Young, and Spivak 
have attempted to make post colonialism a more deconstructive 
discipline. In his later work, Said too has moved away from an explicit 
Foucaultian discursive approach. However the key contribution made 
by Said to post colonial theory was to apply Foucault's work on 
power/knowledge and the discursive production of "truth" to the 
critique of Orientalism. I have been influenced by this approach but 
wished also to pursue a broader and more idiosyncratic approach, 
focusing on historical shifts, cultural difference and the agency of key 
Arab Islamic figures, such as the actions of Sadat or Qaddafi for 
example. These have been analysed in chapter seven and eight. 
I have reviewed a number of critiques of Said and made clear which of 
the evaluations I agree with and those of which I do not. Specifically, I 
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regard Rodinson (1990) as having made some important points 
concerning Said's heroization and romanticisation of non Western 
intellectuals simply because they were supposedly oppressed by 
Western power. Recent works within post-colonialism or post-
coloniality, for example, Spivak has questioned Said's attachment to 
Foucaultian theory, specifically the attempt "to retrieve the lost, true 
speech of the silenced other" (in Young, 1991, p.165). Said has been 
criticised for being too political in blaming the West for all the 
problems of the world, and not political enough, particularly by over-
emphasizing the cultural and artistic manifestations of Orientalism at 
the expense of the political analysis of its effects. Throughout this 
thesis, I have attempted to avoid these problems by refusing to take 
political or ideological sides, specifically I have avoided trying to tackle 
"Islamaphobia" with "Westaphobia".3 
Further, Said has been criticised by Young (1991) for being insufficiently 
self-analytical or reflexive and for failing to provide an alternative to 
Orientalism. According to Young, the recent work of Bhabha and 
Spivak can deal with this problem by analysing minutely and 
reflexively, the position of the writer and the writing of any text. 
However, I felt that such an approach was not appropriate or suited to a 
study of mass media representations of Arab Islamic culture, 
particularly because I wanted to draw upon a wide range of historical 
transformation, indigenous agency and cultural factors in the 
interpretation and analysis of media representation. 
Further, I did not feel it was necessary to explore the intricacies of post 
colonial theory in greater detail because this thesis has throughout, 
emphasised the importance of the long-term historical and therefore 
pre colonial roots of Orientalism. In fact, I have argued that the 
3See discussion in the Times Higher Educational Supplement dated 24th of January 
1997 by an Islamic scholar Akbar Ahmed of Cambridge University. He adopt the terms 
"Islamphobia" and "Westaphobia" in order to demonstrate the dangers facing any 
intellectual who feels able to take or represent one side against another. 
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historical nature of the relationship between East and West must be 
traced back to the Christian Crusades and the earliest historical 
encounters. Here military and religious factors were central to the 
relationship, in particular the antagonism, perceived in the West 
between the religions of Christianity and Islam. It would then have 
been inappropriate for the thesis to focus in detail on contemporary 
theories of post coloniality at the expense of broader historical 
transformation that pre-dates the colonial era. 
In recent years, the Iranian revolution and the rise of Arab, Turkish, 
and other Islamic political movements upset Western stereotypes and 
undermined received wisdom by demonstrating the importance of 
religious and spiritual affairs in the East. Nevertheless, instead of being 
inspired to initiate a new and innovative discourse on Islam and the 
role of religion in modern Arab, Iranian, and other Muslim societies, 
many Western analysts merely revised standard Orientalist 
interpretations to accommodate these new realities. R. H. Dekmejian's 
Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, a study 
commissioned by the US. government, presents the whole expanse of 
Islamic history as characterised by fundamentalist eruptions endlessly 
occurring and recurring in the context of social crisis: " ... the causal 
relationship between spiritual-social-political turmoil and 
fundamentalist ascendance has been a recurrent pattern in Islamic 
history... "(Dekmejian, 1985, p.ll). For Dekmejian, the Islamic 
fundamentalist is a fanatic (he uses the Arab term mut'asib) who 
exhibits a severely pathological psychological profile. In Dekmejian's 
text we see a transparent wedding of simplistic Orientalism with 
unsubstantiated assertions based on modern psychology, sociology, and 
political science. This fusion of Orientalism and modern social science 
is not limited to the analysis of Islam. 
Equally of interest is the influential work of Samuel Huntington which 
reproduces many of the stereotypical images of Arab Islamic culture 
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while flattening the diversity of political events of that region. For 
Huntington, human history is created by the endless clashing of hostile 
civilisational "blocks", in particular "West" "East" and "East" and "Far 
East". These opposed cultures or civilisations determine the form of 
international relation. Huntington ignores the complexity and inter-
relatedness of human cultures, their cooperations and common 
agendas (Huntington, 1993, p. 22). Further Huntington has far too little 
to say about the globalization of the world and patterns of migration 
leading to increasingly multi-cultural societies. He does manage to 
question the hegemony of Western power, arguing that the world "will 
increasingly be de-Westernised and become again in which non-
Western civilisations are actors and not simply objects" (Huntington, 
1993, p. 48). However, it does not follow that "conflicts between groups 
in different civilisations will be more frequent, more sustained and 
more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilisation" 
(ibid.). It is not clear what the term "civilisation" is intended to 
represent nor how many "different civilisations" there are supposed to 
be. 
9.3. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The legacy of imperialism and Orientalism underpins may of the 
assumptions and stereotypes present in media reporting of 
contemporary Arab Islamic affairs. The Western media of course, play 
an enormously important role in structuring the views of its audience. 
It is hardly surprising that the media reflect and help to constitute 
Western ideological beliefs and motives in very general terms. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that the Western media 
present information as if it were neutral, objective and factual data. 
The empirical data analysis of this thesis has shown that Western 
media, particuhlrly that of the United States and the United Kingdom, 
look favourably upon conformity by Arab Islamic actors and groups, to 
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Western aims and ideology, while it negatively interprets non-
conformity or difference and divergence from its own belief systems. In 
short, the Western media is intolerant of the very idea of divergent 
rationalities which might be able to foster enhanced East/West 
relations on the basis of an equality. The mass media treatment of the 
case of President Sadat illustrates these points, since Sadat was widely 
regarded as a friend to the West, conforming to its expectations and 
demands. 
Further the empirical data of this study demonstrated the fluctuating 
levels of interest of the West in Eastern affairs, again according to its 
immediate self interest. Moreover, we have shown that the Western 
media tends to skew or exaggerate certain phenomena, while failing to 
report other events, in order to present the East as a violent and chaotic 
world that exists in sharp contrast to the smooth functioning of the 
West. The specific form or content of this image of the East, particularly 
since the late 1970's, has been influenced by the growth of "Islamic 
fundamentalism". In the perceptions of the Western media all Arabs 
are seen to be Islamic and all of Islam is taken to be fundamentalist. 
Fundamentalism is viewed as the product of an irrational and violent 
religion but it is also evaluated in secular and political terms. Hence, 
Islamic fundamentalism is exaggerated, standardised and generalised to 
incorporate the whole Arab Islamic region which then becomes a 
primarily political and economic rather than religious threat to the 
Western world. 
If we turn to the actual results of the empirical work, a number of our 
expectations were confirmed. In terms of newspaper coverage devoted 
to the Arab Islamic world, amongst the British newspapers The Times 
provided by far the most coverage. The tabloid newspapers, the Daily 
Mirror and the Daily Express, had little or nothing to say about the 
Arab Islamic world apart from the violent or catastrophic events such 
as the assassination of President Sadat and the outbreak of the Gulf 
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war. Coverage in these tabloid newspapers was frequently hostile and 
sarcastic, in particular by introducing a number of caricatures of Eastern 
figures. These images were consistently grouped around two themes, 
the first was the Islamic religion, often assumed to be fundamentalist, 
and the second was Arab oil wealth. Although The Times included 
greater coverage of factual material, this was still often characterised by 
familiar themes of Negativity. 
The American newspapers, Washington Post and New York Times 
demonstrated a more detailed interest in the Arab Islamic world in 
particular relations between Arabs and Israelis over the peace treaty, 
and during the Gulf War an interest in the supply of oil was clearly 
visible. Other important themes in the news coverage include the 
American sale of arms to the region. Here American economic self 
interest appears to condition its media interest in the Arab Islamic 
world. The French newspaper Le Monde demonstrated a considerable 
interest in French former colonies in the North African Arabic region. 
This clearly reflects the country's colonial history, however the French 
newspaper demonstrated far less interest in equating Arabs and the 
religion of Islam with terrorist action activities. Nevertheless, even Le 
Monde showed little ability to comprehend Arab Islamic affairs outside 
of the narrow confines of its own political self interest. Again we 
observe that the West is only able to approach or view the East through 
its own narrow self-interest, however, the West is clearly not a 
monolithic structure as the divergencies between British, American 
and French newspapers have revealed. 
While the highest scoring event of the data analysis was the Gulf war, 
by far the most frequent theme was terrorism (7.8% of all Western 
media coverage, in the study, of the Arab Islamic world, between 1978-
1993, was concerned explicitly with terrorism). This shows the scale of 
the shift from a Romanticism in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries to the Negativity of the twentieth century. Terrorism consists 
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of events and occurrences such as bombing, hijacking, coup d'etat, and 
assassination. All of these are shocking and violent and are used by the 
Western media both to generate sales and to present the Eastern world 
as threat, that is in terms that are skewed or exaggerated towards the 
negative. The empirical work shows clearly that economic and political 
events in the Arab Islamic world, particularly where violent or 
threatening, were emphasised at the expense of other possible themes 
such as Arab Islamic religion and culture. Each of the six Western 
newspapers showed very little interest in Arab cultural, artistic or 
literary achievements. 
The empirical work also revealed that a number of crucial terms were 
being constantly used in the Western media. The most frequently used 
terms were those of 'terrorist', 'threat', 'enemy', 'failure' and 'Shiite'. 
The interpretation of the use of these terms in the media reveals not 
only the negativity of the Western press but also its tendency to link or 
conflate violent or threatening activities with the Islamic religion. 
Individual Islamic Arab actors in these events would be referred to, for 
example, as "Islamic fundamentalist", rather than reference being 
made to their distinct nationalities or affiliations. While there is no 
necessary connection between the religion of Islam and terrorism, the 
Western media seems to forge a strong connection. Islamic 
communities, both within Western countries and in the East are more 
consistently vilified than would be tolerated of any other cultural 
group. 
Finally, in terms of the representation of Islamic movements (figure 8 
in Appendix 4) the empirical study has shown that these are portrayed 
in overwhelmingly negative terms. The most salient terms were 
"struggle", "enemy", "murderer", and "aggressive". The study also 
looked for instances of the use of positive terminology in relation to 
Islamic movements. These were shown to be extremely rare. 
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In summary, the findings of this thesis have confirmed many of the 
fears or intuitions that were held at the beginning of the thesis. 
Unfortunately, the tone of Western media representations of the Arab 
Islamic world seem to be becoming more negative and hostile. The 
situation seems to be worsening rather than improving. We will 
return to this issue below. 
9.4. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATIONS 
We must now ask why this is the case. What is it, specifically, about the 
Western media representations of the East, that bring about increasing 
negativity and the erosion of more positive images. Firstly, the 
historical-economic and political legacies of Orientalism and 
imperialism are important in setting up the background and context of 
the Western power to determine images of the Arab Islamic 'East'. 
However, these images have been shown to include both positive or 
romantic as well as negative and hostile images. The specific factors 
relating to the current and increasing negativity of images must then 
be looked for in more contemporary shifts and changes. Of great 
importance here, as this thesis has tried to show is the functioning of 
the Western media. The crucial factors here are the increasing 
concentration of the ownership of the media and their deregulation, or 
erosion of state control, in favour of privatisation and the competition 
between companies struggling for market share, the effects being the 
homogenisation, reduction and simplification in particular in media 
representations of the "Other". Secondly, and relatedly, there are 
specific kinds of news values that dominate in such a homogenised 
media systems, such as 'negativity', the preference for 'unambiguity', 
'elitism' and the existence of a certain 'threshold' determining the 
extent, importance or sensational nature of an event. As the Western 
media in this contemporary form has encountered recent political and 
social events in the Arab Islamic 'East', specifically instances of 
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terrorism and conflict, the Western media has taken such images as 
being representative of an entire culture. The diversity of the Arab 
Islamic 'East' has been forced into ever more narrow, homogenised 
and simplistic media stereotypes or models. The result is that the entire 
Arab Islamic 'East' can be made to appear backward, threatening and 
terroristic· . 
This does not imply that the Western media is unable to perceive 
certain national, regional or cultural differences and nuances within 
the Arab Islamic region. The data analysis shows for example, that 
president Sad at of Egypt was treated in a more positive way than most 
political figures of this region. However these differences or 
complexities tended to be broken down by the media into simplistic 
"Self" / "Other or "Us" / "Them" categories, president Sadat being 
accepted by the West as one of "Us". 
In short, the central argument, themes and findings of this thesis can 
be seen as reducible to the twin notions of threat and power. Over the 
centuries, the West has perceived the Arab Islamic East as a threat or 
potential threat. The precise form or manifestation of the sense of 
threat has changed and shifted over the centuries. Initially the threat 
was largely characterised in religious terms and later in military, 
economic and political terms. Where the sense of threat has become 
particularly marked, for example during times of increased political, 
economic or military sensitivity, Western notions of Romanticism 
had become reduced or marginalised, to be replaced by increased 
hostility or Negativity. Secondly, the West has always had the power, 
whether military, economic or literary-cultural to define the Arab 
Islamic East in the terms which most suit contemporaneous Western 
self interest. This power to define has been rapidly extended by the 
growth of modern mass media and the ability of the West to define 
recent political events in the Arab Islamic world has resulted in the 
increased levels of hostility and Negativity felt in the West. 
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These are the general theoretical contentions of this thesis. We have 
offered a reading which presents distinct historical shifts and changes 
in Western representations of the Arab Islamic East. The interpretation 
of our primary data shows how the contemporary Western media 
skews its reporting towards negative and hostile views. Current 
Western media coverage exhibits little of the Romanticism that was 
present in earlier Orientalist accounts of the East. 
Nevertheless, this writer does not wish to draw exclusively negative or 
pessimistic conclusions from the primary data. The future is always 
open to new development and transformations. For example, the 
effects of the contemporary media on the formation of images of 
various groups can be interpreted in a number of ways. Generally, 
current transformations in communication technology can be 
interpreted either optimistically or pessimistically. 
On an optimistic reading, since the future is characterised by 
globalization, the decline of nation states, of national boundaries and 
national identities; access to the media or ability to use the media is 
opening more and more to ethnic and marginal groups. The East/West 
division is being eroded and replaced by a complex network of inter-
relatedness. If the ideas 'East' and 'West' are breaking down, then the 
prejudiced constructions, biases, and skewing may also break down. 
On the other hand, more pessimistically, media communication 
networks are still controlled by a tiny number of multi-national media 
corporations. Rather than promoting greater freedom of expression 
and information, modern technology enables multi-national 
corporations to control and structure information even more rigidly 
than before. Many groups are permanently excluded access to global 
media networks. 
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Both these optimistic and pessimistic interpretations deal with 
contemporary information technology. For the optimist, this brings 
freedom of expression and liberation from national boundaries. For the 
pessimist inequality, exclusion and "Self" / "Other" distinctions have 
shifted but not disappeared. 
In my opinion, and relating specifically to Western media 
representations of the Arab Islamic world, the modern media is always 
able to recreate "Self" / "Other" dichotomies in times of difficulty or 
conflict, e.g. during a war. The global information network can actually 
help to create these images more rapidly and efficiently, it can restrict 
the diffusion of marginal voices through commercial, market 
imperatives and harden already negative suppositions into outright 
hostility. 
Although all the case studies date from the contemporary period alone, 
by drawing upon the historical investigations of Said and others, it has 
been possible to gain a general appreciation of shifts and changes in the 
Western interpretation of the Arab Islamic world. These sources have 
emphasised the Romanticism of Western accounts, whereas our 
primary data demonstrates the extent to which hostility has taken over 
from the former Romanticism. This researcher does not assume that 
her main findings are entirely unproblematic, nor especially that they 
represent a final and definitive account of the nature of Western media 
representations of the Arab Islamic world. The analysis and the 
interpretations of this study are intended to facilitate or open up a 
sense of the divergent, though not necessarily opposed rationalities of 
the modern West and modern Arab Islamic East and the mutual 
ongoing evaluation. We have stressed that we do not wish to take sides 
ideologically but to allow a space for independent research. This does 
not mean independent in the sense of neutral, objective or final but 
rather as a research strategy to strive consciously to avoid taking 
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political or ideological sides, that is the tendency to either support the 
West and to denigrate the East or vice versa. 
Linking these points to our theoretical stance and analytical findings, 
this researcher believes that it is necessary that the West learn to 
respond to Arab Islamic events not as a threat but as a challenge. 
Clearly if certain groups or individuals use violence as a means of 
furthering their aims, this is rightly seen as threatening behaviour. 
However, in many cases the West is not threatened but is rather 
challenged by a competing Eastern rationality. Drawing on the work of 
Esposito (1992) the West should accept the challenge of the Arab 
Islamic East in the spirit of pluralist, democratic participation that now 
forms one of the central principles of modern Western identity. 
9.5. SCOPE OF THE THESIS AND REFLEXIVE 
OBSERVATIONS 
This thesis has concerned itself primarily with Western interpretations 
and images of the Arab Islamic East. As a result the terms of the 
arguments have been necessarily general, although it has pursued 
greater depth and detail where appropriate. Since the concern has been 
with Western interpretations of the East, the thesis has not probed the 
precise historical, literary and philosophical context through which the 
West has established its own self-understanding. Similarly, the thesis 
has not attempted to present the truth of the East, that is an authentic 
or actual sense of what the East is but rather Western interpretations of 
it. Therefore it has not been necessary for this thesis to enter into 
highly problematic assumptions concerning the real or essential nature 
of the Arab Islamic East. It was very important to avoid making 
speculations of this kind since this thesis is concerned with examining 
the Western media's attempts to locate the essential nature of the Arab 
Islamic "Other". Further the focus of the thesis has been not the entire 
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East but on media representations of the distinctiveness of the Arab 
Islamic countries. 
Other possible approaches for a thesis of this kind may have 
encountered the following difficulty. That is, performing the criticism 
and evaluation of Western essentialist discourses (Orientalism) only to 
replace them with a new essentialism of the "real" Arab Islamic East 
which would repeat many of the suppositions on which Orientalism 
has been dependent. Our focus on Western interpretations of Arab 
Islamic culture and events does not involve such a difficulty. Similarly 
this thesis has stressed, repeatedly, that it does not wish to view the 
West in essentialist or monolithic terms. Such an approach might be 
labelled "Occidentalism" and might attempt to cast blame for all the 
world's problems on the West. Although Said has been accused of 
doing this, this researcher has certainly aimed to resist such an 
assumption. 
Another possible method for such a thesis would have been to 
compare the Western media representations of events occurring in the 
Arab Islamic region, with the Western media coverage of events 
involving Arab Islamic actors in the Western world, such as, the 
Salman Rushdie affair.2 However, a considerable amount of work of 
this kind has already been completed. Another possible approach that 
may have been fruitful but which could not be pursued here is the 
comparison between Western media coverage of Arab Islamic affairs 
with Arab media coverage of the same events over the same period. 
The constraints of time prohibited the development of such 
comparison, and then, in addition, this researcher did not find the 
comparative method of analysis attractive. It was felt from the 
inception of the study that greater attention should be paid to the 
2 See in particular the articular by Modood, T (1992) "British Asian Muslims and the 
Rushdie Affair" in Race. Culture & Difference. and in a recent thesis by Mohammed 
Mohsen (1990) The British Press Construction of Iran. 1979-1989. 
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lengthy historical and cultural shifts and mutations in the changing 
relationships between East and West. The concept of Orientalism was 
judged to be, at least in a modified sense, of crucial importance to the 
understanding of this relationship. Further, Said's approach to 
Orientalism, influenced by Foucault, Poststructuralism and a wealth of 
historical material did not favour a comparative approach between 
Western media representations of the Arab Islamic East and its 
representations of Arab Islamic actors and events in the West. 
Further, the works that were chosen for review and evaluation in this 
thesis were not always the latest studies, rather the thesis examined the 
most influential and widely established bodies of theory, in particular 
Said's Orientalism and Lerner's Passing of Traditional Society. Said's 
work in particular can be seen as instating a whole new field of 
academic inquiry and any discussion of western representations of 
Arab Islamic culture would be seriously impoverished without a 
discussion of his notion of Orientalism. Moreover, later theoretical 
developments of these works can only be understood through the 
appreciation of earlier studies. 
Concerning the empirical work, it may have been desirable to have 
included additional publications. However, in many cases such data 
was not available for the entire duration of the period of the study. 
Further, the extent of the data was already considerable and in order to 
remain manageable had to be restricted in this way. 
Finally, concerning the role of the writer and the writing of this thesis, 
I do not think it is possible to dispute Said's assertion that intellectual 
neutrality "is as illusory as that of intellectual objectivity" (Childs & 
Williams, 1997, p. 112). This suggests that the researcher's position as a 
writer is always involved in a cultural specificity. I have not deny that 
this is the case but I have found it essential to avoid taking political or 
identical sides, or at least attempting to suspend common place cultural 
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stereotypes. Lastly, I would support Spivak's calling for an increased 
emphasis on collaborative projects in order to move away from the 
idea of individual expert declaring the "truth". 
9.S. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
Turning towards future possibilities for academic research into the 
subject of East/West relations, it is important that the emerging body of 
work by Arab Islamic scholars on the East continuous to grow and 
exerts an influence on academic and particularly social scientific 
disciplines. A number of scholars (See Hisham Sharabi, Samih 
Farsoun, Lila Abu Lughod, 1990) following in the wake of Said have 
turned their attention to the academic discursive practices of the West 
in an attempt to loosen their grip or to allow a competing plurality of 
discourses both Eastern and Western. These attempts are grouped 
around a rethinking of historical and sociological truth-claims so that 
they do not operate in relation to a centre or to an origin, which is 
usually the developed West, (but could also be a developed East) but 
rather seeks an autonomous nature, that is an independent ground for 
renewed and reciprocal dialogue. Such dialogue could never be perfect 
or complete but would at least offer the possibility of improved 
relations. 
Rather than the West taking the view that it is uniquely developed and 
rational and exists in opposition to an undeveloped and irrational 
"Other" (even though that "Other" may be developing in accordance 
with Western prescriptions) it is preferable to think in terms of 
"divergent rationalities". The divergence of rationalities may be seen as 
a result of differences in tradition, cultural practices, and historical 
experiences, not of essential makeup or structure. 
315 
Chapter 9 Conclusion 
This thesis has focused on the historical conditions in which 
"Otherness" is produced in terms of ideologies or discursive practices 
which have the power to impose and define the "truth" of the "Other". 
Future academic research on the subject of Western representations of 
the East, or of East/ West relations in general, might turn to a 
consideration of the non-discursive aspects of the relationship, since 
prejudice is also experienced directly and emotionally as 'foreignness', 
'strangeness', 'hatred', and 'fear'. In our criticism of Said, and his 
Foucaultian influence, we argued that an emphasis on individual 
human agency, specifically native and indigenous agency was lost in 
this approach. There seems to be no necessary reason why a revised or 
expanded theoretical approach could not be developed, one that might 
incorporate the general and the particular, the global and the local, and 
most importantly the operations of discursive systems, like 
Orientalism, and native or indigenous human agency. 
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APPENDIX 1: News About Arab Affairs: Western Newspapers 
CASE NUMBER 
1 
AUTHOR 
TITLE: 
HEAD: 
SUBH: 
PACT: 
DAY DATE MON1H YEAR PAPER PAGE CL PAGE POSITION NO.VIS. 
T 1 I r T T I I I I 
AUTHOR LOCATION 
Arab News Agency D Algeria D 
Associated Press (AP) D Iraq D 
Correspondent/Reporter 0 Bahrain 0 
Diplomatic Correspondent D Lebanon 0 
Diplomats D Dubai D 
Foreign Editor /Editor /M. E. D Egypt D 
Foreign Staff/Staff D Jordan D 
Joint Correspondents D Kuwait D 
Local News Agency 0 London D 
Middle East Correspondent 0 New York D 
Middle East News Agency D Other Arab Countries D 
Military Correspondent D Other Asian Countries D 
Official D France D 
Other News Agencies D Saudi Arabia D 
Political Correspondent D Syria D 
Reader 0 T el A viv / Jerusalem D 
Reuters D Turkey D 
United Press International (UPI) D Washington DC. D 
Not Known D Not Known D 
Others D Others D 
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SUBJECT 
Arab Politics/Internal D Peace Movement D 
Arab Politics/International D Personalities D 
Arab politics/Regional D Religion D 
Culture/Education/ Arts D Science D 
Defence/Military D Sports D 
Environment/Ecology D Trade/Industry D 
Famine/Disaster D Others D 
Law/Crime D 
o ACTORS 
2 THEWEST 
USPres George us us us MH .. UK UK UKMP. Ch .. Eng Fee. Other 
Clinton Bu,h Vice "",. Del. Fig. PM FO State. West. 
Fres. H •. State 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
West West Carter Others SOy. SOy. Special Official Reagan 
Host Media Pees. Off. Advisor 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
ARAB COUNTRIES: 
GULF STATE FIGURES 
Saudi Pein Kuw. UAE Qatar Bahrain Oman Dip Fig. Mil fig. Pub/ 
Kuw Pub Others 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
EGYPT 
Mubl Sadatl Prime Del Police Publ 
Pres. former Minist. Min, Others 
Pres. 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
W PLO AND LEBANESE FIGURES!ISRAELI 
Arafatl Leb. Rabin Peres Begin Dayanl Others. 
PID Pees. Shamir 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS 
Hamas Hesboll Islamic FlS C.ama Hesb Fatah Islamic 
ah Jihad Islamia Mujahe Action 
""" 
Front 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
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OTHER ARAB FIGURES 
Syria! IraqI Jordanl lranl Iraqi Algeria Libyal Others 
A""d Sadam King Khorn. Political Qaddaf 
Hussein Fi. ; 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
INTERNATIONALiREGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
UN. Int.Red OPEC Arab Others 
Cross r...",e 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
OTHERS 
Econ. Milit. Diplom. Other Arab Foreign Analyst 
Experts Experts Experts Experts Spokes Spokes 
man man 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
GJ THEME/EVENTS 
Arab Detainees D PLO-Israeli Peace Process D 
Arab-Israeli Conflict D Political/Economic Reforms D 
Arab-West relations D Sanctions D 
Arms/Weaponry D Scandals D 
Civil War D Terrorism/Violence D 
Debts/ Aids D Western Hostages D 
Diplomatic Inter-Arab relations D D Middle East Peace 
Economic Inter-Arab relations D Israeli settlements D 
EconomicProblerns D OPEC Countries D 
Election/Democracy D PLO-West relations D 
Environmental Issues D Iran-Iraq War D 
Famine/Poverty D D Gulf War D Nuclear / Chemical weapons 
Iraqi Internal Affairs D Sports D 
UN Resolutions D 
Islamic Fundamentalism D Investment D 
Kurds Flight to Turkey & Iran D Aftermath/Special report D 
Law/Legal Suits D Others D 
Lockerbie D 
Military Actions D 
Military Inter-Arab Relations D 
Palestinian-Israeli Conflict D 
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MAIN COUNTRIES CONCERNED [I] Economic Factors D Algeria 
Bahrain D Attack on Foreigners D 
Egypt D Clashes D 
Iraq D Oil Reserves/OPEC Meeting D 
Israel 0 Scandals D 
Jordan D Setting Fire to oil Fields D 
Kuwait D Tourism D 
Lebanon D Arms Sales D 
Libya 0 Econorrricnegotiation D 
Morooco D 
Sanctions D 
Other African States D Aids D 
Other Gulf States D Poverty D 
Palestine 0 Banking D 
People's Dem Rep of Yemen 0 Flood D 
Saudi Arabia D Technology D 
Iran D Military forces D 
Syria 0 Others D 
Tunisia 0 Religious Factors 
Yemen Arab Republic D Clashes in Hajj D 
Others D Death Sentence D 
CLAssmCA nONS RELATED TO Adultery D MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES 
Shiite & Sunni D 
Political Arena MeccaMosque D 
Assassination D Ramadan Holy Month D 
Bombing D D Coup d'etat 0 Praying 
Elections 0 Applying Sharia Rule D 
Explosion D Islam vs. Christianity D 
Western Hostages D Islam vs. Judaism D 
Agreement D Zakat D 
Peace/Settlement D Others D Cultural Factors 
Cease-fire D Alcohol banned D 
meeting 0 Issue of Hijab (Women's dress) D 
Conflict D Magic D 
Prisoners D Treasure/ Ancient History D 
Intifada (Uprising) D Men's Wear D 
Invasion D Music & Dance D 
Others D Historical Background D 
Others D 
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CRUCIAL TERMS 
Activists D Annihilate/ destruction D 
Aggressive D Target D 
Barbaric D Failure D 
Cruel D Reject/Refuse D 
Extremist D Surrender D 
Fanatics D Explosion D 
Fundamentalist D Dictator D 
Guerrillas D Beggar D 
Kidnapper D Assassinate/Thug D 
killing D Traitor D 
Militant D Suspend / Eliminate D 
Moderate D Satisfactory / Good D 
Murderer D Crazy D 
Radical D Evil/ Corrupt D 
Rebel D Maniac D 
Shiite D Warning/Caution D 
Sunni D Fight D 
Terrorist D Sabotage D 
Threat D Odd/Strange D 
Optimistic D Demonstrator D 
Rally D Disoriented D 
Brave/Courage D Accuse/Guilty D 
Dignified/Honour D Trouble/Problem D 
Poverty D Mobs D 
Compromise / Jeopardise/Peril D Collapse D 
Demolished /Destroy D Notorious D 
Sceptical/Doubts D Slavery D 
Executed D Refugee D 
Attack/Enemy D Murabitoun D 
Arrest/ Legal Custody D Hijacking D 
Crackdown/Repression D Menace/ Tyrant D 
Shelling/Bomb D BaboonlJackal D 
Militia/Troops D Looting D 
Bloodshed / Massacre D Zealot D 
Madman/Insane D Phalangist D 
Struggle/ Attempt D Others D 
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APPENDIX 2: Informations Sur Les Affaires Arabes 
nombre du 
l' echantillon 
1 
Auteur: 
Titre: 
Gros Titre: 
Sous Titre: 
Traite: 
[jour Date Mois Annee I Tournal Cl. de Page Page Position No. de visuel 
I I I I 
Auteur Emplacement 
Agencede Presse Arabe D Algerie D 
Press Associee(AP) D Irak D 
Correspond ant / Reporter D Bahrein D 
Correspondant Diplomatique D Liban D 
Diplomates D Dubai D 
Redacteur D Egypte D 
Personnel Etranger D Jordanie D 
Correspondantsconjugues D Koweit D 
Agence de Presse Locale D Londres D 
Correspondant du Moyen-Orient D New York D 
Agencede Presse Francaise D Autres Pays Arabes D 
Correspond ant Militaire D Autres Pays Asiatiques D 
Officiel D France D 
Autre Agences de Presse D Arabie Saoudite D 
Correspond ant Politique D Syrie D 
Lecteur D Tel AvivlJerusalem D 
Reuter D Turquie D 
United Press International (UPI) D Washington DC. D 
Non Indique D Nonindique D 
Autres D Autres D 
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Politique Arabe/lnterne 0 
Politique Arabe/lnternationaie 0 
Politique Arabe/RegionaIe 0 
Culture/Education/ Arts 0 
Defense/Militaire 0 
Environment/Ecoiogie 0 
Famine/Catastrophe 0 
Loi/Crime 0 
nACTEURS: l2J L'OUEST: 
us George us us us Mil. fig. UK 
Pres. Bu,), Vice Sec Def. PM 
Clinton Pres. 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
Otages U. Carter Autres SOy. SOy. Conseill 
Quest Medias Pres. Off. e, 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
LES PAYS ARABES: 
LES FIGURES DES ETATS DU GOLFE 
Saoudit Off. Pub/ UAE Qatar Bahrein Oman 
Kow Kow 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
EGYPI'E 
Pres. Sadate Off. Defmin Police Pub/ 
Mub. autres 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
W OLP, FIGURES LIBANAISEsaSRAEL 
Arafatl lob. Rabin Peres Begin Dayan/ Autres 
OLP pres. Shamir 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
LES MOUVEMENTS ISLAMIOUES' . 
Hamas hesboll Islamic FIS Cama Hesb Fatah 
ah Jihad Islamia Mujahe 
d~ 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
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Accord de Paix 0 
Une P ersonali Ms 0 
Religion 0 
Sciences 0 
Sport 0 
Commerce /Ind ustrie 0 
Autres 0 
UK UKMP. Ch. Eng France autre 
FO Eta. 
ouest 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
Offidel Reagan 
Q A Q A 
Fig. Fig. Autres 
Dip. Mil. 
Q A Q A Q A 
Islamic 
Action 
Front 
Q A 
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LESAUfRESFIG ARABES· . . 
A""d Sadam King Iran/ Fig. Algerie Ltbye Autres 
Hussein Khom. Pol. 
d'Irak 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
LES ORGANISATIONS INfERNATIONALESIREGIONALES: 
U.N. Croix DPEP Ligue Autres 
Rcu e Arabe 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
AUfRES 
Experts Experts Experts L'autres Porte- Porte- Analyst 
Econ. Mil. Diplom. Experts parole parole e 
Arabe Etra~g. 
Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A 
GJThemes 
Detenus Arabes 0 Sanctions 0 
Conflit Israelo-Arabe 0 Scandales 0 
Arab-Ouest relations 0 Terrorisme/Violence 0 
Armes/Armernent D Otages de I'Ouest D 
Guerre Civile D 
Dettes/ Aides 0 Accord du Moyen-Orient D 
Relations dip. entre Arabes D Colonie D'Israel 0 
Les Pays del' OPEP 0 
Relations econ. entre Arabes D Relations OLP-Ouest D 
ProblemesEconomiques D La Guerre Iran-Irak D 
Election/Democratie D 
ProbJemes d 'Environment 0 Arrnement Nuc\eaire D 
Famine/ /Pauvrete D Sport D 
GuerreduGolfe 0 Resolutions des Nations Unies 0 
Affaires Interieures (Irak) 0 Investissernent 0 
Consequences/Rapport Special 0 
Fondarnentalisme Islarnique D Autres D 
Fuite des Kurds a en Iran et Turquie D 
Legislation 0 
Lockerbie 0 
Actions Militaires D 
ReI. Mil. entre Arabes 0 
Conflit Israelo-Palestinien D 
Processus de Paix OLP-Israel D 
Reformes Politiques/ Economiques D 
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LESPAYS CONCERNES: m FacteursEconomique 
Algerie 0 
Bahrein 0 Attaque en pays Etranger 0 
Egypte 0 Conflit 0 Irak 0 Industrie Petroliere 0 
Israel 0 Scandale D 
Jordanie 0 Mettre le feu aux gisements de Petrole D 
Koweit 0 Tourisme D Liban 0 Ventes d'Armes D Libye 0 N egociation Economique D Maroc 0 
Sanctions D Autres Etats Africains 0 Aide 0 Autres Etats du Golfe 0 Pauvrete D 
Palestine 0 Operations Banquaires D Yemen Dem Rep 0 Inondation/ deluge 0 Arabie Saoudite 0 Technologie D Iran 0 Forces 0 
Syrie 0 Autres D 
Tunisie 0 Facteurs Religieux 
Yemen Arabe Republique 0 Conflit a Hajj D 
Autres 0 Condarnnalion a mort D 
Les Classifications ontun raI!I!ort avec Adultere D les pays du Moyen Orient 
Chiite & Sunnit D 
Arene Politique Mosquee de la Mecque D 
Assassin 0 Le moi sacre (Ramadan) 0 
Bombardement 0 
Coup d'Etat 0 Priere D 
Elections 0 Appliquer le reglement du Sharia D 
Explosion 0 Islam contre Christianisme 0 
Les Otages de rOuest 0 Islam contre Juif D 
Accord 0 D 
Paix/Colonisation 0 Autres 0 
Les Facteurs Culturel 
Cessez-Ie-feu 0 Prohibition de I'a\cool D 
Reunion 0 Les robes des femme 0 
Conflit 0 Magique D 
Prisonniers 0 L'histoire ancienne/Tresor 0 
Intifada (Sou\evement) 0 Les vetements masculins 0 
Invasion 0 Musique & Danse 0 
Autres 0 Histoire D 
Autres D 
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Les Termes Cruciaux: 
Activiste 0 Annihiler / destruction 0 
Aggressif 0 Cible 0 
Barbare 0 Echec 0 
Cruel 0 Rebut/Refus 0 
Extremiste 0 Capitulation/Reddition 0 
Fanatique 0 Explosion 0 
Intt<griste 0 Dictateur 0 
GueriIJeros 0 Mendiant 0 
Ravisseur /Kidnappeur 0 Assassin 0 
Meurtrier 0 Traitre 0 
Militant 0 Suspendre / Eliminer 0 
Modere 0 Satisfaisant/bon 0 
Meurtrier 0 Fou 0 
Radical 0 Mal/Mauvais 0 
Rebelle 0 Maniaque 0 
Chiite 0 A vertissement 0 
Sunnit 0 Combat 0 
Terroriste 0 Sabotage 0 
Menace 0 Etrange 0 
Optimiste 0 Manifestant 0 
Meeting/Rassemblement 0 Desoriente 0 
Brave/Courageux 0 Accuse 0 
Dignitt</Honneur 0 Probleme 0 
Misere/Pauvrete 0 Foule 0 
Compromis/Peril 0 Ecrouiement/ Chute 0 
Demolir / Detruire 0 Mauvais reputation 0 
Scepticisme 0 Esclavage 0 
Executer 0 Refugie 0 
Attaquer/Ennemi 0 Murabitun 0 
Arreter 0 Detoumement 0 
Repression 0 menace/Tyran 0 
Bombarder 0 Babouin/ Chacal D 
Milice/Troupes 0 pillage 0 
Massacre 0 fanatique 0 
Fou 0 Phalangists 0 
Lutte 0 Autres D 
326 
Appendix 3 
APPENDIX 3: FREQUENCIES AND CROSS TABULATIONS 
THEME AUTHOR 
Agency Staff % 
Arab Detainee 17 24 1.1 
Arab-Israeli Conflict 75 54 3.5 
Arab-West relations 152 121 7.4 
ArmsiWeapon 49 51 2.7 
Civil War 101 95 5.3 
Debts/Aids 25 12 1 
Diplomatic Inter-A R 78 69 4 
Economic Inter-A R 23 4 0.7 
Economic Problem 38 32 1.9 
Election/Democracy 59 59 3.2 
Environmental Issues 14 9 0.6 
Poverty 11 3 0.4 
Gulf War 166 209 10.2 
Iraqi Intemal Affairs 52 46 2.7 
Islamic Fundamentalism 26 31 1.6 
Kurds Flight 26 32 1.6 
Law/Legal Suit 63 47 3 
Lockerbie 18 14 0.9 
Military Action 97 89 5 
Military Inter-A R 12 14 0.7 
Pal-Israeli Conflict 84 95 4.8 
PLO-Israeli Peace 26 41 1.8 
Politics/Economic Reform 63 75 3.7 
Sanctions 28 38 1.8 
Scandals 9 12 0.6 
Terrorism 171 115 7.8 
Western Hostages 107 87 5.3 
Middle East Peace 116 133 6.7 
Israeli Settlements 35 45 2.2 
OPEC Countries 47 28 2 
PLO-West Relations 30 13 1.2 
Iran-Iraq War 103 35 3.7 
Nuclear Weapons 44 38 2.3 
Sports 5 4 0.2 
UN Resolution 28 31 1.6 
Investment 29 10 1.1 
Special Report 27 13 1.1 
Others 215 51 7.3 
Table A1: Cross-Tabulation of Selected Themes & Events and Authors 
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SUBJECT AUTHOR 
Agency Staff Total % 
Arab Politics Internal 483 417 900 24.6 
Arab Pol~ics International 133 129 262 7.1 
Arab Politics Regional 121 101 222 6.1 
Culture/Education/Art 51 14 65 1.8 
Mil~ary 389 306 695 18.9 
Environment 13 10 23 0.6 
Disaster 25 10 35 1 
LawlCrime 259 199 458 12.6 
Peace Movement 167 190 357 9.7 
Personalities 44 40 84 2.3 
Religion 20 25 45 1.2 
Science 19 8 27 0.7 
Sports 5 4 9 0.2 
Trade/Industry 249 113 362 9.9 
Others 77 46 123 3.3 
Table A2: Cross-Tabulation of Subjects and Authors 
Author !Aggression Murderer Enemy Good Struggle Total % 
ANI'\ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AP 7 31 49 2 42 131 3.5 
Correspondent 38 99 204 33 272 646 17.4 
Diplomatic Correspondent 4 9 20 1 25 59 1.5 
Diplomats 1 1 0 
Editor 3 4 6 2 12 36 1 
5taff 3 5 1 9 18 0.5 
Joint Correspondent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Local News Agency 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Middle East Correspondent 0 0 1 0 1 2 0.1 
Middle East News Agency 14 26 40 0 14 94 2.5 
Military Correspondent 1 1 5 0 4 1 1 0.4 
Official 3 1 7 2 3 16 0.4 
Other News Agencies 16 38 105 1 1 208 378 10.1 
Political Correspondent 0 0 3 0 3 6 0.2 
Reader 1 8 13 4 1 1 37 1 
Reuters 19 45 64 2 48 178 4.7 
UPI 3 7 16 0 15 41 1.1 
Unknown 36 1 19 211 17 231 614 16.5 
Others 2 8 27 4 17 58 1.5 
Table A3: Cross-Tabulation of Authors and Crucial Terms 
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Western Actor Appeared Quoted Quoted & Frequency 
Appeared 
Clinton 23/.6% 61.2% 29 
Bush 167/4.5% 4/.1% 50/1.3% 221 
Vice President 12/.3% 21.1% 14 
US Secretary 244/6.6% 2/.1% 54/1.5% 300 
US Defence 83/2.2% 21.1% 17/.5% 102 
Military Figure 87/2.3% 91.2% 42/1.1% 138 
UKPM 92/2.5% 61.5% 98 
UKFO 63/1.7% 31.1 % 17/.5% 83 
UKMP 54/1.5% 11.0% 21/.6% 76 
Church of England 91.2% 3/.1 % 12 
French Figures 142/3.8% 4/.1% 24/.6% 170 
Other Western States 148/4% 2/.1% 22/.6% 172 
Western hostages 208/5.6% 331.9% 241 
Western Media 401/10.8% 7/.2% 22/.6% 430 
Carter 145/3.9% 11.0% 14/.4% 161 
Others 507/13.7% 261.7% 134/3.6% 667 
Soviet President 311.8% 31.1% 33 
Soviet Official 106/2.9% 131.4% 119 
Advisors 91/2.5% 15/.4% 37/1.0% 143 
Officials 531/14.3% 4811.3% 235/6.3% 814 
Reagan 182/4.9% 151.4% 197 
Table A4: The Frequency of Western Actors in the Selected Newspapers 
TOTAL OF FREQUENCIES 4220 
Arab Actors Appeared Quoted Quoted & Appeared Frequency 
Saudi Royal 271/7.3% 4/.1% 13/.4% 288 
Kuwaiti Royal. 84/2.3% 41.1% 88 
Kuwa~i Officials 160/4.3% 1/.0% 18/.5% 179 
UAERoyal 36/1.0% 41.1% 42 
QatarRoyal 11/.3% 21.1% 13 
Bahrain Royal 15/.4% 15 
Oman Royal 63/1.7% 31.1% 66 
Diplomatic Figures 93/2.5% 31.1% 201.5% 116 
Military Figures 22/.6% 11.0% 1/.0% 24 
PubliclOthers 161/4.3% 3/.1% 12/.3% 176 
Table AS: The Frequency of Arab Actors in the Selected Newspapers 
TOTAL OF FREQUENCIES 1007 
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Egypt. Actors Appeared Quoted Quoted & Appeared Frequency 
Mubarak 119/3.2% 201.5% 139 
Sadat 224/6.0% 1/.0% 24/.6% 249 
Officials 69/1.9% 21.1% 18/.5% 89 
Defence Minister 171.5% 1/.0% 18 
Police 16/.4% 21.1% 18 
Public/Others 203/5.5% 8/.2% 33/.9% 244 
Table A6: The Frequency of Egyptian Actors in the Selected Newspapers 
TOTAL OF FREQUENCIES 757 
PLO/Lebanese/lsrael. Appeared Quoted Quoted & Appeared Frequency 
Arafat 462/12.4% 1/.0% 58/1.6% 521 
Lebanese President 147/4.0% 1/.0% 14/.4% 162 
Rabin 95/2.6% 21.1% 28/.8% 125 
Peres 100/2.7% 1/.0% 31/.8% 132 
Begin 191/5.1% 321.9% 223 
Shamir 214/5.8% 1/.0% 45/1.2% 260 
Others 1185/31. 9% 18/.5% 386/10.4% 1589 
Table A7: The Frequency of PLO/Lebanese/lsraeli Actors in the Selected 
Newspapers 
TOTAL OF FREQUENCIES 3012 
Islamic Movements Appeared Quoted Quoted & Appeared Frequency 
Hamas 24/.6% 11.0% 25 
Hezbollah 70/1.9% 41.1% 74 
Islamic Jihad 39/1.1% 61.2% 45 
FIS 15/.4% 31.1% 18 
Gamaalslamia 3/.1% 1/.05 4 
Hesbomojahed 8/.2% 8 
Fatah 68/1.8% 31.15 71 
Islamic Action Front 2/.1% 2 
Table AS: The Frequency of Islamic Movement Actors in the Selected 
Newspapers 
TOTAL OF FREQUENCIES 247 
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Other Arab Figures Appeared Quoted Quoted & Appeared Frequency 
Assad 319/8.6% 161.4% 335 
Saddam 525/14.1% 2/.1% 17/.5% 544 
King Hussein 232/6.3% 251.7% 257 
Khomeini 254/6.8% 191.5% 273 
Iraqi Polnical Figures 317/8.5% 6/.2% 39/1.1% 362 
Algerian Figures 89/2.4% 28/.8% 117 
Qaddafi 214/5.8% 211.6% 235 
Others 749/20.2% 141.4% 196/5.3% 959 
Table A9: The Frequency of Other Arab Actors in the Selected 
Newspapers 
TOTAL OF FREQUENCIES 3082 
International Organisations Appeared Quoted Quoted & Frequency 
Ap~ared 
UN 420/11.3% 5911.6% 479 
International Red Cross 64/1.7% 11.0% 11/.3% 76 
OPEC 49/1.3% 11/.3% 60 
Arab League 84/2.3% 71.2% 91 
Others 25/.7% ·2/.1% 27 
Table AID: The Frequency of International Organisation in the Selected 
Newspapers 
TOTAL OF FREQUENCIES 733 
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Other Actors Appeared Quoted Quoted & Frequency 
Appeared 
Economic Experts 4/.1% 1/.0% 2/.1% 7 
Military Experts 64/1.7% 6/.2% 8/.2% 78 
Diplomatic Experts 58/1.6% 12/.3% 14/.4% 84 
Other Experts 18/.5% 3/.1% 2/.1% 23 
Arab Spokesman. 35/.9% 28/.8% 19/.5% 82 
Foreign Spokesman 65/1.8% 48/1.3% 36/1.0% 149 
Analysts 69/1.9% 4/.1% 13/.4% 86 
Table All: The Frequency of Other Actors in the Selected Newspapers 
TOTAL OF FREQUENCIES 509 
FREQUENCIES TOTAL 
Western Actors 4220 
Arab Actors 1007 
I Egyptian Actors 757 I 
I PLO/lsrael/ Lebanese Actors 3012 J 
I Islamic Movement 247 I 
IOther Arab Actors 3082 I 
International Organisations 733 
Other Actors 509 
Table A12: Total Frequency of all Actors 
Total = 13,567 
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Crucial Terms % Crucial Terms % 
Activist 0.8 Aggressive 4.1 
Barbaric 0.1 Cruel 0 
Extremist 3.1 Fanatic 1.2 
Fundamentalist 3.7 Guerrillas 7.3 
Kidnapper 3.1 Killing 16.5 
Militant 2.7 Moderate 0.7 
Murderer 2.9 Radical 2.1 
Rebel 2.7 Shiite 7.2 
Sunni 1.7 errorist 10.7 
Threat 10.5 Optimistic 1.4 
Rally 1 Brave 0 
Honour 0 Poverty 0.1 
Compromise 3.3 Destroy 0.2 
Doubts 2.2 Executed 0.3 
Enemy/Attack 21.7 Arrest 3.9 
Crackdown 0.5 Shelling 14.8 
Militia 19.1 Massacre 2.4 
Madman 0.7 Struggle 9.9 
Annihilate 3.6 arget 5 
Failure 5.2 Reject 13.4 
Surrender 0 Explosion 4.1 
Dictator 1.4 Beggar 0.1 
Thug 3.5 raitor 0.3 
Eliminate 0.1 Good 0.3 
Crazy 0 Evil 0.1 
Maniac 0.1 Warning 7.6 
Fight 8.6 Sabotage 0.9 
Odd/Strange 0 Demonstrator 2.7 
Disoriented 0 Guilty/Accuse 7.3 
Trouble 9.9 Mobs 0 
Collapse 1.1 Notorious 0.1 
Slavery 0 Refugee 5.3 
Murabitoun 0.3 Hijacking 1.8 
MenacelTyrant 0.6 Baboon 0 
Looting 0.1 Zealot 0.1 
Phalangists 2.2 Others 0.2 
Table A13: The Percentage of Crucial Terms 
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Theme % 
Arab-Israeli Conflict 3.5 
Arab-West relations 7.4 
ArmslWeapon 2.7 
Debts/Aids 1 
Diplomatic Inter-Arab Relations 4 
Economic Inter-Arab Relations 0.7 
Economic Problems 1.9 
Election/Democracy 3.2 
Environmental Issues 0.6 
Poverty 0.4 
Iraqi Internal Affairs 2.7 
Islamic Fundamentalism 1.6 
LawlLegal Suit 3 
Military Action 5 
Military Inter-Arab Relations 0.7 
Palestinian-Israeli Conflict 4.8 
PLO-Israeli Peace 1.8 
Political/Economic Reform 3.7 
Sanctions 1.8 
Scandals 0.6 
Terrorism 7.8 
Middle East Peace 6.7 
Israeli Settlements. 22 
OPEC Countries 2 
PLO-West Relations 1.2 
Nuclear Weapons 2.3 
Sports 0.2 
UN Resolution 1.6 
Investment 1.1 
Special Report 1.1 
Others 7.3 
Table A14: The Percentage of Themes Occurring in the Selected 
Newspapers 
Events % 
Arab Detainee 1.1 
Civil War 5.3 
Gulf War 10.2 
Kurds Flight 1.6 
Lockerbie 0.9 
Western Hostages 5.3 
Iran-lraqWar 3.7 
Table A15: The Percentage of Events Occurring in the Selected 
Newspapers 
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Theme T DExp. DMirr. WP NYT Monde Totall% 
Arab-Israeli Conflict 39 8 33 33 18 131/3.5% 
Arab-West relations 75 17 4 43 64 73 276/7.4% 
Arms/Weapon 19 2 4 25 33 19 102/2.7% 
DebtslAids 15 2 9 10 36/1.0% 
Diplomatic Inter-Arab Relations 39 3 29 22 55 148/4.0% 
Economic Inter-Arab Relations 24 1 1 1 271.7% 
Economic Problem 27 2 7 23 11 70/1.9% 
ElectionlDemocracy 31 14 34 40 119/3.2% 
Environmental Issues 8 2 1 3 6 3 231.6% 
Poverty 7 1 3 4 15/.4% 
Iraqi Intemal Affairs 28 3 2 18 16 32 99/2.7% 
Islamic Fundamentalism 16 1 7 11 23 58/1.6% 
LawlLegal Suit 36 2 7 31 34 110/3.0% 
Military Action 50 3 9 54 71 187/5.0% 
Military Inter-Arab Relations 4 2 1 8 6 6 271.7% 
Palestinian-Israeli Conflict 41 6 3 46 47 33 178/4.8% 
PLO-Israeli Peace 13 1 2 15 21 16 68/1.8% 
PoliticallEconomic Reform 25 1 16 16 81 139/3.7% 
Sanctions 20 5 4 12 15 10 6611.8% 
Scandals 4 1 8 3 5 21/.6% 
[Terrorism 93 17 9 41 69 61 290/7.8% 
Middle East Peace 80 2 3 47 74 43 249/6.7% 
Israeli Settlements 13 1 10 25 33 8212.2% 
OPEC Countries 22 6 1 12 24 11 76/2.0% 
PLO-West Relations 11 2 8 16 7 44/1.2% 
Nuclear Weapons 15 5 16 21 27 84/2.3% 
Sports 4 1 1 1 2 91.2% 
UN Resolution 20 9 17 15 61/1.6% 
Investment 16 4 19 39/1.1% 
Special Report 23 11 6 40/1.1% 
Others 109 30 32 24 26 47 270/7.3% 
Table A16: Total Number of Themes Selected in the Selected 
Newspapers 
Events Times DExp. DMirr. WPost NYT. Monde Totall% 
Arab Detainee 9 1 7 18 6 41/1.1% 
Civil War 49 5 4 34 50 56 198/5.3% 
GuHWar 78 37 18 101 83 60 377/10.2% 
Kurds Flight 14 3 1 11 10 19 58/1.6% 
Lockerbie 12 4 7 6 2 2 33/.9% 
Western Hostages 43 24 23 42 36 26 196/5.3% 
Iran-lraqWar 35 4 1 25 36 37 138/3.7% 
Table A17: Total Number of Events in the Selected Newspapers 
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[Theme 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
Arab-Israeli Conflict 13 1 6 20 37 12 11 7 8 4 1 1 3 5 2 
~rab-West relations 11 13 20 27 21 33 26 10 33 14 15 12 17 18 3 3 
Arms/Weapon 11 4 13 15 1 9 4 3 7 3 7 2 6 7 5 5 
Debts/Aids 1 4 3 3 1 1 1 1 5 2 3 2 6 2 1 
Diplomatic Inter-A R 10 8 10 5 11 21 17 11 8 8 8 5 13 7 4 2 
Economic Inter-A R 1 16 7 1 1 1 
Economic Problems 4 5 11 7 2 1 4 4 2 2 1 1 11 6 6 2 
Election/Democracy 5 9 7 9 12 8 7 2 4 3 8 4 6 12 16 6 
Environmental Issues 1 4 2 2 14 
Poverty 1 1 1 3 1 3 2 3 
Iraqi Internal Affairs 2 2 4 2 1 1 1 1 6 3 6 38 19 11 
Islamic Fundamentalist 2 3 5 2 4 2 1 1 4 4 3 4 4 3 5 10 
Law/Legal Suit 3 6 16 2 4 6 8 3 11 9 7 6 2 13 2 12 
Military Action 7 1 7 14 8 13 3 5 10 28 5 8 33 37 8 
Military Inter-A R 3 3 2 1 1 6 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 
Palestinian-Israeli Conflict 3 6 8 7 8 6 5 16 13 18 28 22 8 15 9 7 
PLO-Israeli Peace 3 4 3 3 2 8 6 7 9 23 
Politics/Economic Reform 9 7 7 24 8 5 10 9 7 5 11 9 9 7 7 4 
Sanctions 2 2 2 6 1 1 24 14 8 6 
Scandals 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 
errorism 11 9 9 11 14 17 16 33 58 22 23 4 15 12 15 21 
Middle East Peace 56 27 28 10 7 20 7 11 11 4 14 8 3 14 20 9 
Israeli Settlements 14 10 14 3 6 2 4 2 1 3 2 2 4 3 7 5 
OPEC Countries 4 3 11 8 5 5 3 14 4 6 2 5 2 2 2 
PLO-West relations 7 5 5 2 8 1 1 8 4 1 1 
Nuclear Weapons. 5 15 1 2 3 2 2 5 8 7 18 10 6 
Sports 1 4 1 1 1 1 
UN Resolution 2 2 1 1 2 1 3 4 4 12 10 12 7 
Investment 4 3 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 3 8 1 5 2 
Special Report 1 7 28 3 1 
Others 25 16 36 21 10 31 13 13 9 13 18 13 11 17 13 9 
Table A18: Number of Themes During the Selected Years 
Events 78 7S 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
Arab Detainee 3 1 6 3 5 8 7 8 
Civil War 3, 1C 5 11 3e 26 30 12 5 8 1 13 8 2 
Gulf War 1 213 15 5 
Kurds Flight 1 1 1 6 3 1 3~ 4 2 
Lockerbie 1 3 22 4 3 
Western Hostages 2 1 1 5 30 17 25 11 7 41 43 3 3 
Iran-IraqWar 1 23 8 9 8 18 11 20 21 16 3 
Table A19: The Occurrence of Events During the Selected Years 
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MCC Times DExp. DMirr. WPost NYT Monde Total/% 
Algeria 21 1 10 13 72 117/3.2% 
Bahrain 2 1 3 6/.2% 
Egypt 97 8 6 63 81 78 333/9.1% 
Iraq 180 47 23 150 140 157 697/18.8% 
Israel 218 22 10 183 254 181 868/23.4% 
Jordan 36 6 3 35 32 19 131/3.5% 
Kuwait 64 9 13 30 28 26 170/4.6% 
Lebanon 147 25 13 120 119 169 593/16.0% 
Libya 46 19 12 39 44 29 189/5.1 % 
Morocco 9 2 12 46 69/1.9% 
Other Afr.St. 19 1 1 4 9 21 55/1.5% 
Other Gulf St. 66 6 1 7 1 1 9 10012.7% 
Palestine 109 22 13 144 142 116 546/14.8% 
PDR Yemen 4 6 3 10 23/.6% 
Saudi Arabia 58 23 17 57 64 43 26217.1% 
Iran 31 6 7 41 40 44 169/4.6% 
Syria 57 6 3 42 45 52 205/5.5% 
unisia 12 2 4 55 73/2.0% 
YemenAR 2 8 2 10 221.6% 
Others 91 71 52 224 130 124 692/18.6% 
Table A20: Main Countries Reported in the Newspapers 
Subject Times DExp. DMirr. WPost NYT. Monde Total % 
AP Internal 239 39 9 130 167 328 912 14.6 
AP Int'l 91 17 1 1 67 43 34 263 7.1 
AP Regional 44 4 3 70 39 65 225 6.1 
Cult/Educ/ Art 21 6 2 9 11 17 66 1.8 
Military 162 39 1 1 120 207 161 700 18.9 
Environment 8 1 1 3 7 3 23 0.6 
Disaster 15 2 5 8 6 36 1 
Law/Crime 151 25 27 72 107 84 466 12.6 
Peace Move. 95 2 6 70 122 64 359 9.7 
Personalities 23 10 3 20 20 9 85 2.3 
Religion 14 1 1 1 1 1 9 46 1.2 
Science 1 1 1 3 3 5 4 27 0.7 
Sports 4 1 1 1 2 9 0.2 
rrrade/lndust .. 149 26 13 46 67 65 366 9.9 
Others 33 7 18 26 16 24 124 3.3 
Table A21: Main Subjects Occurring in the Newspapers 
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APPENDIX 4 : SELECTED FIGURES 
% 
Total 
Le Monde 
NYTimes 
W. Post 
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DExpress 
Times 
0% 50% 
Appendi:.c 4 
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100% 
Figure 1: Authors (Staff & Agency) in the selected newspapers 
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Technology 
o Flood 
• Banking 
• Poverty 
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• Econ. Neg. 
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o Scandals 
Figure 2: Economic factors occurring in the selected newspapers 
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NYT 
WPost 
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• Zakat 
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• Islam vs Chris. 
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• Praying 
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Appelldix 4 
Figure 3: Religious Factors Occuring in the Selected Newspapers 
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Figure 4: Cultural Factors Occuring in the Selected Newspapers 
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Monde 
NYT 
WPost 
OMirr . 
OExp. 
Times 
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• Conflict 
EJ Meeting 
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Appendix 4 
Figure 5: Political Factors Occuring in the Selected Newspapers 
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Figure 6: Portrayal of Islamic Fundamentalism in relation with Terrorism 
in the Six Western Newspapers 
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Figure 7: News about Islamic Fundamenta lism related to Terrorism 
through the Sixteen Years 
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Figure 8: Crucial Terms Portraying Islamic Movements in the Selected 
Newspapers 
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